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Abstract 
 
This thesis is empirically grounded in New Zealand’s restructuring of unemployment 
and taxation policy in the 1980s and 1990s.  Theoretically it is inspired by a post-
Marxist discourse analytical approach that focuses on discourses as political 
strategies.  This approach has made it possible, through an analysis of changing 
citizenship discourses, to understand how the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s 
citizenship regime proceeded via debate and struggle over unemployment and 
taxation policy.   
 
Debates over unemployment and taxation in New Zealand during the 1980s and 
1990s reconfigured the targets of policy and re-ordered social antagonism, 
establishing a neoliberal citizenship regime and centring political problematic.  This 
construction of a neoliberal citizenship regime involved re-specifying the targets of 
public policy as consumers and taxpayers.  In exploring the hegemonic discourse 
strategies of the Fourth Labour Government and the subsequent National-led 
governments of the 1990s, this thesis traces the process of reconfiguring citizen 
subjectivity initially as ‘social consumers’ and participants in a coalition of 
minorities, and subsequently as universal taxpayers in antagonistic relation to 
unemployed beneficiaries.  These changes are related back to key discursive events in 
New Zealand’s recent social policy history as well as to shifts in the discourses of 
politicians that address the nature of the public interest and the targets of social 
policy.   
 
I argue that this neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s citizenship regime was the 
outcome of the hegemonic articulatory discourse strategies of governing parties in the 
1980s and 1990s.  Struggles between government administrations and citizen-based 
social movement groups were articulated to the neoliberal project.  I also argue that in 
the late 1990s, discursive struggle between the dominant parties to define themselves 
in difference from each other reveals both the ‘de’contestation of a set of neoliberal 
ii 
policy prescriptions, underscoring the neoliberal political problematic, and the 
privileging of a contributing taxpayer identity as the source of political legitimacy.   
 
This study shows that the dynamics of discursive struggle matter and demonstrates 
how the outcomes of discursive struggle direct policy change.  In particular, it 
establishes how neoliberal discourse strategies evolved from political discourses in 
competition with other discourses to become the hegemonic political problematic 
underscoring institutional practice and policy development.    
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Constructing a neoliberal citizenship regime in New Zealand 
1980-2000 
 
Introduction 
 
New Zealand’s taxation and unemployment policies were radically reformed in the 
1980s and 1990s, challenging established discourses and practices of citizenship.  
The rationale for New Zealand’s radical restructuring was to improve the efficiency 
of the economy by encouraging the market allocation of resources and incomes.  
Market or market-like regulation was therefore steadily introduced into policy areas 
that were previously considered within the ambit of state regulation.  In this context, 
discourses of ‘unemployment’ and ‘taxation’—both issues central to the 
restructuring—broke out of specialist enclaves and became the focus of broad 
political debate (Higgins, 1997; New Zealand Planning Council, 1980, 1981a, 
1981b).  Changes to policies in these areas sought to significantly challenge the 
previous citizenship regime which emphasised the policies of full employment and 
taxation credits (Belgrave, 2004, p.32; Castles, 1985).  Despite the significance of 
this issue, however, little or no scholarly attention has been given to a discursive 
analysis of the links between the restructuring of taxation and unemployment policies 
and changing forms of citizen representation in political discourse.   
 
The neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s citizenship regime and political problematic 
was the outcome of a complex of discursive struggles over ideology that took place in 
numerous sites at the interface between state, economy and civil society.  This thesis 
focuses on the political dimensions of New Zealand’s process of neoliberalisation and 
1 
for this reason concentrates on struggles between governing administrations and 
Opposition parties in the political field and between governing administrations and 
citizen-based counter-hegemonic groups.  It draws attention to the political and 
discursive processes through which citizen subject positions are constructed, 
contested and renegotiated.  A subject position is a discourse of the subject that 
speaks to the position of the subject in social, economic and political relations.  The 
theory of subject positions stems from Althusser’s (1971) critique of the view that the 
subject is the source of his/her own actions and beliefs.  Instead, he argued that 
subjects are discursively constructed, hailed or interpellated.  In other words, 
individuals acquire knowledge of who they are and their role in society by being 
positioned in certain ways by discourses, customs, beliefs etc with which they come 
to identify1.   
 
New Zealand’s neoliberalisation through the 1980s and 1990s significantly included 
shifts in taxation and unemployment policy.  In unemployment policy there was a 
shift away from state responsibility for full employment and maintenance of the right 
to a fair wage (Castles and Shirley, 1996) towards the positioning of employment and 
wage rates as a function of the economy rather than of politics (New Zealand 
Department of Labour, 1985).  In taxation policy, New Zealand’s highly progressive 
income tax schedule was flattened and an essentially regressive Goods and Services 
Tax (GST) was introduced in 1986 (Stephens, 1990).  These reforms, in particular, 
disarticulated the connection between the social citizenship right to an income and the 
broader discourse of redistribution and, ultimately, were central to the rolling back of 
New Zealand’s distinctive “wage earners’ welfare state” (Castles, 1985, p.102).   
 
During the late 1990s, a number of neoliberal policy prescriptions and rationales were 
transformed from being the subject of political contestation and debate to become un-
contested background assumptions of policy practice and development.  In particular, 
                                                 
1 Citizen subjectivity on the other hand involves the active taking up of citizen subject positions.  This 
analysis focuses on the constitution of new subject positions.  Whether the subject positions identified 
in the thesis have been taken up beyond the political field is a question that is beyond the scope of this 
research.   
2 
labour market participation became the new and exclusive basis of social membership 
whereas, previously, a wider range of socially useful activities were supported and 
interpreted as expressions of contribution and membership.  In addition, the flattening 
of the income tax rate scale and the shift from a wage earners’ welfare state to a 
neoliberal workfare policy paradigm was evident in the residualisation of New 
Zealand’s welfare benefit system and the use of social policy as an instrument for 
promoting both labour market flexibility and new citizen subject positions consistent 
with a vision of New Zealand as a “competitive enterprising nation” (New Zealand 
National Party, 1990a, p.10).   
 
This thesis explores the consolidation of a broad neoliberal policy direction via an 
analysis of the shifting focus of discursive struggle in the political field.  During the 
1990s, the focus of this struggle shifted from the direction of economic and social 
policy to a struggle for moral authority via contestation over discourses of social 
justice, fairness and equality of opportunity.  Struggle over these moral discourses, 
central to the consolidation of a neoliberal citizenship regime, redefined the 
ideological reference points by which policies are assessed.  Furthermore, this 
struggle between the social democratic Labour party and neo-conservative National 
party to define themselves in difference from each other, in moral terms, reflects both 
the consolidation of a neoliberal policy consensus and its demarcation into social 
democratic and neo-conservative moral dialects. 
 
This study focuses on the consolidation of a neoliberal citizenship regime in New 
Zealand as the political component of a wider shift to a neoliberal mode of 
development.2 I examine the changing modes of political interpellation,3 constitutive 
of the shift from a social democratic to a neoliberal citizenship regime, and explore 
processes of ideological struggle over discourse and articulation that led to the 
                                                 
2 Defined in terms of the package of policies referred to as the Washington Consensus. 
3 Following Stuart Hall, interpellate means to “speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of 
particular discourses” (Hall, 1996a, p.5).  Interpellation was originally introduced by Althusser (1971) 
in his essay ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’. 
3 
consolidation of a neoliberal centring political problematic4 and citizenship regime in 
New Zealand’s political field.   
 
This research provides an account of the ideological struggle over discourse deployed 
by participants in the restructuring of taxation and unemployment policy.  It shows 
how the ideological struggle between competing discourses contributed to the 
emergence and consolidation of a new, neoliberal citizenship regime. The embedding 
of a neoliberal citizenship regime in New Zealand included the re-ordering of the 
moral economy of citizenship and the construction of a mode of subjective 
identification based on an expanded discourse of the taxpayer.  
 
Citizenship discourses are central because they enlist the subject to act, to identify 
with the subject positions and discourses connected to particular political projects.  
The movement from subject to citizen involves the internalisation of both a personal 
ethic and set of purposes.  In this way citizenship discourses are quintessentially 
mobilising.  Most analyses of New Zealand’s restructuring have failed to stipulate the 
problem of representation and identity formation.  A focus on the construction of 
citizen subject position marks this research as distinct from an approach that asks: In 
whose interests are New Zealanders constructed as taxpayers?  Rather, this study 
enquires into the processes through which citizenship becomes a site of subjective 
identification which reframes the question of interests such that the question 
becomes: How were New Zealanders’ interests and identities constructed in this 
way?   This study addresses this question through a discursive analysis of the state-
driven projects of the 1980s and 1990s to restructure New Zealand’s citizenship 
regime.  
                                                 
4 Following Bourdieu (1991), a political problematic has a broad meaning in terms of the dominant 
paradigm that centres the political space and a narrower meaning that focuses on how the state is 
articulated into the activity of government (Rose and Miller, 1992, p.175).  This discussion 
incorporates both emphases, adapting Bourdieu’s definition and incorporating Bobbio’s (1996) 
insights which recognise that the centre of political space is both about consensus and contestation.  
The centre represents the point where the differences between Left and Right are most clearly drawn 
and it is the position in the political field where an albeit tacit, Left and Right consensus emerges and 
consolidates (see Chapters Two and Seven).  
 
 
4 
  Restructuring unemployment and taxation policy 
 
According to Castles (1985): 
 
If we are to seek explanations for the adoption of divergent strategic 
options and policy trade offs, we must examine the historical 
evolution of policy formulation, going back to the point where 
reforms were the live substance of political conflict rather than the 
dead routines of administrative agencies or the taken for granted 
orthodoxies of contemporary public opinion. (Castles, 1985, p.75) 
 
This statement usefully distinguishes key stages in the life of policy regimes.  The 
late 1970s and 1980s represent a period in the development of New Zealand’s policy 
paradigm in which the “live substance of political conflict” expanded as competing 
discourses of the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state5 and the prescriptions for 
reform jostled for hegemony.  Discourse is a significant determinant of the direction 
of change in ‘out of regulation’6 periods.  New Zealand’s neoliberalisation 
principally involved the disarticulation of the previously embedded Keynesian 
welfare state citizenship regime and its replacement with a neoliberal citizenship 
regime.  Neoliberal discourses offered a convincing interpretation of New Zealand’s 
economic decline and social dislocation, and developed via a series of discourse 
articulations which when taken together, constituted a new hegemonic mode of 
signification supportive of a neoliberal policy paradigm.   
 
                                                 
5 The Keynesian welfare state is an ideal typical model describing a form of socio-economic 
reproduction dominant in Western countries during the immediate post-WWII period.  According to 
Torfing, the Keynesian welfare state was ‘Keynesian’ in that it aimed to secure full employment within 
a relatively closed national economy primarily through demand-side management.  In social 
reproduction the Keynesian welfare state sought to generalise norms of mass consumption beyond 
those employed in Fordist sectors of the economy so that all citizens might share in the fruits of 
capitalist growth and contribute to effective domestic demand (Torfing, 1999a, p.373).  The Keynesian 
welfare state was the institutional expression of a social democratic, egalitarian vision of society.  
6 The term ‘out-of-regulation’ comes from the French Regulation School and refers to an historical 
time in which previously sedimented social and economic relations become politicised. 
5 
During the immediate post-WW2 period, the discourses and policies regulating 
unemployment in New Zealand reflected the hegemony of a social democratic 
political problematic and citizenship regime.  This social democratic problematic 
treated full employment as the central governmental goal that was to be achieved by 
direct government intervention.  During the 1970s and 1980s this central goal was 
displaced and new criteria for interpreting and acting upon unemployment began to 
influence the formulation of policy.   
 
The previous Keynesian welfare state policy paradigm was based on a Keynesian 
style demand management policy that created jobs through public sector expansion 
within the terms of a social democratic discourse of social citizenship.  A right to a 
job and a fair wage were central to notions of social citizenship expressed most often 
in terms of the ‘social wage’ and manifest in successive governments’ commitment 
to, and Labour’s vigorous defence of, a full employment policy.  During the 1980s, 
but most significantly post-1990, New Zealand’s social policy paradigm was 
restructured in a workfare direction and (re)oriented towards achieving competitive 
and flexible labour markets.  This restructuring made full employment a by-product 
of market forces and individual effort, rather than being the central goal and outcome 
of direct government intervention.  This fundamental policy shift occurred alongside 
the construction of a new mode of political identification based on the identity of the 
(productive) taxpayer.  The shift to a workfare social policy paradigm and flattening 
of the tax schedule altered the terms upon which unemployment and taxation were 
understood and contributed to a broader shift in discourses and practices of 
citizenship in New Zealand.  
 
During the 1990s, a neoliberal political problematic and citizenship regime were 
embedded via a discursive process of ideological struggle.  The causes of 
unemployment were transformed from being based on a critique of the market system 
rationalising a call for state intervention to a social disease generated by the welfare 
state itself.  The consolidation of New Zealand’s neoliberal political problematic and 
citizenship regime entailed a transformation of the subject of politics from a social 
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rights-bearing universal citizen to a taxpayer citizen who has rights because s/he is 
fulfilling his/her obligations as distinguished from the non-taxpaying beneficiary.  
The unemployed were recast as the constitutive outside of this increasingly hailed 
consumer/taxpayer subject.  From the 1990s, unemployment and the unemployed 
were positioned along a different moral axis.  This shift saw the creation of a 
composite unemployed, raced, sexed, classed, maladjusted identity that took on a new 
political significance as it functioned as a political frontier for the new citizenship 
regime under construction. 
 
 
Three phases of neoliberalisation  
  
The first phase of the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s citizenship regime occurred 
in the 1980s under the Fourth Labour Government.  It featured ideological struggles 
over the meaning of unemployment and the treatment of the unemployed, together 
with a restructuring of New Zealand’s income tax schedule and the introduction of 
GST.  The Fourth Labour Government actively reconstituted citizenship discourse in 
an attempt to create a form of unity among disparate interests.  Labour’s citizenship 
discourse in this period celebrated social diversity and sought to represent the 
neoliberal reforms as the broader project through which the aspirations of, 
particularly, Maori, liberal feminists, and radical democrats could be realised.  This 
articulatory discourse strategy offered recognition of longstanding critiques of the 
Keynesian welfare state by women, Maori, radical democrats and workers’ 
cooperative groups whilst continuing to frame these identities within a New Left, 
social democratic universalising discourse of social membership via the discourse of 
the “social consumer” (Larner, 1997b, p.383).  According to Larner, while Labour’s 
social consumer was a variant of neoliberal selfhood, it continued to link “universal 
service provision to a coherent and integrated national population” (Larner, 1997b, 
p.396), reflecting the Labour government’s continued commitment to a 
universalising, inclusive, social democratic citizenship. 
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 The Fourth Labour Government’s radical economic reform project fell short of 
restructuring New Zealand’s welfare state (Larner, 2002, p.154; Neilson, 1998; 
Nagel, 1998). However, its restructuring of unemployment and taxation policy 
deployed a number of discursive strategies designed to shift New Zealanders’ 
perceptions of the role of the state and the meaning of citizenship in line with the 
rolling out of a new neoliberal mode of economic regulation that was a significant 
precursor to New Zealand’s welfare restructuring.  Castles and Shirley (1996) argue 
that although the Fourth Labour Government did not reform social policy, it paved 
the way for the redesign of New Zealand’s welfare state under National.  They argue 
that the Fourth Labour Government were the “gravediggers” of New Zealand’s 
welfare state as they created the political climate in which the 1990 benefit cuts and 
1991 Budget changes became possible (Castles and Shirley, 1996, p.89).   
 
During the 1990s, unemployment policy in New Zealand was concerned with 
“managing the consequences and contradictions” of the neoliberalisation of New 
Zealand’s state and economy (Tickell and Peck, 2003, p.166).  These contradictions 
stemmed in part from a disjuncture between the restructured state and economy on 
the one hand, and New Zealand’s social democratic citizenship regime on the other.  
In the face of political debates over modes of citizenship and the legitimacy of 
welfare during the 1990s, political players actively engaged ideological discourse 
strategies to renegotiate citizens’ subjectivity.  Castles (1985) describes a political 
culture with a favourable image of the welfare state, politically sensitive to welfare 
issues (Castles, 1985, p.53).  With the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s state and 
economy largely complete by 1990, the newly elected National government turned its 
attention to shifting New Zealanders’ favourable image of the welfare state.  
   
This second phase of the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s citizenship regime 
involved the redesign of New Zealand’s welfare state (Boston, Dalziel and St John, 
1999).  Changes to the social construction of the targets of social policy occurred 
alongside a reordering of citizen subject positions that privileged taxpaying as central 
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to New Zealand citizenship.  The neo-conservative, neoliberal, National-led 
Governments’ restructuring of taxation and unemployment discourses constructed a 
particular ordering of social antagonism that erected a political frontier between 
ordinary New Zealand taxpayers and a supposedly socially deviant, parasitic 
underclass of unemployed beneficiaries.  New behavioural norms associated with the 
taxpayer/producer were promoted by highlighting violations of these new norms 
through the social construction of a deviant (non-taxpaying, non-waged worker, non-
stakeholder) dependent beneficiary (Hackell, 1999).   
 
The National-led Governments’ citizenship discourse disarticulated the previously 
hegemonic chain of signification between welfare, progressive taxation and social 
responsibility, arguing that progressive taxation corresponds with taxing some for the 
benefit of others.  In this discourse ordinary taxpayers were distinguished from 
special pleaders.  National’s discourse displaced the previous policy paradigm, which 
articulated special needs with inclusive social citizenship (New Zealand Royal 
Commission, 1972), and constructed the taxpayer as the universal citizen in 
opposition to those with special needs.  
 
The National-led Governments of the 1990s constructed a taxpayer/producer identity 
(distinct from Labour’s taxpayer/consumer) centrally linked to the national project of 
building a competitive, enterprising nation.  Unlike Labour’s inclusive discourse of 
citizenship based on the identity of the social consumer which was in keeping with 
the social democratic traditions of New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state, National’s 
emphasis on the productive taxpayer as the privileged subject of politics divided the 
citizenry into a core group of ordinary working, taxpaying, mainstream New 
Zealanders and an underclass of unemployed beneficiaries constructed typically as 
socially destructive and parasitic.  
 
The third phase of the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s citizenship regime was 
marked by struggle for political leadership and moral authority between a 
neoliberalised social democratic Labour Party in Opposition, and the neoliberal, 
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traditionally conservative, National-led minority Government.  The outcome of this 
struggle between Labour and National to define their respective positions in 
opposition to each other was the refinement of a tacit consensus constitutive of a 
neoliberal political problematic and citizenship regime with Left and Right dialects.  
Analysis of the debates between Labour and National over taxation and 
unemployment reveal the differences between their social democratic and 
conservative positions but also the nature of the unspoken neoliberal consensus that 
by the late 1990s was both Left and Right. 
 
Following Peck and Tickell (2003), the political course of neoliberalisation was never 
clearly mapped out by the project’s founding ideologies and vanguard politicians.  
Rather, the ascendancy of neoliberalism has occurred as “a faltering expansion 
through a number of qualitatively distinctive phases” (Tickell and Peck, 2003, p.168).  
This thesis contributes to the task of “mapping the historical geography of 
neoliberalism”, defined by Tickell and Peck (2003, p.168) by providing an account of 
the “qualitatively distinctive phases” of the emergence and consolidation of New 
Zealand’s neoliberal citizenship regime and political problematic. 
 
 
The New Zealand literature: Explaining policy paradigm change 
 
Existing analyses of neoliberalism can be divided into two camps—neoliberalism 
understood as a policy framework and neoliberalism understood as a discourse.  The 
majority of these analyses are of the first type and include authors such as Kelsey, 
1997, 2002; Boston, 1996; Jesson, 1999; and Goldfinch, 1998.  This literature 
understands the neoliberal policy framework to be the result of the ‘capture’ of key 
institutions and political actors by neoliberal ideology.  It links the capture of key 
agents and institutions with a trans-national network of think tanks, the IMF, World 
Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
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the Chicago school of economics as well as private interest lobbies associated with 
multinational capital.   
 
The historical analyses of New Zealand’s restructuring focuses on how the neoliberal 
transformation of New Zealand’s state and economy was driven by a neoliberal cadre 
of politicians and Treasury bureaucrats occupying strategically key positions of 
central state power (Goldfinch, 1998; Jesson, 1989; Kelsey, 1997).  These accounts 
focus on the role of interest groups (Harris and Twiname, 1998; Roper, 1993), 
political leaders and bureaucrats such as Roger Douglas and Treasury officials, and 
key decisions that produced public policy change (Oliver, 1989).  It also explores the 
conjunctural dynamics which favoured neoliberal solutions in reaction to the heavy-
handed statism of the previous Muldoon-led government of 1975-1984 (Schick, 1996, 
p.13; Kelsey, 1997, p.22).   In these accounts, New Zealand’s restructuring was the 
outcome of the coming together of a number of factors, including the perception of 
crisis and the political impetus for undefined change (Schick, 1996, p.8; Schmidt, 
2000b, p.246), New Zealand’s “elective dictatorship” (Palmer, 1987), and the 
dominance of the neoliberalised Treasury in the provision of policy advice to the 
incoming government (Goldfinch, 1998, pp.178-9) These institutional and 
conjunctural factors were key in allowing a small cohort of elites to dominate the 
reform process (Goldfinch, 1998; Boston, 1996; Schick, 1996; Nagel, 1998).  As 
Aberbach and Christensen comment:   
 
The reforms in New Zealand were dominated by a few central 
institutional actors who held homogenous economic views and 
accepted common models.  The models chosen by these actors were 
typical of certain theories in economics, and reflected changing 
trends in elite thinking, and in that way disregarded others that could 
have been connected to the reforms. (2001, p.410)  
 
The question of how to explain policy change, particularly policy change that is 
abrupt and discontinuous with previous policy approaches, is explored in the existing 
literature as the effect of a combination of powerful interests within the state and the 
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economy and a conjunctural dynamic that offered a political “window of opportunity” 
for neoliberal reform (Aberbach and Christensen, 2001).   
 
This literature analyses New Zealand’s neoliberal restructuring as the result of the 
coming together of rational actors and a propitious institutional environment.  They 
claim that a set of rational actors with a clear agenda managed to dominate the reform 
process because they marshalled clear theoretical models that offered coherent 
problem analysis and a convincing solution (Jesson, 1999; Boston, 1996, p.16-25; 
Goldfinch, 1998, pp.178-9; Kelsey, 1997).  This, combined with New Zealand’s 
small Westminster electoral system, led to the neoliberal capture of the New Zealand 
state (Jesson, 1999; Chapman, 1992; Kelsey, 1997).  These accounts of the capture by 
a neoliberal cadre of politicians and bureaucrats fail to establish how the transition 
from one mode of regulation to another proceeds in discursive practice except in very 
general institutional and actor-oriented terms.  Furthermore, the central role of 
discourse in delimiting the problem of New Zealand’s economic crisis, and 
constructing its solution in terms of neoliberal reform, is not properly explored.  
Rather, the restructuring is assessed as an effect of the predetermined interests of the 
key players.  These accounts thus fail to address the constitution of interests in 
political discourse and the ideological struggle between competing constructions as a 
key component of the restructuring process. 
 
This thesis disputes the idea that political discourse simply or directly reflects the 
interests that are already constituted at the structural level.  Rather, ideological work 
is necessary and discursive strategies must be deployed.  The discourses of 
subjectivity through which we live our structural positionings are constituted in and 
through discursive struggle over ideology.  Ideological discourse mediates people’s 
experience of their social, cultural, political and economic circumstances and is 
constitutive of the relation between circumstances and political subjectivity.  
Ideological discourse offers modes of political identification that construct people’s 
experience of their social circumstances that, once hegemonic, crystalise a social 
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unity around a particular political project.  Discursive struggle and its role in 
processes of political identity formation is a significant driver of social change.  
 
The ‘neoliberalism as policy framework’ literature either does not explore the role of 
discourse at all or treats discourse as little more than a set of ideas or beliefs shared 
by a policy community connected to a set of real interests.  In this view discourses are 
the outputs of real interests rather than constitutive of them (Finlayson, 2004).  When 
these accounts do point to discursive shifts they do so on the basis that the power of 
the discourse is derived from the power of the group or institution deploying the 
discourse.  The discourses themselves are largely ignored.  
 
This literature identifies who and why and explores the consequences of the 
restructuring, but it does not reflect on how this radical transformation in the policy 
making agenda was achieved.  How, for instance, are we to understand the success of 
neoliberalism in reshaping subject positions and redefining the centre of political 
space?  In privileging the role of actors and institutions, these accounts fail to 
acknowledge the relative autonomy of hegemonic struggle over discourse to construct 
interests and institutions.  These accounts assess discursive outcomes as the effects of 
actors and interests, paying little or no attention to the ideological process of 
discourse change as a process of discursive strategy, articulation and struggle.  
Consequently the importance of discourse as a relatively autonomous driver of 
change is lost.   This thesis, in contrast, asks what articulatory discourse strategies 
were deployed, which discourses were displaced and how the outcomes of ideological 
struggles over discourse shaped the development of policy in a neoliberal direction. 
 
This thesis is distinct from the above literature because it views discourses as 
relational systems of meaning and practice that constitute the identities of subjects 
and objects.  It therefore places discourse at the centre of the analysis and examines 
discourse in terms of the conditions to which neoliberalism was a response and the 
discursive tactics, strategies and mechanisms through which it operated and became 
hegemonic.  In so doing it builds on a smaller body of literature that understands 
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neoliberalism as a discourse (see for example, Larner, 1997a, 1997b; Brodie 2002, 
2004; Jenson, 1999, 2000, 2004; and Mitchell, 2003), including some analyses that 
have focused specifically on the New Zealand case (for example, Larner, 1997a, 
1997b and Kingfisher, 1999, 2002; Higgins, 1997; and Peters, 2001).  There is also a 
neo-Foucauldian literature on neoliberalism as a discourse (Rose, 2000; O’Malley, 
2000; and Clark, 2005), which examines neoliberal discourse in terms of the modes 
of conduct it encourages and the technologies of governance it deploys.     
 
This ‘neoliberalism as discourse’ literature considers a broader set of processes, and 
places discourse and identity formation at the centre of the analysis.  For example, 
Kingfisher (1999) shows how gendered and raced discourses of savagery are 
deployed in welfare restructuring discourses to identify and distinguish legitimate and 
surplus populations.  This thesis builds on this literature by providing a discourse 
analysis of the shift from a Keynesian welfare state to a neoliberal citizenship regime 
in the New Zealand case that shows how subject positions were redefined and how 
neoliberalism became the centre of political space.   
 
This thesis extends this literature through its application of post-Marxist discourse 
theory.  Much of the neoliberalism as discourse literature has a tendency to focus on 
discursive shifts and the outcomes of neoliberal restructuring but to spend less time 
examining the details of how these shifts occurred.  The approach applied in this 
thesis shows how discourses were transformed via the logics of equivalence and 
difference, the construction of social antagonisms, the relation between the universal 
and the particular, etc and demonstrates how these discourse operations restructured 
citizen politics.  This novel method contributes to the development of the discourse 
analytic approach because, as a method of analysis, it constructs actors and 
institutions as if they are the bearers of discourse.  This method of abstraction offers a 
way of perceiving discursive change, the dynamics of discursive struggle and how 
exactly through particular, discursive strategies, tactics and operations, 
transformations in citizen subject positions are achieved.   
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This thesis contributes to the literature in two ways.  Empirically, it offers an account 
of how New Zealand’s citizenship regime was neoliberalised in the 1980s and 1990s 
that adds to existing accounts of who, why and what.  Through its focus on how 
neoliberal discourse became hegemonic, the thesis demonstrates the importance of 
articulatory discourse strategies and the ordering of social antagonism to citizenship 
politics.  It shows how through the strategic articulation of specific discourses and the 
re-ordering of social antagonism, the taxpayer became the privileged subject and the 
new source of political legitimacy in debates over citizenship and public policy in 
New Zealand.   
 
Methodologically, the post-Marxist approach applied here recognises that political 
discourse is produced to persuade.  This approach is able to explore the re-articulation 
and arrangement of ideas and arguments and identify how this produces re-definitions 
of citizen subjects and re-descriptions of policy problems.  This novel approach is 
able to specify the nature of the relation between ideas and policy change by pointing 
to the keywords and subject positions that sustained neoliberal arguments and 
facilitated neoliberal ‘capture’.  In particular, the thesis specifies the role of discursive 
struggle over ideology between Governing and Opposition political parties in 
constructing and embedding a new citizenship regime through the pursuit of 
neoliberalising state projects.  It thus extends theoretical and empirical 
understandings of the expansion of neoliberal hegemony.   
   
This focus excludes an investigation of the ideological discourse strategies deployed 
by a range of non-state actors which influenced the course of the restructuring.  
Whilst many of the projects of non-state actors not examined here were successfully 
articulated and thus implicated in these state-driven projects, a full scale investigation 
into the multiple and various discursive strategies that had a role to play in New 
Zealand’s process of neoliberalisation is beyond the scope of this research.  
 
Instead, the thesis offers a case study of the discourses of citizen-based social 
movement groups articulated under the rubric of the workers’ cooperative movement.  
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The decision to focus on the workers’ cooperative movement’s discourse strategies in 
struggle with the Fourth Labour Government over unemployment policy was based 
on the movement’s articulation of an alternative space of representation that 
significantly challenged the government’s neoliberal agenda.  The workers’ 
cooperative movement, unlike a number of other relevant social movement groups, 
offered an alternative socio-economic settlement.  
 
The cooperative movement articulated the discourses and projects of Maori self-
determination, liberal feminism and radical democracy and not only opposed the 
government’s neoliberal strategy but offered an alternative counter-hegemonic 
discourse and project.  An exploration of all three of these articulations in detail is 
beyond the scope of this research.  For this reason, Chapter Five focuses in particular 
on the articulation between the Maori self-determination movement and the workers’ 
cooperative movement that centred on the practice of the work cooperative and the 
struggle between their discourses and political agenda and the discourses and agenda 
of the Fourth Labour Government.      
 
 
A post-structuralist mode of inquiry 
 
This research addresses a number of questions raised by a post-structuralist reading of 
New Zealand’s policy reform process.  A post-structuralist mode of inquiry reflects 
on the restructuring of unemployment and taxation policies as the contingently 
realised outcome of ideological struggle between contesting discourses, the outcome 
of which is the development of a set of politically relevant policy problems and 
solutions.  This research thus conceptualises unemployment and taxation policies as 
articulations of discourses and identities.  Unemployment and taxation are not 
examined as straight-forward facts and statistics; rather, they are constructed as 
politically relevant signifiers via discursive processes of representation.  
Consequently, the focus of this research is the transformation of unemployment and 
taxation, understood as the outcome of ideological struggle through discourse.  
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 The association between neoliberalisation and new subject positions such as taxpayer, 
client and/or consumer has been widely acknowledged in New Zealand and elsewhere 
(Larner, 1997a, 1997b; Larner and Walters, 2000; Kingfisher, 2002; Jenson, 2000, 
2004; Brodie, 1996; 2002).  However, the process of constructing and embedding 
neoliberal citizen subject positions and the ways these new citizen subject positions 
were articulated in unemployment and taxation policy discourses in New Zealand has 
not, until now, been properly explored.   
 
A post-structuralist mode of inquiry places questions of identity at the heart of 
political analysis.  This means that the political construction of the targets of policy is 
of particular importance in examining changing citizen subject positions.  Laclau’s 
(1995) insights into the relation between particularity and universality and Laclau and 
Mouffe’s (1985) emphasis on the productivity of antagonism for politics inform this 
analysis of changing citizenship discourses, and are deployed to draw out a number of 
features of political discourse that have been peripheral to analyses of New Zealand’s 
reform process until now.  In particular, I am referring to the constitutive role of 
changing discourses of citizen subjectivity in New Zealand’s process of 
neoliberalisation and the centrality of antagonistic constructions of universal citizen 
identities in relation to particular ‘others’ in this process.    
 
This thesis takes account of the changing representational practices of politicians, 
bureaucrats and social movement actors and sees the construction of citizen subject 
positions as an effect of these discursive articulations and hegemonising struggles 
rather than pre-existing them.  The thesis adopts a discourse analytical mode of 
analysis that provides a novel understanding of New Zealand’s process of 
neoliberalisation by focusing on the discourses themselves rather than the hidden 
interests they can be said to represent.  In doing so, it addresses Finlayson’s (2004) 
critique of political science for under-analysing discourse and failing to fully 
recognise its potentially causal role.  He offers a perceptive critique of how political 
scientists have incorrectly reduced discourse to a component of other social 
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phenomena rather than an influence on them.  These analyses interpret discourse as 
instrumentalist and tend to reduce it to an effect of something else rather than a 
constitutive political force in itself.  “Ideas are interpreted as narrowly instrumental, 
covers for the real work of ‘real’ interests, which are not significantly shaped by 
ideas” (Finlayson, 2004, p.535).  This point is worth emphasising as, although many 
political scientists now recognise the importance of discourse, they view it as a 
component of a larger social realm.  Post-structuralist accounts, on the other hand, do 
not distinguish between the discursive and the non-discursive and insist on the 
interweaving of discourse, objects and actions.  Torfing expresses this interweaving 
in the following way, “All actions have meaning and to produce and disseminate 
meaning is to act” (Torfing, 1999, p.94).  It follows that it is necessary to explain the 
discursive construction of interests and social antagonisms and not merely reflect on 
the non-discursive conditions in which they emerge.  Following Finlayson’s critique, 
this thesis regards discourse as a form of political action and argues that changing 
forms of political identification are not simply effects of other political and economic 
shifts but play a constitutive role in their transformation. 
 
From a distinctive model of policy-making, sometimes referred to as the social 
construction model, this thesis aims to explain how New Zealand’s process of 
neoliberalisation proceeded.  In this model, policy change is the outcome of struggle 
over discourse (Fischer, 1995; Stone, 1997).  As Stone (1997) points out: 
 
Policy making…is a constant struggle over the criteria for 
classification, the boundaries of categories, and the definition of 
ideals that guide the way people behave. (p.11)    
 
This approach demonstrates the role of discourse and discursive struggle in making 
certain things appear appropriate and others seem problematic (Hajer, 1997, p.54) 
within a chain of discourse that articulates problem definitions and goals with ideas 
of blame, responsibility and justice.  According to Foucault, the historical 
development of regimes of truth is “a complex relationship of successive 
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displacements” (Foucault, 1991, p.55, italics in original).  In studying discourse his 
stated aim was to “define the transformations which, I do not say provoked but, 
constituted change” (Foucault, 1991, p.56, italics in original).  A Foucauldian 
emphasis on discursive transformations orients social policy research towards 
understanding how social policy is always already imbricated within wider political-
economic strategies and governmental problematics.  This thesis, in analysing the 
restructuring of unemployment and taxation policy discourses in New Zealand, seeks 
to define the transformations and displacements of the meaning of unemployment and 
taxation that both reflect and constitute a new neoliberal citizenship regime in New 
Zealand. 
 
A number of analyses of the restructuring of New Zealand’s welfare state have 
pointed to the inadequacies and contradictions in neoliberal justificatory discourses in 
terms of their social scientific accuracy (Boston, 1992; Kelsey 1997).  These 
approaches contrast the claims of neoliberals with the real facts of poverty and 
unemployment in New Zealand and have usefully countered neoliberal claims.  
However, the truth or falsity of neoliberal claims does not undermine their capacity to 
do work in the world.  The approach of this thesis is to evaluate the use of discourse 
as a political tool for persuading others of the necessity of pursuing neoliberal reform.  
To this end, political discourses are examined as articulatory strategies deployed to 
persuade and convert rather than in terms of their logic, accuracy or philosophical 
integrity.  In this regard, an analysis of ideological discourse strategies must take 
account of the role of the emotional investments and moral dimensions these 
strategies draw on as well as cognitive features.  
 
Many of the existing accounts on New Zealand’s neoliberalisation focus on the 
institutional outcomes of the reforms rather than the “contingently realised process” 
(Tickell and Peck, 2003, p.165) of transformation itself.  This limitation is rectified in 
this research which examines the process of neoliberal transformation through an 
analysis of hegemonic articulatory discourse strategies deployed in political struggle.  
This form of analysis highlights the process of winning consent for the neoliberal 
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programme that began in the 1980s, and intensified in the 1990s via processes of 
hegemonic articulation that established the neoliberal reform programme as more 
than just a pragmatic response to hard economic realities but as a new moral authority 
capable of addressing all the legitimate demands in society.   
 
Much of the New Zealand literature focuses on the initial roll-back phase 1984-1990 
of New Zealand’s neoliberalisation.  This thesis focuses less on this initial phase of 
neoliberalisation and more on the subsequent process of consolidating and embedding 
the neoliberal policy paradigm as a “space of representation” (Laclau, 1990, p.61) for 
an expanding range of societal demands.  This roll-out phase of neoliberalisation, 
1990-1999 approximately, centrally included a reordering of policy priorities 
constitutive of a neoliberal centring political problematic and the political 
construction of a new mode of political identification, establishing a neoliberal 
citizenship regime.  Some accounts of New Zealand’s restructuring argue that the 
neoliberal reforms were implemented without first winning consent (Neilson, 1998; 
Schmit, 2000b).  While this research does not dispute this view I show how consent 
to the on-going restructuring process was produced during the late 1980s and 1990s 
via changing discourses of citizenship.    While the initial reforms were not based on 
consensus building, once the neoliberal mode of economic regulation was in place, 
governing parties and the advocates of neoliberalisation constructed various 
communicative discourses that sought to articulate the neoliberal policy framework 
with the experience and motivations of political subjects.  The construction of a 
neoliberal mode of regulation included the re-specification of the citizen subject.  As 
Yeatman (2004, p.403) points out, the state denotes both the institutional reality of 
the state and the subjectivity that is required if that idea of the state is to be realised.  
It follows that changes to discourses of and about the state and citizen subject 
positions played a constitutive role in New Zealand’s regime restructuring.      
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Towards a new citizenship regime 
 
Traditionally, citizenship has been understood as a set of political, civil and social 
rights and obligations enshrined in the institutions of the state (Marshall, 1950).  
More recently, many writers have begun to offer expanded conceptualisations of 
citizenship that focus on the exclusionary discourses that establish citizenship in 
historical time and place (Mouffe, 1992; Isin, 2002; Jenson, 1999, 2004).  Rather than 
examining the legislated rights of citizenship, this research analyses the ways citizens 
are produced through an array of exclusionary discursive practices and how this 
ensemble of practices shifts in focus over time.  Whereas others have noted the 
negative construction of unemployed beneficiaries in National’s discourses (notably 
Bassett, 1998), no study until now, has explored the relationship between the 
representation of beneficiaries and the construction of New Zealand citizens as 
taxpayers.     
 
This study follows Isin in recognising that:  
 
Citizenship and otherness are then really not two different 
conditions, but two aspects of the ontological condition that makes 
politics possible. (2002, p.10) 
 
Citizenship regimes specify which categories of subject can claim rights and the 
manner in which they can be claimed.  Citizenship discourses are representational 
practices that establish citizenship regimes (Jenson and Phillips, 1996).  In addition, 
by excluding non-nationals, citizenship regimes establish external borders of 
belonging.  The internal borders of citizenship are established by invoking an internal 
hierarchy of political subjects which specifies appropriate relations between 
differently categorised citizens.  The internal and external borders of citizenship are 
defined and delimited in discursive practice. 
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The internal borders of citizenship are the focus of this research.  Internal borders are 
established through the “politics of recognition” (Jenson and Phillips, 1996, p.114), 
while the external borders are established through the politics of non-recognition.  
The politics of non-recognition denotes aggressive practices of exclusion that are 
unambiguous, such as the deportation of illegal immigrants.  In New Zealand, major 
shifts in immigration policy occurred during the 1980s and 1990s that reconfigured 
the politics of non-recognition.  A full scale treatment of shifting discourses of 
immigration, however, is beyond the scope of this study.7   The politics of 
recognition, on the other hand, establishes the internal limits of citizenship.  A set of 
subjects are recognised as legitimate citizens within a discourse of the social order 
that establishes a hierarchy of citizens including model citizens, second class citizens, 
conditional citizen categories and categories of social subject that establish the 
internal limits of citizenship (Jenson and Phillips, 1996, p.114).  The internal limits of 
citizenship are represented by those categories of persons constructed as the antithesis 
of the model citizen.  These maligned categories are included, but politically 
exploited as a means to draw attention to the character and privileged status of the 
model citizen (Hackell, 1999).   
 
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxist discourse approach 
 
This study specifically inquires into the re-articulation of economic, political, social 
and national identities that reconfigured citizen subject positions in New Zealand in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  Post-Marxist discourse analytics is applied to an analysis of the 
strategic discourse articulations between neoliberalising governments, counter-
hegemonic political projects and previously embedded discursive traditions, as well 
as an analysis of the ideological struggle between Governments and Oppositional 
parties.  The transformation of New Zealand’s citizenship regime is explored through 
                                                 
7 Some interesting studies on discourses of immigration and the policing of the external borders of 
citizenship have been done, for example, Kurian and Munshi (2006); Skilling, (2003).   
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an application of the post-Marxist theory of discursive articulation which draws 
attention to the political construction of forms of subjective identification and 
hegemonic articulatory practices and is based on the work of Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985).  Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) post-Marxist discourse theory develops out of 
their participation in a critical phase in the Marxist intellectual tradition, particularly, 
their critical re-reading of Althusser’s famous essays, ‘Ideology and ideological state 
apparatuses’ (1971), and ‘Contradiction and overdetermination’ (1969), and 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony (1971).   
 
In Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) discourse theory, the question of representation and 
the formation of political subjectivities are of central importance.  Laclau and Mouffe 
distinguish between subject positions and political subjectivity in order to make a 
distinction between the representational positioning of subjects within a discursive 
structure and the agency of subjects.  Their theory of subjectivity built on Althusser’s 
theory of ideological interpellation.  His theory critiqued the liberal concept of the 
unified and self-transparent subject and argued that subjects are constructed by 
ideological practices with which they come to identify (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 
2000, pp.12-13).  Laclau and Mouffe’s theory develops out of Althusser’s account of 
ideological interpellation and overdetermination, which drew attention to the 
independent effect of ideology on the economic base, which broke with traditional 
Marxism.  Laclau and Mouffe took up Althusser’s idea that the ideological 
superstructure has its own independent modality.  From this starting point, Laclau and 
Mouffe developed their conception of the logic and primacy of the political.  
 
Laclau and Mouffe reject the class reductionism built in to Althusser’s mode of 
theorising and, stemming from a Foucauldian account of the multiple ways agents are 
produced in discourse, they distinguish between ‘subject positions’ designating the 
positioning of subjects within the discursive structure and ‘political subjectivity’ that 
addresses the way subjects actively identify with the modes of political identification 
offered by political projects.  Following Foucault, any person can have a number of 
even contradictory subject positions, meaning they can be positioned within the 
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discursive structure in multiple ways as, for example, a woman, a Maori, a mother, an 
employee, etc.  The concept of ‘political subjectivity’, on the other hand, addresses 
the way the subject actively identifies, and argues that the agency of the subject 
emerges in response to societal dislocation or an out-of-regulation phase of social 
development.  In this context existing identities are challenged.  These periods are 
productive of new identities because they are the political foundations upon which 
new identities are constructed and taken up.  Howarth and Stavrakakis comment on 
this process: 
 
Dislocations disrupt identities and discourses, they also create a lack 
at the level of meaning that stimulates new discursive constructions, 
which attempt to suture the dislocated structure. (2000, p.13) 
 
Out-of-regulation periods, in which existing identities are disrupted, compel the 
subject to actively search for a new mode of identification.  The subject is in a 
position of taking a decision to identify with certain political projects and the set of 
articulated discourses they offer.  This process of identification is constitutive of 
political subjectivity.  Once a particular form of political subjectivity becomes 
hegemonic it produces individuals with certain expectations, motivations, capacities 
and dispositions (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, pp.13-14).  
 
In Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, hegemonic articulatory practices are the 
central form of politics involving the articulation of different identities and discourses 
into a political project.  Their conceptualisation of hegemonic articulatory practices 
builds on and critiques Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (1971).  Gramsci understood 
hegemony to be a general political logic involving the articulation of different social 
forces constructive of a common sense which translates a form of intellectual, cultural 
and moral leadership.  Laclau and Mouffe further develop Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony out of a critique of his insistence on the class character of the 
hegemonising process ensured by the economic structure.  Gramsci’s position that, 
due to their structural position at the level of the relations of production, social 
classes have a privileged role in the hegemonising process is rejected by Laclau and 
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Mouffe who presuppose a social field criss-crossed with social antagonisms, 
inclusive of, but, not exclusively class-based.  In their view, the major aim of 
hegemonic political projects is to construct nodal points (privileged signifiers) that 
articulate as many social signifiers as possible into a relatively coherent significatory 
system capable of hegemonising the universe of political discourse (Torfing, 1999). 
 
A hegemonic discourse acts to temporarily neutralise social antagonisms—although it 
may also exploit them—and incorporate within its explanatory and legitimating 
framework a broad set of societal demands.  This research makes use of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s ideas about political subjectivity and hegemonic articulatory practices to 
account for the movement from the dislocation of New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare 
state to the embedding of a neoliberal citizenship regime by analysing 
transformations in political discourses of citizen subjectivity.  By examining the 
emergence and development of the taxpayer as the model citizen in contemporary 
New Zealand politics, this thesis shows how through hegemonic articulatory 
discourse strategies citizens were enjoined to take up new forms of political 
subjectivity.  This process of rearticulating citizen subject positions and encouraging 
their take up was an important part of the process of hegemonising a neoliberal 
political problematic and citizenship regime in New Zealand.   
 
Following Laclau and Mouffe (1985), this thesis adopts an antagonistic conception of 
politics that recognises the centrality of discourses of social antagonism in the 
construction of identity.  Subject positions become meaningful through differential 
relations with other subject positions and with respect to the prevailing political 
problematic.  While most political science approaches view social antagonism as 
reflective of the contradiction between the objective interests of different social 
groups, the discourse approach adopted here sees the discursive ordering of social 
antagonisms not simply as reflective of objective interests but also as constitutive of 
them.   I argue that in the 1990s, the discursive re-ordering of social antagonism 
played a decisive role in establishing and embedding a new mode of political 
identification in New Zealand. 
25 
Citizenship, identity and social change 
           
This research feeds into an extensive and growing literature on citizenship (see, for 
example, Isin, 2002; Jenson and Phillips, 1996; Jenson, 1999; Jenson and 
Dobrowolsky, 2004; Tilly, 1996).  Despite a recent resurgence of interest in 
citizenship and the development of interdisciplinary approaches to citizenship studies, 
there has been a lack of empirically based studies of citizenship in New Zealand.  
This research applies post-Marxist theoretical insights to an empirical case and 
provides a plausible and empirically justifiable account of the restructuring of citizen 
subject positions in New Zealand.  This research is empirically grounded in the 
changing citizenship discourses of particularly—but not exclusively—politicians, 
focusing on the late 1980s and 1990s.  The analysis of these political discourses is 
underscored by recognition of the mutually constitutive relation between the state and 
the citizen.  New Zealand’s neoliberal reforms presupposed particular subject 
positions that linked forms of personhood to the neoliberal project of the ‘competitive 
enterprising nation’ and celebrated these forms of personhood as ideal expressions of 
New Zealand citizenship. 
 
In examining how a neoliberal mode of political identification was established, this 
thesis explores shifting modes of political rhetoric and articulations between 
neoliberalism and other moral traditions.  I argue that the neoliberalising governments 
of the 1980s and 1990s disarticulated previous social democratic discourses of 
citizenship and increasingly hailed the citizen as a taxpayer.  This shift has altered 
perceptions of both the role of the state and the meaning of taxpaying and 
unemployment, and has fundamentally transformed the normative foundations of 
New Zealand citizenship. 
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Research design 
 
Three key questions guided the research: How were the meanings associated with 
citizenship in the Keynesian era called into question? How did neoliberalising 
governments succeed in re-articulating new meanings of citizenship and citizen 
subject positions?  And in what ways can the post-Marxist view of discourse 
contribute to our understanding of how this transformation came about?  
 
 
Data selection/collection  
 
This study included both depth of sample and wide coverage.  In terms of depth of 
sample I selected documents related to key conferences on unemployment that 
brought together a range of participants including government actors and social 
forces.  These key discursive events-the Employment Promotion Conference, the 
Beyond Dependency Conference, the Porter Report, the introduction of GST and the 
Taskforce on Employment-were one focus of the document selection because the 
study sought to explore the dynamics of struggle over discourse.  
 
 The documents associated with these key discursive events were included in order to 
garner a sense of the discursive struggle between the government and citizen-based 
social movement groups, constitutive of the restructuring process.  In particular, 
newsletters, particularly the workers’ cooperative newsletter Nga Rongo Korero, non-
governmental publications such as Business Roundtable8 publications, union 
publications and feminist publications were analysed.  Much of this material emerged 
in response to government policy-making and therefore provided an account of both 
the responses of social movements and citizen-based organisations to governmental 
policy-making as well as traces of the articulation of oppositional agendas in both 
                                                 
8 The New Zealand Business Roundtable is a non-government organisation of Chief Executives of 
major business firms.  It has been prolific in the publication of reports and submissions that support the 
ongoing neoliberal direction of policy change.   
27 
government and social movement discourse that was the outcome of discursive 
struggle.   
 
Discursive struggle was understood not just in terms of direct confrontation between 
alternative discourses but also in terms of the armistices and compromises that are the 
outcome of discursive struggle.  So, publications that appear after an event like the 
Employment Promotion Conference, for example, were analysed in relation to the 
event.  The analysis of discursive struggle offered in this thesis does not present all 
instances of the discursive strategies examined.  Instead I present samples of text that 
best represent contesting positions in the debates. 
 
I also undertook a keyword search of parliamentary debates from 1987-2000 using 
online Hansards which provided every instance of the keywords.  Pre-1987 
parliamentary debates and budget statements were manually searched using the index.  
Approximately 300 pages of debates were analysed.  I examined the ways that 
parliamentarians positioned themselves and their policies in opposition to other 
parties, and how the dynamics of struggle between political parties to represent the 
agenda via the construction of the citizen was played out.  
 
I also selected texts directed at the public designed to persuade.  For example, Pre-
election party manifestos, New Zealand Planning Council discussion documents, the 
Code of Social and Family Responsibility and public information pamphets such as 
‘A fairer deal’ published by the GST Coordinating office were all texts that offered 
rationales for reforms and/or re-specified citizen subject positions.  
 
In terms of wide coverage, the research collected a wide range of policy and related 
documents that addressed the issue of unemployment and taxation collected from the 
Universities of Waikato, Auckland and Canterbury libraries and the Alexander 
Turnball Library.  I collected approximately 57 policy and related documents that 
formed the main corpus of policy data for analysis. These included a range of 
28 
governmental policy documents and related discussion documents, produced in the 
period 1970-2000 that defined policy problems and furnished solutions.   
 
I also drew on OECD reports that had been extensively referred to in the government 
policy documents.  OECD perspectives were extremely influential in New Zealand 
particularly in the restructuring of unemployment policy and the reform of the benefit 
system and were included in this analysis because they were frequently cited in 
Department of Social Welfare policy documents and reports.  The rationales and 
policy prescriptions in the OECD documents were reproduced in New Zealand policy 
documents and department reports and were deployed in New Zealand to show that 
neoliberalising governments were following internationally recognised trends in 
policy making and as a way of legitimising the neoliberal reforms. 
 
While I do not explicitly examine the connections between trans-national processes of 
change and the New Zealand experience in the thesis, the inclusion of OECD 
documents recognises that discourse shifts in NZ were influenced by international 
organisations and discourses coming from the US and UK. 
  
The research analyses instances of what Gee (1990) has called “little d” discourses in 
policy making and political fields and their role in the transformation of hegemonic 
Discourse with a big D.  The texts I analysed called into question (or made 
problematic) what it means to be a New Zealand citizen, and can be seen as examples 
of the struggle over who is a model citizen, a second class citizen and a non-citizen.  I 
analysed policy documents, parliamentary debates, conference proceedings, pre 
election party manifestos, Government reports and publications.  While the status of 
the ‘little d’ texts analysed here are different, they all deploy citizen subject positions 
in their presentation of policy problems.  This analysis of discourse with a little d 
served to illustrate the broader argument that discourse strategies drove the 
transformation of hegemonic Discourse with a big D. 
 
Little d discourses selected for close analysis included, in particular; New Zealand 
Royal Commission (1972); An Agenda for Tax Reform (1981); A Review of 
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Employment Subsidy Programmes: A framework for consultation; A New Deal in 
Training and Employment Opportunities (1985); New Zealand Royal Commission on 
Social Policy (1988); the Porter Report (1991); Social Assistance: Welfare that 
Works: A Statement on Government Policy on Social Assistance (1991); Strategic 
Directions: Ministerial Briefing Papers (1996); Towards a Code of Social and Family 
Responsibility (1998) and the OECD’s Future of Social Protection (1988).  
 
These documents were selected for close analysis because, firstly, they contain 
problem definitions and rationales and forms of persuasion for policy decisions.  
Secondly, these documents represent instances of policy discourse that involved 
communication with, and the direction of, an audience of citizens.  In these 
documents, the state attempted to communicate its intentions within a mode of 
democratic consultation.  In this way, these discourses seek to inform and redirect 
citizens’ self-perceptions, aspirations and the expectations of the state.   
 
This broad corpus of data was categorised according to authorship and mode of 
communication criteria and indexed according to the following 13 codes: 
 
GR  government report 
NGOR  non government organisation report 
IOR  International organisation report 
G/PI  Government public information 
P/PI  Political Party public information 
NG/N  non government newsletter 
C  Conference proceeding or paper including pre conference background reports 
NA  News paper or non-academic journal article 
H  Hansards 
PS  Political speech 
MoP  Member of Public 
QGO  Quasi government organisation 
CI  Commissions of Inquiry 
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 The coding criteria reflected the study’s interest in discourse strategies designed to 
rearticulate citizen subject positions as well as the role of discursive struggle. 
 
 
Methods for analysing documents 
 
All of the documents were subject to a keywords analysis.  Following Raymond 
Williams (1985), keywords analysis means more than identifying keywords and 
collecting examples of their use but also establishing how they articulate with other 
keywords.  It is used to establish the connections necessary for the construction of  
hegemonic Discourses wit a big D.  Discourses are relational systems of meaning and 
practice that constitute the identities of subjects and objects.  Neoliberalism is a big D 
discourse that establishes the identities of various subjects; citizens, taxpayers, 
entrepreneurs, consumers etc and various objects such as employment and taxation 
policy.  This kind of discourse analysis analyses empirical data as discursive forms.  
Reports, manifestos, speeches events, policies and even institutions are treated as 
strategic discourses.   
 
Policy discourses establish coherence between different policies and governmental 
practices.  Analysis of policy documents involved searching for patterns in the 
discourse as well as looking for discontinuities in policy problematisations and in the 
“social constructions of target populations” (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p.1).  I 
looked for clear shifts in how unemployment and taxation policy problems were 
constructed particularly in terms of the targets of these policies and in terms of the 
nature of social division or the inter-subjective relations being constructed.    
 
This study traced the discursive strategies of Governments and Parties in Opposition 
while simultaneously looking at the discourses of some citizen-based social 
movement groups.  A particular focus on the struggle between the dominant political 
parties to define themselves in difference from each other entailed a close analysis of 
parliamentary debates in the 1980s and 1990s.  These debates were highly relevant to 
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this study because they record instances of persuasive political argument in struggle 
with oppositional discourses.  This part of the analysis involved key word searches of 
the database Knowledge Basket with a focus on the targets of unemployment and 
taxation policy.  Systematic searches were made of the following keywords: citizens; 
consumers; taxpayers; workers; unemployed; beneficiaries; electors; unemployment; 
unemployed; taxation; tax; enterprise; entrepreneurial; social responsibility; fairness; 
social justice; equality of opportunity; benefit reform; workfare; New Zealanders; 
work ethic.  I noticed a drop-off in the incidence of the term citizen and a marked rise 
in the use of the term taxpayers particularly in the 1990s, as well as, a particular 
relation being constructed between beneficiaries and taxpayers.  This led to the study 
of taxation discourses which was initially not part of the study.  In this way the initial 
keyword searches generated subsequent keywords as articulatory strategies were 
identified, for example, fairness and social justice appeared frequently in the 
‘taxpayers’ search indicating a link between ideas about taxpayers and ideas about 
fairness and social justice.   
 
Analysis of parliamentary debates, policy documents and conference material focused 
on the representational meanings and practices they established.  Debates that made 
reference to these target identities were analysed as acts of representation constitutive 
of social identity and as instances of discursive struggle over ideology.   
 
A shift from one centring political problematic to another entailed the elaboration of a 
new set of terms for political contestation, a new policy paradigm and a re-
specification of political identities.  Political professionals represent political 
identities by offering an interpretive framework that constitutes people’s interests and 
experience in ways that correspond with the political programme they offer.  For this 
reason the study also examined a selection of election campaign material including 
manifestos and political speeches.  Analysis of election material focused on the 
discursively organised connections between target identities and the political 
programmes on offer.   
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 Analysing discourse 
 
A discourse analysis that follows the analytics of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) entailed 
evaluating these instances of discourse as the effect of repeated choices, exclusions 
and articulations with other discourses.  The documents described above were 
analysed as instances of hegemonic articulatory practice, paying attention to the 
construction of chains of equivalence, relations of difference, displacements and 
condensations.  All the documents were analysed with reference to the articulations of 
discourse and the subject positions they made available with a view to understanding 
how discursive struggle engineered the shift from a social democratic to a neoliberal 
citizenship regime and political problematic.  
 
The analysis charts the movement from a period in regulation characterised by a 
narrow set of political conflicts and a relative consensus to a period out of regulation 
where challenges to that consensus emerged and alternative interpretive frames 
openly contested for political hegemony.  For this reason, particular attention is paid 
to discursive struggle and to the ways that certain political strategies positioned their 
opponents and how this war of position constructed relational meanings in discourse. 
 
Attention was paid to disjunctures, displacements and variability in the discourses of 
Government administrations, Parties in Opposition and bureaucrats in order to 
investigate transformative ruptures in the policy trajectory.  Analysis of these 
discursive shifts focused on establishing the links between shifting discourses of 
economic and state management and the new target identities and forms of 
citizenship they assumed and encouraged. 
 
This research rejects a simple correspondence between the discourse purposively 
constructed and disseminated and the interests of specified groups.  While this study 
analyses discourses as political strategies, it views the subject as constituted in and by 
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discourse itself rather than operating outside of discourse and simply manipulating 
discourse according to already specified ends.  According to Foucault: 
 
The logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often 
the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can 
be said to have formulated them. (1976, p.95)  
 
This means that the very identities of social agents are constituted in and by 
discourse; therefore, discourse cannot be explained with reference to pre-given 
interests.  Interests are discursively produced, maintained and transformed.  The 
analysis should therefore seek to discern how, in the context of controversy, a 
particular identity or set of identities comes to predominate and structure the other 
identities in the field via hegemonic articulatory practices.  
 
The shift from the social democratic to a neoliberal citizenship regime and political 
problematic is analysed as a shift from one way of domesticating and conceptually 
overseeing social, political and economic discourses and identities, which during the 
crisis became disarticulated and unstable, towards a new neoliberal “space of 
representation” (Laclau, 1990, p.61), which conceptually represented a range of 
rearticulated discourses and identities and guided New Zealand’s process of 
neoliberalisation.  
 
This discussion has provided an account of the nature of the data and how the 
analysis of the data proceeded.  The following chapters offer the actual analysis and 
findings.  The problem of how and why social policy should shift from a principle of 
redistribution of social risk to an object of a neoliberal economic rationality guides 
the analysis.   The principle of income maintenance and progressive taxation is not in 
and of itself more irrational than workfare and flatter tax regimes, but it is irrational 
in the context of a new policy paradigm involving new ways of conceiving the effects 
to be produced by unemployment and taxation policy, and new ways of calculating its 
social, economic and political utility.  
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 Summary 
 
Ideological struggle over discourse reflects the battle for hegemony and involves the 
re-specification of political identities.  This thesis provides an historical account of 
political identity formation in New Zealand from 1980-2000 and explores the 
discursive conditions that made the taxpayer/beneficiary distinction so pertinent to 
the restructuring of New Zealand’s welfare state and citizenship regime. 
 
This thesis contributes to a fuller understanding of the contingently realised process 
of the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s mode of development and joins a set of 
researchers (notably, Wendy Larner, Jane Higgins and Jane Jenson) in exploring how 
neoliberalisation proceeded by paying particular attention to the role of ideological 
discourse in hegemonising neoliberal forms of subjectivity.  The theoretical claim 
underpinning this thesis is that ideological discourse strategies and the outcomes of 
struggles between political parties and between governing parties and counter-
hegemonic forces shaped the direction of neoliberal policy reform in New Zealand.  
This analysis of discourse strategies and how discourses are reinscribed in new 
relations in the course of struggle is important for understanding New Zealand’s 
qualitatively distinct process of neoliberalisation.    
 
 
Chapter outlines 
 
While the different chapters of the thesis focus on different phases of New Zealand’s 
contingently realised process of neoliberalisation and foreground different sites of 
hegemonic articulatory practice, all of the chapters are concerned with the 
reconfiguration of representational discourses constitutive of a new form of political 
identification.   
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 Chapter Two: Theoretical framework 
 
This chapter sets out the key assumptions of discourse theory upon which the thesis 
questions and mode of inquiry are based.  The chapter outlines Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(1985) theory of discourse, in particular their view of the constitutive role of social 
antagonism, and processes of identification in hegemonic politics.  Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory is supplemented by the French Regulation School’s political 
economy, in particular, the concept ‘mode of regulation’ and its role in establishing a 
mode of development.  The post-Marxist emphasis on discursive operations is 
combined with Jane Jenson’s (1996) citizenship regime concept which identifies the 
actual discourses that make up a citizenship regime.  Laclau and Mouffe’s post-
Marxist account of ideology draws attention to the forms of ideological struggle 
involved in citizenship regime change.  Taken together these theoretical insights 
inform a way of analysing discursive struggle over ideology and its role in the 
construction and reproduction of citizenship regimes.   
 
This chapter asks how this combined approach can usefully be applied to the 
empirical setting of New Zealand’s restructuring of unemployment and taxation 
policy.  To this end, it introduces explanatory concepts that inform understanding of 
the nature and context of political discourse.  Bourdieu’s concept of the political field 
and how it operates to truncate political discourse, and Bobbio’s concept of the 
relative form of the Left/Right dynamic in particular, inform investigations into the 
context and dynamics of ideological struggle over citizen subject positions.    
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 Chapter Three: Changing citizenship regimes   
 
This chapter outlines and builds on Jane Jenson’s (1996; 2004) theoretical framework 
for analysis of the process of constructing and embedding a citizenship regime.  It 
then investigates the role of discursive struggle in the process of undermining the 
discourses and practices of citizenship connected to New Zealand’s Keynesian 
welfare state and the corresponding, ongoing process of both constituting new citizen 
subject positions and rearticulating already formed positions, in new relations 
supportive of neoliberal reform.  In focusing on unemployment and taxation policy 
this chapter shows how ways of knowing and regulating unemployment and taxation 
governed conceptions and practices of citizenship in New Zealand’s Keynesian 
welfare state.  I argue that the transformation of the discourses, programmes and 
administrative routines for governing tax and unemployment policy that occurred in 
the 1980s and 1990s formed part of the process of constituting a new neoliberal 
citizenship regime that corresponds with a neoliberal mode of development.  
 
 
Chapter Four: From unemployment to welfare dependency: Shifting policy 
narratives in New Zealand 1970-2000. 
 
The period 1970-2000 was a period marked by an increase in the number of official 
commissions of inquiry into various aspects of welfare and unemployment policy.  
This chapter examines discontinuities in welfare and unemployment policy discourse 
emanating from the state bureaucracy over this period and charts the shift from a 
Keynesian wage earners’ welfare state policy paradigm to a neoliberal workfare 
policy paradigm.  This transformation is explored via an analysis of discontinuities in 
policy discourse focusing, firstly, on the shift from comparative to competitive 
advantage in discourses of economic management.  Secondly, the chapter examines 
the shift from a full employment wage earners’ welfare state that articulated the 
citizen’s right to a job to an emphasis on training and employability for an 
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‘unregulated’ labour market and, thirdly, the shift from passive income support to an 
active assistance approach to benefit administration.  These shifts were constitutive of 
a movement from a social democratic welfarism to a neoliberal workfare policy 
regime. 
 
 
Chapter Five: Articulating neoliberal goals with social democratic values: 
Labour’s coalition of special interests 
 
This chapter focuses on the discursive struggle between the neoliberalising Fourth 
Labour Government and citizen-based counter-hegemonic groups during the 1980s.  
It analyses the 1985 Employment Promotion Conference as a key discursive event in 
the construction and management of ‘consensus’ by the neoliberalising Labour 
Government seeking to expand its basis of support and neutralise key sectors of its 
opposition.  This chapter provides an account of how the Labour Government 
articulated the roll-out of a neoliberal mode of economic regulation with aspects of 
the established Keynesian welfare state citizenship discourse in order to popularise 
their neoliberal agenda by articulating neoliberalism and social democracy.   
 
This chapter also explores how Labour’s New Deal in Training and Employment 
Opportunities (1985) deployed a strategy of recasting the unemployed as a series of 
disadvantaged groups individualising the indices of disadvantage and pre-empting a 
discursive process later taken up in earnest by the National Government in the 1990s, 
to construct a political frontier between a chain of legitimate citizen/subjects and a 
sexed, raced, socially destructive and parasitic underclass of deficient unemployed 
beneficiaries. 
 
This chapter explores the ideological discourse strategy of the Fourth Labour 
Government which deployed the logic of difference establishing positive constitutive 
differences between the Labour Government’s neoliberal discourse and the claims of 
counter-hegemonic groups, particularly the discourses of Maori self-determination, 
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women’s equality in the labour market and those committed to devolution as part of a 
democratisation project.  This chapter analyses discursive struggle between the 
neoliberalising Labour Government and counter-hegemonic groups organised around 
unemployment.  It demonstrates how the discourses of radical democrats, liberal 
feminists and Maori radicals were repositioned in new relations which coincided with 
Labour’s project to neoliberalise social democracy via the construction of links 
between what were, until the 1990s, disparate goals.  
 
 
Chapter Six: Transforming New Zealand’s political problematic and citizenship 
regime 1980-2000: Shifting moral discourses and the taxpayer   
 
This chapter analyses parliamentary debates in New Zealand’s House of 
Representatives in the 1990s and charts the development and articulation of the 
neoliberal ideology in argumentative action.  It examines the strategic construction of 
a neoliberal mode of political identification and its links with debates over taxation 
and shifting moral discourses in the 1990s.  The construction of a neoliberal mode of 
political identification invited and enforced the subjective internalisation of the norms 
of neoliberal citizenship.  The chapter argues that the project to establish a neoliberal 
mode of political regulation based on the identity of the productive taxpayer involved 
giving a particular ideological spin to a number of apolitical terms, specifically, 
fairness, equality of opportunity and social justice.  In this connection, the chapter 
provides an account of the moral discourses underpinning the Keynesian citizenship 
regime, such as justifications for its progressive and redistributive tax regime.  It 
proceeds to document the discursive dis-articulation and re-articulation of discourses 
of taxation and taxpaying that occurred during the 1990s as part of the process of re-
interpellating citizens as taxpayers, divesting taxpaying of its specific meaning and 
re-articulating it to conceptions of social responsibility and social justice.  This 
discussion runs alongside an account of the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s 
centring political problematic which emerged, at least in part, as a consequence of 
these changing narratives of citizenship.  This chapter specifies the chain of 
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equivalences that underpinned the re-specification of the citizen as a taxpayer and 
constructed the taxpayer as the new source of political legitimacy.  Further it 
describes the process of constituting a dichotomous division of society around the 
nodal points of fairness, social justice and equality of opportunity.  Finally this 
chapter explores the changing relative form of the Left/Right dynamic in New 
Zealand.  
 
 
Chapter Seven:  Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides a summary analysis of the findings of the research and their 
significance and a brief discussion of the limitations of the research including an 
agenda for future research.  It includes a postscript discussion exploring the post-
2000 period under the stewardship of the current Labour government, which I argue, 
has continued to neoliberalise social democracy but has moved away from employing 
a coalition of minorities’ discourse of the nation towards an adapted universal 
taxpayer citizenship discourse.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
This thesis applies discourse theory to a political analysis of the respecification of 
political identity and public policy that occurred as part of the restructuring of New 
Zealand’s citizenship regime 1980-2000.  Theoretically it proceeds from a post-
Marxist theory of discourse developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) comprising a 
synthesis of recent developments in Marxist, post-structuralist, post-analytical and 
psychoanalytic theory (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000).  This is combined with 
Jenson’s (1999) theory of citizenship regime change, which synthesises a French 
Regulation School mode of theorising stability and change in the patterning of social 
relations with a historical institutionalist perspective on political struggle and path 
dependency.  
 
Principally this chapter provides an account of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of 
antagonism and its role in the production of identity as well as the operation of the 
articulatory logics of difference and equivalence in hegemonising discourse strategies 
and demonstrates the applicability of these theoretical insights to the study of the 
dynamics of citizenship regime change.  The combination of post-Marxist and 
citizenship regime theories provided me a way of conceiving how citizen subject 
positions are established and transformed in hegemonic discourse.  The post-Marxist 
approach provided a way to account for how discursive strategies are involved in the 
transformation of political subjectivity.   
 
The categories introduced by Laclau and Mouffe such as social antagonism, political 
frontiers, myths and imaginaries and the logics of equivalence and difference do not 
empirically demonstrate what fulfills these functions in time and place.  It is this gap 
that my thesis addresses.  These categories are difficult to apply in an unmediated 
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way to concrete empirical studies and this is where Jenson’s citizenship regime 
concept comes in.  It provides a framework for understanding the discourses in time 
and place that actually subjectivise meanings of citizenship.   
 
Jenson and Dobrowolsky’s concept defines the parameters of the actual discourses 
and identities that sustain and transform citizen subject positions. These include: The 
responsibility mix defining boundaries of state responsibilities and distinguishing 
these from those of markets, families and communities.  The formal recognition of 
particular rights and obligations establishing the boundaries of inclusion and 
exclusion.  Institutional mechanisms for giving access to the state, including in 
particular, modes of participation and citizen claims making and a definition of 
national identity establishing the identities that belong to the nation (Jenson and 
Dobrowolsky, 2004).   
  
Combining post-Marxist discourse theory and the citizenship regime concept 
provides a theoretical lens to examine how citizenship regimes are established, 
transformed and consolidated, in this case from a Keynesian to a neoliberal regime.   
 
The chapter is divided into two sections.  The first outlines the key assumptions of 
discourse theory and serves by way of an introduction to the discourse analytics of 
Laclau and Mouffe elaborated in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985).  It 
concludes by identifying and addressing a number of criticisms made of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s work.  The second section examines how discourse theory can be applied to 
understand the role of discursive struggle and political discourse strategies in 
citizenship regime change.  The chapter argues that a fusion of the discourse analytics 
of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Jenson’s (1996) citizenship regime concept serves 
as an epistemological grounding for a discourse analysis of New Zealand’s shifting 
mode of citizenship and political problematic and has the capacity to generate a 
compelling interpretation of New Zealand’s welfare restructuring. 
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 Discourse theory and political analysis 
 
Discourse theory demonstrates how discursive struggle shapes our present and offers 
a theoretical analytic capable of explaining historical change.  Discourse theory 
claims, first, that it is impossible to perceive social reality independently of discourse 
and, second, that discourse cannot be identified and distinguished from social 
practices.  Discourse is an active political force composed of “practices which 
systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972, p.49). This 
research focuses more exactly on policy development as occurring not in response to 
a changing real world but rather in response to discourses which attempt to interpret 
the real world.  This process is further complicated by a process of refraction whereby 
policy development occurs in response to discourses defining what is, which in turn 
transform what is.  This thesis views discourse as a theory of social causality.  
Discursive struggle engages actively in the restructuration of society.   
 
According to Foucault: 
 
Discourse is constituted by the difference between what one could 
say correctly at one period (under the rules of grammar and logic) 
and what is actually said. (1972, p.63) 
 
Thus, discourse analysis attempts to show how and why one particular discourse 
prevails rather than another.  It must go beyond simply identifying which ideas were 
important in shifting regimes of citizenship to accounting for why those particular 
ideas and not others were the ideas that mattered.  This method gives priority to 
analysis of processes of articulation.  As Foucault points out: 
 
What I am analysing in discourse is not the system of its 
language…for I am not concerned about knowing what makes it 
legitimate, or makes it intelligible, or allows it to serve as 
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communication.  The question which I ask is not about codes but 
about events: the law of existence of statements, that which rendered 
them possible—them and none other in their place: the conditions of 
their singular emergence; their correlation with other previous or 
simultaneous events, discursive or otherwise. (1991, p.59) 
 
Analysis of articulation must not only examine the relations between the discourses in 
circulation but must also account for what these “spaces of dispersion” (Foucault, 
1991, p.55) exclude.  This is because the articulatory process both 
combines/substitutes and excludes.  
 
Following Foucault, discourses are relational systems of meaning and practice that 
constitute the identities of subjects and objects.  Texts must be analysed as specific 
configurations of statements that are politically constitutive.  This kind of discourse 
analysis treats empirical data as discursive forms.  Reports, manifestos, speech 
events, policies and institutions are treated as strategic discourses.  These “little d” 
discourses are analysed as articulatory strategies deployed in the transformation of 
hegemonic discourse with a “big D” (Gee, 1990).   
 
The theory of discourse offered by Laclau and Mouffe provides a conceptual 
framework for analysing concrete discursive struggles.  The concrete ways in which 
discourse makes history cannot be understood without reference to actual historical 
discursive formations.  This research provides a historically and nationally situated 
account of the process of constructing and consolidating a neoliberal citizenship 
regime and political problematic in New Zealand.  This is achieved by mapping the 
shift from the hegemony of New Zealand’s Keynesian citizenship regime and 
political problematic, its disarticulation, and the construction and consolidation of a 
neoliberal citizenship regime paying close attention to displacements in the meaning 
of ‘unemployment’ and ‘taxation’ that shaped this shift.     
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 The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe 
 
The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) arises out of post-structuralist and 
post-Marxist modes of theorising which deconstruct the notion of closed and centred 
structures (Derrida, 1972).  Post-structuralism questions the idea of an ultimate 
foundation or centre, determining rationality or origin.  In the Marxist tradition, the 
centre is conceived as the internal economic rationality which determines the social 
formation, while in the Liberal tradition, the autonomous subject is the centring 
transcendental subject around which liberal political thought is based.  Post-
structuralists have argued that there is no privileged centre, a priori subject or 
determining instance which ultimately structures social relations (Daly, 1991, p.81).     
  
This break with the idea of an ultimate structuring centre means that there is no 
foundational source of the structure.  Discourse theory critiques the idea that there 
can be a foundation that structures the structure and yet escapes structuration itself 
(Derrida, 1978).  This recognition of the incoherence of a foundational centre gives 
rise to recognition of the social totality as an endless play of significatory 
substitutions.  If there is no foundational ground upon which social relations/identities 
are built, then social meanings are constituted out of relational significatory systems.  
Laclau argues that there are two consequences that follow from the differential nature 
of identity.  Firstly, “each identity is what it is only through its differences with all the 
others” and secondly, “if all identities depend on the differential system, unless the 
latter defines its own limits, no identity would be finally constituted” (1985, p151).  
According to Laclau, if we had a foundational perspective then we could appeal to the 
ultimate determining rationality as the source of all the differences.  Since 
foundationalism is abandoned in discourse theory, the only way to define the system 
of differences is by constituting its limits.  The only way to establish the limits of a 
system of differences is to postulate a radical otherness.   This means that the 
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totalising vision of ‘the social’ is constituted by what is constituted as external or 
threatening to it.  The vision of the social is thus achieved via antagonism. 
 
Discourses and the identities produced through them are inherently 
political entities that involve the construction of antagonisms and the 
exercise of power.  Moreover, because social systems have a 
fundamentally political character, they are always vulnerable to 
those forces that are excluded in the process of political formation. 
(Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p.9) 
 
Laclau (1985) argues that the impossibility of a universal ground does not eliminate 
the need for it: “it just transforms the ground into an empty place which can be 
partially filled in a variety of ways (the strategies of this filling is what politics is all 
about)” (p.158).  It follows that hegemonising political projects seek to arrest the 
endless play of signification and establish a temporary fixing of discourse via 
articulation.     
 
The discussion above draws attention to the central role of antagonism and 
articulation to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory of politics.  The following 
discussion explores Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of social antagonism and hegemonic 
articulatory practices.  These conceptual processes are relevant to post-Marxist, trans-
historical theoretical understandings of the nature of discourse and social change. 
However, they are also tools for understanding concrete discursive operations in 
times and places and are highly relevant to understandings of citizenship regime 
change.   
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 Social antagonism 
 
Social antagonisms reveal the points at which social meanings are contested.  
According to Torfing (1999), hegemonic articulations, as opposed to articulations per 
se, involve the negation of alternative identities, meanings and options and the people 
who identify with those meanings and options.   
 
The negation of identity tends to give rise to social antagonism.  The 
hegemonic force, which is responsible for the negation of individual 
or collective identity, will tend to construct the excluded identity as 
one of a series of threatening obstacles to the full realization of 
chosen meanings and options. (Torfing, 1999, p.120) 
 
In establishing the limits of a system of differences, a radical otherness is necessarily 
excluded because it provides the inside with its unity.  The constitutive outside is 
both what constitutes and what denies the inside.  Social antagonism is therefore 
constitutive of social identity.  The antagonistic other is constructed as blocking the 
full realisation of society.  Political actions are thus guided by the illusion that 
domesticating or annihilating the antagonistic force/identity will permit the full 
realisation of society (Torfing, 1999, p.129).    
 
The hegemonic discourse of society, or what Laclau (1990), calls myth, “a principle 
of reading a given situation” (p.61) provides a coherent space of representation.  This 
discourse becomes the “surface of inscription” (p.63) for the demands and aspirations 
of social groups.  Myths break down when the discourses that support them are 
confronted with events, identities or political projects that reveal the prevailing myth 
to be inadequate or unresponsive to new demands.  These events, discourses or 
projects force the recognition of the limits of the myth.  Recognising these limits 
creates an opening for an alternative vision of the social to emerge and become 
consolidated.   
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 Laclau and Mouffe’s exploration of the nature of antagonistic relations is relevant to 
understanding citizenship regime change as citizenship regimes erect modes of 
political identification and institutionalise acts of exclusion thus ordering social 
antagonisms in particular societies.   
 
An antagonism is seen to occur when ‘the presence of [an] other 
prevents me from being totally myself….Given this, the task of the 
discourse analyst is to explore the different forms of this 
impossibility, and the mechanisms by which the blockage of identity 
is constructed in antagonistic terms by social agents. (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis, 2000, p.10)     
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s political theory of discourse draws attention to the centrality of 
social antagonism to the construction of identities in their “antagonistic conception of 
politics” (Smith, 1998, pp.129-130).  Accordingly there is no identity without 
antagonism.  Rather than see political conflicts as the result of the clash between pre-
existing forms of positive identification, political identity construction results from 
the institution of a frontier between two sides which is constitutive of each identity. 
 
 
Hegemonic articulatory practices: The logics of equivalence and difference  
 
Articulation is the practice of establishing a relation between elements such that their 
identity is modified as a result (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.105) and is fundamental 
to hegemonic politics.  Articulatory practices institute privileged signifiers that 
establish the social as an organised system of differences (Torfing, 1999, p.109).  An 
organised system of differences, or myth of the social, is established through the 
construction of political frontiers resulting from the expansion of chains of 
equivalences.  Following Laclau and Mouffe, hegemonic practices primarily attempt 
to manage collective representations through the deployment of the cross-cutting 
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logics of equivalence and difference.  The logic of equivalence operates to emphasise 
equivalences between identities such that their differences are sublimated in 
opposition to a radical other.  This equivalential logic reshapes the differences in the 
chain transforming them into positivities and displaces antagonisms to the periphery 
of the social (the constitutive outside) (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.130). 
 
On the other hand, representations are structured according to the logic of difference, 
when their differences define their identity.  A discourse strategy employing the logic 
of difference attempts to displace existing antagonisms to the margins by combining 
the discourses and goals of antagonistic groups.  A discourse strategy employing the 
logics of equivalence on the other hand, constructs a clear cut division of social space 
between two antagonistic poles.  
 
The two logics limit each other such that neither one completely 
defines the social; the effects of a differential representation is 
suppressed insofar as it is displaced by an equivalential 
representation, and vice versa. (Laclau and Mouffe as cited in Smith, 
1998, p.174) 
 
As a method for analysing actual discourses, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory 
focuses our attention on discursive representations governed by the logics of 
difference and equivalence.  The development of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory is linked to developments in the field of linguistics, particularly the work of 
Saussure (1959) who argued that language should be understood as a social system of 
rules for combination and substitution.  Discursive representations governed by the 
logic of equivalence entail different signifiers substituting for each other, while the 
logic of difference combines different signifiers.  Thus all identities within a 
linguistic system are relational and differential identities (Torfing, 1999, p.87).   
 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, the social is open and precarious; social 
relationships are constituted on the basis of a logic of radical contingency.  “Societies 
must be understood as products of a dispersed plurality of practices with no necessary 
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centre or unifying principle” (Jessop, 1990, 243).  The absence of a structuring centre 
renders absolute closure impossible.9  However, discourse does achieve the 
establishment of temporary structural orders and arrests the play of substitutions 
through the establishment of precarious centres.  These centres are established by way 
of the production of privileged signifiers that shape the identities of the other 
signifiers establishing a chain of signification.  
 
The logic of difference establishes a relation of combination between two discursive 
elements, which is mutually constitutive of their identities.  This occurs through a 
process in rhetorical discourse that permits one thing to be differentiated or compared 
and contrasted with another in order to differentially establish their mutual identities.  
For instance, within liberal discourse, nature is compared and contrasted with 
rationality and the differential relationship between the two terms is constitutive of 
their identity.  Nature is the state in which a generalised struggle ensues of all against 
all.  It is absence of property law and thus the absence of rationality.  Rationality is 
the liberal ‘order’ and nature is ‘disorder’.  
 
According to Laclau and Mouffe: 
 
If we remain in the field of differences, we remain in the field of an 
infinitude which makes it impossible to think any frontier and which, 
consequently, dissolves the concept of ‘formation’.  That is, limits 
only exist insofar as a systematic ensemble of difference can be cut 
out as a totality  with regard to something beyond  them, and it is 
only through this cutting out that the totality constitutes itself as 
formation. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.143)   
 
Despite the relative openness of the social, discourse achieves a partial fixing of 
meaning.  This partial fixing of meaning is necessary because without the fictitious10 
                                                 
9 Absolute closure refers to the permanent fixation of meaning.  
10 The fixing is fictitious because no discourse can totalise the field of possible meanings.  The fixing 
of discourse achieved by hegemonic articulations is temporary and unstable. 
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fixing of meaning there would be no meaning. This fixing is partial and ultimately 
temporary because those identities which are not fixed as a differential identity within 
a discourse, but negate the discourse, escape the differential logic of the discourse in 
action and ultimately threaten to subvert it.   
 
The logic of difference is also circumscribed by the logic of equivalence which 
produces chains of equivalential signifiers.  A chain of equivalence is a chain of 
signifiers which substitute for each other, creating a paradigmatic relationship (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985, pp.127-128).   
 
Two terms, to be equivalent, must be different—otherwise there 
would be a simple identity.  On the other hand, the equivalence 
exists only through the act of subverting the differential character of 
those terms. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.128) 
 
The construction of a chain of equivalence, for example, between the neoliberal 
conception of the human individual as ‘rational economic man’ and neoliberal 
conceptions of ‘democracy as the market’ is achieved by constructing an equivalence 
between a particular version of freedom as central to humanness and the market as 
the collective expression of that freedom/humanness.  The construction of a chain of 
equivalence between the two terms involves a loss of meaning (an emptying), as a 
whole corpus of meanings associated with humanness and democracy are displaced in 
order to achieve the paradigmatic relationship between the neoliberal human 
individual and market democracy.  
 
The logic of equivalence operates by floating and emptying.  This means that the 
expansion of a chain of equivalence requires the floating of the privileged term in 
order for it to attach to other signifiers.  This expansion of the chain implies an 
enrichment of meaning.  However, what is achieved through expansion is the 
opposite as:  
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The more the chain expands, the more differential features of each of 
the links will have to be dropped in order to keep alive what the 
equivalential chain attempts to express. (Laclau, 1996, p.209) 
 
A chain of equivalence is established when a privileged signifier shapes the meanings 
of the other signifiers in the chain.  For example, in the Keynesian welfare state, the 
privileged identity of the worker shaped the identity of the wife, the young and the 
retired insofar as each of these categories were defined in terms of their relationship 
to the worker identity (Jenson, 1999, p.6). 
 
The expansion of the logic of difference, on the other hand, occurred as a result of the 
breakdown of the chain of equivalence established by the Keynesian welfare state.  
New socioeconomic problems such as stagflation, and political identities such as 
feminists, contested the discourses of the Keynesian welfare state extending the play 
of difference.  According to Torfing: 
 
The relation between difference and equivalence is, in other words, 
undecidable.  The discursive identities are inscribed both in 
signifying chains that stress their differential value, and in signifying 
chains that emphasise their equivalence.  The tension between the 
differential and the equivalential aspects of discursive identities is 
unresolvable, but political struggles may succeed in emphasising one 
of the two aspects. (Torfing, 1999, p.97) 
 
Overdetermination relates to the distinction between relations of difference and 
relations of equivalence.  There are two forms of overdetermination, according to 
Laclau and Mouffe: condensation and displacement.  Condensation is the fusion of 
discursive identities into a unity.  For example, the anti-globalisation protests of 
recent years condense a range of democratic demands into an anti-system discourse.  
Condensation is the result of relations of equivalence. 
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Displacement concerns the transferral of the meaning of one moment of discourse to 
another moment of discourse (Torfing, 1999, p.98).  For example, those behaviours 
identified as threatening to the rational social order envisaged by the neoliberal 
political project, such as idleness, dependency, poverty, criminality, new familial 
forms, etc. are displaced onto the threatening subject of the beneficiary.  The 
unemployed beneficiary is the embodiment of a certain lack/absence—the 
impossibility which prevents society from becoming a fully sutured positivity.  Thus 
the neoliberal social order exists only insofar as it displaces its own contradictions on 
to a fictive character.  The constitution of this fictive character is conceptually 
necessary for the neoliberal regime as it provides it with a unity by way of 
constituting its limits. 
 
The unemployed beneficiary is constituted in and by processes of condensation and 
displacement.  The contradictions of the neoliberal discursive formation are displaced 
onto the fictive character of the unemployed beneficiary in order to define the unity 
of the neoliberal social order.  And the mass of contradictions and impossibilities 
inherent in the neoliberal vision of society such as, the contradiction between work 
ethic and familial responsibility, are also condensed in the figure of the unemployed 
beneficiary.  In this way, the logics of difference and equivalence operate 
simultaneously to construct a political frontier effect in which the unemployed 
beneficiary represents the constitutive outside of the neoliberal social order under 
construction.  
 
Within the political field certain signifiers float.  This means that they acquire 
different meanings in different contexts.  For instance ‘democracy’ means something 
different at a New Zealand Labour Party conference than at a New Zealand National 
Party conference.  It has one content within a neoliberal, social democratic discourse 
and a different content when articulated within a neo-conservative, neoliberal 
discourse.  According to Torfing (1999), this does not mean we have a polysemic 
coexistence of different versions of democracy, as the different versions tend to 
negate and substitute for each other in the course of political struggle.  This is of 
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central importance to this research because it speaks to the centrality of antagonism in 
determining identity.11
 
The relational and differential character of linguistic identities means that language 
constitutes a system in which no element can be defined independently of others 
(Laclau, 1993, p.432).  The relational nature of discourse means that the signifier 
‘citizen’ has no positive content outside of a particular chain of signification.  This 
signifier has content only when it is perceived alongside a particular conception of the 
economy, the nation, democracy, etc.  Thus the signifier acquires meaning via its 
articulations with other signifiers.   
 
Once a signifier becomes articulated within a chain of signification its meaning is 
derived from its relationship to the other signifiers in the chain.  All of the moments 
in the chain while retaining their differences, can substitute for each other and thereby 
evoke the same discursive unity.  For example, within the neoliberal discourse, the 
signifiers market, democracy, autonomous subject, etc., whilst retaining their 
differential meaning, point to something other than themselves, in this case the 
neoliberal social order.       
 
A hegemonic chain of signification consists of a number of complementary 
discursive identities which, taken together, constitute a particular interpretive frame.  
An interpretive frame constitutes “a way of acknowledging what is ‘true’ and 
                                                 
11 The centrality of antagonism distinguishes a Laclau-Mouffian analytic with a neo-Foucauldian 
approach.  Laclau and Mouffe stress the centrality of ideological struggle to the production of 
discursive formations.  Foucault, on the other hand, has been criticised for an apparent neutrality with 
regard to politics.  However, Foucault’s genealogical approach is sharply political insofar as it 
provides a method for “an insurrection of subjugated knowledges” (Mahon, 1992) with the purpose of 
opposing the effects of hegemonic discourse and is for this reason is hardly apolitical.  The charge of 
political neutrality, however, possibly stems from Foucault’s and some neo-Foucauldians’ over-
emphasis of the polysemic coexistence of distinct and contradictory discourse.  Although all discourse 
contains contradictions, the crucial point made by Laclau and Mouffe is that different discourses 
negate and substitute for each other in the course of political struggle.  This means that while 
alternative or competing discourses may not be prohibited by the establishment of a hegemonic 
discursive formation these discourses are discredited as belonging to the category of ‘false’.  These 
processes of exclusion involved in the ordering of social antagonisms are central to determining the 
meaning-giving limits of the predominant discourse. 
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excluding what is ‘false’ ” (Hall, 1988a, p.51), thereby allowing the bearers of the 
interpretive frame to interpret events and new discourses in a way that both reinforces 
the premises of their interpretive frame and informs a practical agenda.   
 
The previous discussion points to the significance of articulatory strategies in the 
production of meaning.  Processes of articulation are constitutive of hegemonic 
discourses.  According to Laclau and Mouffe, articulation is “any practice 
establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result 
of the articulatory practice” (1985, p.105).  This means that a hegemonic discourse is 
not just a collection of disparate discourses clumsily stitched together.  Rather, the 
process of articulation modifies the discourse elements emphasising their 
compatibility and excluding their contradictions.  According to Laclau, “hegemonic 
articulatory politics involves the articulation of different discourse elements in such a 
way as to neutralise their antagonistic contents” (1977, p.161 quoted in Morley and 
Chen, 1996, p.119).  
 
Hegemonic articulation is defined by Torfing as “attempts to dis- and re-articulate 
social elements in and through antagonistic struggles in order to become hegemonic” 
(Torfing, 1999, p.298).  Hegemony is the end goal of hegemonic articulation and 
consists in the consolidation of a hegemonic discourse and its materialisation in a 
social formation.  Hegemonic social formations such as the Keynesian welfare state 
and ascendant neoliberal mode of development are the consequence of hegemonic 
practices of articulation.  They constitute articulations of discourses that provide the 
chain of signification supportive of a political project.  These hegemonic chains are 
contingent articulations of different discourses which inform social practice (Torfing, 
1999, p.103).  
Torfing, drawing on Laclau and Mouffe, defines hegemony as:  
 
…an articulatory practice instituting nodal points that partially fix 
the meaning of the social in an organised system of difference.  The 
discursive system articulated by a hegemonic project is delimited by 
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specific political frontiers resulting from the expansion of chains of 
equivalence. (Torfing, 1999, p.109) 
 
The expansion of a chain of equivalence occurs through the construction of its limits.  
These frontiers are political because they constitute the space occupied by alternative 
identities and discourses which negate the identities and discourses articulated within 
the chain.  A hegemonic chain of equivalence is constituted out of the representation 
of this political frontier because its unity is partially constituted through the exclusion 
of that which it is not.  For example, the unity of the neoliberal discourse is 
constituted out of the creation of a social division between the responsible, self-
sufficient, employed, citizen/taxpayers and dependent, idle, criminal 
beneficiary/immigrant non-citizens.  
 
This displacement contributes to the objectification of the social, as 
it facilitates the fantasmatic construction of a liberated society of 
fully achieved identities by means of holding out the promise of the 
annihilation of the enemy which hitherto has denied society its self-
identity. (Torfing, 1998, p.92) 
 
Political forces engaged in the pursuit of hegemonic projects assemble links between 
discourses in order to construct a hegemonic chain of signification, which interpret 
the historical experience of political subjects and offer them a mode of political 
identification that is linked to a new political agenda.  This process is hegemonic 
when it involves the negation of alternative discourses and the identities of those 
social forces identified with those alternatives. 
 
In periods marked by undecidability or in French Regulation School terms, periods 
out-of-regulation, a floating of signifiers occurs.  This means that discourses that 
were once fixed in a hegemonic chain become disarticulated and float.  For example, 
Labourism was articulated within New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state during the 
post-war era.  Once the Keynesian welfare state began to unravel, the discourse of 
social democracy was disarticulated from Labourism and began to float in search of 
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new articulations which would once again provide social democracy with a politically 
relevant discourse and agenda.   
  
Ideological processes establish a fixing of discourse that converts the variety of 
antagonistic meanings and options into a hegemonic discourse which limits 
contestability and involves a filling of terms such as justice, democracy, economic 
renewal etc. (Norval, 2000b, p.323).  Political struggles are thus struggles over the 
filling of empty signifiers.  Empty signifiers are those signifiers which attempt to 
shape the identities of the other signifiers in the articulated chain and thereby 
represent the absent fullness12 of a community (Laclau, 1994).  
 
 
Criticisms of Laclau and Mouffe: The discursive and the non-discursive 
 
Discourse provides the terms upon which any actual historical experience is 
understood.  This means, for example, that although high unemployment levels have 
material effects, these effects are established by the discourses in which ‘high 
unemployment’ appears.  The meaning and treatment of unemployment depends on 
the discourses which describe it as, for example, an indicator of the failure of the 
capitalist mode of development or, alternatively, as a sign of economic failures to 
which governments are accountable, or as a necessary condition for the achievement 
of labour market flexibility.   
 
Laclau and Mouffe have been criticised for a tendency to reduce everything to 
discourse.  However, while this discourse reductionism may be a possibility built into 
their mode of theorising it is an unnecessary tendency.  Although all practices are 
inscribed by discourse this does not mean that all practices are only discourse.  While 
Laclau and Mouffe may have provided a theory of discourse which shows how social 
                                                 
12 The term absent fullness refers to the idea that while hegemonising discourse seeks to achieve a 
‘fullness’ by totalising the field of meaning, this project is ultimately unachievable as a number of 
discourses must be displaced in the constitution of a hegemonic discourse.     
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formations are established through hegemonic articulatory practices, it does not 
follow that they do not recognise how non-discursive factors also circumscribe the 
field of discourse and discursive struggle.  For example, Laclau (1990) argues that 
dislocation occurs in a situation in which there is always a relative structuration of the 
social (p.43).  This means that events cannot be discursively represented in any 
possible way.  While there may be multiple possibilities the possibilities are 
circumscribed by material and discursive conditions.  
 
This research does not view discourse as the sole determinant of citizenship regime 
change, but does argue that it is a pre-eminent causal factor.  Citizenship regime 
change depends on the positional advantages and resources of differently positioned 
social groups represented in discourse.  However, it is discourse that structures these 
non-discursive relations.  Hegemonic discursive formations organise, represent and 
regulate concrete social formations.   
 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982, p.66) point out that even within the context of a system 
of relations established in and by discourse, institutions and practices must also 
somehow sustain discourse.  Although the political field may be dominated by the 
battle over ideas, a successful discourse must respond to a set of non-discursive 
constraints.  While hegemonic formations condition the material/non-discursive 
relations with which they are articulated, the material/non-discursive relations either 
sustain the discourse and thereby lead to its consolidation or, as the case may be, 
contradict the discourse and ultimately lead to its disarticulation. 
   
While discourses can be disrupted and marginalised when events do not fit the terms 
of the discourse, this lack of fit does not always lead to the disarticulation of the 
discourse.  Some discourses may lack a correspondence with primary relations and 
may simply be promoted by a number of agents.  This non-correspondence between 
primary relations and discourse can be overcome, as discourses can become self-
fulfilling.  For example, the neoliberal discourse of the market alters people’s 
58 
expectations and induces them to operate in the world according to market 
imperatives.  In this way discourse can produce a movement from theory to practice. 
 
Criticisms of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory also relate to their post-Marxism, 
which, according to the critiques, is rather too post-Marxist (Geras, 1988, pp.14-61; 
Geras, 1990).  Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxism is inspired by post-structuralism 
which rejects the Marxist insistence of the economic as the underlying determining 
centre of the social totality.  Although the economic as a discursive formation may 
play a central role in structuration, it does not function, as in structural Marxism, as a 
theory of history in Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxist account.  Their theory of 
discourse is to a large degree conditioned by their opposition to structural Marxism.  
The main criticism relating to Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxism focuses on alleged 
relativism resultant from their expansion of the field of political contingency.  The 
field of political contingency is expanded in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory because the 
social lacks a fixed centre.  A number of political projects offer competing centres.  
The openness of the social, central to Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, as well as their 
rejection of a clear distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive, implies 
that there are no limits to the possible articulations within a dislocated social 
structure.  Torfing points out, however, that their insistence that everything is 
discursively constituted should not be understood as meaning “that everything can be 
discursively constituted in any possible way” (1999, pp.152-3).  While the social is 
open, not everything is possible.  This point is relevant to the discussion of discourses 
of social justice, fairness and equality of opportunity in Chapter Six because what 
matters in a study of the hegemonic articulatory discourse strategies deployed in 
political struggle is the actual usage of concepts. For example, the concept ‘equality’ 
has no necessary correspondence with recognition of differences between people and 
the idea that they should be reduced.  However, the political use of the concept 
‘equality’ across time and place has deployed this shared meaning.  Nevertheless, the 
discourse of equality cannot be reduced to this core component as the political-
ideological use of the term is contingent and fillable and can be articulated with 
different discourses and projects that alter its meaning.   
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 Following Laclau, social dislocation13, which occurs when a discursive formation is 
destabilised by undomesticatable events, widens the field of the possible.  However, 
this takes place within a determinate situation of a relative structuration of the social 
which places limits on possible articulations (Torfing, 1999, p.153).  
 
…the dislocation of a structure does not mean that everything 
becomes possible or that all symbolic frameworks disappear, since 
no dislocation could take place in that psychotic universe: a structure 
must be there for it to be dislocated.  The situation of dislocation is 
that of a lack which involves a structural reference.  There is a 
temporalization of spaces or a widening of the field of the possible, 
but this takes place in a determinate situation: that is one in which 
there is always a relative structuration (Laclau, 1990, p.43).   
 
This means that new discourses are established in relation to what is already in place.  
Some discursive articulations become sedimented and so while they are contingent 
insofar as the potential exists for these elements to be articulated into different 
moments, there can be powerful discursive and material barriers to this happening.  
While the relative structuration of the social rescues Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory from charges of discourse reductionism, it highlights a gap in their theory 
insofar as they fail to fully theorise the nature of the ‘relative structuration of the 
social’ (c.f. Nash, 2002).  Contrary to the claims of their critics, Laclau and Mouffe 
do not deny the existence of real events but rather view discourse as organising 
certain sequences of events into narratives which are defined by a certain society as 
real and or serious.  In holding this view they do not deny the existence of a 
materiality of events; rather, their argument is that our access to this materiality is 
mediated by hegemonic articulations of discourse.  
 
                                                 
13 Dislocation is defined by Laclau as the moment of failure and subversion of a system of 
representation (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p.105). 
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 A French Regulation School supplement 
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s failure to fully theorise the relative structuration of the social 
can be remedied by supplementing their discourse analytics with the French 
Regulation School’s theory of regulation (Aglietta, 1998; Lipietz, 1994; Boyer, 
1988).  Members of the French Regulation School14 attempt to account for historical 
development of hegemonic formations defined as in regulation punctuated by 
ruptures in which the contradictions put on hold by the mode of regulation en regime 
can no longer be contained and a period out-of-regulation ensues.  According to 
Aglietta (1998), a mode of regulation consists of mediation mechanisms that modify 
the tensions between the individual and society.  The construction of a mode of 
regulation depends in large part on political struggles.  The representational practices 
of citizenship are important to this process because citizenship regimes create a 
compatibility or mediate between individual goals and membership of society, 
orienting citizens to the conditions necessary for stable economic and social 
reproduction (Lipietz, 1994, p.339).  
 
The French Regulation School offers a mid-range historically grounded account of 
the construction, embedding and breakdown of modes of regulation, which grounds a 
post-Marxist discourse analysis of historically developed sets of practices and 
meanings of citizenship.  Citizenship discourses can be analysed as part of the 
hegemonising political projects to establish hegemonic modes of regulation.  The 
political component of a mode of regulation includes a citizenship regime.  Jenson 
and Phillip’s (1996) concept of a citizenship regime establishes how discourses of 
subjectivity are organised politically to support particular political projects.  
According to Jenson and Phillips (1996), a citizenship regime establishes a 
paradigmatic representation of the model citizen and a system of inter-subjectivity 
that enumerates interests and establishes the appropriate set of relations between 
                                                 
14 Both post-Marxism and French Regulation School theory developed out of Althusser’s Marxism. 
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citizen categories.  A citizenship regime denotes the representational system that 
establishes the forms of citizen subjectivity that must be mobilised if a mode of 
regulation is to be established and reproduced. 
 
The French Regulation School concepts of a mode of regulation that establishes a 
mode of development fills in the missing account of the relative structuration of the 
social and provides a spatial and temporal grounding for a post-Marxist discourse 
analysis.    
 
 
Citizenship regimes 
 
A citizenship regime includes a mode of political identification and a corresponding 
institutional matrix that corresponds with, and is a component of, a mode of 
regulation.  Jenson’s (1999) exposition of the discursive and practical connections 
between Canadian citizens and the state in the post-war period is underpinned by an 
analytical framework for understanding changing citizenship regimes.  Her 
citizenship regime concept is a useful theoretical construct for guiding our 
interpretations of contemporary democratic citizenship because it draws attention to 
the role and place of representational practices in ordering social and economic 
relations.  According to Jenson:  
 
The concept of citizenship regime denotes institutional 
arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape 
concurrent policy decisions and expenditures of states, problem 
definitions by states and citizens, and claims making by citizens. 
(Jenson, 1999, p.3) 
 
A citizenship regime is a central component of a mode of regulation which orders 
economic, political and social relations.  As such, when a mode of regulation enters 
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crisis, so does the citizenship regime embedded within it (Jenson and Phillips, 1996, 
p.113).  Discourse plays a dynamic role in reorganising representative practices and 
meanings.  It cannot be separated out and examined within a circumscribed field of 
ideology separate from the field of institutions or production relations.  Rather it 
needs to be theorised and examined in conjunction with a theory of regulation in 
order to take account of the social embeddedness of the capitalist economy.  While 
this thesis analyses shifting citizenship discourses and emphasises the interplay of the 
political logics of equivalence and difference in their dis-articulation and re-
articulation, it is important to place this analysis within the wider context of the 
neoliberalisation of the global mode of development.   
 
This thesis therefore combines Laclau and Mouffe’s political theory of discourse, 
which informs a mapping of discursive changes, with the regulatory explanatory 
account of the dynamics of citizenship change offered by Jenson’s (1996, 1999, 
2004) concept of a citizenship regime.   
 
According to Jenson (2004), there are four elements of a citizenship regime that 
contribute to ordering the space of citizens’ representation and give content to the 
institutions and practices that sustain it.  Firstly, a citizenship regime establishes the 
“responsibility mix” (Jenson, 2004, p.156).  This means that discourses and practices 
of citizenship define the boundaries of state, market, community, family and 
individual responsibility.  Secondly, a citizenship regime recognises particular rights 
and obligations and in so doing “establishes the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion 
of a political community” (p.157).  Thirdly, a citizenship regime constitutes 
governing practices including discursive rules and modes of citizen access to the state 
particularly the legitimacy of certain types of claims making by establishing which 
discourses are legitimately mobilised in citizens’ and social movement claims 
making.  Fourthly, “a citizenship regime contributes to the definition of the nation” 
(p.157).  Each construction of the nation implies a set of relative identities or a 
system of inter-subjectivity connected to that conception of nationhood which 
expresses and directs the legitimate social relations among and within citizen 
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categories.  Following Jenson, “a citizenship regime encodes within it a paradigmatic 
representation of identities, formative of the ‘national’ as well as the ‘model citizen’, 
the ‘second class citizen’ and the ‘non citizen’” (Jenson, 1999, 4).  A citizenship 
regime, therefore, consists of a chain of linked discourses and subject positions which 
establish what Anderson (1983) has called an “imagined community”.  Anderson 
describes national communities as imagined because “the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even 
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (p.168).  
According to Calhoun, imagined communities are constituted in and by political 
discourse:  
 
People without direct interpersonal relations with each other are led 
by the mediation of the world of political symbols to imagine 
themselves as members of communities defined by common 
ascriptive characteristics, personal tastes, habits or concerns. (1991, 
p.108)     
 
Citizenship regimes consist of discourses of community and personhood that position 
the subject within a moral framework that orients their political judgements.  A mode 
of political identification is a central component of a citizenship regime and mobilises 
political subjects to actively identify as particular kinds of citizen subjects.  
Following Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000), during periods of dislocation when the 
contingency of discursive structures is made visible, identities connected to the 
disarticulating structures are disrupted.  This situation induces an identity crisis in the 
subject who actively searches for a replacement subject position to identify with. 
 
The political subject is forced to take decisions—or identify with 
certain political projects and the discourses they articulate—when 
social identities are in crisis and structures need to be recreated.  In 
Lacanian terms, the emergence of political subjectivity is the result 
of a lack in the structure.  It is this lack in the structure that ‘causes’ 
subjects to identify with those social constructions that seem capable 
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of suturing the rift in the symbolic order. (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 
2000, p.14)  
 
Citizens actively identify with modes of citizenship and the political projects they 
articulate (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p.14).  Different political projects seek to 
inculcate different subjectivities. 
 
 
Contestation and decontestation 
 
The distinction between periods in regulation and out of regulation draws attention to 
discursive processes of ‘contestation’ and ‘decontestation’ elaborated by Norval 
(2000b).  For example, when a policy approach is subject to contestation, alternative 
perspectives are legitimately expressed and debated.  Decontestation is the process by 
which what is the result of historically specific instances of hegemonic articulation 
becomes naturalised and counter-hegemonic discourses are displaced to the 
constitutive outside.  The movement from contestation to decontestation is thus of 
particular importance to understanding how certain discourses become hegemonic.     
 
Out-of-regulation periods feature increased contestation whereas in-regulation 
periods feature decontestation.  Correspondingly, Laclau (1990) distinguishes 
between ‘the political’ and ‘the social’.  In-regulation periods correspond with 
Laclau’s theorisation of the social while out-of-regulation periods correspond with his 
theorisation of the political.   
 
‘The social’ is the routinisation or sedimentation of discourse and the 
construction of ‘objective’ institutions and structures.  ‘The 
political’, on the other hand, is the reactivation or rediscovery of the 
fact that what are taken to be ‘objective’ social forms are actually 
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nothing more than contingent constructions that may be reconfigured 
in new ways. (Nash, 2002, p.104)  
 
During periods in regulation, the space of political contingency and contestation is 
circumscribed by the hegemony of ‘objective’ social forms.  During out-of-regulation 
periods, the space of ‘the political’ expands as ‘objective’ social forms are recognised 
as contingent and subjected to contestation.   
 
Nash (2002) argues that political sociology is a necessary addition to post-Marxism.  
She suggests that Laclau and Mouffe’s radical constructivism is inadequate to 
theorising the social and historical conditions in which structures and identities are 
actually formed.  Their emphasis on deconstruction makes it impossible to theorise 
the way in which “social forms are instituted in hegemonic discourse” (p.105).  
However, while Nash identifies some limitations in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory for 
theorising the relative fixity of ‘the social’, their analytics is better equipped to 
theorise periods out of regulation in which the space of political contingency expands.      
 
The French Regulation School’s distinction between periods in regulation and times 
out of regulation is useful for understanding processes of identification which 
produce specific subjects in specific times and places.  Out-of-regulation periods are 
characterised by a decentring of discursive structures which destabilise pre-existing 
identities inducing identity crises.  Following Gramsci, an ‘organic crisis’ 
corresponds with the collapse of popular identifications with institutionalised subject 
positions and political imaginaries (Smith, 1998, p.164).  Out-of-regulation periods 
are characterised by both the dis-articulation of pre-existing identities and the re-
articulation of new identities and this process is governed by the political discursive 
logics of equivalence and difference. 
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 Subject positions and subjectivity 
 
Discourse theory has developed out of a radicalising of Gramsci’s and Althusser’s 
concepts of politics and ideology, drawing on post-structuralist understandings of 
identity formation (Howarth and Stravrakakis, 2000, p.5).  In discourse theory, 
processes of identification which produce subjectivity are central.  In discourse 
theory, identities do not exist prior to or outside of specific hegemonic formations.  
Hegemonising articulatory practices invoke particular subject positions and 
encourage individuals to reshape their action guiding self-understandings in 
accordance with these.  Discourse theorists distinguish between subject positions and 
political subjectivity.  The concept of subject positions draws on the work of Foucault 
and designates the positioning of subjects in the discursive structure.  It challenges 
the idea of a unified subject with objective interests and instead argues for a 
discursive structure offering multiple points of identification.   
 
Within each society, each social agent is inscribed in a multiplicity 
of social relations—not only social relations of production but also 
the social relations, among others, of sex, race, nationality, and 
vicinity.  All these social relations determine positionalities or 
subject positions, and every social agent is therefore the locus of 
many subject positions. (Mouffe, 1988, p.89) 
 
Political subjectivity, on the other hand, designates the active process by which 
subjects come to identify as a particular type of subject.  During periods of social 
dislocation, hegemonic projects offer particular interpretations of subjective 
experience and encourage their take up.  “In short, it is the failure of the structure, 
that ‘compels’ the subject to act, to assert anew its subjectivity” (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis, 2000, p.13).   
 
The idea of a mode of political identification which requires the subject to actively 
identify with it is important to understanding processes by which citizenship regimes 
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are established and consolidated and is of central importance to this research which 
begins historically with the breakdown of the dynamic synergy between the 
discourses of the Keynesian welfare state and the discourses and practices of 
citizenship it hegemonised.  The hegemony of the Keynesian welfare state was no 
longer sustained by the events that followed the world economic crisis of the 1970s.  
Stagflation, in particular, could not be integrated within the Keynesian welfare state 
discourse and thereby challenged its coherence and capacity to domesticate social 
reality.  Contradictions internal to the Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime, 
particularly the contradiction between a workerist conception of the citizen and a 
expanded conception of equality that emerged in response to social movement 
discourses of the 1970s, also contributed to the disarticulation of the Keynesian 
welfare state hegemonic formation (see Chapter Six).  This period was characterised 
by dislocation in which the contingency of discursive structures was evident 
(Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p.13). 
 
The breakdown of the stable relationship between the Keynesian welfare state 
discursive formation and its mode of regulation that occurred during the 1970s led to 
a proliferation of floating signifiers and dislocated identities—an unfixing of 
discursive chains.  Crisis periods call for the development of a hegemonic project 
capable of rearticulating the floating signifiers within a new discourse that promises 
security, economic renewal and stable identities. 
 
 
Processes of identification 
 
Jenson (1990) points out that not all historical moments are equally open to the 
recognition of new actors.  During periods in regulation there is relative consensus 
about the names of the primary actors and their interests.  A number of structuring 
discourses are decontested.  Conflict is primarily within the terms of the ongoing 
system of representation (Jenson, 1990, p.665).  When a mode of regulation enters a 
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crisis new primary actors are represented and linked to alternative modes of 
regulation.   The crisis of the Keynesian welfare state destabilised previously 
hegemonic citizenship identifications and created the need for a new system of inter-
subjectivity creative of a privileged universal social subject and subordinate 
categories.  This occurred via the re-articulation of disarticulated subject positions in 
new relations.   
 
Out-of-regulation periods are creative of identity crises as people become disaffected 
with previously embedded subject positions, and hegemonising political projects 
compete to offer new subject positions with which people can identify. 
 
More and more subjects become unusually open to innovative 
political discourses; they therefore begin to experience the network 
of social structures into which they have been thrown as 
antagonistically blocking them from becoming what they believe to 
be their true selves—a phantasmatic construction that is itself always 
shifting.  As this experience of lack becomes more acute, competing 
political forces will attempt to ‘hegemonise’ the social: they will 
attempt to offer their specific ‘systems of narration’ as a 
compensatory framework, and they will represent that framework as 
the only one that can resolve the identity crisis. (Laclau in Smith, 
1998, p.165)  
 
Shifts in modes of political identification are thus complex processes involving the 
reconstruction of identities and political values.  New discourses of the subject linked 
to particular political agendas are offered, taken up and consolidated.  
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Representing citizens: the universal and the particular 
 
Discourse theory seeks to rethink notions of the universal and the particular in order 
to account for their mutual conditioning.  In discourse theory, the universal and the 
particular are entangled in an undecidable game (Torfing, 1999, p.168).  The 
modernist project privileges the universal over the particular to the point where the 
universal rationality seeks to ultimately colonise particularity and achieve a rational 
scientific social order.  Advocates of multiculturalism, on the other hand, view 
universal principles as the preserve of western imperialism and advocate for a radical 
particularism (Torfing, 1999, pp.170-1).   Torfing points out the problem with both 
political projects stems from the impossibility of asserting a particularism without 
reference to a universal value.  He states: 
 
The struggle to gain respect for the integrity of the group has to be 
waged in terms of everybody’s right to the same.  However, if the 
reference to universal values is the condition of possibility for the 
advancement of the interests of a particular group, it is at the same 
time the condition of impossibility for the maintenance of its 
particularity. (Torfing, 1999, p.172)  
  
The relation between the universal and the particular is important to a study of 
citizenship regime change because the myth of the social cannot be represented but 
needs to be represented.  Its (inadequate) representation requires some particular 
identity to assume the function of representing the whole.  This particular identity 
must stand in for the whole community.  This particular identity, “by making its own 
particularity the signifying body of a universal representation comes to occupy – 
within the system of differences as a whole – a hegemonic role” (Laclau, 1995a, 
p.153).  That some particular identity functions to represent the community as a 
whole in hegemonic discourse is central to our understanding of citizenship. 
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 Ideological struggle and the Left/Right dynamic: Transforming the political 
problematic  
 
A radical restructuring of New Zealand’s political problematic and citizenship regime 
took place between 1980 and 2000.  This restructuring is commonly associated with 
the movement from a Keynesian social democratic regulatory paradigm to one based 
in neoliberalism and neo-classical economics.  Although arguably this shift began in 
the late 1970s, the most decisive break in policy came after the election of the Fourth 
Labour Government in 1984.  The policy goals and priorities applied to guide policy-
making changed radically after 1984.   Driving, and being driven by, this process of 
policy change was the reconfiguration of the representation practices of citizenship, a 
restructuring of New Zealand’s political field and associated changes in the 
discourses of policy-making.   
  
This research focuses on the role of ideological discourse in transformations in 
unemployment and taxation policy and explores the movement of neoliberal 
hegemonic articulations through major sites of the state: the bureaucracy, state 
institutions and the political field during the 1980s and 1990s.  The discursive 
discontinuities in the constitution of unemployment and taxation provide an entry 
point through which issues of political conflict and identity are analysed.  The 
hegemonising articulatory discourse strategies deployed in New Zealand’s process of 
neoliberalisation produced a re-description and re-ordering of the targets of 
representational political rhetoric and a restructuring of unemployment and taxation 
discourses that transformed New Zealand’s citizenship regime.      
 
Broadly speaking, this thesis examines the role of discursive struggle in the process 
by which one citizenship regime replaced another.  It examines the conditions under 
which ‘unemployment’ and ‘taxation’ appear in various forms of governmental, 
political and social movement discourse in order to understand how changing ways of 
discoursing about and regulating unemployment and taxation both express and 
71 
constitute a wider ideological shift in New Zealand’s political field.  For instance, 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, discursive struggle over unemployment 
centred on discontinuities between policymakers who constructed unemployment as a 
way of acting on the social and the economic, and social movement groups who 
mobilised a particular discourse of unemployment when they demanded devolution 
and social rights.  Rather than view ‘unemployment’ and ‘taxation’ as marking a 
relatively stable set of meanings, this research maps the discontinuities in the ways of 
interpreting and acting on unemployment and taxation and treats these discontinuities 
as reflecting political struggle.  Two paradigmatic discourses of unemployment and 
taxation are mapped, one that is an element of the Keynesian welfare state political 
problematic and the other which makes up part of the neoliberal political problematic.  
These distinct political ‘problematics’ are examined and treated as separated from 
each other by a period of transition from the Keynesian welfare state mode of 
development to a neoliberal mode of development.   
 
This research applies the discourse analytics of Laclau and Mouffe to guide an 
analysis of discursive struggle over the constitution of ‘unemployment’ and ‘taxation’ 
in New Zealand during the period 1980 through 2000.  It assumes that changes to 
unemployment and taxation policy were the outcome of contingent discursive 
struggles, which, taken together, expressed and constituted a new hegemonic political 
problematic and citizenship regime.  The role of politics is foregrounded in this 
process because the movement from one political problematic and citizenship regime 
to another ultimately depends on hegemonic articulatory practices.  As already noted, 
hegemonic articulatory practices involve attempts to dis- and re-articulate various 
social, political and economic discourses. 
 
The following discussion develops the conceptual framework built around the 
primacy of ideological struggle over discourse and its role in the constitution of social 
identity, and offers a set of organising concepts for understanding the strategic 
context and nature of ideological struggle in citizenship regime change.  It descends 
from the broader focus on discourse theory explored above towards an account of the 
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political field, the political problematic and the relative form of the Left/Right 
dynamic informing a sense of the strategic context of discursive struggle over 
citizenship.  
   
 
Ideology: Myth, social imaginaries and the cycle of hegemony 
 
Laclau (1990) critiques conceptions of ideology within the Marxist tradition, 
specifically, the Marxist conception of ideology as a particular superstructural level 
and ideology as false consciousness.  Torfing (1999) outlines Laclau’s argument thus: 
 
The problem with the Marxist notion of ideology is that the extra-
ideological reality, which is distorted in ideological representations, 
is always already ideological.  We do not have access to the real 
world except through its construction as a discursive form within 
more or less ideological systems of representation.  With the 
disappearance of an objective world of real essences against which 
we can measure and finally demask ideological forms of 
representation, the Marxist notion of ideology no longer has any 
meaning.  (1999, pp.111-2)  
 
Laclau re-formulates ideology in the following way:  
 
The ideological would not consist of the misrecognition of a positive 
essence, but exactly the opposite: it would consist of the non-
recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the 
impossibility of any ultimate suture.  The ideological would consist 
of those discursive forms through which a society tries to institute 
itself as such on the basis of closure, of the fixation of meaning, of 
the non-recognition of the infinite play of differences…. And insofar 
as the social is impossible without some fixation of meaning, without 
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the discourse of closure, the ideological must be seen as constitutive 
of the social. (1990, p.92)  
 
In his conception, the ideological consists of discourses that seek to construct a 
totalising vision of society and social agency that is natural and eternal.  Laclau’s 
assertion that our access to the world is always already discursively mediated through 
ideological systems of representation places ideology at the centre of analysis.   
 
The concepts of myth and social imaginary are central concepts in Laclau’s 
theorisation of ideology.  Following Laclau, Torfing defines the concepts myth and 
social imaginary as the ideological forms of discourse that aim to construct society 
and social agency as positive and fully sutured identities.  Thus myths and social 
imaginaries are metaphors for the impossible: the fully realised society.  
 
Social imaginaries provide the horizon for meaning and action that is 
structured around tendentially empty and essentially ambiguous 
signifiers.  At a less ambitious level, myth provides a reading 
principle (embodied in a set of norms, values and presuppositions, 
etc.) which helps to constitute a new objectivity…. Ideology 
constructs the real world in terms of a set of fully constituted 
essences and tends to deny that these essences are contingent results 
of political decisions taken in an undecidable terrain. (Torfing, 1999, 
pp.115-6)  
 
Laclau’s conceptual distinction between myths and social imaginaries demarcates 
different ideological forms.  Myths construct spaces of representation that attempt to 
suture social dislocation.  The construction of a new, mythical space of representation 
entails the re-articulation of floating elements into a new objectivity that functions as 
the surface of inscription for social demands.  Myth is a particular reading of a given 
situation and constructs a new space of representation in a situation of dislocation 
(Laclau, 1990, pp.61-65).  According to Torfing, myth provides a surface on which 
unsatisfied social demands are inscribed (1999, p.115).  For example, social justice 
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was the myth that provided the surface of inscription for the demands of the new 
social movements of the 1970s.   
 
Myths can be transformed into social imaginaries.  Social imaginaries are myths that 
suppress their particularism and construct a universal eternal principle of order 
capable of ordering the social in its entirety.  According to Norval, “Hegemony here 
consists of a universalisation of particularistic demands, a process that can never be 
fully achieved” (2000a, p.229).  Myths are constitutive of the interests of a particular 
group.  An imaginary is the effect of the transformation of particular interests into the 
universal interest.  Myths are the first stage in the ideological process of establishing 
a hegemonic social formation.  The final achievement of hegemony entails the 
constitution of a social imaginary.  A social imaginary is a myth transformed into a 
horizon for the inscription of social demands. 
 
 
Discursive struggle over ideology and the political cycle 
 
The distinction between myth and imaginary usefully describes the ideological 
process involved in the construction of hegemony.  Following Laclau’s account, 
Smith (1998) proposes a political cycle that proceeds from a situation of social 
dislocation and begins with the disarticulation of the traditional hegemonic discourse 
and the floating of its elements.  In this out-of-regulation period alternative discourses 
contest for hegemony, offering myths that structure alternative political projects and 
modes of political identification.  In the next stage, the demands emphasised in the 
hegemonising discourse are then “metaphorised” and become what Norval (1996), 
calls an “explanatory and legitimising framework for interpreting and responding to a 
widening set of political demands” (p.96).  It thus emerges from a single political 
position into a social imaginary that structures the other positions in the field.  Over 
time, the identifications provided for in the hegemonic discourse become routinised 
and their political contingency is effaced.  This conception of the political cycle 
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leading to the embedding of a hegemonic discourse informs this analysis of New 
Zealand’s neoliberalisation.  
 
The research begins with an analysis of crisis discourses of the early 1980s (c.f. 
Novitz and Willmott, 1992).  This period was marked by a faltering of the values, 
instruments and goals of the previous mode of regulation combined with renewed 
ideological struggle to define social reality and the way forward.   In Gramsci’s 
definition of an ‘organic crisis’, there is a collapse in popular identifications with 
institutionalised subject positions and the hegemonic political imaginary (Smith, 
1998, p.164).  As Laclau points out: 
 
The crisis of confidence in the ‘natural’ or ‘automatic’ reproduction 
of the system is translated into an exacerbation of all the ideological 
contradictions and into a dissolution of the unity of the dominant 
ideological discourse. (1977, p.103)    
 
During these periods the space of political contingency expands and discourses such 
as democracy and citizenship are available for multiple alternative articulations 
(Smith, 1998, 164).  Discursive struggle in New Zealand during this out-of-regulation 
period was dominated by competing assessments of the shortcomings of the 
previously hegemonic Keynesian welfare state mode of development now in crisis 
and the emergent neoliberal prescriptions for its remedy.   
 
Following Hall, for a discourse to become hegemonic the subject addressed must 
assume a number of specific subject positions in relation to the chain of discourse 
established (Hall, 1996a).  Within the Keynesian welfare state political problematic 
and citizenship regime, a number of discourse elements were combined in a chain of 
equivalence that hailed a workerist citizen subjectivity (McClure, 2004).  This social 
citizen was the anchor of state policy during the hegemony of the Keynesian welfare 
state.  This chain of equivalence positioned the worker citizen within a set of 
articulated discourses.  For instance, the worker citizen was addressed as a social 
democrat who held the state responsible for taming the excesses of the market and for 
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a commitment to social equality supportive of a particular form of welfarism 
corresponding with social democratic reformism.  In this way, the Keynesian welfare 
state citizenship regime privileged a worker citizen and represented him as the bearer 
of a particular set of views which are connected to a set of democratic demands that 
correspond to the Keynesian welfare state social democratic imaginary.  The 
continuing hegemony of the Keynesian welfare state depended on the subject 
addressed identifying with this set of interconnected subject positions. 
 
The discourse of the welfare state is central in both the Keynesian welfare state and 
the neoliberal political problematics and unifies a whole corpus of political, economic 
and moral discourses and practices.  The welfare state manifests an attempt to 
construct a societal project around particular conceptions of membership, 
participation and popular sovereignty.  It establishes a particular set of relations 
between state, society and economy.  Any attempt to establish a hegemonic mode of 
regulation requires that the discourse of the welfare state be given particular contents.  
Political competition manifests in discursive struggle over the substantive content of 
discourses such as ‘the welfare state’.  The contents of central discourses such as the 
welfare state are constituted in and by equivalential or differential articulations with 
other essentially contested discourses such as the economy, democracy, citizenship, 
nation unemployment taxpaying, etc. 
 
In mapping the shift from a Keynesian welfare state to a neoliberal hegemonic 
formation, this research traces the lines of transformation of unemployment and 
taxation policy discourses, in order to understand how problems such as benefit 
levels, incentive structures, benefit fraud, the work ethic, workfare, active labour 
market policy and tax relief came to be posed in New Zealand during the 1980s and 
1990s.  Addressing this central question begins with an examination of the discursive 
struggle over the nature of the crisis that began during the late 1970s.  A shift in the 
definition of the role of social policy in the management of the economy occurred as 
a consequence of the struggle to interpret the crisis.  The outcomes of this and other 
ideological struggles were creative of the discursive conditions which made these 
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transformations in the meaning, function and treatment of unemployment and 
taxation possible.   
 
Discursive struggle in the political field 
 
Discursive struggle ensues when different discourses represented by disparate 
interests compete for hegemony.  In this process, social power holders develop and 
propagate their preferred discourses.  Discursive struggle involves expanding a 
hegemonising discourse by establishing points of difference and equivalence.  
Discursive struggle for hegemony involves the bridging of the hegemonising 
discourse with those discourses which are aligned or non-aligned in a “transformistic” 
(Laclau, 1995a, p.154) way such that the contradictions and contestations between 
them are nullified.   
 
This process of linking discourses together occurs by way of hegemonic articulatory 
practices.  Hegemonic articulatory practices, in this context, involve the struggle to 
expand a particular discourse of norms, values and interpretive frames through 
persuasive re-descriptions of the connections amongst essentially contested concepts 
such as democracy, economy, social justice, welfare, etc. that are constitutive of a 
chain of signification.  Hegemonising discourse strategies construct the material 
conditions and experiences of people in ways commensurate with the social values 
and goals of hegemonising political projects.  Following Hall, political discourse 
strategies entail “winning existing symbols and slogans away from the connotative 
chains of association they have acquired, and building them into new discourses” 
(1988b, p.58).  In addition to the expansion of the hegemonising discourse through 
articulation, competing discourses that directly confront the hegemonising discourse 
are repudiated and the identities that align themselves with these competing 
discourses are maligned.  This is important as hegemonising projects construct their 
discourses through the construction of social antagonisms.  In this way hegemonic 
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discourse strategies evolve out of a struggle to define themselves in opposition to 
alternative hegemonising projects and the social identities that identify with them. 
 
Discursive struggle entails contestation between antagonistic social forces to 
hegemonise their articulatory discourse strategies.  Analysis of discursive struggle 
enables a novel way of thinking about the process of policy change as an outcome of 
contingent processes of contestation and decontestation involving struggle over social 
meanings and identities.  Discursive struggle is the process of contestation that moves 
us from dislocation (contestation) toward hegemony (decontestation), the outcome of 
which is the constitution of social identity.  Discursive struggle occurs all the time, 
but, when events or new discourses challenge sedimented social forms, the scope 
expands for discursive struggle in the political field to direct social and political 
change.   
 
 
The political field 
 
Bourdieu’s (1991) concept of the political field is a central focus of this analysis of 
discursive struggle to institute a new mode of regulation in New Zealand.  
Competition between contesting ideologies in the political field is centrally about the 
project to construct a particular signifying configuration which both supports the 
economic, political and social aspirations of particular articulations of social forces 
and is sustained by institutions, practices and discourses.  To this end, political 
players centrally engage in expansionist discursive strategies involving attempts to 
construct articulations between particular economic, political, social, moral and 
cultural discourses and popularise their interpretive frame in order to win elections 
and thereby direct social action.  The movement from discourse to the reform of 
social practices requires political mobilisation of those discourses which provide the 
motive for reform.  Discursive struggle in the political field involves ideological 
contestation and culminates in the election of governments which in turn formulate 
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policy that directs social practices.  In this way, this thesis provides an account of 
how discourse shapes social practice.   
 
Following Bourdieu (1991), the political field provides the formal arena for the 
struggle between competing projects for regulating economy and society.  It 
comprises all the political positions represented within a national party system.  Each 
political position represented provides an account of the purposes and values of the 
polity.  These discourses serve to explain political events, to justify political action 
and to develop political identities.15   In the context of an out-of-regulation period in 
New Zealand, neoliberals offered an account of the crisis, a course of action which 
they argued could deliver the New Zealand economy out of crisis and a construction 
of new political identities in line with their vision of “a decent society”.16    
 
The national party system matters because it defines the institutional parameters of 
discursive struggle.  Rather than being a site for the free competition between 
different political discourses, the political field, following Foucault (1972), is an 
institution which establishes procedures for externally and internally regulating 
political discourse.  These regulatory procedures include: electoral systems; historical 
alliances; the relative form of the Left/Right dynamic, all of which structure the field 
of discourses.  The political field in these ways stages a circumscribed contest 
between political discourses.   
 
According to Bourdieu, the political field organises political discourse into a party 
system with a “finite space of discourses” (1991, p.172).   
 
The political field in fact produces an effect of censorship by 
limiting the universe of political discourse, and thereby the universe 
of what is politically thinkable, to the finite space of discourses 
capable of being produced or reproduced within the limits of the 
political problematic, understood as a space of stances effectively 
                                                 
15 Adapted from Schmit’s (2000b, 279) definition of normative political discourse. 
16 New Zealand National Party’s 1990 election campaign slogan.    
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adopted within the field – i.e. stances that are socio-logically 
possible given the laws that determine entry into the field. (Bourdieu, 
1991, p.172) 
 
Within the political field, competing discourses are represented by contesting parties.  
Political parties aim to differentiate their positions from the positions of opposing 
parties.  For this reason, political positions within the political field must be 
understood relationally “in and through difference” (Bourdieu, 1991, p.172).  
Discourses refer to each other and are constituted out of this referential process.  
Discourses marshalled in this context are not only constructed to persuade, they are 
also constructed in opposition to alternatives.  According to Bourdieu, in order to 
understand a particular political stance it is at least as important to know the universe 
of stances present in the field as it is to know the demands of those whom the parties 
claim to ‘represent’:   
 
Political parties…have only a relational existence and it would be 
futile to try to define what they are and what they profess 
independently of what their competitors in the same field are and 
profess. (Bourdieu, 1991, p.184) 
 
Establishing the political field as a positive system entails placing of limits on what is 
sayable in the field and which therefore determines the political frontiers of the field.  
The frontiers of the political field are discursively established through practices of 
exclusion and repression.  These practices of exclusion establish a frontier between 
the politically thinkable and the politically unthinkable (Bourdieu, 1991).  Discourses 
can enter the field if they engage with the historical structure of discourse already 
present in the field.  The “free play” (Derrida, 1972, p.248), of political discourse in 
competition is thereby restrained by the limits of the political field which establish 
the field of possible options.  In this way, what is outside of the field; the unthinkable, 
is constitutive of what is inside; the thinkable.  This is important because the political 
mobilisation of social forces depends, in large part, on the discourses available to 
them.  The boundaries of political action are limited to the set of actors that are 
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accorded legitimacy and thus a position within the political field.  Whether a 
particular political position is accorded legitimacy depends on the capacity of its 
discourses to articulate with the prevailing political problematic or centre of the 
political field.  What is politically thinkable and thereby politically possible is 
established in relation to the prevailing political problematic.  
 
 
The political problematic 
 
A political problematic has a broad meaning in terms of the dominant paradigm that 
centres the political space (Bourdieu, 1991) and a narrower meaning that focuses on 
how the state is articulated into the activity of government (Rose and Miller, 1992).  
This discussion incorporates both emphases and adapts Bourdieu’s definition to 
incorporate the insights of Bobbio (1996), who argues that the centre of political 
space is both about contestation and consensus.  The centre represents the point 
where the differences between Left and Right are most clearly drawn and it is the 
position in the field where a Left/Right consensus emerges and consolidates.  The 
centre of the political field is the space in which Centre-Left and Centre-Right parties 
define themselves in difference from each other and the space where the consensus 
between them is elaborated.  Out of a process of contestation in which the difference 
between oppositional parties are emphasised, a Left/Right consensus evolves.  This 
consensus can be discerned in attention to what is de-emphasised in ideological 
contestation or what is decontested. 
 
The political stances effectively adopted within the political field are limited by the 
laws that determine entry into the field (Bourdieu, 1991, p.172).  The political 
problematic constitutes the unifying discourse that connects all the positions in 
political space.  It is the centring discourse of political space that defines the 
legitimate goals and methods of government.  For instance, the neoliberal political 
problematic, which centres the political field post-1990, defines the goal of political 
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action as managing a stable and competitive economy through the extension of 
market regulation.  All political positions represented within the field must refer to 
this coordinating problematic if they are to be considered politically relevant.   
 
A political intention can be constituted only in one’s relation to a 
given state of the political game and, more precisely, of the universe 
of the techniques of action and expression it offers at any given 
moment. (Bourdieu, 1991, p.173) 
 
The prevailing political problematic thus limits entry into the political field.  New 
discourses that enter the political field do so only on condition that they engage with 
the prevailing political problematic.  In this way, the political problematic acts as a 
centripetal force on the political discourses in struggle, truncating political discourses 
which insist on different goals and methods for political action.  This centring effect 
reduces the full range of possibilities for political action to a finite set of regulatory 
projects consistent with the prevailing problematic.   
 
Bourdieu’s concept of the political problematic is adapted here to take account of 
how the political problematic centres political discourse and structures the relative 
form of the Left/ Right dynamic.  The political problematic expresses the legitimate 
activities of the state and structures patterns of political contestation.  Prior to the 
1980s, the Keynesian welfare state set the terms of the political problematic and thus 
the limits of thought and action for all the political parties.  During this time, political 
parties of the Left and Right tended towards a compromise centring position that 
articulated the poles of Left and Right discourses of the state and the market:  While 
the Centre-Right pragmatically accepted the role of the state in modifying market 
capitalism, the social democratic Left enthusiastically embraced the mixed economy 
project.  The crisis of the 1970s precipitated a dis-embedding of the previous political 
problematic which had given substantive content to the Left/Right distinction.  Since 
the late 1970s, the political problematic shifted from providing national security via a 
full employment Keynesian welfare state to a re-ordering of the priorities of social 
policy in keeping with an export-led economic recovery based on the pursuit of 
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international competitiveness.  Concomitant with this shift, the liberal content of both 
social democracy and conservatism was revived and renewed alongside a critique of 
the stultifying effects of bureaucratisation that traversed the Left/Right dimension 
(Gustafson, 2003, p.26).   
 
The political problematic is in this way historically relative.  In out-of-regulation 
periods, previously hegemonic problematics are disarticulated and new problematics 
emerge that recast the legitimate goals and methods of political action.  During out-
of-regulation periods, normative discourses about the goals and methods of political 
action are reactivated as opposed to periods in regulation where the political 
problematic functions as the unquestioned background assumptions, principles and 
values embedded in institutional practice.  The shift from one political problematic to 
another that occurred in New Zealand during the 1970-1990 period called for the 
elaboration of a new set of terms for political contestation and deliberation that 
effectively restructured the form of Left/Right dynamic in the 1990s.   
 
Competition within the political field is centrally about linking political projects with 
a constituency and maligning the project and constituency of contesting projects.  To 
this end, political professionals and parties engage in expansionist discursive 
strategies to articulate a greater number of social signifiers around their particular 
project.  For example, signifiers such as equality, justice, democracy, rationality and 
fairness are empty signifiers that can be articulated with divergent political projects.  
Positions in the political field are more or less consistent expressions of discourses 
which articulate particular contents for these terms with prescriptive policy 
discourses. 
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 The Left/ Right dynamic and political discourse 
 
The relative form of the Left/Right dynamic is a central feature of the political field.  
The historically relative poles of the Left/Right distinction represent the limits of 
what is politically thinkable and sayable in any historically situated period in 
regulation.  The substantive content of the Left/Right distinction is premised on the 
historical construction of a political problematic.  Some authors have called for the 
abandonment of the Left/Right distinction arguing that it made sense only during the 
industrial Fordist period, before the rise of the new social movements and the social 
effects of post industrialism (Giddens, 1994).  The distinction is seen to privilege a 
Marxian perspective on politics which remains anachronistically rooted in class and 
economy.  However, the Left/Right distinction does not reduce to a geopolitically 
universal or trans-historical universe of political stances but is relative to particular 
political struggles in particular times and places.  Bobbio refers to this as “the relative 
form of the Left/Right dynamic”.  He argues that:  
 
The prevailing use of the left/right pair to designate the principal 
antithesis which governs all the other political antitheses, does not 
mean that it is univocal, or indeed that it remains unchanged over 
time.  Some conflicts become less important, or even disappear, 
while others emerge.  As long as there are conflicts, there will be 
polarization, although the principal antithesis may become 
secondary, and vice versa, as time passes and circumstances change 
(Bobbio, 1996, p.35). 
 
If Left and Right are not simple trans-historical positions in a universal political space 
but are instead historically relative signifiers of political space, this begs the question 
of whether they are in fact empty signifiers which can be filled with anything at all.  
Bobbio disputes this argument and makes the claim for a definition of ideal types of 
Left and Right sufficiently general so as to allow for significant variation over time.  
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His generalised distinction rests on the divider between the egalitarian Left and the 
non-egalitarian Right.  He argues that this division is not definitive but rather rests on 
two distinct emphases in Left and Right discourses. 
 
We can then correctly define as egalitarians those who, while not 
ignoring the fact that people are both equal and unequal, believe that 
what they have in common has a greater value in the formation of a 
good community.  Conversely, those who are not egalitarian, while 
starting from the same premises, believe that their diversity has 
greater value in the formation of a good community. (Bobbio, 1996, 
pp.66-67) 
 
Bobbio’s discussion of Left and Right can be interpreted as offering a thick and thin 
conception of Left and Right.  A thick conception might represent the complete set of 
political stances of a political field embedded in an historical time and place 
connected to an historically relative political problematic.  A thin conception, in 
contrast, would constitute a core principle making trans-historical understandings of 
Left and Right possible.  However, Bobbio’s transhistorical Left and Right is 
mitigated by the fact that the signifiers ‘equal’ and ‘unequal’ have meaning only in 
relation to the centring political problematic they are articulated to.  The core 
principle is as contextual as the relative form because we need to say something about 
what we have in common and identify which differences are relevant if we are to say 
anything at all.  Thus while the categories Left and Right are historical constructions 
they are permanently negotiated in context.   
 
Left and Right are useful categories because they function to divide the political 
space and reflect democratic practice in that democratic decisions always constitute 
and divide a majority from a minority.  Bobbio (1996) introduces some useful criteria 
for understanding the dynamics of Left and Right.  His analysis of the politics of the 
centre establishes two criteria: the “included middle” which represents the dividing 
line between the Left and the Right and provides an alternative or what is beyond Left 
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and Right; and the “inclusive middle” which represents what is both Left and Right or 
a third way combination.  He elaborates further: 
 
The ‘included middle’ is essentially practical politics without a 
doctrine, whereas the ‘inclusive middle’ is essentially a doctrine in 
search of a practical politics, and as soon as this is achieved, it 
reveals itself as centrist. (Bobbio, 1996, p.8)     
 
This thesis adopts and adapts Bobbio’s theory of the politics of Left and Right to 
inform an analysis of the discourses of the centre in New Zealand politics.  This 
political analysis of centrist politics is informed by an understanding of the tension 
between the division of Left and Right which involves their mutual constitution 
through defining their differences and the political construction of an inclusive 
middle (or centring political problematic).  This analysis shows how the inclusive 
middle emerges out of this struggle between the Centre-Left and Centre-Right to 
constitute themselves out of their differences from each other in periods out of 
regulation.  The consolidation of an inclusive middle represents the achievement of a 
hegemonic political problematic and thus a period defined as in regulation.  
 
Discursive struggle in the political field ensues when different discourses represented 
by political parties and associated interest group organisations compete for 
hegemony.  In this process, political parties develop hegemonising articulatory 
strategies.  Discursive struggle for hegemony involves both competition between 
discourses and articulation between hegemonising discourses, and aligned or non-
aligned but non-contradictory discourses constituting chains of equivalences.  It can 
also involve articulations between competing, contradictory discourses (see Chapter 
Six).  With this in mind, the documents examined in this research will be analysed 
relationally, both in terms of their antagonistic relationship to other discourses –how 
political parties position their version of truth in relation to their competitors-and in 
terms of the discursive articulations they deploy.  
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The consolidation of a stable, hegemonic mode of regulation comprising a political 
problematic and citizenship regime is the object of discursive struggle in the political 
field.  A ‘mode of regulation’ consists of an institutional framework, state policies, 
laws, a range of social norms, habits and conventions that are reproduced over time, 
becoming taken-for-granted action guiding regulatory modes (Lipietz, 1988).  A 
mode of regulation is established and maintained by the practices of social actors.  It 
describes the social rules, norms and procedures embedded in a social formation.  The 
cumulative effect of individual acquiescence to these rules and norms is their 
reproduction over time, materialising in a stable mode of regulation.  A mode of 
regulation operates through social norms and the discursive and material inducements 
and sanctions that uphold them.  For instance, the social norm of participation in paid 
work is punitively sanctioned by social exclusion and unemployment which are both 
discursive and material.  A mode of regulation can be understood as discourse in 
action.  A mode of regulation includes a citizenship regime and political problematic.  
A citizenship regime establishes in the citizen a particular self-perception, whereas 
the political problematic constitutes the goals and rationales of the state.   
 
 
Citizenship regimes: Respecifying political subjectivity. 
 
Foucault’s studies of early modern ‘governmentality’, which account for the 
production of the social subject, are particularly relevant here because, like Foucault, 
this research views the social subject as a historical construct whose attributes are 
defined and fostered by the activities of government (Foucault, 1979). 
 
According to Kingfisher (2002), concepts of social subjectivity are embedded in an 
historical time and place and are articulated with a particular concept of society 
(p.18).  The re-specification of conceptions of social subjectivity is a central process 
involved in the movement from one citizenship regime to another and is for this 
reason a central focus of this research.  Hegemonising articulatory practices 
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interpellate people as particular categories of citizen and establish a system of 
intersubjectivity.  This system of intersubjectivity defines the internal and external 
borders of belonging concomitant with a specific hegemonic project.  In this way 
citizenship regimes produce particular forms of citizens’ subjectivity and discursively 
organise social antagonisms.  For a mode of regulation to achieve hegemony it needs 
to muster acquiescence to particular modes of subjectivity in order to direct the 
energies, motivations and commitments of the population in ways supportive of the 
hegemonising mode of regulation.  For example, the promotion of an ‘enterprising 
culture’ was endorsed by the National-led Governments of the 1990s and promotes 
social relations supportive of a neoliberal mode of regulation.   
 
Political projects to establish a hegemonic mode of regulation involve attempts to 
construct new political identities and organise the legitimate relations between them.  
An analysis of citizenship regimes must account for the ways the social subject is 
addressed and how s/he is constituted in relation to ‘others’.  While all the chapters in 
this thesis address this theme, Chapter Three, in particular, provides an account of the 
re-specification of citizen subjectivity that corresponds with the movement from a 
Keynesian welfare state to a neoliberal citizenship regime and political problematic 
and analyses the dynamics of discursive struggle over the re-specification of 
citizenship constitutive of this shift.  
 
As a result of processes of discursive struggle, the worker/citizen of the Keynesian 
welfare state was displaced by an increasingly celebrated consumer/taxpayer citizen.  
Following the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, this analysis of the 
governmental constitution of political subjectivity involves an emphasis on both 
chains of equivalence and relations of difference.  An exposition of the political 
frontier effect of neoliberal discourse in its construction of a taxpayer solidarity via 
the constitution of its negative reverse, the welfare dependent underclass, forms part 
of the story (see Chapter Four).  Relations of difference are also constitutive of 
political identity.  Chapter Five focuses on this differential dimension and argues that 
neoliberal state actors engaged a hegemonising articulatory strategy designed to 
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establish a continuity between a neoliberal ethics of self-sufficiency and autonomous 
personhood, and Maori discourses of self-determination, radical democratic 
discourses of devolution, liberal feminist demands for gender equality in the labour 
market and worker cooperative demands for a wider definition of work.  This 
research analyses both equivalential chains and relations of difference in the 
respecification of subjectivity and, in this respect, counters the tendential over-
emphasis in discourse analysis on antagonistic political frontier formations (Norval, 
2000a, p.223).   
 
This thesis argues that a respecified taxpaying subject was assumed by policymakers 
in the construction of the new agenda for unemployment and tax policy.  The 
ascendant respecified neoliberal taxpayer was inscribed in this new policy paradigm.  
The neoliberal mode of political identification associated with the neoliberal mode of 
regulation has been discursively and materially established by way of the 
displacement of certain categories of person, namely a gendered and raced welfare 
beneficiary (Kingfisher, 2002, pp.20-21), as well as through a discursive strategy 
creative of relations of difference between neoliberal goals and the goals of 
oppositional groups such that antagonisms are reconstituted.  The thesis examines the 
process by which the particular demands of taxpayers became the “space of 
representation” (Laclau, 1990, p.64) for citizens’ democratic demands and shows how 
the ideological construction of social antagonisms is central to the process of 
transforming particular claims into universal principles of social regulation.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The discussion above has stated, explained and defended the epistemological 
premises of the thesis which are based on the theoretical advances of Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), particularly their work on articulation through the political logics of 
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equivalence and difference, the centrality of antagonism to politics and the relation 
between the universal and the particular for representational politics.  Jenson’s 
citizenship regime is also a key organising concept for the thesis.  Citizenship 
regimes are established through regulatory norms that de-legitimate certain identities 
and practices and fix others as universal and natural.  A citizenship regime is the 
product of concrete discursive struggles in historical time and place.  The thesis 
extends theoretical and empirical understandings of the expansion of neoliberal 
hegemony.  It builds in particular on discourse analytic approaches to neoliberalism 
by applying a post-Marxist theoretical framework to citizenship regime change in 
New Zealand in a way that has not been done before.  The combined approach offers 
a way of perceiving discursive change, the dynamics of discursive struggle and how 
exactly through particular, discursive strategies, tactics and operations, 
transformations in citizen subject positions are achieved.   
   
The following chapter describes the set of articulated discourses and identities that 
underpinned New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime, its 
disarticulation during the 1980s, and proceeds to offer a preliminary discussion of the 
emergence of the neoliberal articulatory discourse strategy that underscored the 
consolidation of a neoliberal citizenship regime and political problematic in New 
Zealand in the 1990s.  
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 CHAPTER THREE 
 
Citizenship regime change 
 
Introduction 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, New Zealand’s version of the Keynesian welfare state 
mode of regulation began to unravel and, beginning with the Fourth Labour 
Government in 1984, the construction of a neoliberal mode of regulation was set in 
motion.  As part of this process of economic, political and social reconstruction, new 
identities were created and old identities were reconfigured.  Discourses of 
citizenship were central to this process because they constitute the norms and values 
through which the citizen is identified, persuaded, engaged and constituted in relation 
to various others.  During the 1980s and 1990s, the New Zealand state changed the 
ways it recognised and addressed its citizens.  This change involved a shift from 
recognition of a worker identity to a new consumer/taxpayer identity in the discourses 
of politicians and policymakers.  This shift in how the state simultaneously addressed 
and constituted the citizenry contributed to the embedding of a neoliberal citizenship 
regime in the 1990s central to generating the subjective effects required to bolster a 
neoliberal accumulation strategy.  
 
This chapter demonstrates how citizenship regimes are socio-historically constituted 
in and through political discourse.  It focuses on how the restructuring of taxation and 
unemployment discourse in the 1980s and 1990s reinscribed discourses of citizen 
subjectivity.  This investigation is oriented by Jenson’s (1996, 1999, 2004) 
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citizenship regime concept which establishes an analytical framework for 
understanding changing discourses and practices of citizenship  
 
The thesis as a whole explores the rearticulation of political values and changing 
discourses of and about the responsibility mix; rights and obligations; citizens’ claims 
making and; representations of the ‘nation’ (Jenson, 2004), expressed in key policy 
documents, political debates and conference proceedings.  This chapter explores the 
shift from a social democratic to a neoliberal citizenship regime in New Zealand, 
firstly by providing an account of the discursive context in which New Zealand’s 
Keynesian welfare state was embedded.  Secondly, it examines the disarticulation of 
the post-War consensus that proceeded out of a political challenge to a number of its 
central discourses and its capacity to continue to operate as the “surface of 
inscription” (Laclau, 1990, p.63) for the claims of competing sectors of society.  
Thirdly, it provides a preliminary account of the process of re-articulation that 
recombined a number of previously hegemonic discourses in new relations that 
shaped the emergence and consolidation of a neoliberal citizenship regime and 
political problematic. 
 
 
Citizenship, the nation and public policy discourses 
 
Political rhetoric builds ‘imagined communities’ as part of the process of constructing 
constituencies.  Political professionals offer narratives of the national community 
they hope will garner the identification of the greatest number of voters.  
Governments establish systems of inclusion and exclusion, confer rights, and ground 
feelings of identification with the national community (Jenson, 1999, pp.8-9).  They 
do so by constructing problematisations that privilege certain identities and construct 
their constitutive adversaries.   
 
93 
The specification of citizen subject positions constructs a set of alliances and 
identifies opponents.  It follows that the central discursive mechanisms at work in the 
construction of citizenship are articulation and othering.  Mouffe (as cited in Smith, 
1998), in recognition of the centrality of antagonism to identity construction, argues 
that citizenship should be seen as an “articulatory principle” which produces an 
ordering of social antagonism (p.135).  
 
The social construction of target populations is the process by which an ordering of 
social antagonism proceeds.  Schneider and Ingram (1993) define the social 
construction of target populations as the normative and evaluative “cultural 
characterisations” that positively or negatively portray target populations through 
symbolic language, metaphors and anecdotes (p. 334).  These social constructions 
also operate to engage or disengage groups in the policy making process. 
 
The agenda, tools, and rationales of policy impart messages to target 
populations that inform them of their status as citizens and how they 
and people like themselves are likely to be treated by the 
government.  Such information becomes internalized into a 
conception of the meaning of citizenship that influences their 
orientations toward government and their participation. (Schneider 
and Ingram, 1993, p.340) 
 
This analysis focuses on the social construction of target identities (Schneider and 
Ingram, 1993) and explores how the construction of target identities contributed to 
the consolidation of a neoliberal citizenship regime in New Zealand by targeting 
citizens in specific ways and constructing them in relation to an excluded other.    
 
The targeting of policy to particular constructions of groups such as beneficiaries, 
taxpayers, consumers, business people or wage earners informs them of their relative 
position in society and influences not only their orientations towards participation in 
the political process but also their expectations, behaviour patterns and self 
perceptions.  For example, beneficiaries learn that they are dependent and a drain on 
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the economy.  They learn that the principle of self support is central to being a New 
Zealander.  This understanding of their relative position may induce them to intensify 
their efforts to become self supporting.  On the other hand, business people learn that 
they are worthy citizens who contribute to public welfare.  For example, tax cuts for 
high income earners are justified as necessary to enhance business confidence and 
achieve national goals such as international competitiveness.  Their particular 
interests are in this way constructed as the public interest (Schneider and Ingram, 
1993).   
 
The social construction of target populations via public policy produces an effect of 
the internalisation of relevant social norms and values central to the process of 
political identification.  Out of this process, political subjectivities are formed which 
produce individuals with the motivations and attributes that bolster the regime of 
accumulation.  Belgrave in the context of debate over the implementation of the 
Porter Report stated:   
 
Government policies generate incentives which encourage 
individuals to see their interests in different ways.  Well designed 
policies will align the interests and action of individuals with those 
of the nation. (Belgrave, New Zealand Secretary of Commerce, 
1991, p.33)   
 
The social construction of target populations via social policy is the central process in 
the construction of a mode of regulation.  A mode of regulation establishes a 
congruence between the goals of a particular capitalist accumulation strategy and the 
regulation of the expectations, habits, behaviours and self-perceptions of the 
population. 
 
Defining citizens in certain ways makes some claims meaningful and makes others 
less relevant or outside of the scope of citizenship (Jenson, 2004).  According to 
Jenson (1999), a citizenship regime establishes recognised discourses for citizens’ 
claims making (p.4).  During the hegemony of the Keynesian welfare state mode of 
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regulation, citizens made claims based on conceptions of ‘social justice’ articulated 
with a conception of social rights.  Social rights responded to social needs.  For 
instance: 
 
Need and the degree of need, should be the primary test and criterion 
of the help to be given by the community irrespective of what 
contributions are made. (New Zealand Royal Commission, 1972, 
p.65) 
 
The New Zealand Royal Commission to inquire into and report upon Social Security 
(1972) highlighted the centrality of economic equality as the basis of a socially just 
society in which all members could “belong and participate”.  It stated:   
 
That everyone is able to enjoy a standard of living much like that of 
the rest of the community, and thus is able to feel a sense of 
participation and belonging to the community. (1972, p.65) 
 
Social rights and social needs were defined in relation to a conception of social 
justice that privileged an egalitarian conception of the just society.  Some measure of 
economic equality between members of the community was the stated aim of income 
support.   
 
….the level of social security expenditure must be determined by 
need, and by judgment (which we agree must finally be political) of 
what level of income support is fair and adequate relative to 
changing incomes and living standards in the community as a whole 
(New Zealand Royal Commission, 1972, p.69) [Italics mine]. 
 
Fairness was construed as resulting from a relativity of incomes and living standards 
and was to be realised via progressive taxation and redistribution.  According to the 
New Zealand Royal Commission (1972), fairness dictated that each member of 
society no matter what their individual circumstances receive an adequate income as 
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the basis for belonging and participation.  An adequate income was defined in relative 
terms and represented a stated shift in social policy values and aims away from 
subsistence towards belonging (p.62).  Further, it explicitly recognised the incapacity 
of the market mechanism to deliver a just distribution of the national product and 
denied the argument that social needs could be met by economic growth (p.70).   
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, these conceptions of social justice and the market were 
the subjects of ideological work by political professionals managing the 
consequences and continued implementation of neoliberal reforms.  In this context 
the discourse of the market as an imperfect mechanism incapable of delivering the 
‘social good’ began to give way to a preference for market over state regulation 
(Larner, 1997a, p.14).  In this process of ideological change, discourses of social 
justice and fairness were re-articulated within a neoliberal discursive framework such 
that claims made in the name of fairness and social justice supported neoliberal 
interpretations and reforms.  
 
 
New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state  
 
The Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime was underscored by the belief that the 
provision of comprehensive welfare services, free to all, on the basis of need would 
ameliorate market-produced inequality (Marshall, 1977).  This citizenship regime 
legitimated the goal of state support for the disadvantaged in the pursuit of egalitarian 
goals of equality (Wilkes and O’Brien, 1993, p.140).   
 
During the postwar period there was a widespread understanding that 
it was the responsibility of the state to promote equality, reflected in 
attempts to promote full employment and an ongoing commitment to 
social programmes.  Equality, in this context, was understood 
primarily in class and income terms. (Larner, 1998a, 603) 
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 Discourses of social justice and equality were the discourses through which most 
societal demands were articulated.  The principles underpinning the Keynesian 
welfare state asserted the pre-eminence of the public over the market and generated 
expectations that the state was responsible for meeting the basic needs of citizens, 
while relative equality remained a constantly stated goal (Wilkes and O’Brien, 1993, 
p.530; Brodie, 1996, p.386).  Citizen access to jobs and social programmes such as 
health, education, superannuation, accident compensation (ACC), unemployment 
and, from 1973 onwards, domestic purposes benefits (DPB) reflected an inclusive 
social democratic discourse of social citizenship.  Social policy was the means by 
which the linkages between state institutions and individual New Zealanders were 
made manifest in everyday popular experience via the provision of these services.  
State provision of social services was a practical expression of the Keynesian welfare 
state’s imagined community. 
 
Discourses of equality were central to the way the social democratic citizenship 
regime constructed certain social antagonisms.  In particular, the relations of 
domination experienced by workers in their relation to production under Fordism, 
was a central discourse.  Recognition of this central antagonism based on the 
inequality of power between workers and employers secured the rights of workers to 
organise, and underwrote the position of union organisations as legitimate 
representatives of their members in negotiations with the state and business.  
According to Jesson:  
 
This system of government-business-union cooperation reached its 
apex with the National Development Council, set up in 1969, where 
representatives of all areas of society discussed the nation’s 
economic goals.  Consensus was the term used to describe this 
process of consultation and cooperation, and it applied not just to the 
economy but to most areas of policy. (Jesson, 1992, p.367) 
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New Zealand’s social democratic citizenship regime was based on the politics of 
production.  Discourses of social membership articulated individual worker citizens 
as members of class alliances and the workerist content of the Keynesian welfare 
state citizenship regime was generalised to the whole of society.  Discourses of 
consumption were notably absent from the broader Keynesian welfare state 
discursive formation. 
 
 
A “wage earners’ welfare state” 
 
New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime comprised a number of 
discourses, institutions and practices including support for a mixed economy 
underscored by social democratic commitments, consideration of established interests 
such as trade unions and a strong commitment to full employment.  New Zealand’s 
distinctive variant of the generalised model of the Keynesian welfare state has been 
described by Frank Castles as a “wage earners’ welfare state” manifesting a particular 
historical formation predicated on the strategies of the industrial and political wings 
of the New Zealand Labour movement: 
 
Wage security for the worker rather than social security for the 
citizen reflects the emergence of the Australasian working class 
strategy in the context of early modern capitalism and has been 
crystallised as a central component of the distinctive pattern of 
public policy trade-offs which has characterised these countries for 
much of the century. (Castles, 1985, p.87) 
 
Central to New Zealand’s wage earners’ welfare state, was minimum wage regulation 
and protection actualised through a system of arbitration, rather than, as in the 
Scandinavian model, extended citizenship rights through universal provision of social 
security (Castles, 1985, p.84).  In 1972, the New Zealand Royal Commission argued 
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that “Social security cannot be a substitute for a fair wage system” (New Zealand 
Royal Commission, 1972, p.163).   
 
The basis of New Zealand’s variant of the Keynesian welfare state was full 
employment and the general wage order system operated by the Arbitration Court.  
Under this system New Zealand citizens maintained a right to a job17 rather than a 
right to a benefit.  The First Labour Government upheld the New Zealand worker’s 
right to a fair living wage in 1936 when the Labour government amendment to the 
Arbitration Act fixed a basic wage for adult male workers which would be “sufficient 
to enable a man in receipt thereof to maintain a wife and three children in a fair and 
reasonable standard of comfort” (Woods, 1963, p.138).   
 
A right to a job and a fair wage was part of New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state 
citizenship regime and was manifest in the Labour Government’s vigorous defence 
of, and successive governments’ commitment to, a full employment policy.  Full 
employment was seen as the basis of other social objectives.  For example, Sutch 
(1966) noted, “The demand of full employment is essential to give some breathing 
space to bring real equality to the Maori people” (p. 453).  In this way, full 
employment not only secured the welfare of New Zealanders, but jobs for Maori were 
seen as a way of integrating Maori into the norms of Pakeha society.  
 
The foundations of New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state were established by the 
First Labour Government (1935-1948).  These foundations included a wholesale 
acceptance of what was to become known as the Keynesian orthodoxy, in particular, 
the government’s responsibility to maintain full employment and constrain price 
inflation through aggregate-demand management.  Prior to 1984, successive Labour 
Governments strengthened the priority of full employment over price stability in 
monetary policy (Dalziel, 1993, p.83).  In 1960, the Second Labour Government 
changed the order of priorities in the Reserve Bank Act, giving priority to production, 
                                                 
17 The right to a job was central to the Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime not as an entitlement 
in the same way that other social rights were conceived, but by measures affecting the aggregate of 
employment in the economy which by creating full employment, indirectly secured citizenship rights. 
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trade and employment over price stability.  The future Labour Prime Minister 
Norman Kirk argued in defence of the change: 
 
So far as the Government is concerned the monetary and economic 
policies must ensure that there is no unemployment.  We reject all 
thought of a measure of, or acceptable level of, unemployment.  Our 
aim is to ensure there is no unemployment. (New Zealand 
Parliamentary Debates, 325, 1960, p.3308 quoted in Dalziel, 1993, 
p.83).   
 
In 1973, the Third Labour Government strengthened the Reserve Bank Act’s 
commitment to pursue full employment by requiring the Bank to make loans on 
request to the government in order to ensure full employment (Dalziel, 1993, p.83).  
The hegemony of the Keynesian welfare state model in New Zealand meant that 
successive governments of both the Left and the Right took responsibility for a full 
employment economy.  
 
In Endre’s (1984) survey of the changing attitudes of policymakers to full 
employment in official publications from 1950-1980, he argues that full employment 
translated as total employment in New Zealand and he noted a tendency to make a 
moral issue out of any unemployment (p.34).  In 1977, Prime Minister Robert 
Muldoon described the New Zealand electorate as having a “paranoic attitude to 
unemployment” (as cited in Endres, 1984, p.37).  New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare 
state institutionalised a commitment to full employment as a political priority and this 
commitment was established as the dominant ethic of economic and social policy 
(Endres, 1984). 
 
New Zealand’s wage earners’ welfare state manifested a citizenship regime that 
established the criterion of inclusion based on the identity of the worker.  Within the 
broad parameters of the Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime, the identity of the 
worker was the primary basis of social identification such that even managers and 
professionals viewed themselves as members of the working class.  Non-workers 
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were constructed as auxiliary citizens.  Benefits for those engaged in unpaid labour, 
such as child care, were treated as benefits for workers’ families.  However, these 
auxiliary identities were not excluded identities: rather, they were constructed in their 
relation to the primary workerist identity.  For example, the unemployed were 
constituted as out-of-work workers, while retirement pensions were for retired 
workers (Jenson and Phillips, 1996, p.113).  While this set of linked identities 
privileged the male wage earner, within it, the interests of workers and ‘auxiliary 
workers’ were reconciled.  Those dependent on the wages of a primary producer both 
directly and indirectly were included as contributors to the wage society by virtue of 
their specific connection to wage earning or a wage earner.  In this way an inclusive 
“waged society” was constructed which aimed to convert economic growth into 
social progress (Aglietta, 1998, p.54). 
 
According to Castles (1985) and Shirley (1997), New Zealand’s variant of the 
Keynesian welfare state was less social democratised than its European counterparts.  
In New Zealand, according to Castles:   
 
The historic compromise between the classes did not centre around a 
modification of the reward structure of capitalism through the 
distribution mechanisms at the command of the state, as in the 
European countries, but focused directly on the primary distribution 
of income generated by the capitalist market mechanism. (Castles, 
1985, p.87)   
 
His point is significant as it alludes to the tension in New Zealand’s Keynesian 
welfare state citizenship discourse between capitalist and welfare goals.  This tension 
was implicit in the New Zealand Royal Commission (1972), which explicitly 
reasserted the welfarist goals of an inclusionary social democratic welfare state yet, 
nonetheless, also expressed recognition of the need to optimise the market 
mechanism and an awareness of the potential conflict between the goals of social 
welfare and economic growth (p.69).  During the 1980s and 1990s this implicit 
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tension was to become increasingly explicit and the basis for a reordering of social 
antagonisms. 
 
While the ‘fulcrum’ of New Zealand’s social democratic welfare state was full 
employment (Rosenberg cited in Shirley and St John, 1997, p.40) rather than social 
insurance, the interests of workers were closely aligned with the beneficiaries of 
welfare expenditure because, in accordance with a demand-led economy, both 
workers’ consumption and state expenditure on welfare fuelled the engine of growth.  
 
Full employment, as well as making profits greater, enabled the 
economy to sustain easily the various social security payments. On 
the one hand there was the virtual absence of unemployment 
payments and on the other the additional taxable production of those 
who in other countries would have been unemployed.  Social 
security payments helped sustain full employment and full 
employment helped sustain social security payments. (Sutch, 1966, 
p.458)  
 
This discourse promoting solidarity between male workers and auxiliary citizens was 
not put to the test until the unemployment crisis of the late 1970s.  Until then New 
Zealand’s record of full employment was not equalled by any other country in the 
world (Shirley, 1997, p.41).  By the late 1970s, this discourse of solidarity based in a 
fully employed waged society lost its connection with the idea of a virtuous circle 
described above by Sutch. 
 
The Keynesian welfare state aimed to combine and convert economic objectives into 
social security and equity.  According to Aglietta (1998), equity was an important 
dimension of the wage society because it reconciled capitalist interests with social 
progress by preventing exclusion and thus reinforcing citizenship and hence 
identification with the economic system.  A degree of egalitarianism had both a social 
and economic function. 
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By preserving homogeneity in the distribution of income, it 
encourages the widespread adoption of modern lifestyles and hence 
the development of markets for mass consumer goods, the very 
development that served as the main engine of capitalist 
accumulation. (Aglietta, 1998, p.62) 
 
The wage earner was a central categorical identity of the Keynesian welfare state 
citizenship regime.  In contrast to New Zealand, the European and Scandinavian 
variants included more extensive systems of income maintenance and social 
insurance that embraced a broader conception of the citizen where the connection 
between citizenship and work was much looser.  In New Zealand, work was central to 
citizenship.  New Zealand’s welfare state was highly redistributional.  A system of 
wage relativities and a highly progressive taxation system reflected an egalitarian 
commitment to a classless society (Wilkes and O’Brien, 1993).  The operation of a 
discourse of classlessness underscored by a prevailing belief in social mobility and a 
relative equality in lifestyles (Oliver, 1981, p.406), created a sense of solidarity that 
cut across occupational classes and within the welfare state was manifest in an 
emphasis on the restriction of wage differentials.  The wages strategy emphasised the 
compression of wage differentials and, according to Castles, as of the early 1960s, 
New Zealand manifested the lowest dispersion of earnings of some fourteen advanced 
capitalist states (Castles, 1985, p.106).   
 
New Zealand’s welfare system was basically selective inasmuch as eligibility for 
benefits depended on meeting some moderate conditions.  The selective provision of 
income assistance was one of the pillars of New Zealand’s system of social 
protection, but, means testing was justified on the grounds that it is generative of 
greater equality (Castles, 1985, p.97).  The New Zealand Royal Commission (1972) 
iterated this view, quoting from Professor Titmuss: 
 
The challenge that faces us is not the choice between universalism 
and selective social services…[the problem is to develop] socially 
acceptable selective services aiming to discriminate positively, with 
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minimum risk of stigma, in favour of those whose needs are greatest. 
(Titmuss quoted in New Zealand Royal Commission, 1972, p.59) 
 
Equality is generated in this view through the redistribution of resources away from 
those with the greatest share of the national product towards those in greatest need.  
The application of selectivity is constructed as positive and enabling rather than mean 
and stigmatising.   
 
New Zealand’s system of income maintenance, while not as extensive as the 
European and Scandinavian variants, reflected a commitment to the citizen’s social 
right to a share of the economic rewards of society.  Quoting from the New Zealand 
Royal Commission on Social Security’s review of “community values and aims” of 
the welfare system: 
 
Those who cannot or do not contribute through the market system 
get nothing directly from the productive process.  Given the social 
ethic that those who cannot contribute nevertheless ought to receive 
a share, the problem is how to modify or supplement the market 
mechanism in a way which ensures that they do so without impairing 
the productive capacity of the economy as a whole. (1972, p.69)  
 
While a citizen’s right to a share in productive capacity of the nation is asserted, 
universalism would presumably impair the productive capacity of the economy.  
Selectivism was favoured because it traversed this tension between social justice and 
productive capacity.  
     
The political regulation of wages was articulated with a discourse of solidarity.  All 
citizens were included in the distribution of the total production of the community. 
 
A share of national income for all citizens was to be guaranteed by 
the provision of jobs for all during their working life and an income 
when the working life was over.  This was the first attempt by a 
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capitalist country, and a colonial one at that, to provide the right for 
every citizen to an automatic share of the total production of the 
community. (Sutch, 1966, 238, quoted in Wilkes and O’Brien, 1993, 
p.115).  
 
The concept of shared social product was central to the First Labour Government’s 
representation of the nation and a central component of the Keynesian welfare state 
citizenship regime.  This discourse established a right to a job and social welfare as a 
central citizenship discourse.  However, this goal was not connected, as it was in the 
Scandinavian model, with evolutionary socialist goals, such as the nationalisation of 
the means of production (Castles, 1985, pp.78-79).  In 1951, after the bitter waterside 
dispute18, the New Zealand Federation of Labour eliminated all explicit references to 
capitalism and socialism in their constitution, reconstructing the aim of the federation 
as being “to work for a more equitable share of the national income and, ultimately, 
production for social use and not private profit” (Sutch, 1966, p.375).  In New 
Zealand, the goal of an equal right to economic wealth and social welfare was to be 
achieved through a full employment economy.   
 
Until the 1970s New Zealand’s wage earners’ welfare state was fairly successful at 
generating relative equality in lifestyle between wage earners.  At the end of the 
1960s, New Zealand was described as having a “very homogenous culture” with a 
high degree of “political consensus” (Chapman, 1985, p.14).  By the late 1970s, 
rising levels of unemployment not experienced in New Zealand since the Depression 
began to disturb the “political quietitude” (Wilkes and O’Brien, 1993, p.18). 
 
One phase of hegemony had disintegrated; the society entered that 
era of contestations, crises and alarms that frequently accompanies 
the struggle for the formation of a new hegemonic stage. (Hall, 1988, 
p.37) 
 
                                                 
18 The 1951 waterside dispute between the National government and striking watersiders has been 
described as “a full-scale industrial battle, the longest, costliest and most widespread in New Zealand’s 
history” (Bassett, 1972, p.11). 
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By the late 1970s, New Zealand’s Fordist regime of accumulation and mode of 
regulation based in the Keynesian welfare state was in decline.  Social and economic 
instability was evident in increased voter volatility (Aimer, 1992) and civil protest 
(Neilson, 1996).   
 
 
Model worker citizens and their second class counterparts 
 
As a consequence of a system of welfare based on the regulation of income from 
employment, the social needs of male Pakeha workers were privileged over others, 
creating a hierarchy of social needs generative of inequities.  According to Wilkes 
and O’Brien:  
 
While the Fordist state was decidedly egalitarian in its class and 
income aspirations, it was orthodox in terms of its gender and 
ethnicity settlements.  The state-driven vision of family life was 
predicated on the cult of domesticity, women at home and men in 
paid work.  In ethnic relations, the state was equally paternalistic, 
offering material support in housing and employment in return for 
gradual assimilationist policies for Maori. (1993, p53)   
 
The Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime identified the dominant citizen group, 
comprising the immense majority as workers and their families, via the core identity 
of the Pakeha male waged worker.  The Pakeha male waged worker stood in for the 
universal New Zealand citizen.  Identities that deviated from the predominant waged 
worker identity were defined in their connection to him (Jenson, 1999, p.6; Brodie, 
2002, p.93).  Women were the wives and mothers of workers, the elderly were retired 
workers and Maori were to be integrated into Pakeha society through urbanisation 
and full employment (Sutch, 1964, p.39; Hunn 1961).  For instance, the family 
benefit both provided mothers with additional income and dramatically increased the 
incomes of larger Maori families without overtly addressing Maori’s or women’s 
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entitlement (Cheyne, O’Brien and Belgrave, 1997, p.155).  This citizenship regime 
sought to achieve social solidarity via a universalist discourse of social homogeneity 
which established unity by subsuming gender and racial difference.  “Social security 
was designed to obscure difference and achieve a common culture” (McClure, 2004, 
p.149).  A cult of domesticity naturalised a gendered division of labour and an 
integrationist social policy agenda aimed to de-differentiate Maori and immigrant 
groups and create a homogeneous Pakeha hegemony.  The Maori Social and 
Economic Advancement Act 1945 “aptly conveys the goals of Maori policy 
following the war” and was explicitly designed to “integrate Maori fully into the 
social and economic structure of the country” (Harris, 2004, p.192).  The 1967 report 
of the Department of Maori Affairs endorsed the pepper-potting of Maori families 
throughout Pakeha areas based on the expectation it would lead to increasing rates of 
integration and inter-marriage (Spoonley, 1982, p.281).   
 
One of the key values institutionalised in New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state was 
‘social justice’ defined as equality and inclusion and manifested in terms of a fully 
employed workforce.  Full male employment however, was premised on a strict 
division of labour in which women were relegated to the domestic sphere.  The 
integrationism of the Keynesian welfare state subsumed Maori identities within the 
identity of the worker.  Maori were to be integrated into the Keynesian welfare state 
so long as they accepted the basic censorship of their particular Maori identity.  
Social differences and divisions between men and women and Maori and Pakeha 
were subsumed by a conception of the universal citizen organised by the privileged 
identity of the worker.  According to McClure: 
 
Labour’s programme derived from the male workplace, and an 
understanding of social rights in terms of the brotherhood shared by 
the band of socialist colleagues, Christian idealists and male workers 
who formed the core of the Labour Party. (McClure, 2004, pp.146-7) 
 
During the 1970s, calls for social justice appealed for recognition of social needs 
beyond the male Pakeha worker to include Maori and women.  A politics of 
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recognition that exclusively recognised the wage earner failed to fit with social 
expectations and expanding discourses of the needs and aspirations of these “second 
class citizens”.  The influence of second wave feminism put women’s domesticity 
and exclusion from both the labour market and welfare provisions on the agenda 
(Shirley and St John, 1997, p.42).  Maori asserted their tangata whenua status and 
challenged the assimilationism of the welfare state (Kelsey, 1997, p.20). 
 
During this period Prime Minister Robert Muldoon provoked confrontations between 
the state and Maori, sanctioned police raids on Pacific immigrant “overstayers” and 
insisted the Springbok rugby tour go ahead despite widespread public opposition 
(Kelsey, 1997, p.22).  These events, and others, combined to undermine the social 
consensus underpinning the Keynesian welfare state’s mode of regulation.  The social 
citizenship discourse of the Keynesian welfare state became the focus of social 
conflict and the discursive terrain upon which these social movement groups 
demanded consideration of their differentiated social needs.  In this way, the 
achievements of the Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime were increasingly 
seen as at odds with its programmatic promise (Neilson, 1998).  Put another way, 
these demands were made within the terms of the Keynesian welfare state citizenship 
discourse, rather than in the name of an alternative discourse of citizenship.  
 
 
The disarticulation of New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state 
 
The ascendant neoliberal citizenship regime was built on the disarticulation of the 
Keynesian welfare state. During the late 1970s, as a result of changing socio-
economic relations and the incapacity of the Fordist mode of development to 
maintain coherence in the face of societal dislocation and economic decline many of 
its central tenets fell into disrepute.  Unemployed workers and feminist and Maori 
groups drew attention to their systematic exclusion from full citizenship (Walker, 
1992; Dann, 1985).  Feminist groups drew attention to the cult of domesticity that 
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underwrote the breadwinner workerist citizenship regime and excluded women from 
access to welfare services and to equal participation in the labour market.  The 
women’s movement in New Zealand supported a series of legislative reforms 
including the Equal Pay Act 1972 which guaranteed gender equality in setting wage 
rates; the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 which recognised the contribution of 
unpaid work and established equal entitlements to matrimonial property and the 
Human Rights Commission Act 1977 which prohibited discrimination in access to 
employment, housing and other goods and services (Shirley and St John, 1997, p.42).  
Maori claims of cultural leveling drew attention to the incapacity of the Keynesian 
welfare state to recognise differentiated social needs (Kelsey, 1997, pp.20-23).  The 
Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime blocked recognition of the claims of 
Maori and women because their demands for recognition and equality could not be 
domesticated within a citizenship regime that exclusively centred on the norm of the 
Pakeha male wage earner.  The growth of an underclass marginalised by the Fordist 
hegemony and over-represented by women and ethnic minorities became politically 
significant as unemployment began to rise (Neilson, 1996, p.29), reinforcing the 
claims of women and Maori for recognition of their disadvantage in the labour 
market.  The 1972 Equal Pay Act challenged the family wage which recognised the 
familial responsibilities of male workers via the fair wage policy and through tax 
exemptions and benefits.   
 
Poor economic performance during the late 1970s and early 1980s signalled the crisis 
of New Zealand’s Fordism and attendant Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime.  
During this period, established patterns of economic management were maintained 
under new conditions.  The policies of the Muldoon government essentially served to 
stave off the effects of the decline until the election of the Fourth Labour Government 
in 1984.   
 
Under Muldoon’s political leadership, borrowing, and increasing 
state intervention in the daily management of the economy and social 
relations maintained a declining regime of accumulation. (Neilson, 
1998, p.53)   
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 By 1984, a number of discourses challenged New Zealand’s Fordist mode of 
development and created a political opportunity for the incoming Labour government 
to pursue a radical break with New Zealand’s policy trajectory.  The defeat of 
Muldoon’s Government in 1984 was the culmination of a coalition of opposition to 
his heavy handed interventionism that united the Left and Right (Cheyne, O’Brien 
and Belgrave, 1997, pp.40-41). 
 
The Fourth Labour Government was elected in 1984 with an unspecified mandate for 
change underscored by the party organisation, the unions and a constituency of 
middle and working class voters (Neilson, 1998, p.54).  The advent of a foreign 
exchange crisis in the week of the election provided further indication of the 
seriousness of New Zealand’s economic situation (Jesson, 1992, p.43).  Debt levels 
had reached 35.4 percent of GDP and inflation skyrocketed to 15 percent (Larner, 
1997a, p.10).  Upon election, the Fourth Labour Government moved quickly to 
establish a new policy paradigm, initiating a shift from Keynesian macroeconomic 
theory and demand management to a neoliberal policy agenda (Roper and Goldfinch, 
1993, pp.50-55).  The government’s programme to reinstate the market involved the 
devaluation of the New Zealand currency by 20 percent, the deregulation of finance 
markets, and the removal of exchange controls, controls on wages, prices, interest 
rates, rents and credits.  The tax regime was altered with emphasis moving from 
direct to indirect taxation through the introduction of a goods and services tax (GST).  
Personal income tax rates were flattened, representing a shift away from the 
redistributional tax system central to the Keynesian welfare state, New Zealand 
markets were opened up to international capital and there was a radical restructuring 
of the public sector.  The restructuring of the public sector has been referred to as 
New Zealand’s ‘bureaucratic revolution’ and centrally involved the corporatisation of 
a range of state organisations, many of which were later privatised (Kelsey, 1997, 
pp.2-3; Neilson, 1993, p.52).  The logic behind the corporatisation and privatisation 
programme was to make the goals of efficiency and profitability primary, by 
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replacing centralised state management with market modes of government (Neilson, 
1998, p.60). 
     
The shift to a neoliberal mode of regulation involved not only a series of strategic 
responses to the harsh economic realities of a globalised economic system but 
transformation of the mode of signification governing citizenship which in turn 
transformed the form and content of political struggle into the 1990s.  In the context 
of economic decline, neoliberal conceptions of economic policy dominated by the 
regulatory ideal of competitiveness were articulated with discourses of subjectivity 
and institutional reformism that articulated a new citizenship regime and political 
problematic.  Discourses of employment and taxation central to New Zealand’s 
Keynesian welfare state, were disarticulated.  Once the economy was liberalised, 
discourses of employment were repositioned as a function of the economy rather than 
of politics (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1985) and Labour’s substantial 
flattening of the tax rate scale and introduction of GST (Stephens, 1990) 
disarticulated the connection between the social citizenship right to an income and the 
broader discourse of redistribution. 
 
As the Keynesian welfare state mode of development entered decline so too did its 
citizenship regime.  Long standing ideals of citizenship, discourses of the national 
community and patterns of political participation were disrupted.  Historical practices 
through which citizens were constituted were transformed and novel ways of 
addressing the electorate were launched.   
 
Discourses concerned with the inflated powers of the bureaucratic state were 
powerfully mobilised against the Keynesian welfare state’s centralist bureaucratic 
social administration and articulated with neoliberal arguments for the restoration of 
control to the citizen as a free choosing individual (Cheyne, et al., 1997, p.40).  
 
Underlying all the neoliberal reforms there was a rejection generally 
of communal values and processes, and a re-emphasis on 
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individualism.  The rights of an individual were emphasised, 
however, to the extent that his or her responsibilities or duties to the 
community were largely ignored. (Gustafson, 2003, p.27) 
 
According to Larner, by the early 1980s a broad range of social forces challenged 
state involvement and service provision in terms of both cost and effectiveness 
(Larner, 1997a, p.17).  Central to these challenges was the identity of the consumer.  
The Fourth Labour Government specifically targeted consumers as the beneficiaries 
of its neoliberal programme emphasising the disadvantages consumers had faced 
under the previous mode of development and presented its neoliberal programme of 
economic and state reform as key to promoting the rights of consumers and 
supporting rather than suppressing social diversity (Cheyne, O’Brien and Belgrave, 
1997, p.41). 
 
The citizens of New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state comprised Pakeha male 
workers and their families.  During the 1980s and 1990s this image of society was 
disarticulated.     
 
There were decisive shifts in the shape of political culture.… 
Moving away from envisioning society as a system of collectives 
and revamping this vision towards a new individualism, was an 
attempt to do away with the historical baggage of collective 
agreements, the role of unions at centre stage, and their replacement 
with autonomous individuals making choices. (Wilkes and O’Brien, 
1993, p.135) 
 
 
Rolling back social democracy 
 
Citizenship regimes shape the social organisation of the economy by supporting and 
encouraging forms of subjectivity compatible with economic and political forms of 
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organisation (Kingfisher, 2002).  The neoliberal prescription for personhood 
prescribes characteristics of self reliance, adaptability and individualism.  During the 
1980s and 1990s, the political identities of New Zealanders were reconstituted first as 
consumers and subsequently as taxpayers.  These identities were articulated with an 
economic nationalism which prioritised the goal of competitiveness.  This process of 
reconstituting citizenship entailed the metaphorisation of the particular identities of 
consumers and taxpayers.  This means that these particular identities became the 
means of expression by which specific demands could be asserted.  These neoliberal 
citizenship discourses articulated already formed subject positions in new discursive 
relations.  As Smith (1998, pp.169-70) suggests, to be effective hegemonising 
discursive strategies must develop articulations that appropriate discourses from 
sedimented traditions.  Taxpayer and consumer identities played a role in the 
Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime to the extent that politicians and 
bureaucrats frequently categorised citizens in this way; however, these identities 
appeared within certain clearly defined policy areas.  By the late 1980s, taxpayer and 
consumer identities were politically mobilised as central universal categories and 
applied extensively across policy fields.   
 
According to Jenson (1999) a citizenship regime establishes the legitimate relations 
between citizen categories.  The political construction of a neoliberal citizenship 
regime, therefore, included discourses of intersubjectivity.  In particular, the 
neoliberal citizenship regime created alliances between active consumers, working 
mothers, hardworking family men (Phillips, 1996), entrepreneurs, and business 
investors, and articulated these experiences and identities via a discourse of the 
consumer or taxpayer.  For instance, working women taxpayers were constructed in 
terms of their right to equality of opportunity in the labour market.  Self-reliant 
taxpayer/consumers were constructed as entitled to ‘value for money’, ‘choice’ and 
‘accountability’ from politicians.  In this way, political professionals offered 
constructions of the public interest which implicitly constructed their publics as 
consumers and taxpayers and the beneficiaries of the neoliberal policy programme.  
These identities were articulated with a conception of the nation that defined our 
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collective purpose in terms of enterprise and competitiveness.  Politicians began to 
emphasise the need to foster an enterprising culture: 
 
Having been part of a Government prepared to break the vicious 
cycle of ever-increasing public expenditure and high levels of tax 
burden, I am very pleased to have been part of a Government that 
has broken the mould.  The third and last policy mould that I want to 
speak about is more of the desire to match an enterprise economy, 
which our heads tell us we need, with an enterprise culture.  That is a 
rather more difficult task of attitudinal change…. We are recognising 
that success comes from playing to our strengths; our strengths lie in 
the energy and the attitudes, and the endeavour of individuals. 
(Richardson, 14 Jul 1994, NZPD, Valedictory) 
 
In these discourses, entrepreneurialism was linked to a pre-welfare state settler 
tradition of “rugged individualistic pioneers” (Kelsey, 1995, p.186) and the revival of 
a pre-colonial Maori tradition of entrepreneurialism (Asher and Naulls, 1987).  In his 
keynote address to the 1993 National Party annual conference, Prime Minister Bolger 
argued: 
 
This recovery is about New Zealand and New Zealanders; about how 
we see ourselves.  For a while New Zealand lost its way.  We forgot 
the pioneer spirit, the sense of independence, and the community’s 
responsibility for those who fell by the wayside.  We said the state 
can look after this-and-that and eventually we expected the state to 
look after everything…. What we are dealing with here is nothing 
more or nothing less than the renaissance of the Kiwi spirit.  The 
pulse of New Zealand is beating again. And with it we are seeing the 
return of the true spirit of New Zealand; proud, independent, hard 
working and caring for your neighbour. (as cited in Kelsey, 1995, 
p.186)  
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Prime Minister Bolger thus expresses a crisis of cultural character which he attributes 
to the welfare state and argues for a return to our authentic pioneering roots. 
 
 
Rolling out neoliberalism 
 
It is useful to make a distinction between coordinating and communicative discourse 
when comparing the social policy discourse and the political rhetoric of the 1980s and 
1990s.19  Coordinating discourse contributes to the consolidation of a mode of 
development by coordinating policy and administration to specified ends.  
Coordinating discourse operates in the integral state and is directed at policymakers, 
bureaucrats and employees of the state responsible for implementing policy.  
Communicative discourse, on the other hand, is directed at the electorate and is 
mobilised in order to win popular consent and redirect subjective understandings, 
expectations and behaviours.   
 
Following Schneider and Ingram (1993), parliamentarians construct communicative 
discourses which justify their policy positions to the electorate by articulating their 
particular perspective on the public interest.  They do so, for example, by setting the 
goals to be achieved and showing how their proposals are logically connected to these 
end goals.   
 
Elected officials may emphasise some goods rather than others 
because target populations that they wish to benefit or burden have 
credible linkages to the goals. (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p.336) 
 
In addition they construct excluded groups as blocking the realisation of public 
interest and in this way order social antagonism(s). 
 
                                                 
19 The distinction between coordinating and communicative discourse is adapted from Schmidt (2000b, 
p.232-3). 
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The following discussion makes the argument that in New Zealand during the 1980s, 
a neoliberal coordinating discourse was consolidated in the policy arena before a 
corresponding communicative discourse was mobilised in the political field.  This put 
political professionals in the position of constructing a postfacto communicative 
discourse that sought to persuade the New Zealand public of the benefits to them first 
as consumers (1980s) and later as taxpayers (1990s) and re-order social democratic 
value traditions in a neoliberal direction (Schmit, 2000b, p.245).  
 
The process of constructing a neoliberal citizenship regime entailed the rolling out of 
a set of neoliberal rationalities and policy approaches (Tickell and Peck, 2003) 
alongside sedimented traditions.  The Fourth Labour Government attempted to 
harness aspects of sedimented social democratic citizenship discourse to their project 
to neoliberalise the state and economy (Larner, 1997a).  This articulation involved the 
jettisoning of some aspects of social democratic discourse while retaining those 
discourses and projects that could be incorporated within the neoliberal reform 
programme.  The Labour government linked a number of demands that had gone 
unrecognised in the Keynesian welfare state citizenship discourse and constructed an 
antagonism-free system of differences between the neoliberal reform project and this 
selection of social movement identities and projects.  This strategy both broadened its 
support base and neutralised its opposition, differentially incorporating the discourses 
and goals of Maori self-determination, radical democracy and liberal feminist 
demands for equity in the labour market.  Labour’s construction of a coalition of a 
select group of social movement discourses and goals sought to reconcile its 
commitment to social diversity with their neoliberal reform agenda.  This coalition of 
special interests retained the universalism and inclusiveness of the Keynesian 
citizenship discourse by claiming to recognise social diversity and metaphorised the 
social consumer as the genuine representative of these articulated interests in a 
neoliberalised political economy.   
 
The tension between the Fourth Labour Government’s neoliberal economic policies 
and their expressed support for the continued expansion of social services in 
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recognition of the claims of previously excluded groups was reconciled to some 
extent through their discourse of “efficiency”, and later, “value for money”, which 
argued that present levels of social spending could provide improved services at a 
lowered cost.  The mobilising of the identity of the consumer in, for example, 
addressing the demands of some social movement groups for a more differentiated 
social service model, sought to reconcile the Fourth Labour Government’s economic 
strategy and its expressed commitment to social diversity and solidarity.  The 
demands of social consumers were constructed by Labour as representing the 
demands of New Zealand citizens.  In this way, the social consumer functioned as the 
“surface of inscription” (Laclau, 1994) for a set of differentiated identities and 
demands.    
 
The Fourth Labour Government deployed the political logic of difference in the 
construction of a universalising and inclusive discourse of social membership.  The 
discourse of the social consumer embraced the entire population and became the 
basic unit of social policy (Belgrave, 2004, p.36).  During the 1980s, a neoliberal 
mode of political identification was actively reconstituted around a celebratory 
conception of the active consumer (Kelsey, 1997, p.294).  Consumers were 
constructed as empowered to demand better products and services at a reduced cost.  
The consumer was the agent of competition and the sovereign of the market.  This 
new mode of political identification retained the idea of New Zealanders as a 
collective group, constructed as the beneficiaries of the new order (Larner, 1997b, 
p.384).  For example, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Michael Bassett, targets 
consumers as the beneficiaries of Labour’s programme to open the economy in 
opposition to the previous regime that protected industries at the expense of 
consumers: 
 
What the member’s party did to tariff rates while it was in 
Government should also be remembered.  It tried to ensure protected 
and inefficient industries in New Zealand, which meant high costs 
for consumers---and that resulted in people in my electorate 
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suffering, the cost price index increasing, and everything suffering as 
the country became uncompetitive. (Bassett, 15 Nov 1985)  
  
The social consumer was constructed in opposition to a number of adversaries of the 
neoliberal project.  During the 1980s the consumer was pitted against the unionised 
worker, state bureaucrat, subsidised agriculture and manufacturing industries whose 
actions were seen as increasing New Zealand consumers’ cost of living and 
ultimately reducing the competitiveness of the New Zealand economy.   
 
There is now economic growth that will fund the social 
programmes…. The Government has grasped the global economy 
and taken the primary sector off its addiction to subsidies.  The 
Government has lowered some of the protections that imposed 
unnecessary costs on consumers.  It has reformed the public sector.  
It has devolved power in education to the parents. (Jeffries, 5 Dec 
1989) 
 
While the Fourth Labour Government (1984-1990) is not usually credited with 
reforming the structures of the welfare state, they did deploy a number of discourses 
that set in motion the process of rolling out neoliberal rationales and workfare policy 
initiatives and have for this reason been described as the “gravediggers” of the 
welfare state (Castles and Shirley, 1996, p.89).  In particular, their unemployment 
policy discourses shifted the indices of disadvantage away from socioeconomic 
towards individual determinants (Cheyne, O’Brien and Belgrave, 1997, p.194).  This 
shift involved a rhetorical focus on the exceptionalism of the disadvantaged 
unemployed that recast them as a special class of people with “skill deficits”, “social 
and psychological difficulties” and who are often “hostile to authority” (New Zealand 
Dept of Labour, 1985, p.6).  This discourse retained a continuity with New Zealand’s 
Keynesian citizenship regime, which, due to the experience of full employment, had 
tended to treat beneficiaries of social support as exceptional categories.  “If wages 
were fair and reasonable it would only be the improvident and those unusually 
circumstanced who would require help” (Castles, 1985, p.99).  In addition, during the 
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Keynesian era, the preoccupation of the New Zealand labour movement with wage 
levels and relativities as a defence of living conditions and equality effectively 
categorised other social needs and identities as atypical.   
 
While the Labour Government positioned the unemployed within a discourse of 
disadvantage that built on New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state discourse of 
exceptionalism, it jettisoned the previous connection between unemployment and 
injustice.  The Keynesian welfare state’s discourse of the socioeconomic determinants 
of social inequalities was built on a construction of the unemployed as receiving an 
unjustly large share of the burdens of the socioeconomic structure.  Redress for this 
injustice was redistributive and entailed social security for the unemployed in order to 
ameliorate disadvantages generated by the socio-economic structure.  In this 
discourse, the disadvantages of unemployment were structurally determined rather 
than the fault of individuals. 
 
By 1990 the tensions between the neoliberal direction of Labour’s economic 
restructuring programme and its social democratic aims in the area of social policy 
were becoming apparent to the electorate and the National Party was elected on the 
platform of “the decent society” (New Zealand National Party, 1990a), implying an 
intention to roll-back the market.  Beginning in 1990, however, the newly elected 
National administration set about constructing a complementary citizenship regime to 
buttress the neoliberal economic structures put in place by Labour (1984-1990).  The 
newly elected National Government presided over a new phase of neoliberalisation.  
This phase included the “redesign of New Zealand’s welfare state” (New Zealand 
National Party, 1990a, p.25), involving the roll-out of a neoliberal workfare rationale 
and policy approach central to the consolidation of a neoliberal political problematic 
and citizenship regime.  The National government’s citizenship discourse deployed 
the political logic of equivalence in the reordering of social antagonism around a 
polarisation of the identities of the New Zealand taxpayers and the unemployed 
beneficiaries.  National constructed a positive discourse of the taxpayer defined in 
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opposition to the unemployed beneficiary who was cast as the taxpayers’ inverse, as 
discussed below.  
 
The taxpayer, rather than the social consumer, was foregrounded in National’s 
communicative discourse and was constructed as a producer, as the generator of 
wealth, who contributes by paying taxes which fund social services.  The ‘social 
consumer’ identity mobilised during the 1980s was retained and included within the 
taxpayer identity, which unlike the social consumer identity, was able to articulate 
both consumption and production relations.  The state, in National’s discourse, was 
cast as the taxpayers’ delegate, ultimately acting on behalf of and accountable to the 
taxpayer.  For example, the government must “provide value for taxpayer’s money” 
and must “maintain the confidence of the taxpayers” (New Zealand Department of 
Social Welfare, 1991, p.11 p.24).  
 
While this change in the mode of political identification and the re-specification of 
the relationship between the state and the citizen involved a significant challenge to a 
number of sedimented discourses and practices central to the previous Keynesian 
welfare state citizenship regime, it also entailed the retention and recombination of a 
number discourses central to it.  For example, discourses about the work ethic were a 
central component of the previous workerist citizenship regime.  A productivist work 
ethic was redeployed in the 1990s, and articulated with the identity of the 
taxpayer/producer and a nationalist project of competitiveness.  
 
The National Party’s discourse strategies attempted to create a specific unity among 
different interests by connecting them to international competitiveness constituted as 
a national rallying project and by establishing a political frontier to define the forces 
to be opposed.  The deployment of an economic nationalism constituted around the 
logic of international competition reinvested the privileged identity of the worker 
central to the previous regime, within a new set of discourses that encouraged 
workers to internalise the motives of the firm to see themselves as contributing to the 
competitiveness of the firm.  This discourse was central to National’s preamble to the 
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introduction of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, which sought to displace the 
previous discourse which stressed the antagonism between employees and employers 
and at the same time rearticulate the longstanding social democratic ideal of high 
employment:   
 
We intend to liberalise the current structure [of industrial relations], 
remove existing constraints, and bring true democracy to the 
workplace with a wide range of choices. (New Zealand National 
Party, 1990b, p.26) 
 
A labour market based on a common-law freedom to contract would 
lead to major improvements in work practices.  It would result in 
higher productivity and much higher employment because 
employment contracts would now be based on mutual interests of 
employer and employee. (Richardson, 1995, p.62) 
 
This discourse attempted to reconcile the interests of employees and employers by 
offering a discourse of work as a means to self-realisation, encouraging a revitalised 
work ethic which stressed the assumption of responsibility for the success or failure 
of the firm in opposition to their construction of the Keynesian welfare state wages 
system as encouraging an irresponsible worker disregard for the profitability of the 
firm.  National’s discourse equated democracy with increased choice and displaced 
recognition of the unequal power between employees and employers in bargaining 
that was previously recognised in the state-led advancement of the egalitarian 
interests of the labour movement through the institutionalisation of union 
representation.  
 
While many of the components of this discourse originated in university and 
management circles and espoused a Left-wing view about how to create a spirit of 
collaboration (New Zealand Employers Federation, 1977), they were taken up by the 
neoliberalising state in an effort to displace the class collectivism and corporatism of 
the Keynesian citizenship regime and connect the interests of employees and 
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employers to a project of economic nationalism emphasising settler discourses of 
entrepreneurialism, classlessness and a competitive state.  For example, National MP, 
Marie Hasler states: 
 
We have to recognise that economic nationalism is a major force 
internationally.  Japan and Germany often act upon the basis that the 
nation-State is the key unit of analysis, rather than the individual.… I 
do not mean that the Government should tell firms what to do, or that 
it should replace them, but only that there should be a more 
systematic method of working with business and markets to achieve 
mutually beneficial goals. (18 August 1992) 
  
The linking of employees and the employers in the joint project of the competitive 
firm incorporated an established critique of the Taylorist technology paradigm20 of 
the Keynesian mode of regulation, which excluded the producers from involvement 
in intellectual aspects of the labour process and argued for increased employee 
participation in the interests of increased productivity and competitiveness (Victoria 
University of Wellington, Industrial Relations Centre, 1989; New Zealand 
Department of Labour, 1979).  
 
The National Government’s economic nationalism and taxpayer mode of political 
identification was accompanied by the exclusionary definition of beneficiaries as 
potentially fraudulent bludgers (Bassett, 1998), who constituted a threat to the 
competitiveness of the New Zealand economy.  The abjectification21 of beneficiaries 
was central to the discourse of economic nationalism which axiomatically constituted 
employers and employees as one subject with one interest under the rubric of the 
internationally competitive firm.  International competitiveness was to be the new 
                                                 
20 Technology paradigm is a French Regulation School term that expresses the general principles of 
labour organisation and deployment of technology and managerial techniques (Lipietz, 1992) 
21  Abjectification is a psychoanalytic concept developed by Kristeva who argued that the social being 
is constituted through the force of expulsion (Kristeva, 1982, p.5).  This is reinforced by Laclau and 
Mouffe’s (1985) political theory that social identity is resultant from the constitution of social 
antagonism. 
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fulcrum of social solidarity uniting contributing taxpayers in opposition to a non-
contributing underclass of beneficiaries who were constituted as blocking the 
achievement of an internationally competitive nation. 
 
This social antagonism was emphasised in the construction of a solidarity between 
the employees and employers in the competitive sector in opposition to unemployed 
beneficiaries, displacing the universalising discourse of social citizenship that had 
been central to the Keynesian citizenship regime and the Fourth Labour 
Government’s communicative discursive strategy.  Norval (2000a) argues that the 
construction of national identities tends to draw clear-cut frontiers, dividing us from 
them. 
 
Far from being given only through ‘positive’ characteristics, 
identities coagulate, or are given their unity, in and through that 
which distinguishes them from others. (p.226)    
 
The articulation of the shared interests of employees and employers was legislatively 
consolidated in the passing of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, which was 
introduced in conjunction with severe cuts in social spending and to benefit levels.  
The Employment Contracts Act replaced the principle of class-based collectivism as 
the basis for industrial relations with the individual employment contract, in which 
the parties are individual employers and employees (Larner, 1998a, p.605).   
 
The passing of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was the legislative component of 
a wider discursive shift.  Then Finance Minister, Bill Birch, in a statement to the 
House in 1990, argued that New Zealand’s industrial relations structure was based on 
an outmoded “adversarial relationship between employers and employees” (as cited 
in Bolger, Richardson and Birch, 1990, p.42).  The new industrial relations legislation 
aimed to provide a more “constructive” environment where “both employers and 
employees will be responsible for the development and operation of productive, 
efficient and rewarding enterprises” (Bolger, et al., 1990, p.42).  This discourse 
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articulated collaborationist principles with the market mechanism and critiqued the 
previous state-led industrial relations system.    
 
This shift entailed a disarticulation of union activity from class-based sectional 
interests and the re-articulation of working people and business behind a national 
competitiveness project.  “We will also create an environment which rewards co-
operation between employer and employee for their mutual benefit” (New Zealand 
National Party, 1990b, p.27).  This was achieved by discursively breaking down 
previous class-based solidarities, reconfiguring subjectivity by privileging individual 
consumers, taxpayers, families, parents, working New Zealanders and self-
determining ethnic group subject positions and representing them as non-antagonistic 
groups sharing common concerns.  ‘The people’ were articulated as a population of 
individual New Zealanders rather than as members of social and class groupings, and 
class interests were displaced onto a defunct socialist past.   
 
Within this new chain of signification the state is reconstituted as the firm and 
taxpayers as its shareholders.  As the then Chairman of the New Zealand Dairy 
Board, Sir Dryden Spring, speaking at the Partnership and Enterprise Conference, put 
it:  
 
…as a nation we can determine our objectives and then focus on 
developing the strategies that will enable New Zealand Incorporated, 
as I like to think of it, to obtain those objectives. (1991, p.39)   
 
In this discourse a chain of equivalence is constructed between the competition state 
(Jessop, 1993b), the competitive firm and the internationally competitive nation.  The 
conflation of the nation and the firm recast the government’s role in terms of the 
effective investment of taxpayer dollars.  For example, the Welfare that Works 
reforms of 1991, were framed in terms of better use of taxpayer funds and as 
preserving the rights of taxpayers.  In this discourse the government must deliver 
value for money, be accountable to the taxpayer and generate a “return on the money 
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that the taxpayer invests” (New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, 1991, p.11).  
The state was to be responsible for creating a competitive market environment in 
which consumers can direct outcomes via their individual consumer choices and 
taxpayers can expect accountability from government in terms of a return on their 
investment. 
 
In the 1980s the reconstitution of the national citizenry as a community of consumers 
articulated a celebration of the autonomous choice-making of consumer citizens with 
Labour’s agenda of corporatisation, privatisation and deregulation.  Until 1986, most 
of the Labour Government’s attention had been focused on the quasi-commercial 
activities of the public sector.  In this context the identity of the consumer was 
actively mobilised as both an active force and a key beneficiary in the restructuring.  
By the 1990s, however, welfare reform was placed high on the agenda and the 
identity of the consumer was unable to motivate the electorate in the right direction.  
According to Kelsey, advocates of the neoliberal turn began to express concern that 
the new order did not have the support of the population (New Zealand Business 
Roundtable, 1992, p.2).  The Porter Report (1991) on New Zealand’s competitive 
advantage also expressed concern that New Zealand’s competitiveness could be 
hampered by “people’s inability or unwillingness to adapt, change and thus compete 
successfully in the global economy”  (Crocombe, Enright and Porter, 1991, p.157). 
 
Changes to the key conduits of national identity, values and 
culture—education, media and the family—were of supreme 
ideological importance to the consolidation of the project.  The 
immediate effect would be to neutralise potential sources of 
criticism.  Their longer-term goal was to instil the neo-liberal ethos 
in the minds of the future generation, the ‘children of the market’ 
who had known no other way. (Kelsey, 1997, p.327)   
 
In this context unemployed beneficiaries were the focus of National’s political 
rhetoric and were identified as irresponsible, dependent and blocking New Zealand’s 
competitiveness.  Support for restricting eligibility for welfare and cuts to benefit 
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levels was mobilised through a discourse of the taxpayer, burdened by increasing 
social spending on dependent individuals who, unlike taxpayers, do not take personal 
responsibility for themselves (Richardson, 1995).  A discourse about the proper 
relation between the state and the taxpayer was also articulated with National’s 
redesign of the welfare state.  The welfare state was to be restructured in accordance 
with the principles of fairness to the taxpayer rather than the differentiated needs of 
social consumers.  
 
 
National’s disciplinary project: Constituting the taxpayer as producer and the 
beneficiary as other 
 
The taxpayer in National’s discourse was constructed as a producer and this 
construction was consistently and repeatedly mobilised in their political rhetoric.  
This identity shaped the formation of policy during the 1990s and provided incentives 
and inducements for New Zealanders to see themselves as taxpaying producers.   
 
The reform agenda outlined in Welfare that Works not only provided an implicit and 
abject account of the welfare dependent beneficiary but also assumed and promoted a 
positive construction of the identity of the productive taxpayer.  This mobilisation of 
the identity of the productive taxpayer emphasised the taxpayer as the funder of 
services and contrasted with Labour’s discourse of the social consumer of public 
services.  This taxpayer producer identity constituted a privileged identity in the 
citizenship regime under construction, which articulated neoliberally inflected 
discourses of fairness and reciprocity with a discourse of national competitiveness 
and market democracy.   
 
The National Government’s restructuring discourse justified restricting access to 
welfare services and sold its market regulation of the labour market project as 
deregulation, designed to relieve taxpayers of the burden and unsustainable cost on 
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society of welfare and provide a return on taxpayer investment (New Zealand 
Department of Social Welfare, 1991).  In this way the taxpayer is a funder of social 
services and a shareholder in New Zealand Incorporated entitled to a return on his/her 
investment. 
 
The thrust of the argument put forward in Welfare that Works and much of the 
official discourse that was to follow was that taxes were too high, benefit payments 
were too high and incentives for beneficiaries to move from welfare into work too 
weak.  The argument was made that a growing number of beneficiaries found it 
morally and financially acceptable to remain on benefits:  
 
There are too many stories of beneficiaries who appear to be reliant 
on benefits when they could provide for themselves.  This is largely 
because of the rules of eligibility and their implementation. (New 
Zealand Government, 1991, p.24)  
 
The reforms were justified in order to provide taxpayers with confidence that the 
system delivers to the deserving: “People will no longer be expected to pay taxes to 
provide free social services to those who can afford to pay for themselves” (New 
Zealand Government, 1991, p.22).  This discourse defines beneficiaries as rejecting 
the work ethic, as giving work a limited role in the organisation of their lives, and as 
potentially fraudulent in the maintenance of entitlement.  
 
Tighter eligibility will be fairer to those people genuinely in need of 
a safety net and it will mean New Zealand taxpayers will be helping 
those in genuine need, and not contributing to the lifestyles of those 
who can work but are not prepared to do so. (New Zealand 
Government, 1991, p.33) 
 
The invocation of a new taxpayer citizen in antagonistic relation to the beneficiary 
evident in official problematisations of ‘welfare dependency’ signalled the exclusion 
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of ‘non-productive’ members of society from the emerging neoliberal citizenship 
regime. 
 
The shift from a social democratic to a neoliberal citizenship regime involved a shift 
from discourses of national community involving notions of collective identity and 
democratic citizenship to discourses of community as a competitive market of 
interests and identities.  The collective totality motivated by a social citizenship ethos 
was disarticulated, and citizen and social movement claims making were re-presented 
as “sectional or special interests” whose claims and/or demands were in opposition to 
taxpayer interests.  In this discourse, taxpayers were ordinary New Zealanders as 
opposed to special interests.  According to Brodie, the construction of oppositional 
groups as special interest groups effectively casts them outside the community 
(Brodie, 1996, p.393; New Zealand Government, 1985b, p.10; New Zealand 
Treasury, 1987).  
 
The construction of the taxpayer as a central identity is articulated with a discourse of 
democracy that equates democracy with the free market.  The taxpayer through the 
act of paying taxes contracts political representation and social services.  New 
Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state on the other hand, provided funding for 
intermediary organisations, such as workers’ cooperatives that were creative of 
channels of democratic representation and participation for a number of 
disadvantaged groups.  The shift from a social democratic to a neoliberal citizenship 
regime transformed discourses and practices of democracy through the consistent 
opposing of the imperatives of “value for money” and “sound” economic policy to 
the sectoral interests of electoral politics and the artificial collective identities they 
impose (Treasury, 1987).   
 
Within the chain of equivalence established in the neoliberal citizenship regime, 
democracy was re-articulated as a calculated device for the provision of 
competitiveness, making market conditions required for an enterprise society.  
129 
Democracy within this chain of equivalence is competitive market democracy.  
According to Larner and Walters:  
 
Whereas taxpaying was once understood primarily as a mechanism 
for linking New Zealanders into a collective totality motivated by the 
ethos of the welfare state, it is now linked to formulations of the self 
responsible neo liberal subject. (Larner and Walters, 2000, p.372) 
 
The establishment of a set of meaning-producing relations between discourses of the 
market, democracy, taxpayers, consumers, producers, international competitiveness 
etc was not, however, internally coherent and always already involved contradictory 
elements.  For instance, the neoliberal discourse contained a fundamental 
contradiction between, on the one hand, a nationalist discourse that united New 
Zealanders in their commitment to New Zealand’s competitiveness discursively 
constituted as the ‘joint product’ of the individual efforts of all New Zealanders, and 
on the other hand, international competitiveness constructed as requiring the 
commitment and active cooperation of a range of economic, political and social 
actors. 
 
There is no inevitability about New Zealand’s economic decline.…  
Effective change will require a broad-based consensus about the 
general thrust of the changes required.  A turnaround will have to be 
driven by thousands of individuals behaving differently in their 
firms, schools, unions, industry associations and government 
agencies. (Crocombe, et al., 1991, p.157)  
 
This same discourse promotes a market version of democracy that disarticulates 
previous notions of collective solidarity, relegating the democratic state to a mere 
pragmatic association of interests embodied in the terms taxpayer, consumer, 
producer and shareholder.  Although discourses of solidarity linked to collective 
interests have to some extent been retained they have been recast in terms of a shared 
interest in the prosperity generated by the achievement of international 
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competitiveness and in opposition to the welfare state.  The social democratic 
citizenship regime offered an ‘imagined community’ of New Zealanders collectively 
responsible for each other.  In this regime the New Zealand citizen was cast as a 
social being.  The neoliberal competitive state connects New Zealanders to a national 
economic project that enjoins them to understand their social selves in terms of 
taxpaying with both individual consumer and producer emphases. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s New Zealand’s citizenship regime underwent a radical 
transformation.  This entailed significant change in the form of political identities and 
the content of ideological struggle.  This chapter traced the links between shifting 
political discourses, forms of social administration and contemporary discourses of 
citizenship.  Citizenship discourses are conceived as a political strategies aimed at the 
subject’s self-perception and are important because people’s subjective 
understandings are not simply a reflection of their lived experience but also reflect the 
limited repertoire of available and legitimate discourses of social membership that 
can be used to interpret their experience.   
 
The following chapter outlines the contingently realised process of building and 
embedding a neoliberal citizenship regime and political problematic in more detail.    
In particular, it maps the discontinuities and displacements of meaning in policy 
discourse during the 1980s and 1990s and demonstrates the ways New Zealanders 
were incited to recognise themselves and thus take on certain obligations and 
behavioural norms via the material inscription of discourse into the social policy 
programmes of the state. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
From unemployment to welfare dependency: Shifting policy 
narratives in New Zealand 1970-2000 
 
 
Introduction 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s unemployment policy was problematised and produced 
through discourses and political programmes which constructed unemployment and 
the unemployed as objects of regulatory policy in new ways.  A number of key 
discourses are implicated in these reforms.  This chapter provides an account of the 
diachronic development and synchronic interplay of the discourses, which, it is 
argued, drove the reform of New Zealand’s policy paradigm.  It maps a number of 
key shifts in the discourse of unemployment that occurred over the period beginning 
in the late 1970s and ending in 2000 and focuses on a number of significant 
discursive events which provide focal points where contestation between the 
discourses of New Zealand’s state and different social groups occurred.   
 
The chapter argues that, over the period, the neoliberalising state imposed a sequence 
of constructions of unemployment that were a part of a restructuring strategy which 
sought to integrate the operations of social security with the neoliberalised state and 
economy.  These constructions were deployed in the discursive struggle to establish 
competition as the new regulatory principle capable of conceptually and practically 
overseeing economic and social regulation.  The discourse changes also functioned in 
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and of themselves as technologies of governance22 aimed principally at the 
unemployed but also at reconfiguring the representational practices and meanings of 
citizenship more generally. 
 
The Keynesian welfare state viewed unemployment as a central concern.  The social 
policy programmes initiated in the 1990s, however, were oriented towards combating 
the problem of welfare dependency.  This shift in the focus of social policy should be 
understood as the outcome of a wider process of change occurring on a number of 
discourse fronts from discourses of competitive advantage and economic 
management to ethical dimensions of personhood.  This chapter investigates some of 
these discourse transformations and argues that the disarticulation of the Keynesian 
welfare state and the corresponding ascendance of a set of articulated discourses 
dominated by a neoliberal interpretive framework drove a radical restructuring of 
New Zealand’s social policy paradigm in a workfare direction.  According to Peck 
and Theodore (1999), a workfare policy approach reflects a shift away from 
discourses of job creation, demand-side intervention and full employment towards a 
discourse of combating cycles of dependency, enforcing obligations and incentivising 
work (pp.485-6).   
 
The shift from a social democratic to a neoliberal citizenship regime and political 
problematic in New Zealand centrally involved the disarticulation and rearticulation 
of economic discourses about the role of the state in the management of economic 
processes.  During the 1980s, a Ricardian discourse of comparative advantage 
(Ricardo, 1971), central to New Zealand’s Keynesian mode of economic regulation, 
was displaced by a new discourse of competitiveness (Crocombe, Enright and Porter, 
1991).  This new discourse was articulated with a state strategy of pursuing 
monetarist economic management alongside the restructuring of many socio-political 
institutional structures.  This shift was associated with changing conceptions of the 
international economic system and drove changes to perceptions of the role of the 
                                                 
22 Technologies of governance are the diverse techniques through which governing is achieved.  The 
term comes from Foucault’s lecture “Governmentality” (1979), which emphasises the practical 
modalities deployed to align the interests of the governed with those of the governing. 
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state in the management of the economy and the restructuring of the welfare state, as 
part of a strategy to achieve ‘competitiveness’.   
 
A new discourse of international competitiveness increasingly dominated policy 
discussions in both economic and social policy and expressed the view that central to 
national competitiveness was a complex set of extra-economic conditions such as 
cultural norms, ethics and incentive structures that may be strongly influenced by 
welfare structures (Department of Social Welfare, 1991; Crocombe, et al., 1991; 
OECD, 1986, p.87).  Calls for targeting benefits, tightening eligibility and work 
search requirements and an emphasis on training reveal the extent to which the state 
and business in New Zealand adopted a competitiveness discourse which linked the 
need to restructure the benefit system to a strategy to facilitate an export-centred, 
flexible economic policy.  This section investigates the discursive dimensions of this 
radical shift.  It analyses how successive governments came to recognise their 
interests and thereby construct the field of policy options.  It explores the extent to 
which that process was a function of the way problems such as the management of 
the national economy in an increasingly global economic context were discursively 
represented in New Zealand. 
 
 
From comparative to competitive advantage 
 
From the mid-1980s onwards, discourses of competitiveness began to locate New 
Zealand’s ability to compete economically in a dynamic and socially constructed set 
of conditions that included a wide range of non-economic factors such as cultural 
values and political and social institutions.  For example, Crocombe, Enright and 
Porter (1991) state: “The factors most important to modern industrial competitiveness 
are not inherited but created” (p.28).  Earlier discourses of national economic strategy 
were based on Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage which assumed that 
national comparative advantage was derived from the efficient exploitation of factor 
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endowments such as land, labour, natural resources, capital and infrastructure.  
Ricardo’s theory assumes that countries specialise in what they are best at producing 
and comparative advantage is derived from producing a better product at a better 
price than other countries.  The dominance of this discourse is evident in the New 
Zealand Planning Council’s 1980 employment policy proposal which emphasised 
structural change to exploit the natural factor endowments of the country:  
 
Changes in the structure of the economy are necessary to encourage 
the expansion of those activities in which New Zealand has a 
comparative advantage. (1980, p.19)  
 
The Think Big programme was an example of this view being implemented as 
economic development policy in the pursuit of economic advantage23.  An important 
point here is that comparative advantages, derived from naturally occurring 
endowments of a geographical locality, were perceived as relatively fixed.  While 
governments might work to efficiently exploit comparative advantages through such 
schemes as Think Big, state actors did not see themselves as having the capacity to 
construct comparative advantages.  New Zealand’s comparative advantage flowed 
from natural endowments such as land and climate, rather than being seen as resulting 
from a dynamic, changing and socially constructed mix of factors including culture, 
social institutions, education, infrastructure, firm compatibilities, etc.   
 
Comparative advantage was articulated by governments with a strategy of economic 
management that rested on: (1) securing the conditions under which economic 
activity can develop, and (2) setting up the appropriate Keynesian macro-economic 
policy framework.  This policy framework corresponded with a system of 
international coordination, especially constraints on capital movements, which 
provided Keynesian welfare states with considerable autonomy from capital.  Within 
this framework stable and dynamic economic reproduction was achieved by applying 
                                                 
23 The so-called Think Big projects of the Muldoon-led National government after 1975 involved the 
state resourced expansion of natural gas and oil exploration as well as aluminium and iron sand 
exploitation. 
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wage labour-driven demand and corporatist methods of management in a way that 
directly eased the disciplinary effects of competition (Aglietta, 1998).  
 
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage maintained an image of the national 
economy as a system of localised capitals whose interests were promoted by the state, 
and as a largely self-regulating system endowed with a natural tendency to grow.  
Ricardo’s theory of international trade assumed that trade occurred between “a 
number of distinct and relatively self-contained national economies” (Hindess, 1998, 
p.215) and was to the advantage of all trading nations because trade development 
over the long term would involve beneficial exchange based on the distinctive 
development of each nation’s comparative advantage (Hindess, 1998, p.215).  
Comparative advantage ran parallel with the Keynesian prescription that required the 
self contained national economy in order that demand-led policies could sustain 
viable accumulation.  
 
Hindess (1998) points out that the ascendance of a new discourse of international 
competitiveness involved a number of challenges to the Ricardian discourse.  
Ricardo’s theory entailed a static view of international trade based on the view that: 
“Owners of capital, in particular, are constrained by the difficulty of controlling the 
use of capital invested in foreign parts, the difficulty of adapting to new laws and 
forms of government” (p.215).  Processes of globalisation have removed these kinds 
of restrictions on capital movements and mobile capitalist firms now seek to optimise 
profitability by exploiting differentials of advantage across nations such as labour 
costs.  In this context individual states must pursue policies that achieve an 
environment attractive to capitalist firms including a workforce characterised by an 
optimal mix of skills, attitudes and prices (Neilson, 2006, p.17). 
 
According to Hindess, the shift from a view of the national economy derived from 
Ricardian theory to a view which prioritises the national economy in terms of its 
relative position in an internationally competitive global economic system entailed a 
number of displacements of meaning; in particular, the idea that the national economy 
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has a natural tendency to grow was displaced onto the international economy.  This 
displacement had far reaching effects on perceptions of security and responsible 
national economic management because while the international economy may 
continue to expand, individual national economies may not.  In particular, this 
discursive change moves from a positive-sum world of comparative advantage to a 
zero-sum world of competitive advantage.  That is:  
 
There is nothing in the idea of a supra-national economic system, 
even one endowed with a benign tendency towards expansion, which 
requires that all geographical regions within that economy will 
benefit from its expansion. (Hindess, 1998, p.221)  
 
This discursive shift was reinforced by the experience of many nations during the 
1970s of zero and negative growth.  By the early 1990s this view was generally 
recognised in New Zealand within policy-making circles and is expressed here in a 
report commissioned by the New Zealand Planning Council24 entitled The Fully 
Employed High Income Society: 
 
Although all countries share in the reorientation of production within 
multinational enterprises there is no guarantee, or indeed any 
expectation, that all will share equally.  Multinational enterprises are 
by and large commercially rational.  Their location decisions may or 
may not benefit a particular country. (Rose, 1990, p.9) 
 
According to Torfing (1999), competitiveness is a discursively constructed notion 
with implications for strategic policy choices.  Internationally, discourses of 
competitiveness changed during the 1980s in response to recognition of the limits of 
earlier Ricardian discourses of comparative advantage that renegotiated the role of the 
state in accordance with a new set of priorities.  Top of the list was the requirement to 
pursue structural competitiveness (Torfing, 1999, p.376; see also Jessop, 1993b).  
                                                 
24 A small independent think tank set up in 1977 as a result of the Task Force on Economic and Social 
Planning. 
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According to Torfing (1999), during the 1980s discourses of structural 
competitiveness that emphasised relative costs, prices and exchange rates were 
extended to include “structures that influence the capacities of firms to compete in 
technology, delivery, after sales services and other forms of firm specific advantages” 
(p.377).  He argues further that official policy discourse often defined structural 
competitiveness in very broad terms, and included “socio-cultural values and 
institutions” and “entrepreneurial culture” (p.377).  These differing emphases in 
discourses of structural competitiveness led to a policy which stressed either 
institutional rigidities or national competencies in the pursuit of structural 
competitiveness (Torfing, 1999, p.377).   
 
These changes were emphasised by the OECD (1986) which argued that the bases of 
industrial strength and competitiveness themselves were rapidly changing and defined 
this change as the central adaptive challenge facing member countries.  In the same 
document, the OECD defined structural competitiveness broadly and emphasised the 
role of “social and institutional frameworks” in stimulating or hampering the 
competitiveness of domestic firms (p.86).  Internationally recognised organisations, 
such as the OECD, direct national strategies by providing authoritative information 
and argumentation.  In New Zealand the OECD contributed to setting new directions 
for discursive struggle over policy by identifying central policy problems and 
formulating solutions 25.  For example, OECD publications established links between 
international competitiveness and the restructuring of social policy (OECD, 1986: 
1988).  OECD proposals for reform such as the “intensification of benefit 
administration” were taken up by the New Zealand Department of Social Welfare and 
their discourses were deployed by the Department to legitimise the reforms and 
connect the Departments strategic direction with internationally recognised trends in 
policy making. 
 
                                                 
25 The analysis of OECD documents in this chapter recognises that discourse shifts in New Zealand 
were influenced to a great degree by international organisations and discourses coming from the US 
and UK (c.f. Kelsey, 1997; 2002). 
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In New Zealand, the Porter Report (Crocombe, et al., 1991) identified a number of 
strategies to enhance New Zealand’s competitive advantage.  The Porter Project 
engaged the expertise of Michael Porter, author of the influential book The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations, in a study of the New Zealand economy 
culminating in the publication of Upgrading New Zealand’s Competitive Advantage 
(Crocombe, et al., 1991).  This study involved, among other things, “a detailed audit 
of New Zealand’s institutional environment” (p.13) in order to assess its impact on 
the competitiveness of the New Zealand economy.  The Porter Report and the debate 
it initiated played a significant role in directing the shift in governmental policy away 
from the achievement of economic growth through the efficient exploitation of 
natural resources within a national accumulation strategy towards a focus on the 
achievement of structural competitiveness within a globalised economic system: 
 
In today’s global economy, success is a function of a nation’s ability 
to develop competitive advantage in advanced industries and 
industry segments rather than its ability to exploit comparative 
advantage of inherited endowments of factors of production.… 
Globalisation decouples the firm from the factor endowment of a 
single nation.  Raw materials, components, machinery and many 
services are available to firms in all nations on increasingly 
comparable terms.  Much traditional thinking has embodied an 
essentially static view of competition focusing on cost efficiency due 
to factor or scale advantages.  In contrast, the essential character and 
source of competitive advantage is innovation and change. 
(Crocombe, et al., 1991, pp.26-27) 
 
This competitiveness discourse also featured in the New Zealand Planning Council 
commissioned report, The Fully Employed High Income Society (1990), which 
challenged earlier discourses of comparative advantage and promoted a view that 
many elements of competitive advantage are not only fluid but result from our social 
and political institutional arrangements as well as our cultural attitudes and 
expectations (Rose, 1990, p.9).  
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 Unlike past notions of comparative advantage, structural competitiveness included a 
widened range of factors that fall within the state’s regulatory ambit.  These socially 
constructed and widened set of factors, seen as contributing to competitiveness, led 
policymakers to view social policy as increasingly significant because of its effects 
on the competitiveness of New Zealand’s economy and society.  As a result, 
unemployment policy began to be assessed in terms of its consequences for 
promoting or impairing the pursuit of national competitiveness.  This is evident, for 
example, in the recognition that the state’s responsibility to support the unemployed 
through social protection is constrained by “the need to take account of possible 
corporate responses” (Rose, 1990, p.9).  In addition, past discourses which prioritised 
social justice in assessments of social policy (c.f. Sutch, 1971) began to lose salience 
due in large part to the irrelevance of social justice to the new criterion of structural 
competitiveness (Jessop, 1993a).  While social policy based in egalitarian 
redistributive ideals depended on economic growth, its social justice rationale 
developed alongside but independently from economic policy considerations.  During 
the social democratic era, social policy was conceived as an autonomous policy field 
driven by its own logic primarily based in conceptions of equity and social justice 
(New Zealand Royal Commission, 1972).  The challenge to the idea of a relatively 
self-contained national economic system undermined government perceptions of the 
autonomy of distinctive policy arenas.   
 
The ascending hegemony of a discourse of international competitiveness inaugurated 
a new conception of the link between unemployment policy and other policy fields.  
Analysis of public sector policy discourses throughout the period reveals a marked 
shift from a social rationale for benefits and programmes for the unemployed, to 
economic justifications for their reform.  The policy documents and conference 
papers analysed in this chapter reflect the growing dominance of economic policy 
concerns in government.  Economic concerns are evident in references to “fiscal 
crisis”, “economic efficiency”, the presentation of state overload and the “crowding 
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out” thesis26, as well as a number of references to the “tax burden” of the welfare 
state (New Zealand Planning Council, 1980; OECD, 1988; New Zealand Department 
of Social Welfare, 1991).  
 
Unemployment policy underwent a shift from a Keynesian welfare state strategy of 
full employment and welfare provision that eased wage dependence and competition 
in the labour market to the competitive re-regulation of the labour market, involving 
active labour market policies designed to promote a competitive, flexible workforce 
in terms of wages, attitudes, availability and skills. 
  
While economic arguments for the reform of welfare proliferated, these new 
discourses argued not simply for the reassertion of an economic over a social 
rationality in policy development but for a re-specification of the nature of the 
relation between economic and social policy.  For example, the OECD publication of 
The Future of Social Protection, (1988) argued: 
 
The improvement of economic performance should be one of the 
functions of social policy: that social policies should, in a sense, be 
concerned with the effective functioning of the supply side of the 
economy is one way to achieve important social aims. (OECD, 1988, 
p.24) 
 
The supply side here refers to the supply of human attributes and capacities, 
motivations and expectations that can contribute to the improvement of economic 
performance.  The Porter Report (Crocombe, et al., 1991) also emphasised how many 
of the contemporary dimensions of firm competitiveness, such as wage and labour 
flexibility and innovative capacity, are the effects of re-regulation rather than 
deregulation.  Thus, in order to align with the multiple dimensions of firm 
competitiveness, states need to pursue a correspondingly compatible institutional 
                                                 
26 The crowding out argument is that economic growth is undermined when the state is a player in the 
economy such that the private sector is constrained. 
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policy nexus including: a workfare approach to unemployment and welfare policy 
and investment in competitiveness-enhancing education, training and infrastructure. 
 
Competitiveness increasingly became an explicit goal of policy during the 1990s.  
Following the election of the National government in 1990, the state, international 
organisations, employers and even the union movement began framing their 
discourses in terms of the need for competitiveness (Larner, 1998a, p.599).  
Increasingly, the motivation of the state, in an era of globalisation, was to achieve the 
structural conditions of competitiveness and foster business confidence in order to 
create employment opportunities for New Zealanders.  The focus of the following 
section is an analysis of the policy means to the achievement of business confidence. 
 
 
Fostering business confidence 
 
The concept of ‘business confidence’ has its origins in the work of Kalecki (1943) 
who argued that unemployment in a market system indicates declining business 
confidence in terms of the motivation of capital to invest.  A crisis of unemployment 
such as that which occurred in New Zealand during the late 1980s is interpreted in a 
Kaleckian discourse as a crisis of business confidence.  In order for the state to avoid 
an unemployment crisis, according to Kalecki, it must directly address the declining 
state of confidence.  Since the mid-1980s, the focus of the New Zealand government 
was the pursuit of an environment conducive to international competitiveness 
specified in terms of business confidence.  This discourse articulated firm 
competitiveness with national competitiveness.  For example Richard Prebble leader 
of the the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers of New Zealand Party (ACT) 
commented in Parliament in the debate over Government expenditure: 
 
Let us look at the fundamentals of the New Zealand economy. One 
has to conclude that the economy at the moment is underperforming 
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and that business confidence is dangerously low.  Business 
confidence is at a 6-year low.  That comes out of the National Bank 
survey.  The difficulty about those sorts of surveys is they become 
self-fulfilling unless we can find reasons to turn them around.  Then 
we have to look at why businessmen have lost confidence.  Well, 
there is a string of reasons why they have lost confidence.  New 
Zealand has slipped to 13th place in international competitiveness in 
the World Competitiveness Yearbook put out by the Swiss-based 
IMD. (Prebble, 19 Jun 1997)  
 
That business confidence surveys can become “self-fulfilling” means that competition 
enables capital to exert disciplinary power, through the logic of business confidence, 
on the behaviour of nation states and workforces.  The goal of government 
intervention was articulated in terms of the need to secure the conditions necessary to 
increase business confidence (New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, 1991, 
p.25).  As these comments from Labour Prime Minster, David Lange and Labour MP, 
Philip Woolaston debating the Labour Government’s Budget in parliament confirm: 
 
The Government will create a climate of certainty and confidence 
that will cause the business sector to invest in employment based 
industry. (Prime Minister Lange, 13 Nov 1984a, p.1657) 
 
The member from Waitotara can grumble away, but he knows that 
unemployment figures are down because business is getting 
confidence back. (Woollaston, 13 November 1984, p.1669)       
 
Business confidence did not feature in earlier Keynesian discourses which promoted 
extra-market mechanisms that subordinated capital investment to national macro-
economic policy and offered alternative policy instruments for addressing 
unemployment.  National Keynesian mechanisms for regulating the economy and, 
specifically, Keynesian policy instruments to provide the social welfare goal of full 
employment, were displaced by the discourse of business confidence.  This discourse 
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was evident in the rhetoric of politicians and in government documents from the mid-
1980s and established an equivalence between profit motivation and job creation in 
discourses of economic growth.  The ascendance of the discourse of business 
confidence as a means to the promotion of competitiveness and employment is 
articulated with the neoliberal project to promote market regulation27 because the 
concept of business confidence assumes a laissez-faire system.  Structural 
competitiveness, business confidence, social policy and market regulation were 
combined and substituted in a discursive chain of equivalence that began increasingly 
to dominate policy development in New Zealand.  In particular, continuity was 
established between the interests of capitalist firms, structural competitiveness and 
market regulation under the signifier business confidence.  This chain is articulated 
by the OECD: 
 
Social policies generally complement and support the market 
mechanisms through which economic progress occurs; they provide 
protection against personal economic insecurity which is the first 
step to a stable social climate and, hence, to consumer and business 
confidence. (1994, p.9) 
 
The relationship between economic growth and business confidence was also 
established when financial institutions offered surveys of ‘business confidence’ and 
the results were cast as a general prospective economic forecast (c.f. McManus, 1992, 
p.13).  This articulation of discourses limited understandings of the conditions for 
national competitive advantage to neoliberal market reform.   
 
The Porter Report was a particularly coherent articulation of a neoliberal strategy and 
acted as a rationale and blueprint for the National-led government’s policy 
programme.  The Porter Report argued: “The New Zealand government should move 
more forcefully to embrace a new role, one that focuses on creating an environment 
in which New Zealand firms can prosper” (Crocombe, et al., 1991, p.177).  In the 
                                                 
27 Some authors refer to the construction of markets as deregulation.  This obscures the active re-
regulation involved in creating and maintaining markets and quasi-markets (c.f. Standing, 1997) 
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same year, the newly elected National government signalled a re-focusing of their 
economic strategy towards ‘competitiveness’ (New Zealand National Party, 1990b, 
14).    
 
The Porter Report was dismissive of past notions of comparative advantage, viewed 
as not appropriate to the new reality of globalisation (Crocombe, et al., 1991, p.26-7).  
In place of the image of the well-managed national economy providing resources for 
the promotion of social justice central to the Keynesian welfare state discourse, the 
Porter Report provided an image of an extravagant and politically irresponsible state, 
undermining efficient, competitive national economic performance.   
   
According to the Porter Report, the provisions of the Keynesian welfare state had 
resulted in under-investment in human capital.  Keynesian welfare policy undermined 
the wage dependency of workers, thereby disinclining them to invest in their human 
capital, providing conditions which disfavour an investment-led economy.  The 
authors took issue with government policy in terms of how past welfare policies had 
created a dysfunctional structure of individual and firm incentives:  
 
New Zealand government policies have shaped incentives for 
individuals and firms in ways that work against the economy.  In 
particular, government policies have inadvertently resulted in 
disincentives for individuals to save and, for some, disincentives to 
obtain training or work.  Policies have also limited the incentives for 
firms to invest in long-term development. (Crocombe, et al., 1991, 
p.173)   
 
In contrast, two decades earlier, the Report of the New Zealand Royal Commission 
(1972) had argued that social security in the form of income support was an important 
part of an economic growth strategy because freedom from the fear of poverty raises 
aspirations and provides a stimulus to effort, self-help and productive capacity: 
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On the one hand, economic growth enables the community to raise 
living standards. On the other, better education, better health and 
living conditions and the freedom from fear of poverty not only 
raises people’s aspirations, but tends to stimulate effort and self help, 
and enhance the capacity to produce. (New Zealand Royal 
Commission, 1972, p.8) 
   
This social citizenship discourse had underscored New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare 
state and starkly contrasted to the argument made in the Porter Report which 
emphasised welfare dependence and the need to incentivise work and training.  Both 
viewpoints highlighted the goal of enhancing productivity.  However, whereas the 
New Zealand Royal Commission was concerned to promote social citizenship as a 
stimulant to individual effort, the Porter Report, written nearly twenty years later, 
viewed income support and full employment policies as creating disincentives to 
individual effort (Crocombe, et al., 1991, p.125).  
 
The Porter Report problematised government policy both in terms of the creation of 
disincentives for individuals to invest in their own human capital and in terms of 
weakening capital’s motivation to invest.  They argued that the solution to rising 
unemployment required the raising of business confidence by investing in human 
capital and infrastructure.  Their argument assumed that capital’s disinclination to 
invest in employment-generating business activity reflects the low quality of the 
workforce, implying that raising the skill levels of the unemployed will induce 
employers to invest in employment.   
 
The rate of participation in the workforce is low as are levels of 
training and skills.… Burgeoning unemployment provides ready 
evidence that the tens of thousands of New Zealanders lack the skills 
to be able to support themselves in productive and rewarding work in 
the modern economy where skills are paramount. (Crocombe, et al., 
1991, pp.99-105) 
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That raised levels of employability among unemployed could coincide with continued 
joblessness is not explicitly considered by the authors.  Instead, they emphasise that 
New Zealand’s overly generous and passive welfare system has produced dis-
incentives to work and train: 
 
New Zealand’s social welfare system tends to dampen the pressure 
for, and rewards from, skills upgrading .… Full employment up until 
the 1980s reduced pressure for individuals to upgrade their skills 
while high marginal tax rates reduced the incentives to work longer 
hours.  The low differential between unemployment benefits and 
paid work that has developed has the same effect. (Crocombe, et al., 
1991, p.143)   
 
The Porter Report linked New Zealand’s competitiveness with the capacities of the 
workforce to respond to the demands and opportunities of an increasingly global 
economic environment.  The authors argued that social policy should be set in a way 
that creates the skills and incentives needed for an investment-led economy.  Whereas 
earlier discourses concerned with social investment were rationalised on social 
grounds, this discourse rationalised investment in human capital in terms of its 
capacity to promote business confidence and thus attract investment capital:     
 
New Zealand faces fundamental human resource challenges.  We 
have not invested aggressively in creating the pools of human 
resource skills needed to be internationally competitive. (Crocombe, 
et al., 1991, p.99)   
 
The discourse of competitiveness found in the Porter Report, and in much subsequent 
policy discourse, articulated a state strategy to foster a suitable extra-economic 
environment supportive of competitive advantage (Crocombe, et al., 1991).  Within 
this discursive environment, social policy was viewed as an instrument of a 
competitive economic strategy.  Services to the unemployed were to be assessed not 
just in terms of the resources they redirect away from productive activity or “fiscal 
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burden” but also in terms of how they contributed to or hampered the pursuit of 
national competitive advantage (Hindess, 1998, p.223).  The onus was on achieving 
an environment capable of attracting and retaining capital investment as a central 
priority of both economic and social policy. 
 
This shift in the rationale for social policy initiated a restructuring of income support 
in order to incentivise paid work, training and a life-long commitment to self-
development in the service of employability.  The aim of policy shifted from full 
employment to full employability in which the entire unemployed workforce is 
available and actively engaged in job search as well as a range of other activities 
designed to foster activity and enhance employability.   
 
In 1991, the National Government introduced major changes to social security which 
transformed the administration of unemployment benefits and challenged previously 
hegemonic notions of social citizenship.  The nature and rationale for the reforms 
were outlined in the Budget paper Social Assistance: Welfare That Works (1991) 
published shortly after the publication of the Porter Report.  Benefit cuts were 
introduced for working-age beneficiaries.  Eligibility criteria were tightened and work 
tests were extended beyond those on the unemployment benefit to apply to all 
categories of working age beneficiaries.  The government’s restructuring discourse 
outlined in Welfare That Works assumed this new relation between the economic and 
the social and was centrally concerned with issues of competitiveness mirroring 
concerns expressed in the Porter Report (1991) and the OECD (1988) report on the 
future of social protection, to coordinate economic policy with appropriate social 
policy: 
 
Economic and social policies must be developed and function 
together.  They are interdependent.… The new social assistance 
policies being introduced by the Government are an essential part of 
the process of creating an environment which encourages the 
economic growth that will generate jobs and relieve that demand for 
welfare. (New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, 1991, pp.2-3) 
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 This view contrasts with the public policy discourses of the 1970s which discussed 
welfare policy in isolation from economic policy concerns.  The New Zealand Royal 
Commission (1972) made particular note of the absence of debate or consideration of 
the economic aspects of social security:  
 
Indeed, if we were to judge by the general nature of many 
submissions, we could only conclude that, even among those of the 
general public who have professional interests in social policy, there 
is widespread lack of appreciation of the plain fact that if a social 
security system is to accomplish its goals, it cannot be separated 
from the economic system through which it must work. (New 
Zealand Royal Commission, 1972, p.68)   
 
This comment reveals a discursive climate in which social policy goals were assessed 
as ends in themselves and largely independent from economic policy.  This ring-
fencing of social policy continued after the election of the Fourth Labour Government 
in 1984 whose economic reforms were justified as an economic means to social 
democratic ends (Larner, 1997a).  Under the previously hegemonic Keynesian 
welfare state, economic policy was geared to the achievement of social goals.  Social 
citizenship and forms of wealth redistribution were considered separately and in 
accordance with a social justice rationale.  The New Zealand Royal Commission 
(1972) had recognised, for example, the growing need to attend to economic growth 
as a means to sustain the “essentially humanitarian” social security system which was 
to be determined by political judgement: 
 
The level of social security expenditure must be determined by need, 
and by judgement (which we agree must finally be political) of what 
level of income support is fair and adequate relative to changing 
incomes and living standards in the community as a whole. (New 
Zealand Royal Commission, 1972, p.69) 
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The Commission argued that while economic growth was an important consideration, 
the level of social security expenditure was a political decision that reflected society’s 
commitment to relative levels of income equality.  This point reflects the priority of 
the Keynesian welfare state which was security and employment articulated by the 
first Labour Prime Minister, Michael Joseph Savage, when he said “Social justice 
must be the guiding principle and economic organisation must adapt itself to social 
needs” (Sinclair, 1980, p.263).  By the late 1980s relative equality of incomes, once a 
central concern of social policy makers, was excluded from the policy discourses 
altogether.  The displacement of discourses of relative equality partly reflected the 
constitution of an equivalence between equality and mass produced standardised 
social service provision associated with an outmoded Fordist national accumulation 
strategy.  Reference to this was evident in statements by the OECD which, for 
example, asked in The Future of Social Protection (1988): 
 
How can the affluent desire for individual and differential service be 
reconciled with the uniformity of provision which is the visible 
aspect of distributional equity? (1988, p.20)  
 
Here the universality and equality goals of the Keynesian welfare state are respecified 
in terms of a trade off between consumer choice and standardised provision.  This 
discursively constructed trade off between equality and consumer choice is not 
inevitable.  An insistence on the provision of choice was a discourse strategy 
deployed to popularise the neoliberal project which was constituted in opposition to 
egalitarianism constructed as equivalent to deadening sameness and the restriction of 
choice.  The Fourth Labour Government emphasised the rights of consumers to 
choice and value for money in justifying the extension of market regulation into 
public service provision.  This comment from the then Deputy Prime Minister, Helen 
Clark, in the House is an example of the Fourth Labour Government’s targeting of 
the consumer:    
 
In the meantime the government is getting on with the job, with 
significant initiatives designed to increase the economy’s flexibility 
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and competitiveness and to enable it to be more responsive to the 
consumer. (Clark, 5 Dec, 1989) 
 
By 1990, social policy goals were closely coordinated and aligned with economic 
goals.  The OECD signalled this new direction when it pronounced that, “Public 
programme policies need to be seen less as ends in themselves and rather more as 
policy instruments within a wider package” (1988, p.17).  The need for a more 
“integrated approach” was everywhere emphasised in the official policy discourses.   
 
The shift from perceiving social policy concerns as separate from economic policy 
concerns to a view of social policy as in the service of economic policy occurred as a 
result of changing governmental perceptions of the national economy both in relation 
to its insertion into the international economy and in terms of the widened set of 
“externalities” now viewed as pertinent to governmental regulation of a competitive 
economy.    
 
Discourses highlighting an increasingly competitive global environment spurred new 
governmental discourses that emphasised the fostering of business confidence in 
order to attract and retain capital investment.  The dominance of this discourse 
articulation had significant implications for unemployment policy.  The shift from a 
Keynesian to a neoliberal mode of regulation centrally involved the disarticulation of 
the discourse of social rights and egalitarian redistributive justice, and the ascendance 
of a discourse of structural competitiveness which demanded that the goals of welfare 
policy be brought into line with the requirements of a competitive economy.  
According to Jessop, this shift 
 
… marks a clear break with the Keynesian welfare state as domestic 
full employment is downplayed in favour of international 
competitiveness and redistributive welfare rights take second place 
to a productivist reordering of social policy. (1994, p.263) 
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This productivist reordering was to be achieved via an “active assistance” model of 
welfare provision (Department of Social Welfare, 1996, p.24).  The following section 
focuses on the process of re-articulating social policy discourses to competitiveness 
via the vision of the active society (Gass, 1988; OECD, 1988; OECD, 1990; New 
Zealand Department of Social Welfare, 1996). 
 
 
The active society 
 
Much of the social policy discourse particularly from the late 1980s onwards was 
preoccupied with active policy measures.  In 1988, at a meeting of social policy 
Ministers, OECD members proclaimed that “an active society in which all members 
have a constructive role is a primary goal for social policy” (1994, p.9).  Public policy 
should facilitate and assist people in seeking and achieving a more active social role 
in both their working and non-working lives (OECD, 1988, p.26).  Active assistance 
policy represented a critique of past “passive” forms of income support and was 
constructed in opposition to the Keynesian model, which was represented as 
hampering production and economic growth, as well as increasing ‘dependency’ 
amongst the population.  Thus the OECD report (1994) stated: 
 
While income support programmes enhance security, they are not 
intended to be long-term alternatives to employment.  To the extent 
that these systems lead to persistent dependency on the State, they 
become a poor alternative to active participation and self sufficiency. 
(1994, p.7) 
 
In promoting a broader concept of activity beyond full time waged work, the active 
society discourse replaced the policy goal of full employment central to the 
Keynesian welfare state with activity in the service of full employability.  The active 
society discourse promoted paid work but also training and education.  The 
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promotion of life-long learning and self-development were proposals designed to 
change the relation of individuals to their productive work.  And much of the 
restructuring of income support delivery focused on prompting a psychological 
attachment between the beneficiary and paid work (New Zealand Department of 
Social Welfare, 1996).  The OECD (1994) had argued that human potential must be 
actively encouraged through “prevention”, “rehabilitation” and “treatment” (p.16).  
The psychological language used in discussions of programmes for dependent 
populations signalled a shift in analysis of the problem posed by unemployment from 
a societal critique to a social disease.    
 
These discourses of active citizenship prevalent in OECD reports and reproduced in 
government policy documents from 1990 articulated discourses of international 
competitiveness and business confidence.  This articulation undermined the long 
standing separation between discourses of production and discourses of social 
welfare.  New Zealand’s process of neoliberalisation involved a reversal of this 
relation.  Social policy was recast as a resource for the competitiveness of the 
economy.  Everywhere in the official discourses the primacy of production was re-
asserted: “Sustainable prosperity will only be achieved if we create incentives and 
focus resources on building the productive capacity of our economy” (Crocombe, et 
al., 1991, p.172).  The OECD argued in New Orientations for Social Policy (1994), 
that programmes which provide the unemployed with income and assistance with 
training and job search are “investments in the productive capacity of the economy” 
(p.9). 
 
While the implementation of an active assistance model in New Zealand did not 
begin until 1985 with the Fourth Labour Government’s New Deal in Employment and 
Training Opportunities the notion of active social policy was in circulation among 
New Zealand policymakers as early as the late 1970s.  During this time, 
unemployment levels were rising for the first time since the Depression and began to 
be represented in terms of crisis even if the numbers involved were not high by 
international standards.  It was in the context of this perceived crisis of 
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unemployment that active policy measures first appeared in the official discourses.  
Full employment had been the mainstay of New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state 
throughout the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s (Castles, 1985).  The 1975 Budget 
justified high levels of overseas borrowing to “prevent tens of thousands of New 
Zealanders from being thrown out of work” (Budget 1975 as cited in Endres, 1984, 
p.39).  By the 1980s, however, a shift in favour of export-led growth and a priority on 
the balance of payments began to dominate over concerns to maintain full 
employment (Endres, 1984).   
 
The active society model was promoted by the New Zealand Planning Council, a key 
participant in the employment debate publishing extensively on the welfare state, 
employment and the economy.  The New Zealand Planning Council sought to give 
advice to Government and to publish documents on topics that merit wide 
consultation and debate.28  In this respect, the Council was expected to serve a 
democratic function:  
 
The mechanism [the Council] should aim to improve the workings of 
our Parliamentary democracy by giving the public more adequate 
information and opportunity to comment on the main issues of 
national development, as well as providing a better basis for 
informed debate among political parties and interest groups. 
(Fischer, 1981, p.4)  
 
In their 1980 publication, entitled Employment: Towards an active employment 
policy, the Council recommended an active policy approach and proposed a radical 
reorganisation of the administrative terrain covered by the unemployment benefit.  
The Council adopted a skill deficit analysis of unemployment: “There are increasing 
numbers of people inadequately equipped with the basic educational, technical and 
social skills required for employment” (p.22), requiring an active employment policy 
                                                 
28 The chairman of the Planning Council had a weekly meeting with the Minister of National 
Development who saw himself as an active protagonist for the Council and liaised with government 
Ministers to ensure that recommendations from Council publications were taken up (Fischer, 1981, 
p.13).  
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approach in order to achieve “efficiency” and “competitiveness” (New Zealand 
Planning Council, 1980).   
 
To this end, the Council proposed that income support be integrated with human 
resources and a number of training initiatives.  The specific policies advocated 
consisted of the intensification of a range of training measures particularly aimed at 
school leavers or those who return to school because they are unable to find 
employment, and an increase in adult vocational education.  The Council also 
proposed that the unemployment benefit be replaced with a Job Search Allowance 
payable for up to a ten-week period.  After ten weeks of unsuccessful job search the 
beneficiary would be offered a training allowance or placement in a job creation 
scheme.  ‘Towards an active employment policy’ did attract some criticism.  For 
instance, the New Zealand Council of Social Services criticised the policy proposal 
for failing to consider a wider range of development options; a broader definition of 
work, different value systems and societal goals (Fischer, 1981, p.11). 
 
The Council problematised unemployment from the perspective of human capital and 
activity and promoted an active employment policy in order “to promote the best use 
of New Zealand’s human resources” (New Zealand Planning Council, 1980, p.22).  
The focus of the problem was the long-term unemployed: 
 
The changes we propose are specifically designed to minimise the 
number of people unemployed for long periods of time.  This is an 
aspect of the present situation of special concern to the Council.  We 
readily accept that of itself the concept of job search allowance does 
not ‘solve’ our unemployment problems although it could to some 
extent circulate a given level of unemployment. (p.39)   
 
Here the Council articulated a concern to restructure income support in order to avoid 
a situation where there was unemployment even though employers were unable to fill 
vacant positions.  The neoliberal interpretation of this mismatch is the growth in the 
number of voluntary unemployed content to remain welfare dependent and/or whose 
155 
skills and discipline deteriorate as a result of their long term detachment from the 
labour market (Torfing, 1999, p.378).    
 
The Council’s proposal consisted of an emphasis on work search requirements as a 
means to activate the unemployed and sought to govern the social and psychological 
effects of unemployment by defining the proper and legitimate orientation and 
conduct of unemployed beneficiaries. 
 
In our job-oriented society people who want, but cannot find, paid 
employment often experience severe financial, psychological, and 
social stress.  This undermines their self-confidence, their sense of 
purpose in life, their sense of belonging to a wider community, and 
their physical and mental health.  The despair followed by apathy, 
which is commonly experienced by those who are unemployed for a 
long time, can often be discerned in the young after only a few 
months of unemployment.  Periods of sustained unemployment also 
impose costs on the whole community.  Symptoms of social stress, 
such as crime and racial tensions tend to increase. (New Zealand 
Planning Council, 1980, p.6)   
 
In other words, the active employment policy advocated by the Council not only 
acted upon the financial plight of the unemployed and upon their job prospects, but 
also upon those attitudes, conduct and dispositions which have a bearing on their 
future job prospects and may cause alienation from social norms such as the work 
ethic and law abidance.  The motivation for a policy approach which works upon the 
attitudes, conduct and dispositions of the unemployed reflected a governmental 
concern to avoid the development of a ‘structural unemployment’29 problem. 
 
                                                 
29 Government recognition of “long term unemployment” and “a curious anomaly: while 
unemployment still remains high … employers are currently reporting difficulty in filling many 
positions through lack of appropriate skills in job seekers” (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1985, 
p.5) suggests that the problem had been identified in these terms. 
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The Council’s proposals in Employment: towards an active employment policy (1980) 
were followed up by a series of ministerial meetings in which relevant ministers were 
provided with a checklist of policy measures.  Extensive pre-publication consultation 
both within and outside the state ensured the document had wide acceptability.  
Following its publication, the Department of Labour was reorganised in accordance 
with the Council’s recommendations (Fischer, 1981, p.14).  The Council’s human 
capital discourse and particularly the notion of an active policy approach became the 
new orthodoxy among policymakers.  During the 1990s, this active society discourse 
provided the underlying rationale for a much more far-reaching restructuring of social 
policy. 
 
 
Shifting the indices of disadvantage 
 
The Employment Promotion Conference of 1985 undertook to “invite ideas and 
debate on strategies to solve our present problems of unemployment” (New Zealand 
Government, 1985a, p.5).  A large number of submissions were received from a wide 
variety of groups from the public, university, and community sectors.  Key 
participants at the conference came from the workers’ co-operative movement that 
had emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s alongside rising levels of 
unemployment.  The workers’ cooperative movement represented a raft of small self-
managed cooperatives which combined training and work and sought democratic 
forms of work organisation (Co-operative Workers' Trust, 1984, p.2).  Funded by an 
assortment of government employment subsidy schemes the workers’ cooperative 
movement represented increasing numbers of work cooperatives and trusts providing 
socially useful work outside of the formal economy.  These schemes were a focus of 
debate at the conference.  This was, in large part, due to the Department of Labour’s 
pre-conference publication of the discussion document entitled Review of the 
Employment Subsidy Programmes: A Framework for Consultation.  Published in 
November 1984, it aimed to inform discussion leading up to the conference.  In the 
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‘Preface from the Minister of Employment’, the Minister argued, “it is apparent that 
employment programmes do not increase the total number of jobs in the economy, 
but they can be useful in providing employment assistance to those people who are 
genuinely disadvantaged in the labour market” (Burke, 1984 cited in New Zealand 
Department of Labour, 1984, p.4).  The Minister’s statement represents the beginning 
of an attempt to articulate a workfarist approach to employment programmes that 
constituted the unemployed as disadvantaged in terms of individual incapacities and 
assessed the needs of the unemployed, in terms of training. 
 
The government’s construction of the disadvantaged unemployed in the review and in 
much of the subsequent policy literature began to shift from a view of labour market 
disadvantage based on systemic disadvantage and discriminatory practices against 
women, Maori and Pacific Islanders (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1988, 
p.14) towards the construction of the disadvantaged unemployed in terms of 
individualised deficits in skills, education and motivation. 
 
Some people lack, for example, occupational skills, general work 
skills, or personal qualities such as confidence or the ability to relate 
to others.  Training can overcome these problems, and may be more 
effective than undirected work experience. (New Zealand 
Department of Labour, 1984, p.11) 
 
At the conference, members of the workers’ co-operatives movement contributed a 
radically different conception of the problem of unemployment.  Questions were 
raised for the first time about the feasibility of ‘full employment’ as a policy goal 
taken to mean a continuous full time job for all who want it.  A number of 
submissions to the employment conference argued that full employment might not be 
possible under new conditions and that the problem of unemployment could be 
solved by a redistribution of a reduced quantum of work. 
 
Now is the perfect time to consider options to full paid employment 
such as job sharing, permanent part-time work, flexible working 
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hours and co-operatives. (A Community Organisation quoted in New 
Zealand Government, 1985a, p.20)  
 
Calls were made by the workers’ cooperative movement and other community 
organisations for a redefinition of work to include work forms outside of the formal 
economy.  These arguments were made alongside a critique of the model of economic 
growth as a solution to unemployment based on predictions of jobless growth.  
Community sector contributors argued that the government should work with 
community groups to construct a socially useful third sector where service to the 
community would be recognised.   
 
Certainly there is value in getting as many people as possible into 
paid employment that is commercially viable but, since the number 
of such jobs is not going to be enough to go around, it is imperative 
that work that contributes to the richness of community life and the 
environment within which people live be respected and paid for. (A 
Community Organisation quoted in New Zealand Government, 
1985a, p.29) 
 
According to Higgins (1997), workers’ cooperatives had attempted to create 
alternative work forms that challenged standard forms of employment and sought to 
create a political context for their needs outside the official economy (p.147).  The 
argument that the unemployed should be channelled into a socially useful third sector 
servicing the needs of the community was supported to varying degrees by a raft of 
different groups and organisations including the university sector, the New Zealand 
Planning Council, unemployed workers groups and the voluntary sector.  
 
The New Zealand Planning Council had argued in 1980 that “Publically funded 
[work]…should enhance social, economic, and cultural development in the broadest 
sense” (p.50).  A submission from economists from the Department of Economics, 
University of Auckland, to the conference argued that employment subsidy 
programmes could be made more productive with the possibility of employing more 
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unemployed workers if they were linked to medium and longer term “cultural and 
local economic development strategies and objectives, rather than being almost 
exclusively for short-term temporary work as with existing schemes” (O’Connor and 
Endres, 1985, p.10).  Arguments for the extension of the length of employment 
subsidy programmes beyond “short-term temporary work” featured in community 
responses to the report (e.g. New Zealand University Students’ Association).  These 
and other submissions sought a positive articulation between the employment subsidy 
programmes and non-market work projects providing tangible benefits to the 
community.   
 
Following the Employment Promotion Conference in 1985, the Government 
published its New Deal in Training and Employment Opportunities (New Zealand 
Department of Labour, 1985).  In it the Minister of Employment identified the 
problem in terms of the lack of employability of jobseekers:  “employers are currently 
reporting difficulty in filling many positions through lack of appropriate skills in job 
seekers” (p.5).  The problem of unemployment was in this way constituted as a 
problem of human capital, thereby removing the issue from its wider political context 
and reconstituting it as a problem of individuals.  
 
This document signalled a practical and discursive shift in the wider field of 
employment policy.  The government’s plan to phase out wage subsidy schemes was 
outlined alongside its intention to channel unemployed workers through a single 
targeted training programme aimed at specific groups “in trouble” (Wilkes and 
O’Brien, 1993, p.142).  The phasing out of job creation/wage subsidy schemes 
represented a wider shift in the Labour Government’s discourse.  Job creation 
schemes in 1985 serviced 52,000 unemployed and underwrote a commitment to the 
idea that every New Zealand citizen had a right to a job (Wilkes and O’Brien, 1993, 
p.133).  The disestablishment of the job creation schemes signalled a shift away from 
the citizenship discourse of a right to a job and a downward reorientation of citizen 
expectations of the state.  This entailed redefining what was legitimately within the 
regulatory ambit of the state such that the state was no longer perceived as 
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responsible for levels of unemployment.  The Labour Government argued that a 
guarantee of jobs for everyone was not possible.  These examples from the Review of 
Employment Subsidy Programmes (1984), and the Report of the Working Group on 
Employment Policy (1988), respectively reconstituted the problem of unemployment 
as a problem of labour market adjustment:   
 
It is often thought that employment programmes can increase the 
total number of jobs in the economy, and ideally we would like to set 
up programmes in times of unemployment which would guarantee 
jobs for everyone.  Unfortunately, this is not possible. (New Zealand 
Department of Labour, 1984, p.6)   
 
The key task for employment policy at present is to promote 
adjustment to change.  Successful adjustment within the labour 
market depends on being able to achieve speedy, fair matching of the 
changing flows of jobseekers, to the changing flows of job 
opportunities as they arise. (New Zealand Department of Labour, 
1988, p.17)    
 
The government identified the target group as “jobseekers” rather than unemployed.  
This further signified the shift away from recognition of the unemployed’s right to a 
job towards recognition of the “jobseekers” need for assistance to adapt to “changing 
flows of job opportunities”.  
 
In the Review of Employment Subsidy Programmes: A Framework for Consultation 
(1984), the government argued that employment programmes cannot increase the 
total number of jobs because subsidised jobs displace unsubsidised jobs (New 
Zealand Department of Labour, 1984, p.12).  The government characterised the 
employment subsidy programmes as “job redistribution schemes” and argued that 
“the effect of subsidies is to redistribute available jobs” (New Zealand Department of 
Labour, 1984, p.13).  This argument evoked a discourse of unfairness.  Government 
job creation schemes interfere in the market to redistribute jobs away from those who 
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would otherwise acquire them towards the disadvantaged who would not otherwise 
be able to secure a job.  In this discourse, job creation undermines a meritocratic 
distribution of rewards based in the level playing field of the market.  
 
The government also argued that subsidised employment is “almost always” lower 
productivity work and crowds out the market by diverting employment into low 
productivity areas with the effect of reducing long term national income and 
employment (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1984, p.13).  The Treasury 
document Economic Management (1984) argued, 
 
Subsidised jobs in the public sector have … contributed to an 
assistance structure which has tended to distort private returns 
between activities and diverted resources from areas that would 
provide the greatest gains in national income. (New Zealand 
Treasury, 1984, p.238) 
 
However, a number of submissions from community organisations, trusts and 
cooperatives to the Employment Promotion Conference argued that low productivity 
was the result of meagre overheads and infrastructural support, the low priority and 
temporary nature of the projects and the lack of integration into longer term 
community, cultural or local economic development goals (O’Connor and Endres, 
1985, p.10).  The government argued that recruitment of jobseekers into the formal 
market economy was a more effective approach to promoting employment, while a 
tightly targeted set of employment subsidy programmes could address the training 
needs of the “especially disadvantaged” (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1985, 
Appendix 3).    
 
Calls from the workers’ cooperative movement for a wider definition of work and for 
remuneration of work outside of the formal economy were not ignored in the 
government’s discourse.  Rather, they were artfully refashioned as “work other than 
conventional waged employment” and incorporated within their market model.  For 
instance, the Review of Employment Subsidy Programmes stated: 
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 There seems to be no reason to distinguish between wage 
employment and other alternative forms of employment, such as 
group employment, cooperatives or self employment…. Subsidies 
should be made available at the same rate and on the same basis for 
all forms of employment…. To offer different subsidies for each 
kind of employment may distort the choices people make, and 
therefore interfere unnecessarily with the normal functioning of the 
labour market. (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1984, p.17) 
 
The social and community service function of the work cooperatives and trusts was 
not acknowledged in the government’s discourse which repositioned them as training 
providers and employers within the normal market economy.  
 
The oppositional discourses of the cooperative movement and the community sector 
challenged the feasibility of full employment within the formal economy and linked 
this challenge with the need to create a socially useful and socially recognised third 
sector.  The government re-articulated their challenge within the terms of its 
neoliberal discourse by acknowledging calls for a wider definition of work and 
articulating them with the neoliberal strategy to introduce flexibility into the labour 
market.  The aim of this widened definition of work was the “expansion of the range 
of vacancies to include more flexible and non-traditional work arrangements” (New 
Zealand Department of Labour, 1988, p.7).  In this way, oppositional discourses were 
reconfigured within the terms of the Labour Government’s neoliberal regulatory goal 
of making labour markets flexible. 
 
The discourses of the workers’ cooperative movement emphasised the Keynesian 
welfare state citizenship discourse of the citizen’s right to a job.  Within the terms of 
this discourse, unemployed workers could legitimately make claims for recognition 
and assistance based on their right to productive work as part of the state’s 
commitment to inclusive citizenship based in participation and belonging.  The 
Fourth Labour Government revealed the contingency of the idea of the rights of the 
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unemployed and rearticulated their claims in terms of the “needs of the 
[disadvantaged] unemployed” (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1984, p.4).  This 
shift from a discourse about citizens’ rights to a job to a discourse about the needs of 
the disadvantaged unemployed had the effect of depoliticising the claims of the 
unemployed.   This discursive manoeuvre repositioned the unemployed within a 
complex of administrative assessment that placed them along a continuum from those 
who require assistance to re-train in areas where there are job opportunities to the 
“severely disadvantaged” requiring special assistance in the pursuit of self-
sufficiency.  Further, the Labour Government’s discourse constituted the unemployed 
as “individuals” with “special needs” (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1984, 
p.11). 
   
It seems that a reasonably practical and effective way of deciding 
who should receive help is based on the length of their 
unemployment, supplemented with a careful assessment of each 
individual’s special needs. (New Zealand Department of Labour, 
1984, p.11) 
 
This discourse constructed the unemployed as a separate group of individuals 
requiring special assistance rather than as members of the wider community.  In this 
way, not just anyone becomes unemployed but particular individuals—individuals 
with an inferior capacity to adapt; with skill deficits; with social and psychological 
difficulties; and those hostile to authority who lack work habits.  The Labour 
Government’s discourse began a process of recommodifying the unemployed within 
the boundaries of the market economy.  Moreover, the new government discourse 
side-stepped issues of inequality of opportunity in the labour market by focusing on 
the unemployed as individual catalogues of deficits requiring targeted interventions 
instead of, as in earlier discourses, as politicised groups with economic and social 
rights. 
 
The rolling back of job creation schemes coincided with the rolling out of the Access 
scheme, a vocationally-oriented programme offering short courses in specific 
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industry areas or in “social” and “life skills” aimed at the “disadvantaged jobseeker” 
(Shirley, Easton, Briar and Chatterjee, 1990, p.108).  The Access Charter (1988) 
outlined the aim of the programme as follows: 
 
1 Ease individual entry or re-entry into the labour market, by 
enabling them to acquire vocational skills; 
2 Enhance the individual’s ability to enter or re-enter the 
workforce by promoting the acquisition of skills necessary for 
working life; 
3 Provide a skill base for further vocational development, which 
will enhance the long run employment and earning potential of 
trainees. (Shirley, Easton, Briar and Chatterjee, 1990, p.109) 
 
 
The Government’s New Deal constituted the unemployed as disadvantaged in terms 
of a skill deficit in vocational, social and life skills.  The New Deal retained wage 
subsidies for a targeted sector of the unemployed that the government identified as 
“particularly disadvantaged” and dysfunctional in terms of social norms.   
 
A key element of the Government’s employment strategy is 
assistance to the most disadvantaged in the labour market to gain or 
return to real jobs. …. Two new additions to the Job Opportunities 
Scheme will make special provision for the particularly 
disadvantaged.  The additional options are designed to assist 
(through either full or part time work) people who are finding it 
difficult to integrate into the work force as a result of physical or 
psychological disability.  In addition, assistance will be made 
available to small groups of job seekers who are alienated from 
society to the extent that they have become hostile towards authority, 
institutions and established work places.  Some examples are gang 
members and those with criminal records who are at risk of re-
offending in the absence of positive alternatives.  Experience 
suggests that they can benefit from employment assistance if they are 
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able to work together as a group. (New Zealand Department of 
Labour, 1985, p.6) 
 
The government identified a group of severely disadvantaged who were variously 
defined as skill deficient or having social or physical disadvantages which hamper 
their ability to find work (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1985, p.77).  A 
package of wage subsidies and short-term work cooperative activities were retained 
to provide additional employment assistance to these “severely disadvantaged” 
jobseekers.  This additional assistance included the Job Opportunities Scheme: 
Special Groups and Small Cooperative Enterprises Scheme, and aimed  
 
to provide assistance to severely disadvantaged job seekers who are 
assessed by the Employment and Vocational Guidance Service as 
likely to benefit most from group forms of employment.  It offers 
disadvantaged registered unemployed job seekers, who wish to 
establish a co-operative or a group enterprise, a period of initial 
assistance in which they can develop their skills before becoming 
self sufficient. (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1985, 
Appendix 3) 
 
Here the cooperative or group enterprise is considered a provisional and enabling step 
in a progression towards self-sufficiency.  These schemes were to provide a 
“supportive environment” to assist the severely disadvantaged to adjust to a “full 
working life and integrate into the workforce successfully” (New Zealand 
Department of Labour, 1985, Appendix 3).  The “special need” for social support and 
recognition is here a marker of incomplete personhood.  The Labour Government’s 
New Deal rearticulated the utility of workers’ cooperatives and trusts in the service of 
managing the shift from incomplete sociability to mature, self-possessed market 
participation.  The workers’ cooperatives and work trusts, on the other hand, 
specifically valued cooperative work as producing socially useful goods and services 
and promoting democratically organised enterprises as an alternative to the alienating 
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character of work organisation in the formal economy (Cooperative Workers’ Trust 
News, 1984, p.28; New Zealand Government, 1985a, p.29).  
 
The privileging of self-sufficiency has implications for discourses of gender and race.  
The construction of the disadvantaged in the Labour Government’s discourse 
acknowledged that women and racial minorities were over-represented in the 
unemployment statistics (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1984, p.10).  These 
disadvantaged groups were identified as in need of “special assistance” unlike “most 
people who become unemployed” who “find work for themselves within a short 
period” (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1984, p.9).  The form of assistance 
targeted towards these severely disadvantaged groups retained aspects of the work 
cooperative activity in order to provide “a period of initial assistance in which they 
[the severely disadvantaged] can develop their skills before becoming self-
supporting” (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1985, p.14).  A limited function 
for group forms of enterprise was retained on the grounds that some unemployed 
needed assistance to become employable before they can enter the formal labour 
market.    
 
The shift away from work cooperatives and trusts towards individualised training was 
based, in part, on claims regarding a deficit in the subjective attributes, skills and 
motivations of the unemployed. 
 
People who are without work, particularly for long periods, become 
subject to a range of problems.  They tend to have a low status, a low 
income, a low sense of well being and may withdraw from social 
interaction into apathy and depression.  They may even become so 
discouraged that they give up trying to find work…. Some people 
lack, for example, occupational skills, general work skills, or 
personal qualities such as confidence or the ability to relate to others.  
Training can overcome these problems, and may be more effective 
than undirected work experience. (New Zealand Department of 
Labour, 1984, pp.10-11)  
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 This construction of the needs of the disadvantaged unemployed according to an 
individualised prescription of personhood and employability implicitly positions 
women by virtue of their assumed responsibility for children, and ethnic groups, 
particularly Maori and Pacific Islanders, by virtue of their wilful sociability as limited 
in their capacity to participate in the liberal institutions of citizenship and the market 
(Hindess, 2002) and thus in need of training and rehabilitation. 
 
The Labour Government’s administrative reforms paved the way for the construction 
of a system for the continuous and seamless regulation of the unemployed.  The 
rolling out of the Access training scheme coincided with the institutional 
reorientation of the Department of Labour away from job placement towards 
counselling, training retraining and relocation.  This institutional reorientation 
represented a shift in the government’s policy discourse away from viewing the 
unemployed as in need of a job towards an individualised and therapeutic discourse 
that captured the unemployed within a series of administrative interventions aimed at 
behaviour modification (c.f. Dean, 1995).  Ironically, the government’s active labour 
market policy constituted the unemployed as the passive receivers of training, 
whereas as members of government-funded work cooperatives and trusts, 
unemployed workers were active in shaping, managing and implementing concrete 
and socially useful projects. 
 
The official governmental discourses continued to construct the unemployment 
problem in terms of frictional employment caused by a mismatch between the needs 
of employers and the skills of the unemployed.  For instance, the Report of the 
Working Group on Employment Policy (1988), states: 
 
The capacity for rapid adjustment through wage flexibility depends 
on the extent of wage flexibility actually available and the degree of 
responsiveness to wage changes; the incentives to search actively 
and accept work are affected by income maintenance levels. (New 
Zealand Department of Labour, 1988, p.17) 
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 In neo-classical economic theory, long term unemployment does not occur in an 
‘unregulated’ market system because short-term unemployment lowers the price of 
labour, since the unemployed underbid those in employment.  This lower price of 
labour induces employers to increase investment, employment and production 
thereby reducing unemployment (Diesing, 1982, p.76).  Implicit in the Labour 
Government’s New Deal was the idea that the labour market would clear once the 
unemployed increased their employability.  The rationale for phasing out the 
employment subsidies focused on the market distortions they were said to produce in 
terms of misdirected investment, inflation and job displacement (Higgins, 1997, 
p.146).  
 
The employment subsidy programmes were designed to provide productive 
employment to the unemployed as part of a full employment strategy and a social 
citizenship discourse of the citizen’s right to a job.  The government’s Review of 
Employment Subsidy Programmes and subsequent New Deal shifted the terms of 
debate by re-casting the employment subsidy programmes in terms of their capacity 
to assist the disadvantaged into paid work.  The political critique advanced by the 
cooperative movement was neutralised by the application of funding criteria oriented 
towards training for ‘unsubsidised employment’.  Funding for cooperative groups 
was dependent on whether participants found paid work.  Higgins states:      
 
Required for their survival, to operate according to the relationships 
of the official economy, work trusts and co-operatives had to 
refashion themselves in a process of self regulation that effectively 
neutralised them as an oppositional grouping. (Higgins, 1997, p.146) 
 
In the Labour Government’s discourse, the employment subsidy programmes were 
narrowly conceived in terms of their training function.  The Labour Government’s 
New Deal pre-empted the abandonment of the sacred cow of full employment.  This 
officially occurred later in 1990 with the passing of the Reserve Bank Act which 
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traded full employment for low inflation and reversed the state’s commitment to 
wealth re-distribution and employment security (Neilson, 1998, p.60).   
 
The Access training programme initiated by the Labour Government was the 
forerunner to a number of programme changes to the administration of the 
unemployed that were to follow under the leadership of a National Government.  In 
1991, the newly elected National Government restructured the benefit system 
introducing case management as a new technology of governance designed to 
actively assist the unemployed. 
 
 
The active assistance model of the 1990s 
 
By the mid-1990s, an active assistance model defined the New Zealand Department 
of Social Welfare’s strategic direction.  The 1996 briefing papers to the incoming 
coalition government, entitled Strategic Directions: Implementing the Active 
Assistance Model, represented an unalloyed invocation of the active society model.  
The report promoted “positive income support” designed to “create incentive oriented 
benefits” (Department of Social Welfare, 1996, p.17).  This package was broadly 
consistent with OECD (1994) proposals to “increase the intensity of benefit 
administration” (as cited in Department of Social Welfare, 1996, p.24). 
 
In it, a discourse of work, perceived not as a matter of constraint but as a good in and 
of itself and as a means of self-development, was promoted alongside a range of 
policy proposals designed to activate not just the unemployed but all beneficiaries 
including those on disability, sickness, domestic purposes and superannuation 
benefits.  This widening of the target population had the effect of enlarging the field 
of application of dependency and discrediting rival discourses which had promoted 
social support for a number of socially useful activities outside the formal labour 
market, such as childrearing.  The discourse of welfare dependency severely 
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restricted the conditions under which non-participation in the formal labour market 
was permissible.  Furthermore, state support for the domesticity of mothers that had 
underwritten post-war welfare policy was in this way officially dropped.  The 
‘choice’ between paid work and domesticity was to be made by individual women.  
 
This broadening of the application of dependency also entailed a shift in notions of 
“retirement” and “disability” from relatively fixed static categories to negotiated 
“flexible” and temporary categories.  This shift reconstituted these categories of 
beneficiary as members, or at least potential members, of the active society.  For 
instance, in 1990, the OECD argued for the increased participation of the elderly and 
those with physical, mental and social disabilities “whose work potential is often 
grossly under-utilised” (OECD, 1990, p.11).   
 
The categories of beneficiary defined as dependent was enlarged and the principle of 
‘activity’ replaced ‘full employment’ as the goal of policy; however, the demarcation 
between the self-sufficient and the dependent continued to be arbitrated by full-time 
paid work.  The active assistance model promoted the possibility of re-socialising the 
beneficiary through various ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘treatments’ with the end goal being 
self-reliance through full-time paid work.  This resocialising was to be achieved by 
aiding the beneficiary to discover his/her own powers of self sufficiency through an 
administrative approach referred to by the department as a mix of “helping and 
hassling” (New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, 1996, p.26).  “Helping” 
techniques for re-socialising the beneficiary largely involved training and skills 
development and constituted the beneficiary as deficient in the skills and training 
necessary for employability.  “Hassling” techniques, on the other hand, addressed the 
beneficiary’s attitude to work and sought to enforce:  
 
… clear and firm requirements on applicants…. The work 
expectation sends a clear message to recipients that they are capable 
of work. (New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, 1996, p.26)   
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This approach constitutes the beneficiary in terms of an ethical deficit that can be 
rectified by restoring their work ethic.  The attitude and work ethic of beneficiaries 
was subject to the scrutiny of their individual case managers which formed the new 
basis of their entitlement to social support.  The need to re-emphasise the moral 
dictum of work corresponded with a decline in the material incentives to work, the 
outcome of National’s neoliberal labour market policy which placed a downward 
pressure on wages. 
 
The active assistance model deployed a discourse of “reciprocal obligation” as a 
means to manage the relation between the state and the beneficiary.  This discourse of 
reciprocal obligation replaced the social citizenship discourse and associated practices 
of income maintenance with a contractual relation designed to activate the 
beneficiary.  “An active assistance approach can be used to make explicit reciprocal 
obligations of a recipient on a benefit” (New Zealand Department Of Social Welfare, 
1996, p.24).  Activation was taken to mean both “active payment and active receipt” 
of benefits.  Implicit in the language of active payment and receipt was a contractual 
relation between the beneficiary and the state.  Active assistance administered a new 
pattern of obligation that sought to promote a number of subjective effects central to 
the achievement of competitive labour markets.  Active assistance sought to govern 
the attitudes and lifestyles of those on benefits, constituted as “at risk” of welfare 
dependence, and was in large part, administered via practices of case management 
introduced in 1996.  Case management of the unemployed required that “jobseekers” 
be assisted through a series of steps: 
 
• Meeting with an advisor to assess the individual’s needs; 
• Production of a plan for getting into employment and self-
sufficiency; 
• Individual agreement to carry out plan; 
• Individual progress through agreed activities towards 
unsubsidised work; and  
• Follow-up and employment support (New Zealand Prime 
Ministerial Task Force on Employment, 1994). 
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 Case managers administered ‘Job Action Plans’, these being agreements between the 
beneficiary and the case manager on what constitutes appropriate job search and/or 
training activities for individual beneficiaries.  This administrative practice displaced 
the citizen with the right to social support and replaced him/her with the “jobseeker” 
(Dean, 1995, 576).  A contractual relation was established between the state and the 
beneficiary in which the receipt of benefit is attached to the obligation to be “job 
ready”.  Many of the changes proposed under the heading “positive income support” 
involved techniques for motivating and impelling the beneficiary to assume greater 
responsibility to be active in the pursuit of employment.   
 
The administration of a contract between individual beneficiaries and a case manager 
covered not just job search activity but any activities considered to enhance the 
beneficiary’s employability.  These ‘contracts’ were backed up by sanctions for non-
compliance: 
 
Central to the notion of a more active system is a reciprocal 
requirement for recipients themselves to be ‘more active’.  Picking 
up on such ‘reciprocal obligations’ can involve simple changes in 
attitude (towards accepting responsibility for changing 
circumstances), but it can also involve meeting new statutory 
requirements…. In some instances, the plan [job action plan] may be 
quite specific and involve close follow up, with clear sanctions for 
‘non performance’. (New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, 
1996, p.25)   
 
This new contractual relation administered the shared management of an individual’s 
‘employability’ and involved the contractual exchange of employability for “income 
protection”: “The focus of active assistance is on reducing an individual’s welfare 
dependence by ensuring that they are better placed to take up opportunities in 
employment when they arise” (New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, 1996, 
p.25).  
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Under the social democratic citizenship regime unemployment conferred a right and 
demanded a remedy.  The neoliberal citizenship regime conferred an obligation on 
the unemployed to become employable as a matter of civic responsibility and 
contractual obligation. 
 
During the 1990s, a network of programmes were directed at resocialising the 
beneficiary into activity.  The development of a series of integrated programmes 
established a seamless network for managing the relation between the beneficiary and 
work.  Welfare that Works (1991) proposed a graded series of interventions according 
to three streams of beneficiaries: fully work ready, work ready-part time and fully 
work exempt.  The design of benefit administration was meant to promote the 
movement of people through these streams towards the fully work ready category.  
The Department of Social Welfare’s Strategic Directions (1996) proposed four 
selective programmes under the rubric of ‘customised service’ aimed at particular 
categorisations of beneficiary defined in terms of the particular risks or sets of risks.  
They included: (1) ‘Compass’ which focused on single parents and aimed “at 
assisting sole parent beneficiaries into education, training and employment” (New 
Zealand Department Of Social Welfare, 1996, p.28); (2) ‘Boost’ which addressed 
youth unemployed and was “aimed at assisting young people in receipt of the 
independent youth benefit to greater self reliance through increased participation in 
education, training and employment” (New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, 
1996, p.28), which had a particular focus on “personal issues” defined as barriers to 
successful participation; and, (3) ‘Passport to your Future’ which addressed young 
people still in school and aimed “to shape the attitudes of young people so that they 
do not see benefit receipt as a ‘career choice’” (New Zealand Department Of Social 
Welfare, 1996, p.29).  This tailoring of programmes reflected the idea that the same 
“treatment” does not have the same effect on everyone.  For instance, the young 
unemployed were constructed as lacking the proper inculcation in the work ethic and 
were for this reason placed in programmes designed to instil good timekeeping, 
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respect for authority, etc.  The single parent, on the other hand, who has been 
detached from the labour market, may require rehabilitative assistance.    
 
While the goal of policymakers has focused on getting beneficiaries into paid work, 
the active society discourse presents activity as a good in and of itself rather than 
solely as a means to enter paid employment.  In contrast, in 1980, the New Zealand 
Planning Council recognised the futility of activation (consisting then of a work test) 
in the context of depressed labour markets:   
 
We readily concede that of itself the concept of job search allowance 
does not ‘solve’ our unemployment problems; although it could to 
some extent circulate a given level of unemployment, it does not 
create jobs. (New Zealand Planning Council, 1980, p.39) 
 
By the mid-1990s, activity was constructed as the ultimate goal of welfare policy:  
 
There is a link between the concept of reciprocal obligation and that 
of contribution of participation. It is important not to limit these too 
tightly to contribution through work force participation only.  For 
most, work force participation will unlock the doors to wider 
participation in society.  For others contribution made by activities 
such as caring for children, developing personal and homemaking 
skills should be encouraged as ways of meeting reciprocal 
obligations. (New Zealand Department Of Social Welfare, 1996, 
p.29) 
 
Benefits were not to be granted as a right of citizenship but as part of a contract 
between the beneficiary and the government.  In return for the payment of the benefit 
the beneficiary must be active.  This emphasis on activity as a way of meeting 
reciprocal obligations was evident in the document Towards a Code of Social and 
Family Responsibility (CSFR) (1998), a government-produced pamphlet that was 
delivered to all New Zealand households.  This discussion document’s intention was 
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presented as a means to provide a basis upon which to build a code concerning the 
shared values and principles of New Zealanders (New Zealand Department of Social 
Welfare, 1998).  The document suggested what some of these principles might be and 
put questions such as “Should parents who receive a benefit be required, as a 
condition of benefit, to get their children to school?”(New Zealand Department of 
Social Welfare, 1998, p.15)  The offence of the beneficiary here was not the truancy 
of their children, as many working parents children play truant; the real offence of the 
beneficiary with a truant child was his/her seeming inactivity in the face of the child’s 
truancy.  In the context of this discussion the proposal to withhold benefits from 
beneficiaries whose children play truant is an example of the way activity beyond job 
search activity served as a new relation of obligation imposed upon the beneficiary.   
 
A large number of the questions put in the CSFR (1998) clearly targets beneficiaries 
and signals the government’s intention to move in a workfare policy direction.  For 
instance, the response form asks:  
 
What groups of working age beneficiaries should be required to 
accept training opportunities?… What more can the Government do 
to encourage beneficiaries into work?... Is it fair to expect a working-
age beneficiary to take up part-time or full-time work or training 
when they have the ability to do so?... Should a person on a benefit 
long-term who cannot take up part-time or full-time work be 
encouraged to do things such as community service? (New Zealand 
Department of Social Welfare, 1998, pp.21-23) 
 
In addition, the document established a principle of continuity between benefit receipt 
and irresponsible patterns of behaviour bearing costs to taxpayers.  For instance:  
 
Should the Government use the contact it has with women receiving 
pregnancy-related sickness benefit to encourage good care during 
pregnancy, e.g. to check they have sought proper care?... What more 
can we do to make sure all young children receive immunisations 
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and child health checks? E.g. should Income Support encourage 
parents on benefits to take their children for immunisations and child 
health checks?... Should parent support and education services be 
targeted more to families with the greatest needs?  If so, how could 
this be done? (New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, 1998, 
pp.9-13) 
 
This had the effect of constituting a chain of equivalence between benefit receipt and 
a number of socially and economically disruptive factors such as single motherhood; 
irrationality; criminality; smoking, alcohol and drug dependence; child neglect and 
abuse; lack of education etc. into a single theory of deficits, which a number of active 
assistance programmes can be employed to address.  For example, Christine Rankin 
the then CEO of the Income Support Services arm of the Department of Social 
Welfare stated: 
 
Welfare dependent families have a higher call on the taxpayers’ 
resources of health, welfare and education.  They also figure highly 
in the justice statistics.  It seems likely that there is also a string 
correlation between domestic violence and child abuse and long term 
benefit dependency. (Rankin, 1996, p.171)   
 
In this way, the active society discourse broadened the concept of welfare 
dependency into a general concept condensing all those factors which inhibit an 
individual’s inclusion into the active society.  For instance: 
 
Priority should be given to active measures such as training, 
placement and rehabilitation programmes for the unemployed, the 
inactive and those on welfare in order to break dependency cycles, 
reduce inequality in the access to jobs and generally integrate people 
into the mainstream of productive activity. (OECD, 1990, p.10)   
 
This single theory of deficits resulted in a significant shift in the focus of treatment 
for a population which had hitherto been viewed as simply in need of employment.  
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In addition, this chain of socially and economically disruptive factors was condensed 
onto the figure of the beneficiary who was constituted as a bearer of need, necessity, 
want, dependence, immorality and irrationality.   
 
The authors of the OECD paper, New Orientations for Social Policy (1994), 
established a principle of continuity between benefit receipt and criminality in their 
description of the appearance of a “culture of dependency on non-market incomes” 
inclusive of  both benefit payments and income from “illegal or criminal activities” 
constituting a threat to the “fabric of society” (p.9).  The CSFR (1998) established a 
link between unemployment, child neglect, skill deficiencies, and irresponsible 
decisions affecting health, in the statement “Some social and family circumstances 
are linked with poor outcomes for children.  Amongst such circumstances are: long 
term unemployment; low educational attainment of caregivers; poor housing and poor 
health status” (fact sheet 1).  This statement establishes a principle of continuity 
between unemployment, disadvantage and deviance from social normality.  The idea 
that unemployment is the arbitrary effect of economic downturn was in this way 
replaced with the view that unemployment is the effect of individual incapacities and 
psychological maladjustment.     
 
The discourse of the active society invokes the negative image of a cycle of inter-
generational dependency among a social underclass of welfare beneficiaries “whose 
prospects seem little better than subsistence dependency, without an active role in 
society” (OECD, 1988, p.21).  In response to this “underclass” of beneficiaries policy 
makers have constructed a range of ethical administrative practices and reciprocal 
obligations in order to transform beneficiaries into active responsible subjects.  This 
shift entailed changes to the object of social policy.  Previously, social policy was 
directed at the poverty and lack of capacity to participate fully in society caused by 
loss of income and employment.  The active society model constitutes the object of 
social policy in terms of the self-concept and motivations of the beneficiary.  For 
example, Deputy Prime Minister and New Zealand First leader, Winston Peters, 
argued in support of the CSFR: 
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 It is time to change attitudes, and perspectives.  It is time to ask 
“What can I do for myself?”…. Similarly we are taking an active 
role in promoting Maori affairs and in changing the way Maori think 
of themselves. (Peters, 17 Feb 1998)  
 
Active assistance aimed to reconstruct the beneficiary as an active jobseeker via a set 
of active assistance programmes designed to administer and control beneficiaries’ 
interpretation and experience of unemployment.  The following discussion provides 
an account of the Beyond Dependency Conference of 1997, hosted by the Department 
of Social Welfare.  This event brought together local and international speakers who 
promoted a workfare solution to benefit dependence.  Established practices for 
governing the unemployed were called into question and a discourse of welfare 
dependence was articulated and actively promoted by the National-led government.  
 
 
Beyond Dependency: ‘A watershed for welfare’ 
 
In 1985, the Employment Promotion Conference had focused on the problem of 
unemployment.  By 1997, the problem of unemployment was displaced by the 
problem of benefit dependence.  The title of the conference indicated an acceptance 
of the neoliberal view that income assistance encourages dependence on the state 
instead of self-sufficiency.  The conference brought together social policy and 
welfare delivery arms of the state bureaucracy as well as a number of overseas 
experts, but, excluded community and beneficiary organisations as well as members 
of the academic community (Cardy, 1997, 12 March).  A decade previously the 
exclusion of community groups from the forum would have been seen as incongruent 
with democratic principles of consultation and consensus building.     
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The Beyond Dependency Conference signalled a shift away from a policy geared to 
supporting the unemployed and facilitating their return to work to a policy designed 
to assist and oblige not only the unemployed but a number of other beneficiaries, 
previously defined as “unable to work”, to take up paid employment.  The conference 
was centrally concerned with how the relationship between work and welfare should 
be re-configured given what was described as increased levels of benefit dependence.  
 
In his opening address, Roger Sowry, the then Minister of Social Welfare, relayed 
these statistics: 
 
In the year to June 1996, despite 62,000 more people in the 
workforce, benefit numbers have risen by 2,000.  Between 1991 and 
1996, the number of unemployment beneficiaries fell by 12%.  
Domestic purposes beneficiaries rose by 11%.  Numbers of sickness 
beneficiaries rose by a staggering 68%, and invalid beneficiary 
numbers rose by an equally staggering 44%, so that by last year, 
21% of working age people were dependent on a benefit.  This 
compares to just 8% in 1985. (Sowry, 1997, p.4) 
 
Sowry’s identification of the problem demonstrates a shift away from viewing the 
unemployed as the problem towards those other categories of beneficiary previously 
defined as unable to work.  A larger number of categories of beneficiary were now 
viewed as unemployed, particularly those in receipt of the DPB who were previously 
defined as engaged in socially useful work.   
 
The conference furnished a broad consensus among policymakers and welfare 
delivery workers about the nature of the welfare problem.  This consensus defined the 
problem as centrally about the dependency and lack of motivation of beneficiaries.  
Welfare dependency was conceived as a collective attitude among beneficiaries, one 
which was necessary to redress strategically via a renewed social policy package.    
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While a number of overseas contributors to the conference presented neoliberal 
reform rhetoric, only three of the thirteen papers subsequently published in the New 
Zealand Social Policy Journal (1997), clearly present this neoliberal viewpoint.  
Nevertheless, even the alternative viewpoints, for instance, Baker (1997), St John 
(1997) and McKenzie (1997) conceded to a broadly neoliberal framework.  These 
Left liberal contributors approached the workfare discourse by assessing it in terms of 
its own promises and found it wanting.  For instance: 
 
The evidence indicates that welfare-to-work programmes cannot be 
expected to substantially increase the well-being of poor families and 
to significantly reduce government expenditure on the poor. 
(McKenzie, 1997, p.109) 
 
Evaluating workfare programmes simply on their likely success or failure misses the 
significance of discourse-directed effects and overlooks alternative ways of 
articulating welfare and work such as, for example, the provision of a universal basic 
income in order to facilitate the development of a socially useful third sector.  The 
approach taken by these contributors unwittingly conceded to the underlying rationale 
of workfare by accommodating their proposals for social change to the limits of 
adaptability of the business order and failed to challenge the fundamental precepts of 
the market imperative. 
  
Hardline neoliberal arguments, such as those made by overseas conference 
contributors including, Mead (1997), Rogers (1997), and Preston (1997), constructed 
the beneficiary as voluntarily welfare dependent.  In this way, a clear association is 
made between the maladjustment of beneficiaries and their appropriate treatment.  
The uncontroversial goal of raising employment, it follows, can be achieved by 
improving incentives to work.  This view reflects the neoliberal analysis of labour 
market clearing, articulated here in Welfare that Works (1991): 
  
Past benefit levels have had a negative effect on the lives of many 
New Zealanders, in particular, those they are intended to assist.  For 
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many people the generosity of the benefit system has become a 
poverty trap.  Benefit payments have been high enough compared to 
wages that for many people there has been little financial 
encouragement to take on paid work and employers have been 
unable to attract workers at rates that would maintain the viability of 
their businesses. (New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, 1991, 
p.12)  
   
The workfare approach that follows from a neoliberal account of labour market 
clearing depresses wage levels by raising the supply of potential employees who are 
under threat of benefit withdrawal.  Hence, because labour is cheaper employers are 
able to employ more people, thereby reducing unemployment.  So while the 
behaviour of beneficiaries is the focus of the discourse, the employment strategy is 
about lowering the cost of entry level labour.  
 
The articulation of the discourses of voluntary unemployment, competitiveness, 
structural unemployment, benefit fraud and active and flexible labour markets 
strengthened the case for a workfare approach to social policy since workfare 
addressed a number of these problematisations simultaneously.  The problem of 
structural unemployment, whether seen in terms of voluntary unemployment or 
alternatively, from the perspective of the unemployed in terms of social exclusion, 
can be addressed by workfare strategies which aim to place a downward pressure on 
wages and increase flexibility within the labour market thereby stimulating 
employment growth.  Structural competitiveness can be addressed by workfare 
policies which tighten eligibility criteria and impose stringent work tests, thereby 
lowering the cost of welfare expenditure that is re-interpreted in a competitiveness 
discourse as a cost of international production rather than, when articulated within a 
Keynesian economic framework, a source of domestic demand.  In addition, 
competitiveness entails a highly skilled and flexible workforce.  Workfare policies 
hold out the promise of eliminating skill deficits and raising the quality of the 
workforce.  
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The Beyond Dependency Conference was part of a wider strategy to discursively 
reshape citizen subject positions.  The discourses articulated at the conference 
individualised unemployment which during the Keynesian welfare state era was seen 
as embedded in the economic and social structure.  The discourse offered at this 
Conference presented unemployment as reflecting problems of incentives and as the 
effect of social security.  The consensus about the nature of the welfare problem 
paved the way for the construction of a new social pathology condensed onto the 
fictive character of the beneficiary who was to become the culpable subject raised in 
response to the social dislocation generated by the neoliberal restructuring of New 
Zealand’s mode of regulation.  In this way, discourses about beneficiaries became 
part of an ideological ritual of exclusion functioning to displace the contradictions of 
the neoliberal societal project onto its constitutive outside.  The concepts of the self-
sufficient taxpayer and the active society only make sense within a system of 
classification which designates beneficiaries as dependent, passive, irrational, etc.  
This is because the idea of independent self-sufficiency already implies needy and 
dependent.  The experience of independence requires recognition of its own limits.  
Thus the constitution of the dependent beneficiary is a technique for governing the 
formation of the self-sufficient taxpayer central to the active society.  This process of 
othering in which the contradictions inherent in the active society are disavowed and 
projected onto the beneficiary is centrally about harnessing a new mode of political 
identification to the neoliberal societal project.  The social identity of the citizen is in 
this way a political creation whose character is defined and practised by welfare 
institutions in order to motivate certain behaviours and sanction others.     
 
The Beyond Dependency Conference aimed to shift both policy discourses and 
common sense understandings of the nature of the welfare problem.  It signalled a 
new phase of the National Government’s project to establish a neoliberal citizenship 
regime and political problematic by popularising the main tenets of the neoliberal 
critique of welfare, particularly, an essentially behaviourist explanation of 
unemployment and its solutions.  Advocating the benefits of training and a 
recommitment to the work ethic as solutions to increasing benefit dependence became 
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the means by which the neoliberal hegemonic attack on social democratic welfarism 
and its underlying principles of social citizenship was waged during the 1990s.  State 
actors made use of the Beyond Dependency Conference, and a number of events 
directly preceding and following it, to re-specify the system of inter-subjectivity 
underpinning citizenship in New Zealand.  Contributors to Beyond Dependency 
utilised quantitative social scientific, therapeutic and administrative discourses 
circulated in public and private medical and social service agencies to de-politicise 
the issue of unemployment by screening out those dimensions of the issue that 
involved the political construction of social identity and meaning. 
 
In contrast to the Beyond Dependency Conference, The Beyond Poverty Conference, 
which took place the weekend prior to Beyond Dependency, gave voice to the 
discourses of counter-hegemonic social movements excluded from the Beyond 
dependency forum.30  The Beyond Poverty Conference privileged the expertise and 
experiences of the unemployed and positioned beneficiaries as members of social 
groups.  Many conference contributors focused on the socially useful activities 
performed by beneficiaries and promoted recognition of a socially useful third sector 
in which the work of beneficiaries could be recognised and valued (Boulton, 1997; 
Briar, 1997; Else, 1997; Peet, 1997).  Unlike the neoliberal discourses which aimed to 
represent the beneficiary as excluded, disadvantaged and maladjusted, these 
oppositional discourses emphasised the advantages of free time, with independence 
from wage labour allowing for contribution to family and community needs.  This 
discourse was particularly threatening to the neoliberal citizenship regime as it 
recognised the advantages that flow from being detached from the wage relation and 
challenged the precepts of the work ethic.   
 
Feminist contributors to the Beyond Poverty Conference emphasised the special 
disadvantages women, Maori and Pacific Islanders face in the labour market 
(Nowland-Foreman, 1997; Briar, 1997; Else, 1997).  Their discourses can be 
                                                 
30 The registration fee for Beyond Dependency Conference was $1,700 making it inaccessible to many 
of those who attended Beyond Poverty held at Massey University, Albany. 
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contrasted with the discourses of the Beyond Dependency contributors who 
represented all beneficiaries, including solo mothers, as potential employees.  The 
shift in the official discourses to treating solo mothers primarily as potential 
employees rather than parents represented a reversal of a policy that was in place for 
almost 25 years, a policy which foregrounded women’s role as mothers (Nolan, 
2000).  This shift in official discourses centrally involved an articulation between the 
claims of feminists, based on women’s right to autonomous personhood most clearly 
articulated in feminist calls for equal pay and equity in employment relations (Larner, 
2000; New Zealand Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988), the aspirations of 
Maori for self-determination and the neoliberal project to build a society of self-
sufficient individuals.  Feminist criticisms of the benefit system for encouraging 
women’s financial dependency on a husband were emphasised and articulated with 
the government’s neoliberal agenda.  The government argued that women should 
have equal rights in waged work to advance according to merit and choice in a 
competitive labour market and that this approach would promote women’s equality 
(Nolan, 2000).    
 
 
Conclusions: From governing unemployment to governing the 
dependent beneficiary 
 
Ideas such as equity, social justice and egalitarianism were moments in a discursive 
chain that made up New Zealand’s social democratic citizenship regime.  Social 
justice subordinated the capitalist imperative to the redistributive requirements of an 
egalitarian social order.  Once the links in the chain of equivalence that made up the 
social democratic citizenship regime were severed they began to lose their 
associational meaning and became floating signifiers.  At that point the neoliberal 
discourse, previously confined to academic economics circles, began to articulate and 
collect cultural and institutional signifiers.  Whereas previously social needs had 
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taken priority over market forces, now questions of value for money, competitiveness 
and the equation between freedom and the free market began to gain currency not just 
in parliament and policy circles but also in the popular press.  
 
During the 1990s in New Zealand, the National-led governments made a number of 
attempts to re-specify the nature of the national community of New Zealanders based 
on claims regarding the ideals of subjectivity.  Previous representations of the 
national community emphasised social membership through attachment to the welfare 
state.  The new discourse recognised a community of individual taxpayers as the new 
citizens to which the government was accountable.   
 
The National-led governments embarked on a project to respecify the conditions 
under which non-participation in the formal labour market was permissible.  This re-
specification involved the replacement of the category of unemployed worker with 
the dependent beneficiary.  This over-arching category included not only the 
unemployed, but also Domestic Purposes beneficiaries, the trainee, the sick and to 
some extent also the retired, and the disabled.   
 
The social construction of the targets of unemployment policy is a significant axis 
along which transformations in government policy can be mapped.  A displacement 
of the previous divisions between workers and non-workers in the policy discourse 
resulted in a breakdown of the previous divisions between work and welfare central 
to the Keynesian citizenship regime (Walters, 1996, p.227).  This discursive shift pre-
empted the promotion of a neoliberal, workfarist policy paradigm which integrated 
previously distinct policy fields such as income support, job training, workforce 
preparation and job placement assistance.  This new strategic policy nexus was 
designed to marry the objectives of unemployment policy and active labour market 
policy in order to provide for the imperatives of business confidence and reduce costs 
in order to raise productivity with the ultimate goal of raising New Zealand’s 
competitive advantage.  
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Understanding the shift from a social democratic to a neoliberal citizenship regime 
depends partly on understanding the way neoliberal discourses about economic space 
dominated by the regulatory ideal of competitiveness articulated with wider cultural 
and institutional discourses.  Problematisations of unemployment are caught up in 
larger chains of discourse which establish the boundaries and relationships between 
the economic, the political and the social.  In New Zealand, the shift from a social 
democratic to a neoliberal citizenship regime centrally included a shift in the 
discursive administrative complex aimed at unemployment.  The issue of 
unemployment during the 1980s was highly politicised and constructed in terms of a 
crisis.  Prior to the 1980s, unemployment policy was discussed and formulated in a 
relatively consistent fashion.  The policy documents and public debates of the 1970s 
present a single, coherent conceptual framework in which unemployment featured.  
The goal of full employment understood as “total employment of a homogenous 
labour force” (Endres, 1984, p.35) underpinned New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare 
state and predominated over price stability and productivity goals.  During this period 
unemployment, even at low levels, was considered politically untenable.  This was 
because full employment featured as the mainstay of the Keynesian welfare state 
citizenship regime (Endres, 1984, p.35).   
 
During this period the question of unemployment was treated as a problem of internal 
demand management and not as a problem of export-led growth and international 
competitiveness (Endres, 1984, p.34).  Consequentially, discourses centred on the 
social justice implications of unemployment.  Measures to alleviate unemployment 
and provide for unemployed workers and their families were rationalised in terms of 
social justice.  This conception of unemployment made sense as part of a discursive 
chain of equivalence which linked an egalitarian philosophy with a solidaristic 
conception of society, manifested in the institution of the Keynesian welfare state.  
Economic problems were ring-fenced as the responsibility of macroeconomic 
management dominated by a Keynesian formula.  Over the course of the 1980s, this 
ring-fencing of economic and social policy, while still a feature of government 
discourse, gradually lost ground to a new discourse which saw the coordination of 
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economic and social policy as increasingly important.  The depoliticising of 
unemployment and the new emphasis on policy coordination reflected a large scale 
shift in the state’s raison d’etre from managing the efficient domestic performance of 
the national economy to promoting its overall international competitiveness 
understood in broad terms, and reflecting a heightened awareness of the international 
context of economic and social policy.  The goal of full employment was abandoned 
and a new chain of signification heralded competitiveness as the new regulatory ideal.  
Within this new discourse, job creation was seen to depend on the active management 
of the supply side and the overall flexibility of the labour force.  Employment began 
to be seen as resultant from profitable capital accumulation rather than the result of 
welfare state interventions in the economy.    
 
By the 1990s the general attitude of the Government to unemployment had undergone 
a radical change.  A comparison of the Employment Promotion Conference (1985) 
with the Beyond Dependency Conference (1997) held just over a decade later brings 
the extent of the change into focus.  The government held the Employment Promotion 
Conference as part of a commitment to democratic decision-making.  The organisers 
of the Beyond Dependency Conference made no such concessions to democratic 
consensus building.  The status of beneficiaries and community workers as 
stakeholders with rights to consultation and consensus were displaced and the rights 
of taxpayers heralded in their place.     
 
At the Employment Promotion Conference it was legitimate to make claims in the 
name of equal rights for women and Maori constructed as disadvantaged.  These 
claimants drew attention to the structural determinants blocking the realisation of 
their social citizenship such as low wages, racism, lack of childcare, glass ceilings, 
tokenism, etc.  The Beyond Dependency Conference reconstituted these 
disadvantaged groups as dependent and constructed their dependency in opposition to 
the self-reliant taxpayer citizen.  Within this discourse the taxpayer was defined by 
that which he is not.  He is not raced, gendered or classed and as such does not 
demand special treatment from the state.  This move is instituted, in part, through the 
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use of inclusive language thereby disguising the special disadvantage that women, 
ethnic minorities and working class people face in the labour market.  
 
State actors within the policymaking field utilised the Beyond Dependency 
Conference and a number of other events, most notably the CSFR (1998), to 
reconfigure discursive relations.  Neoliberal contributors and their supporters 
appealed to the traditionalism of the work ethic as part of a discursive strategy 
designed to construct oppositional groups as deviating from recognised social norms.  
In this way the propriety of waged work and the impropriety of benefit receipt was 
reinforced. 
 
In 1988, the OECD argued that as employment has become less available, discussion 
of the imposition of work has been replaced by greater emphasis on the positive 
social role of work (OECD, 1988, p.25).  This statement obscures the active role of 
governments, policymakers and organisations such as the OECD in the promotion of 
this new emphasis in order to transform the social relations of production as part of a 
wider project to implement a neoliberal mode of regulation.   
 
This chapter has documented how the Fourth Labour Government and the National-
led Governments of the 1990s deployed these discourses in attempts to re-articulate 
points of subjective identification consistent with the ideals of an active society and 
the socioeconomic requirements of international competitiveness.  The following 
chapter provides an analysis of the Fourth Labour Government’s citizenship 
discourse and focuses on the struggle between the neoliberalising state and the 
workers’ cooperative movement at the Employment Promotion Conference of 1985. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Articulating neoliberal goals with social democratic values: 
Labour’s coalition of special interests 
 
Introduction    
 
During the 1980s, unemployment was disarticulated from its established chain of 
signification within the social democratic citizenship regime and political problematic 
and rearticulated with neoliberalism.  The neoliberal restructuring emerged out of 
political struggle rather than being the result of the straightforward implementation of 
a neoliberal policy agenda (Larner, 2002, p.154).   Much of the scholarly analysis of 
the Fourth Labour Government’s incumbency has focused on the rolling out of a 
neoliberal economic framework.  This chapter focuses instead on the Fourth Labour 
Government’s under-analysed strategy to articulate a selection of new social 
movement discourses with their neoliberal policy paradigm that included soft 
workfare, entrepreneurialism, devolution and market determination of employment 
levels. 
 
Post-Marxist theory of the logics of equivalence and difference (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985) is applied to analyse the discursive articulation of, and broader discursive 
struggle between, the neoliberal project and other discourses.  In particular, this 
chapter focuses on the proceedings of the Employment Promotion Conference 1985 
which I argue was a ruptural event in the discursive struggle over the restructuring of 
unemployment policy and the re-specification of citizen subject positions.  Analysis 
of this key discursive event reveals a fuller understanding of how the discourses of 
counter-hegemonic groups were articulated to the state-driven neoliberal project and 
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how both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses and policy outcomes were 
shaped in this process. 
 
Labour’s coalition of special interests was constituted via a discourse of the social 
consumer.  Larner (1997b), in a discussion of the politics of restructuring of New 
Zealand’s telecommunications industry, draws attention to the construction of the 
consumer as an inclusive identity encompassing all New Zealanders.  Larner states: 
 
In conjunction with the new dominance of the identity of the 
consumer came a shift in the content of this identity, from that of a 
narrow category encompassing the interests of major users, to a 
broad category in which all New Zealanders were discursively 
constituted as consumers. (Larner, 1997b, p.383) 
 
Larner argues that the consumer was centred as the dominant form of identity in the 
debates over corporatisation and deregulation.  While the discourse of the ‘social 
consumer’ was an attempt to re-specify citizen subject positions according to 
neoliberal prescriptions for personhood, it was also an attempt to rearticulate the 
social and the economic and retain certain earlier understandings of political 
subjectivity (Larner, 1997b, p.384).  She argues: 
 
In this version of the consumer the social remained present as a 
territorially bounded and singular form of social solidarity.  New 
Zealanders, as a collective group, were constituted as the 
beneficiaries of the new order…. While the ‘social consumer’ was a 
variant of the active self of neoliberalism, it was also an attempt to 
reforge the economic and the social, an ‘alternative modality of the 
social bond’. (1997b, p.384) 
 
I argue that the category of social consumer was a privileged signifier in Labour’s 
citizenship discourse which enabled the Labour Government to combine a selection 
of counter-hegemonic projects and rearticulate their claims as the claims of social 
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consumers entitled to differentiated service achievable only in a neoliberalised 
environment. 
 
The discussion emphasises the constitution in policy discourse of the disadvantaged 
unemployed who became the focal point of struggle between the neoliberalising state 
and the counter-hegemonic workers’ cooperative movement.  The latter articulated 
unemployed beneficiaries with a discourse of structurally determined social 
inequality.  The unemployed were constituted within and through an inclusive social 
citizenship discourse which asserted their needs and rights and constructed them as 
the legitimate responsibility of the state.  Disadvantage in this discourse resulted from 
a restructured political economy unable to provide employment opportunities to a 
large group of New Zealanders.  The Fourth Labour Government, on the other hand, 
represented the disadvantaged unemployed as an unskilled and socially deviant 
subclass whose personal skills and attributes fell short of market requirements (New 
Zealand Department of Labour, 1985, pp.4-5; Appendix 3).  This discourse redirected 
unemployment policy away from structural solutions towards individualised training 
programmes designed to improve the employability of the unemployed beneficiary.  
Further, this policy shift disaggregated the unemployed into a series of individualised 
others requiring specific forms of targeted training and assistance. 
 
Principally, this chapter examines the struggle between the state and the workers’ 
cooperative movement over interpretations of unemployment and the social needs it 
generates.  The Employment Promotion Conference (1985) was the stage for the 
conflict over interpretations of the needs of the unemployed.  This conference was 
closely followed by the Fourth Labour Government’s New Deal in Training and 
Employment Policy (1985) which disestablished a range of employment creation 
programmes and replaced them with the Access training scheme.  The Employment 
Promotion Conference is treated as central to the rolling out of a new citizenship 
discourse, one that constructed a coalition of special interests connected each in their 
own way to Labour’s neoliberal project.   
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According to Higgins, “The Employment Promotion Conference provided a national 
stage upon which a gallery of key social actors played out a drama about the future 
direction not only of employment policy, but of its wider domain, economic policy” 
(Higgins, 1997, p.140).  This discursive event manifested the key points of distinction 
between the workers’ cooperative movement, which made claims based on the needs 
of the unemployed as members of an inclusive welfare society, and the 
neoliberalising state promoting skills-based training for the individual in order to 
foster a competitive labour market.  For this reason it functions as the empirical 
background for a more generalised discussion of the Labour Government’s 
articulatory discourse strategy to forge a new citizenship discourse based on a 
coalition of minority interests, each connected to particular neoliberal reforms.  
 
During the 1980s, the Fourth Labour Government deployed a number of articulatory 
discourse strategies designed to expand its basis of support and neutralise key sectors 
of its opposition.  It did so by connecting its neoliberal regulatory project with the 
separate projects of a select group of counter-hegemonic social forces that sought to 
critically extend the Keynesian welfare state project.  This strategy incorporated the 
distinctive goals of Maori self-determination, liberal feminist demands for equality in 
the labour market, and radical democratic calls for devolution by articulating each of 
these distinctive projects in terms compatible with their neoliberalising agenda and 
offering certain political, social and economic concessions.     
 
This articulatory strategy established an antagonism-free system of differences 
between a number of, until then, excluded identities.  It did so by articulating their 
discourses with social democratic values of inclusion and recognition of social 
diversity.  This discourse strategy articulated their distinctive projects and discourses 
alongside aspects of Labour’s neoliberal programme.  Labour’s citizenship discourse 
deployed the logic of difference by establishing links between the distinctive 
identities and purposes of these counter-hegemonic groups and its neoliberalising 
project, and highlighting their differences in what Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) 
describe as a relational and antagonism-free system.  The chapter focuses in particular 
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on the articulation between the government’s neoliberal restructuring project and the 
movement for Maori self-determination.  
 
  
The workers’ cooperative movement: A radical democratic alternative 
 
In New Zealand during the 1980s, work cooperatives proliferated and were based on 
the principle of democratic decision-making, socially useful work, and common 
ownership of the enterprise (Evans and McCalman, 1982, p2 p.6).  At this time New 
Zealand’s mode of economic and social development began to falter manifestly in its 
ability to secure full employment31.  Under these circumstances, the state supported a 
boom in a range of employment creation schemes in order to shore up the Keynesian 
citizenship regime in the context of rising unemployment.  Work cooperatives and 
trusts in 1979 numbered 34.  By 1984, this number had increased to 300 (Cooperative 
Workers’ Trust (CWT), 1984, p.3).  These schemes were justified as addressing the 
social disadvantage created by unemployment and promoting social justice defined in 
terms of relative equality and democratic participation, and were part of a legitimate 
vocabulary for making claims for recognition and redistribution (see Chapter Four).  
For this reason, groups who made claims for equal rights and sought employment 
programmes that aimed to deliver social justice to the unemployed were politically 
effective (c.f. Brodie, 1996; 2002).  For example, Jane Stevens, a representative of the 
Unemployed and Beneficiaries Movement made this statement at the Economic 
Summit Conference 1984:  
 
We are not against growth or changes in the economy, but what we 
are concerned about is the way the wealth of this country is shared 
out…. We want some serious discussion on how workers, 
unemployed, beneficiaries, low income earners, Maori and 
                                                 
31 While figures for unemployment remained relatively low in the 1980s, public sector employment 
and employment creation schemes masked the extent of the problem which by the late 1980s was 
evident in the figures. 
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Polynesian workers, women and community groups will get the 
recognition and involvement in decision making that is their right…. 
There can be no serious or honest attempt to solve our economic 
problems without the redistribution of wealth to those who need it, 
and without participation by a wide range of people in the planning 
and decision making process. (Economic Summit Conference, 1984, 
pp.63-65)     
 
These government-funded programmes, established and administered by workers’ 
cooperatives and trusts, articulated the state’s interest in providing for the needs of 
the unemployed with the wider aims of the workers’ cooperative movement.  
Government funding of work cooperatives reflected the state’s interest in countering 
the social dislocation caused by unemployment and in maintaining the motivation and 
confidence of the unemployed until employment could be generated (Higgins, 1997, 
p.145).  The aims of the workers’ cooperative movement, on the other hand, included 
the transformation of relations between people in work towards democratic control by 
workers and of social relations in order to reduce hierarchies and increase respect for 
difference, especially between the genders and ethnicities.  These goals reflected the 
worker cooperative movement’s recognition of the structural determinants of higher 
concentration of Maori, Pacific Islanders and women among the unemployed (Te 
Roopu Rawa Kore O Aotearoa, 1984, p.469), and its radical democratic socialism.  In 
defining the movement’s vision, direction and principles one member argued: 
 
The development that began at Kaiwhaiki [Marae] on land and [the 
need to challenge] racism and sexism points to the way the work 
cooperative movement should go.  They are part of working out what 
we want in Aotearoa in the way of working life, social life, work that 
blends a sense of social justice and our control of the destiny of this 
land … this means a Pacific socialism. (CWT, 1985a, p.36)   
 
Upon the election of the Fourth Labour Government in 1984, the CWT called upon 
the government to look favourably on work cooperatives and trusts as centres of 
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alternative work forms: “They make space for and encourage cultural differences in 
regard to work and life styles” (CWT cited in Higgins, 1997, p.141).  The movement 
saw the election of the new government as opening up the possibility for the 
recognition of cultural difference through the expansion of the sector (Higgins, 1997, 
p.141).   
 
The workers’ cooperative movement aimed to articulate the work schemes with a 
more radical conception of employment and thus citizenship that went beyond the 
waged society by trying to legitimate a socially useful third sector between market 
and state employment (Kelsey, 1997, pp.361-4).  The report of the working group on 
job creation programmes at the Employment Promotion Conference stated:  
 
The main aim of job creation programmes should be the 
development of new work of value to the community and the 
economy.  In looking at the whole area of job creation the group 
recognised the need to redefine what is useful work…. All forms of 
work, traditional/non-traditional, subsidised/non-subsidised, 
voluntary or paid should be seen as of equal social worth, and 
recognised when incomes are being set for this work. (New Zealand 
Government, 1985b, p.16) 
 
In addition, this articulation between respect for difference and the socially useful 
third sector connected feminist, Maori, radical democrats, environmental and 
Christian socialist contingents to the workers’ cooperative movement’s project of 
social transformation.  According to Higgins, the spread of the workers’ cooperative 
movement funded by an assortment of wage subsidy schemes popularised the idea 
that the needs of the unemployed could be met through work forms outside of the 
official economy (Higgins, 1997, p.144).32   
 
                                                 
32 This idea was reactivated in the 1990s by the New Zealand First Party in order to popularise its 
workfare community wage policy.    
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The workers’ cooperative movement in New Zealand was connected to a wider 
international movement to create alternative forms of work organisation in the civil 
society space between the market and the state (CWT, 1985c, p.30).  
 
The economic ‘alternative’ proposed by proponents of co-operatives 
was deliberately anti-capitalist.  It aimed to minimize the dominance 
of the interests of capital in economic activity, and at the same time 
offered a model of a ‘service-oriented’ and democratically controlled 
form of organization. (Cockburn, 1985, p.3)    
 
Advocates of workers’ cooperatives argued they were more “equitable, socially 
responsible and brought the economy under more direct democratic control” 
(Cockburn, 1985, p.3).  The international movement sought a radical democratisation 
of capitalist relations of production and consumption.  In New Zealand, this discourse 
was taken up at the Employment Promotion Conference:   
 
It became clear at the Employment Promotion Conference that this 
movement, with others in the community sector, was voicing a 
broader critique of the market economy, and calling for the 
reshaping of power relationships within the economy. (Higgins, 
1997, p.145)   
 
Criticism of the capitalist system of wage labour was articulated with the 
cooperatives’ strategy to create an alternative system to provide socially useful 
services and produce marketable goods based on the democratic association of 
workers.  For example:  
 
A work trust is a way of operating on the principle of trust in each 
other to achieve co-operation over bigotry, discrimination.  Work is 
the medium by which trust is achieved; trust is the bond between 
people…. The longer I live the more I understand that we are all 
wanting very simple things.  To be accepted on a basis of equality, 
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not in a master-servant relationship. (Jim, member of the workers 
cooperative movement quoted in CWT, 1985a, p.33)  
 
The workers’ cooperative movement emphasised cooperation and the social benefits 
of democratically organised work.  Their discourses directly confronted the principle 
of competitive regulation central to the neoliberal restructuring.  The following 
discusses the articulation between the workers’ cooperative movement and the new 
social movements and examines their role in the disarticulation of New Zealand’s 
social democratic citizenship regime.   
 
 
The role of social movement discourse in the disarticulation of New Zealand’s 
Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime  
 
Social movements, such as the women’s and Maori self-determination movements 
associated with the workers’ cooperative movement, occupied a contradictory 
position in relation to the restructuring of the Keynesian welfare state.  They both 
contributed to a radical critique of the Keynesian welfare state (see below) and at the 
same time defended it, by protesting the erosion of many of its central institutions and 
discourses (such as equality and social rights).  Further, they expressed post-
Keynesian welfare state principles, for example, the need for a socially useful third 
sector and the democratisation of work (Evans and McCalman, 1982).  This 
contradictory position was politically exploited by those promoting the 
neoliberalisation of the New Zealand state.  For example, part of the feminist and 
Maori critique of the Keynesian welfare state was based on its failure to recognise the 
plurality of social identities.  This critique fed into the Labour Government’s strategy 
to translate disaffection with the standardised service model (Palmer, 1988, p.2) into 
support for neoliberal reform.   
 
Maori and feminist groups associated with the workers’ cooperative movement 
critiqued the Keynesian welfare state because of its failure to achieve its own goals in 
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terms of inclusion and participation (New Zealand Royal Commission, 1972).  New 
Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state had not delivered to women and Maori on an equal 
basis with Pakeha men, they were heavily over-represented in unemployment and 
poverty statistics (New Zealand Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988).  
According to Neilson, the new social movements critiqued bureaucratic institutions 
and sought voluntary and egalitarian associations on the terrain of civil society.  They 
sought to achieve their goals through the reform and extension of social rights and the 
democratic principles of participation and discourse (Neilson, 1996, p.23).  In this 
way, the new social movements demanded the extension of social citizenship to 
previously excluded groups and a democratisation of work and welfare. 
 
While the workers’ cooperative movement expressed a demand for the extension of 
social citizenship, they also expressed a demand for the transformation of the 
Keynesian welfare state away from forms of national solidarity based in waged 
employment, income redistribution and administrative hierarchy (see Chapter Four) 
towards funding for activities which were self-organised, of agreed social usefulness 
and in a space beyond the mixed economy.  The workers’ cooperative movement 
expressed the right to difference and autonomy, and Maori workers’ cooperatives, in 
particular, saw their activities as revitalising traditional ways of organising work or 
mahi which means cooperative work for a purpose other than yourself (Higgins, 
1997, pp.143-144; CWT, 1985a, p.2).  For example, a member of the workers’ co-
operative movement expressed the desire to return to communal life:  
 
Certainly in contemporary society our personal freedom is absurdly 
limited.  We can be jailed, for example, for swearing in the street or 
for having no job and no money.  But the terrible aspect of our lack 
of freedom is the fact that we are not free to act communally. (Hemi, 
quoted in Cooperative Workers Trust, 1985a, p.17) 
 
Women’s cooperatives were established on the basis of women’s need for income 
and flexible forms of work that incorporated women’s childcare responsibilities 
(Evans and McCalman, 1982, p.26).  Many of the cooperatives implicitly expressed a 
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critique of Taylorist forms of work organisation (Lowe, 1988) which separated 
workers from the conceptual and control aspects of the work process and supported 
managerialist prerogatives.  In New Zealand, work cooperatives and work trusts 
implicitly opposed Taylorist forms of work organisation in their expressed 
commitment to democratic forms of work organisation (Evans and McCalman, 1982, 
p.6) and many cooperative enterprises were based on the revival of craft-based 
industry (Cooperative Workers’ Trust, 1985b, p.2, p.4; Cooperative Workers’ Trust, 
1985b, p.2). 
 
The workers’ cooperative movement’s critique of the Keynesian welfare state 
articulated a more fully inclusionary social citizenship discourse with the 
democratisation of work and welfare in order to generate more equal social relations 
between Pakeha and Maori and women and men as well as employers and workers.  
While the worker cooperatives contested the institutions of the Keynesian welfare 
state they argued for a substantive extension of the social democratic citizenship 
regime in terms of an extension of social rights and the inclusion of previously 
excluded groups via a taxpayer funded, socially useful third sector.    
 
Jenson and Phillips (1996) argue that during periods in regulation, when a mode of 
regulation is hegemonic and routinised, the “representation of citizens by the state 
accommodates citizens’ representations of themselves” (p.113).  When the mode of 
regulation starts to break down, citizens’ representations of themselves and the state’s 
representations of citizens become “mismatched” or “out of regulation” (p.113).  This 
type of mismatch developed in New Zealand during the 1980s when marginalised 
groups attempted to assert their positive identity against both their invisibility and 
their negative construction (see below) within the Keynesian welfare state citizenship 
regime.  The second wave of the women’s movement and the Maori renaissance drew 
attention to the mismatch between women’s and Maori representations of themselves 
on the one hand, and the welfare state on the other hand.  This mismatch stemmed 
from a renewed emphasis on issues of Maori sovereignty and women’s contradictory 
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relationship with the welfare state (Cheyne, O’Brien and Belgrave, 1997; Briar, 1992; 
Walker, 1990; Du Plessis, 1992; Pateman, 1989).   
 
The women’s movement of the 1960s and 1970s generated a substantial critique of 
New Zealand’s welfare state.  Feminists argued that the male breadwinner model, 
central to the Keynesian welfare state, assumed and reinforced the sexual division of 
labour which was the source of women’s inequality and offered a gendered analysis 
of work (Cheyne, O’Brien and Belgrave, 1997, p.101; Gardiner, 1983; McKinlay, 
1992; Dann, 1985).  The feminist critique, both in New Zealand and internationally, 
was based on the Keynesian welfare state’s articulation between social democratic 
and liberal theories of personhood exclusive of women (Cheyne, et al., 1997, p.108; 
Pateman, 1989).  Feminists emphasised economic independence as the key to 
women’s liberation from patriarchal structures and their demands were clearly 
directed at the state to facilitate both equality of employment opportunity and social 
security.   
 
At the same time, Maori groups critiqued the Keynesian welfare state for reinforcing 
their subordinate status (Wetere, 1984, C-3; Ministerial Advisory Committee on a 
Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare, 1986; Henare, 1995).  The 
institutional organisation of the Keynesian welfare state imposed Pakeha values on 
Maori citizens and failed to address the specific needs of Maori.  For instance, 
Cheyne et al. comment: 
 
Assumptions about family structure and commitments have resulted 
in policies (for example, eligibility for social security benefits, 
education and state housing design) based on nuclear family forms 
with no regard for wider extended family commitments that are part 
of many cultures. (Cheyne, et al., 1997, p.116) 
 
The Hunn Report of 1961 marked the beginning of a new impetus to more fully 
integrate Maori, particularly urban Maori, and led to the abolition of the separate 
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Maori welfare system33 including Maori schools.  While the Keynesian welfare state 
had always been integrationist, prior to the 1960s a measure of Maori autonomy had 
been preserved.  In the 1960s and 1970s, Maori citizens were increasingly dependent 
on general provisions and the autonomy of Maori community organisations was 
reduced (Belgrave, 2004, p.33).  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Maori demands 
for the right to culturally appropriate services constituted a significant critique of the 
welfare state (Larner, 2002, p.154).  New Social Movement discourse challenged the 
mismatch between the practices and the ideology of universalism that underpinned 
the Keynesian welfare state.  This ideology assumed that all citizens had the same 
rights and needs, but, in practice, its privileging of Pakeha male workers positioned 
women and minority ethnic groups as second class citizens.   
 
The Keynesian welfare state provided standard services within a discursive frame that 
positioned the nuclear family comprising male breadwinners and domestic females as 
the ideal (Belgrave, 2004).  In supporting women’s domesticity it played a critical 
role in the maintenance of women’s economic dependence.  For example, while 
provisions were made for the support of divorced or separated women, these 
provisions were not statutory.  Divorced and separated women were entitled to 
emergency benefits that were administered at the discretion of a welfare officer 
(McClure, 2004, p.147).  In this way, the special benefit offered financial support for 
a growing group of women who fell outside of the idealised nuclear family ideal 
without drawing political attention to their plight (Belgrave, 2004, p.32)   Women’s 
domesticity was positively supported by the state in the provision of the family 
benefit paid to mothers.  Women’s status as legitimate citizens and eligibility for 
social benefits primarily hinged on their role as wives and mothers.  The state 
discriminated against women in the workplace via the family wage which 
institutionalised women’s lower pay (Briar, 1992, p.51).   
 
                                                 
33 Maori welfare officers interfaced between the Department of Maori Affairs and Maori communities.  
The Maori Women’s Welfare League was also strongly supported by the Department (Belgrave, 2004, 
p.31).   
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Maori and Pacific Islanders were also treated as second class citizens in a number of 
ways.  Maori and Pacific Island workers were concentrated in what is referred to as 
the reserve army or the peripheral workforce with inferior employment conditions 
and limited job security (Larner, 1991).  Maori were also subject to discrimination in 
the administration of benefit entitlements (McClure, 2004, pp.145-146).  According 
to Mohanram (1998), discourses emphasising difference are “necessary for sameness 
to come into being and for it to be valorised” (p.24).  In this connection, the 
citizenship discourse of New Zealand’s Keynesian welfare state relied on the othering 
of the “morally corrupt unmarried mother” and the “feckless unemployed Maori” 
(McClure, 2004, p.145 p.150) in the construction of Pakeha workerist social 
solidarity based on the ethics of work and social respectability.  The mobilising of a 
discourse of a common national identity based on equality and social justice, central 
to the Keynesian welfare state’s citizenship regime, was partly maintained and partly 
undermined by discourses that both highlighted and repressed recognition of gender 
and cultural difference.  The universal New Zealander, the kiwi joker of the 
Keynesian citizenship regime, was culturally and ethnically homogeneous and the 
New Zealand family was constituted as comprising a Pakeha male breadwinner with 
dependent wife and children.  Equality, as the repression of difference, was expressed 
in the provision of standardised services designed to address the universalised needs 
of the Pakeha, male, breadwinner citizen defined as the universal citizen.  In this way, 
a homogeneous Pakeha male workerist solidarity was built on the suppression of 
recognition of the unwed mother on the DPB and the unemployed ‘Maori waster’.  
However, in their distinction from these politically exploited characters, the 
mainstream of New Zealanders could identify themselves as not only male and 
Pakeha but hardworking, productive and socially respectable.  In this regard, 
Awatere’s statement that “White people have no real identity of their own apart from 
what exists through opposition to Maori” (Awatere, 1984, p.38) draws attention to 
how social identity is constituted as an effect of social antagonism.   
 
During the 1980s, the Fourth Labour Government actively reconstituted New 
Zealand’s mode of political identification around a celebratory conception of the 
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social consumer.  Consumer confidence was consistently emphasised as a positive 
economic indicator and the Labour Government emphasised the benefits for 
consumers of their neoliberal reforms (Palmer, 12 Dec 1989; Hunt, 12 Dec 1989; 
Clark, 5 Dec 1989).  Consumers were constructed as empowered to demand better 
products and services at a reduced cost.  This new mode of political identification 
retained the idea of New Zealanders as a collectivity constituted as the beneficiaries 
of the reforms (Larner, 1997b).  The previous mode of political identification 
associated with New Zealand’s wage earner Keynesian welfare state emphasised 
workers and was displaced by this new discourse of the social consumer.    
 
As already argued, the Labour Government articulated the social movement critique 
of the welfare state for failing to account for social diversity with its marketisation 
project by connecting the recognition of social diversity with the market model.  This 
articulation expressed the recognition of difference by constituting New Zealanders 
as social consumers of state services entitled to differentiated services (Larner, 
1997b).  This re-articulation of citizen subject positions in terms of the different 
needs of social consumers initiated the first phase in the movement from the 
hegemony of a Keynesian to that of a neoliberal citizenship regime, and signalled a 
major shift from production to consumption relations in discourses of citizen 
subjectivity.  
 
The previous discussion examined the social movement critique of New Zealand’s 
version of the Keynesian welfare state and explored the related emergence of the 
workers’ cooperative movement in New Zealand.  It demonstrated the mismatch 
between the Keynesian welfare state citizenship discourse based on the privileged 
identity of the Pakeha male waged worker and the discourses of these counter-
hegemonic groups, and introduced Labour’s attempt to manage this mismatch by 
representing citizens as social consumers.  The following discussion of the 1985 
Employment Promotion Conference and the subsequent New Deal in Training and 
Employment Opportunities (1985), demonstrates both how discursive struggle 
directed policy change and how the re-specification of the citizen subject was central 
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to this process.  It examines more fully the articulatory discourse strategies deployed 
by the Labour Government to construct a new citizenship discourse supportive of its 
neoliberal programme.   
 
 
The Employment Promotion Conference: Creating a fit between counter-
hegemonic discourse and the priorities of a neoliberalising state. 
 
The Employment Promotion Conference (1985) was an important stage for 
confrontation and contestation between the state and social movement groups on the 
causes of and solutions to unemployment.  Members of the workers’ cooperative 
movement were active participants in this debate.   
 
The New Deal in Training and Employment Opportunities was released following the 
1985 conference.  While this package initiated an active employment policy which 
ran contrary to the discourses of the worker cooperative movement’s contributors, 
their contesting discourses were, nonetheless, articulated with the Labour 
Government’s reform discourse. 
 
The conference functioned to bring together participants from a range of positions 
within the debate and held out the promise of policy change.  For those groups 
seeking change, government pressure was brought to bear to scale back aspirations 
and adapt arguments so as to reduce the ideological distance between aspirations and 
likely policy directions.  Community sector participants adapted their views in order 
to remain relevant and effective in the policy making context, and the Labour 
Government was under pressure to concede ground to the community sector in the 
name of democracy and devolution.34  For example in the Employment Promotion 
                                                 
34 The Labour Party at this time retained a commitment to a delegate theory of democracy.  The 
delegate theory of democracy articulates the role of the politician as a delegate of the community s/he 
represents.  This implies the need for the politician to consult his/her electorate and act in accordance 
with the electorate’s wishes (Mulgan, 1978).  
205 
Conference discussion paper the Government asserted its commitment to consultation 
and consensus:   
 
This Labour Government intends its decisions to be informed by 
consultation and debate and strives to take decisions based upon a 
community consensus. (New Zealand Government, 1985a, p.13)  
 
I argue that the Labour Government pursued a policy of consultation in order to 
recognise, but, more significantly, to articulate in a transformative way the discourses 
of counter-hegemonic social movement groups and align them with their neoliberal 
restructuring discourse.  For example, the restructuring of the public sector through 
market-based, output-oriented and service-based forms of public administration 
addressed a new political subject, the social consumer (Belgrave, 2004; Larner, 
1997b).35   I argue that the re-specification of discourses of citizenship in accordance 
with the identity of the social consumer was strategically deployed to neutralise 
resistance from social movement groups.   
 
In the government’s New Deal a number of priorities were identified as having 
emerged out of a process of consultation (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1985).  
The Labour Government aimed to popularise the neoliberal restructuring by creating 
connections between their neoliberal agenda and the agendas of a number of counter-
hegemonic political projects, namely, the Maori self-determination movement (Durie, 
1998; Walker, 1990), the devolution project seeking a deepening of democratic 
practice (New Zealand Public Service Association, 1990) and the liberal feminist 
project to create equal opportunities for women in waged work (Briar, 1992; Sayers, 
1992).  The articulation of these projects with the neoliberal restructuring of 
unemployment policy did not simply involve the adding together of discourses but 
involved the articulation of this selection of counter-hegemonic discourses with the 
                                                 
35 Larner (1997) argues that although the government began to address the citizenry as taxpayers in 
relation to asset sales it was the social consumer that was the privileged subject position in Labour’s 
discourse. 
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government’s hegemonising discourse which resulted in a reordering of their 
contents. 
 
The government’s articulatory strategy was achieved by constructing links between 
their respective projects via discourses of entrepreneurialism, devolution and the 
apellation of the social consumer, and displacing antagonistic discourses to the 
margins.  These separate but overlapping articulatory strategies both broadened the 
system of differences defining the government’s neoliberal position, adding depth to 
their neoliberal discourse and undercut the antagonistic potential of the remaining 
excluded elements by representing the neoliberalising programme as recognising a 
variety of legitimate demands.  Smith (1998, p.175) argues that a hegemonic 
discourse organises an imaginary national space that provides the appearance that all 
demands of all people can be recognised.  This appearance, however, is supported by 
aggressive behind-the-scenes exclusionary practices, which manage the boundaries 
between legitimate populations and surplus populations.  The Labour Government 
articulated a commitment to liberal feminism via its promotion of Equal Employment 
Opportunities; to Maori self-determination via the bicultural project involving, among 
other things, devolution of government department functions to iwi structures; and to 
radical democrats seeking direct forms of democracy through devolution in social 
policy, particularly, Community Organisations Grants Scheme (COGS), Tomorrow’s 
Schools, and Mana Enterprises.  These policy initiatives linked the aspirations of 
counter-hegemonic projects with the neoliberal reforms and generated the appearance 
of a commitment to social diversity, inclusion and democratic participation.  
However, these inclusions were accompanied by the winding down of the 
cooperatives and work trusts and the exclusion of the broader and more radical 
agenda of the workers’ cooperative movement.  While the neoliberalising Labour 
Government offered opportunities to a selection of counter-hegemonic groups to 
advance their aspirations, these inclusions also set clear limits on the extent and 
direction that recognition of diversity and democracy was to take. 
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One of the priorities that emerged following consultation was “a call for a wider 
definition of work” (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1985, p.8), underpinned by 
the claims of the workers’ co-operative movement for the further development and 
legitimation of work forms outside the formal labour market as a means to generate a 
positive sum game between meeting the needs of the unemployed for socially useful 
work and meeting the economic and social development needs of communities (New 
Zealand Government, 1985b, p.16).  This discourse also articulated the claims of 
feminists for social recognition of the unpaid caring work done by women, and 
Maori, for revitalising traditional forms of mahi.  The call for a wider definition of 
work received strong support from conference participants (New Zealand 
Government, 1985b).   
 
Unemployed workers, feminist and Maori groups argued for “the right to 
employment and participation” based in recognition of voluntary and unpaid work 
done in the home and community (New Zealand Government, 1985b, p.16).  Their 
claims for equal rights and recognition assumed and emphasised an inclusionary 
citizenship discourse.  Their demands for a right to employment and democratic 
participation via the extension of socially useful employment creation schemes for the 
unemployed were re-articulated within the government’s New Deal with the 
obligation to search for and accept often low-paid work or participate in training 
schemes designed to increase employability within the formal labour market.   
 
The shift away from job creation towards flexible labour markets and the targeting of 
training and employment programmes towards specific groups of disadvantaged 
unemployed reflected the government’s commitments in economic policy, which ran 
counter to the emphasis on job creation within the public sector that had historically 
been a feature of successive government policies towards the unemployed (New 
Zealand Treasury, 1984, p.245). 
 
During and after the conference, alliances between the neoliberalising Labour 
government and counter-hegemonic groups were forged around a number of key 
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signifiers.  Labour’s play for ideological hegemony centred on giving spin to 
devolution, entrepreneurialism and the construction of a social consumer citizen 
subject.  According to Zizek (1997, p.30), the struggle for political hegemony is 
always the struggle to appropriate key terms which are experienced as apolitical or 
transcending political boundaries.  For example, everyone is for entrepreneurialism, 
competitiveness, and democracy, but, the struggle to define the connections between 
these discourses, social identities and policy is fundamentally structured by social 
antagonisms.  Hegemonic articulatory practices appropriate key terms that shape the 
content of other signifiers in the chain.  For example, this chapter claims that Labour 
privileged a discourse of entrepreneurialism and both Labour and Maori articulated 
Maori discourses of self-determination in terms compatible with it.  This privileging 
of entrepreneurialism was not politically neutral but involved the subversion of 
alternative pathways to Maori self-determination.  The following section analyses 
Labour’s discourse strategy to articulate their neoliberal agenda with discourses of 
devolution and entrepreneurialism.  In particular, the following discussion focuses on  
the articulation between Maori self-determination, devolution and entrepreneurialism. 
 
 
Articulating democracy and the market via devolution 
 
One of Labour’s key policy platforms was ‘devolution’.  Devolution was framed by 
Labour as empowering both the state and local communities at the expense of 
bureaucracies (Palmer cited in New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1988, 
pp.1-5).  Labour successfully articulated its approach to devolution with anti-
bureaucratic discourses from the Left and the Right (McClure, 2004, p.14); as 
McKinlay argues, support for devolution came from the New Right which favoured 
privatisation and the New Left which favoured community participation (McKinlay, 
1990, p.23).   
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Sociologist and conference participant, Geoff Fougere, speaking at the Devolution 
and Accountability Conference (1988), argued that devolution owes its current 
popularity to an “ambiguity…that allows [it] to speak to widely shared concerns at 
the same time as it lends itself to radically different prescriptions for change” 
(Fougere quoted in New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1988, p.7).  
Labour overcoded the signifier devolution with meaning such that it came to signify 
both the withdrawal of the state, and a direct form of people’s democracy.  
 
In particular, Labour established the Community Organisations Grants Schemes 
(COGS) in 1986.  This scheme administered grants to local community organisations 
for community projects.  In education, Tomorrow’s Schools (New Zealand 
Department of Education, 1988) stressed the need for community decision-making in 
the management of schools.  Labour also articulated devolution with Maori 
aspirations for self-determination through Maori control of their economic resources 
and through partnership with iwi structures (Palmer, 1988, p.4).  In all of these policy 
areas Labour presented devolution as both fulfilling a need for greater democracy in 
social policy, and promoting responsiveness to consumers, particularly Maori.  A key 
example of this was the 1987 announcement that devolution would form the basis of 
its reform of Maori policy.  Tirohanga Rangapu, released in 1988, proposed the 
devolution of the functions of the Department of Maori Affairs to iwi authorities 
(New Zealand Public Service Association, 1990, p.2).   
 
Work cooperatives and trusts operating in the early 1980s were themselves instances 
of devolution to the extent that they provided services for the unemployed, many of 
which were conceived and administered by the unemployed.  The workers’ 
cooperative movement represented an application of the principle of devolution and 
promoted further devolution in the interests of democratisation.  Their support for 
devolution in programmes for the unemployed was expressed at the Employment 
Promotion Conference.  Members of the cooperative movement and other community 
groups called for the transformation of the public sector away from centralised 
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bureaucratic rule towards self-governed local authorities (New Zealand Department 
of Labour, 1984, p.32). 
 
In considering how job creation programmes should be designed and 
implemented there was a widespread call for local community 
control.  The working group felt that the community knows best its 
local resources and needs. (p.16) 
 
Conference participants articulated aspirations for “regional control” and decision 
making at the local level and “maximum consultation and participation of all affected 
groups” (New Zealand Government, 1985b, p.13, p.16, p.21). The wide popularity of 
devolution, particularly in the area of social policy, was evident in over one hundred 
substantial submissions to the 1988 Royal Commission on Social Policy (New 
Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1988, p.37). 
 
Calls for transformation of the public sector made by the workers’ cooperative 
movement and groups working in the community sector were taken up by the Labour 
Government in their stress on empowering consumers and creating a service-oriented 
state that was responsive to the needs of consumers.  In social services, the argument 
was made that effective social service delivery required responsive consumer 
organisations.  The argument put for devolution of social services was based on a 
critique of the Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime.  For example, McKinlay 
states: 
 
Social service delivery requires a more flexible and client responsive 
organisation than a central government structure can provide.  Much 
of the bureaucratic structure is said to be based on outdated concepts 
of ‘nuclear families’ and ‘Pakeha clients’ when real needs are said to 
be elsewhere in the community. (1990, p.20)    
 
Labour’s discourse recast the work cooperatives’ support for devolution of services 
for the unemployed and a taxpayer-provisioned, socially useful third sector and 
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emphasised instead recognition of social diversity via the development of a 
consumer-oriented social service sector.  
 
Further, Labour (re)articulated the discourses of the workers’ cooperative movement 
for democratisation of work as a means to address the needs of enterprise for 
employee participation.  In 1989 the Minister of Labour, Stan Rodger, addressed a 
Seminar on ‘Industrial democracy/ employee participation: Prospects and plans for 
New Zealand’36, where he defined industrial democracy as:  
 
The meaningful participation of workers in decisions affecting their 
working lives.  Among other things, it includes the involvement of 
labour market participants at national, industry and workplace levels 
and, through individual and/or union channels, the system of 
workplace delegates. (Rodger, 1989, p.3)  
 
The Minister goes on to state that industrial democracy has the potential to reconcile 
the needs of employers for a “cooperative way of managing change” and make the 
most productive use of human resources in the interests of efficiency and 
competitiveness as well as serve the needs of employees for involvement in decisions 
that affect them (Rodger, 1989, p.3). 
 
The Labour government re-articulated the workers’ cooperatives aspirations for 
industrial democracy with the needs of competitive enterprise.  This articulatory 
strategy recast the radicalism of the workers’ cooperatives commitment to industrial 
democracy as employee participation in the interests of enterprise.  Labour 
rearticulated workplace democracy as the basis of a new solidarity between workers 
and employers in the competitive sector (Rodger, 1989, p.6).  
   
                                                 
36 This seminar was held in Wellington, (11 May 1989) and Auckland, (19 May 1989). It was 
organised by the Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University of Wellington and was designed to 
promote informed discussion and debate about issues relating to the Government-appointed Committee 
of Inquiry into Industrial Democracy.  Participants at the seminar included the Minister, committee 
members, academics and industrial relations practitioners. 
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The following discussion focuses on Labour’s strategy to articulate Maori economic 
self-determination with devolution and a revitalisation of the economy via 
entrepreneurialism.  This discursive strategy sought to articulate Maori economic 
development with the neoliberal restructuring by constructing a neo-traditionalist 
discourse of Maori entrepreneurialism.  This discourse articulated the revival of a pre-
colonial tradition of Maori entrepreneurialism with Maori self-determination through 
the development of Maori economic bases and marginalised counter-hegemonic 
alternatives based on the resocialisation of work and the ethic of mahi. 
 
 
Devolution and Maori self-determination 
 
In 1984, when the Labour Government was elected, Maori activism centred on the 
alienation of Maori land and resources.  The Waitangi Tribunal had been established 
in 1975 to “mediate tensions” revolving around interpretations of the Treaty of 
Waitangi and its contemporary relevance (Goodall, 2005, p.190).  In this context, the 
workers’ cooperative movement articulated Maori unemployment in relation to Maori 
grievances over land alienation.  For example, “core trust members had commitments 
to political takes [positions] such as Waitangi, which they saw as part and parcel of 
getting economic justice for Maori people” (CWT, 1985a, p.22).  Many of the 
cooperatives and trusts focused on the development potential of Maori land and a 
“revitalisation of the marae economy” (CWT, 1985b, p.28), an aspiration that 
reflected recognition of the destructive consequences of urbanisation for Maori and a 
desire to return to a traditional Maori way of life.  
 
In 1984, the government convened the Hui Taumata, an economic summit for Maori 
leaders, to examine the socio-economic status of Maori.  Debate over the direction of 
Maori economic development was a central theme at the Hui Taumata (Love, 1995).  
At this conference, welfare spending on Maori was represented as negative funding; 
“Positive spending rather than negative funding was the catch cry” (Durie, 1998, p.8).  
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The major recommendations were for a reallocation of resources away from negative 
funding towards Maori providers of social services and financial services for Maori 
enterprise (Durie, 1995).  Another major issue raised at the economic summit was the 
restricted access of Maori to finance for economic development (Love, 1995, p.22).  
Recognition of this restriction on Maori enterprise led to the creation of the Maori 
Development Corporation in 1987, an initiative to provide finance for Maori 
businesses (Sullivan and Margaritis, 1998, p.270).  
 
While the direction of Maori economic development was the subject of much debate, 
devolution was implicitly advocated in many of the submissions.  For example, 
 
The character of the economy must be altered to allow community 
participation in economic activity and to allow communal ownership 
to develop.  If these processes of change can occur, Maori people can 
have an important influence over the policies developed to improve 
the overall economic performance, as well as to enhance the position 
of Maori people in the economic and social life. (Hawea quoted at 
the Maori Economic Development Summit Conference, 1984, K-2)  
 
In addressing the issue of Maori unemployment, the “Maori style of organisation” 
was identified as having much to commend it.  It was argued that Maori economic 
development required changes to the social and economic relations of work.  Maori 
workers need work that is “mentally stimulating, allowing choice of workmates, 
permitting an autonomous work life, giving some security and adequate reward” 
(Pirikahu, Maori Economic Development Summit Conference, 1984, I-2).  Pirikahu’s 
submission reflected a recognition that participation in the formal labour market had 
little to offer Maori workers and concentrated Maori in “menial and thought-stifling 
jobs” (Pirkahu, Maori Economic Development Summit Conference, 1984, I-2).  The 
alternatives that were proposed were based on the development of rural marae-based 
initiatives that redirected funding towards cooperative Maori enterprise.      
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Participants at the Hui Taumata, however, debated the relevance and achievements of 
cooperative, marae-based initiatives.  Co-operative enterprise was challenged as 
unable to drive Maori economic development.  For example, Denese Henare 
suggested: 
 
Whilst we are prepared to support the collective and co-operative 
effort, we leave our entrepreneurs to sink or swim.  So where do we 
stand on the promotion of competition as a positive value?  If we are 
happy to take a back seat and let someone else drive the bus how can 
we complain when it goes in the wrong direction, if it goes too fast, 
or if we are being taken for a ride?  I do not believe we can drive our 
bus or anyone else’s by remaining outside the system, however much 
we feel this may conflict with our traditional values.  We must re-
examine the priorities of our economic philosophy if we are to firmly 
grasp the wheels of control. (Henare quoted at Maori Economic 
Development Summit Conference, 1984, C-5)  
 
Others praised the cooperative approach as quintessentially Maori.  For example, Syd 
Jackson and Bruce Stewart respectively argued:  
 
Our economic renaissance should not be at the price of our soul.  We 
should not accept any proposition that is at odds with our express 
desire to be Maori.  We need not follow the policies based on 
individualism and acquisitiveness.  We have got to reject the concept 
of Maori capitalism, when Maori will exploit Maori. (Jackson, Maori 
Economic Development Summit Conference, 1984, D-3)  
 
We need to go back to the marae and build new ones.  The marae is 
the spiritual base.  The marae is the keeper of history.  The marae is 
the school, our museum, our art gallery…. The marae is our 
economic base. (Stewart, Maori Economic Development Summit 
Conference, 1984, f-3) 
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By 1988, the Labour government was framing its approach to Maori development 
according to two policy principles: to increase the responsiveness of government 
agencies to Maori and the devolution of some government functions to tribes on the 
basis that they were in a better position to understand the needs and provide the 
services to their own people.   
   
The new agenda would be to facilitate greater Maori control over 
resources and increase independence from the state in an attempt to 
generate Maori solutions to Maori problems. (Larner, 2002, p.152)     
 
The government’s commitment to devolution was motivated by its project to 
neoliberalise the state and promote enterprise.  The community sector and workers’ 
cooperatives seized on the devolution project for different reasons and supported 
devolution as a means towards the achievement of a direct form of workers’ 
democracy and local control over social policy.   
 
Devolution represented a critique of the Keynesian welfare state’s integrationist 
tendency and presented an opportunity, for Maori groups in particular, to realise their 
aspirations for autonomy via a neoliberal regulatory environment.  As Cheyne, et al., 
(1997) comment: 
 
With the emphasis on separating funder, purchaser and provider and 
then contracting out or otherwise devolving provision of services, 
Maori groups (iwi or pan-tribal) have been able to take contracts for 
service delivery. (p.154) 
 
Labour’s agenda of increasing market regulation and encouraging enterprise was 
articulated with Maori demands for more tribal control of social services and 
economic resources (Sullivan and Margaritis, 1998). 
 
The Labour Government’s discourse centrally included entrepreneurialism as a 
privileged moment in a wider discursive chain.  Their commitment to the creative 
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potential of unfettered entrepreneurialism was articulated with the aspirations of 
Maori and community organisations for independence from direct state control.  For 
instance, in 1985, the Mana Enterprises Scheme was introduced as part of the 
Government’s New Deal and was designed to address Maori unemployment through 
the facilitation of Maori entrepreneurialism (Durie, 1998).  While Maori placed 
emphasis on the benefits of group action instead of focusing on the role of individual 
entrepreneurs, a revitalising of a discourse exhuming the pre-colonial tradition of 
Maori entrepreneurialism was consciously pursued by both Maori and the 
neoliberalising state.  
 
Rather than pitching our resources at policy for job creation or relief 
for the unemployed, we focused on a cornerstone of the 
government’s policy developing an enterprise culture. (Tahi, 1995, 
p.71) 
 
An historical tradition of Maori enterprise was reasserted as a positive history for 
Maori and a basis upon which Maori could achieve autonomy from the state, (see for 
example Sullivan and Margaritis, 1998; Cooperative Workers’ Trust, 1985c, p.30).  
This articulation between Maori self-determination and neoliberal calls for the 
development of an enterprise culture draws attention to the costs of particular 
discourse articulations in terms of the suppression of alternative pathways to Maori 
self-determination.  For example, alternative visions of Maori self-determination 
expressed in the workers’ cooperative movement emphasised the negative effects on 
Maori of urbanisation, wage dependence and Taylorist work organisation rather than 
negative welfare spending (Maori Economic Development Summit Conference, 
1984).  Further, aspirations to self-determination were articulated in terms of 
cooperative activity and regional economic development of traditional Maori 
communities rather than Maori entrepreneurialism.    
 
The emergence of the workers’ cooperative movement can be seen as part of the 
process to articulate Maori goals with the socialist project.  During the 1970s and 
1980s, urban Maori youth particularly experienced significant unemployment.  Urban 
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Maori’s social and economic marginalisation and growing political consciousness of 
ethnicity and indigenous rights “provided a powerful platform for the practice of 
work cooperatives” (Higgins, 1997, p.143).  Within the cooperative movement, 
however, emphasis on the racial dimensions of disadvantage were linked to a socialist 
recognition of unemployed workers as a surplus class of workers, and criticisms of 
the capitalist economy.  The workers’ cooperative movement linked the exploitation 
of Maori unemployed with other subordinated identities, particularly women.  In this 
way the practice of the democratic co-operative enterprise was the basis for an 
articulation of Maori self-determination, feminist understanding of women’s 
subordination and calls for the democratisation of social relations. 
 
The workers’ cooperatives project to revive the traditional marae economy provided a 
political opportunity to challenge the neoliberal privileging of competitive 
organisational forms over traditional cooperative forms of productive and social 
organisation.  However, Maori entrepreneurialism became a privileged moment in a 
neo-traditionalist discourse such that the meaning of Maori self-determination 
increasingly came to mean Maori autonomy through entrepreneurialism.   
 
Encouraging entrepreneurial activity and fostering a climate for 
positive Maori-initiated developments are much more likely to 
reduce Maori state dependency than the paternal State-led initiatives 
of past decades. (Sullivan and Margaritis, 1998, p.271)  
 
Maori entrepreneurialism became a privileged point in the wider discourse of self-
determination.  The privileging of Maori entrepreneurialism structured Maori 
disadvantage in terms of exclusion from entrepreneurial opportunities constituted as 
the only basis of economic independence.  In this way, the Labour government 
discursively organised the experience of Maori disadvantage through a liberal 
discourse of racism and exclusion in order to construct the solution to Maori 
disadvantage as devolution and Maori entrepreneurialism, facilitated by neoliberal 
reforms. 
 
218 
Maori submitters to the Employment Promotion Conference strategically deployed 
neoliberal discourses promoting self reliance and independence and problematisations 
of “dependency” and “negative funding” (New Zealand Government, 1985b, p.20), in 
order to align their interests in the development of Maori economic bases with the 
neoliberalising state.  For example: 
 
Jobs and self-supporting employment through development of Maori 
enterprises is one step towards closing the gap in income attainment 
and underachievement.  Only when this step is taken, will there be a 
start towards the transition for Maori people from dependency and 
underdevelopment to self-reliance, independence and development 
within the wider New Zealand community. (Maori Economic 
Development Commission, 1985, p.9) 
 
“A call for a Maori dimension in employment assistance” was met in the New Deal 
by the creation of the Maori Enterprise and Pacific Island Employment Development 
Schemes.  These schemes addressed the contradiction between the alternative, 
radically democratic discourses of the workers’ cooperative movement operating 
subsidised employment programmes with neoliberal market discourse.  Practically 
speaking, the government increased funding to a pilot scheme for enterprise and 
employment development assistance to Maori and Pacific Island communities at the 
same time as they phased out an array of programmes that had previously supported, 
however inadequately, Maori cooperatives and trusts.   Discursively, the government 
supported calls for Maori autonomy and self-determination in its emphasis on the 
“decentralisation of control of decision making” and the promotion of specifically 
“Maori and Pacific Island economic bases” and articulated these aspirations with its 
own neoliberal agenda of promoting market simulation in the public sector.  
 
The Labour Government successfully articulated its bicultural initiative with its 
neoliberal project to marketise the public sector which recast the citizen as a social 
consumer.  A report produced in 1987 by the Administrative Review Committee on 
the performance of the Department of Social Welfare stated: 
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 We believe that the consumer oriented approach, led as it is in a 
major way by the bicultural initiative, is a philosophy which should 
permeate the Department and become part of its management 
perspective. (cited in Department of Social Welfare: Maori Unit, 
1989, p.2) 
 
Labour’s discourse (re)articulated the citizen as a social consumer and linked the 
empowerment of citizen groups, and particularly Maori, with an idealised view of the 
consumer as able to exercise control over a service-oriented state.    
 
Labour promoted devolution as a means to fulfil the need for greater democracy in 
social policy (New Zealand Public Service Association, 1990, p.2), but Labour’s 
devolution discourse was part of a strategy to contain and articulate the multiple 
challenges to the Keynesian welfare state and frame them within a neoliberal 
prescription for change. 
 
Labour articulated entrepreneurialism with Maori aspirations for autonomous 
economic development.  This articulation re-shaped the strategies, discourses and 
goals of the Maori self-determination movement, marginalising workers’ cooperative 
calls for the resocialisation of work.  The Labour Government’s New Deal deployed 
this discourse in its construction of Maori self-determination as facilitated by the 
neoliberal state whilst it simultaneously withdrew state support for Maori work 
cooperatives and trusts.     
 
 
Translating oppositional discourses 
 
Articulations between dominant/hegemonic discourse and oppositional or counter-
hegemonic discourses can be described as translative insofar as these articulations 
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translate counter-hegemonic discourses into forms compatible with the hegemonic 
discourse and project (Peet, 2002, p.60). Translation is achieved by displacing the 
contradictions between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects and constructing 
and emphasising their points of compatibility.  
 
The government articulated its intention to target social assistance with Maori 
aspirations for self-determination. Targeting was to undo the damaging effects of 
centralised bureaucratic rule, in particular, the paternalistic and racist aspects of their 
treatment by the social services bureaucracy identified by Maori in Puao-Te-Ata-Tu, 
(Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of 
Social Welfare, 1986).  The government’s intention to target assistance was 
articulated with claims for culturally specific service delivery in employment policy.  
The Fourth Labour Government’s discourse of devolution provided a politically 
viable way to promote a neoliberalisation of the state sector while responding to the 
unique claims of Maori citizens.   
 
Ironically, it is the neoliberal approach, with its emphasis on choice 
and consumer responsiveness which has also had the capacity to 
afford some acknowledgement of the different needs of Maori. 
(Cheyne, et al., 1997, p.121) 
 
The Labour Government’s restructuring discourse purposively connected discourses 
of choice and consumer responsiveness with the acknowledgement of the different 
needs of oppressed groups particularly Maori and women.  The reassertion of local 
democracy via the devolution of state services, and active citizenship via targeted 
assistance programmes created space for and redirected the radicalism expressed in 
the workers’ cooperative movement while affirming the principles of the ascending 
neoliberal discourse and programme.   
 
The unleashing of the potential of the Maori people through self-determination was 
articulated with the neoliberal commitment to the creative potential of unfettered 
entrepreneurialism.  This articulation translated the discourse Maori self-
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determination into terms compatible with the Governments neoliberal agenda.  The 
commitments of the Labour government to Maori self-determination have been 
described by Kelsey (1991) as an attempt to pacify Maori demands (p.109).  The way 
the Labour Government articulated the demands of Maori not only sought to pacify 
but also to redirect the trajectory of Maori claims-making.  Maori aspirations for self-
determination which focused in the 1980s on Maori control over resources and the 
advancement of Maori health and education services developed autonomously from 
the neoliberal state (Durie, 1998, p.4).  However, the articulation of Maori self-
determination with the goals of the neoliberalising state in the 1980s redirected the 
trajectory of Maori self-determination consistent with a neoliberal policy direction.   
 
Maori calls for self-determination sought Maori control over economic resources.  In 
employment policy, the state responded to Maori demands by devolving control over 
training and services for unemployed Maori to Maori providers, thereby creating 
opportunities for the advancement of Maori goals.  Take-up of these opportunities, 
however, translated the discourses and practices of the Maori self-determination 
movement such that entrepreneurialism came to replace the democratic association of 
workers and mahi as a means to the achievement of Maori self-determination.  In this 
way the Labour Government reinterpreted the grievances and prescriptions for 
change offered in the movement for Maori self-determination by constructing 
devolution of social services to Maori providers and support for Maori enterprise as 
the only policies that adequately address recognition of cultural difference and 
support for Maori self-determination.     
 
The articulation of discourses does not simply involve their unification or alignment 
but a restructuring of their contents.  The government translated Maori claims for 
self-determination into terms compatible with their neoliberal agenda by emphasising 
those aspects favourable to their neoliberal economic programme and jettisoning 
aspects of Maori discourse antithetical to it.  For instance, Maori and feminist 
discourses were concerned to widen the definition of legitimate work beyond those 
recognised by the formal economy.  These discourses emphasised meeting the needs 
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of local communities through the provision of home services to elderly, the upgrading 
of Marae facilities and providing basic skills training for young people (CWT, 
1985a), and recognising the contribution of women’s unpaid labour in the home and 
community (Kelsey, 1997).  These counter-hegemonic discourses, promoting a 
taxpayer-provisioned socially useful third sector outside the formal labour market, 
were given practical expression in the work cooperatives of the 1970s and 1980s.  
Their discourses were re-articulated within the government strategy to promote 
alternative “unsubsidised employment” and manage employee involvement in the 
interests of enterprise.  For example:   
 
Maori culture has emphasised co-operative activity, and if this can 
be translated into the workplace it could be a significant means by 
which the Maori and Pakeha communities could increase their 
positive interaction. (New Zealand Government, 1985b, p.27) 
 
Further, the Fourth Labour Government’s New Deal effectively reconstituted the 
social critique offered by Maori and feminist work cooperatives and recast their 
claims within a theory of disadvantage requiring targeted assistance.  The Labour 
Government articulated feminist discourses about women’s inability to take up full 
time jobs and thereby compete on an equal footing with men in the labour market due 
to an entrenched sexual division of labour with the neoliberal goal to promote flexible 
work structures (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1988) and thus allow women to 
both enter the labour market and continue to take responsibility for the care of 
children and the elderly.  This articulation justified the programme to deregulate the 
labour market on the grounds of meeting women’s needs for flexibility to meet both 
home and paid work commitments whilst taking a gender-neutral position on the 
increasingly neoliberal structures which gave rise to women’s greater need for 
flexible work forms.  Excluded from the Labour Government’s discourse was 
recognition of how the emerging neoliberal economic and social structures taken 
together disadvantage women in terms of lower wages and longer hours.  The 
deregulation of the labour market was constructed as a means to construct a pure 
meritocracy that is gender and race blind.  
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 The displacement of recognition of the ways in which social disadvantage is 
constituted as a relation of subordination in Labour’s discourse and the differential 
incorporation of Maori entrepreneurs, professional women workers and democrat 
advocates of devolution shaped the direction of the government’s neoliberal political 
rhetoric which individualised the causes of social disadvantage.  The recognition of 
difference in the Labour Government’s discourse strategies displaced the ways in 
which difference is an effect of social antagonism and is constructed as a relation of 
subordination.  Instead, the Labour Government constructed an antagonism-free chain 
of subject positions inclusive of Maori entrepreneurs, mother workers and responsible 
communities.  These identities were (re)shaped by the dominant identity of the social 
consumer and disarticulated from their previous linkages with the radical counter-
hegemonic movements.   
 
This re-articulation was achieved by selecting those strands of social movement 
discourse which criticised the welfare bureaucracy from the point of view of Maori 
and women and incorporating these criticisms as justifications for neoliberal 
restructuring.  For example, the Labour Government made use of community 
workers’ criticisms of subsidised work schemes, made as part of calls for redirection 
and reinvestment, to justify their disestablishment. 
 
Some 18 months ago New Zealanders decided that they had had 
enough of employment schemes such as PEP and the Work Skills 
Development Programme.  They told the Government that these had 
to go.  We agreed because by and large they had failed miserably in 
providing unemployed people with the skills that would get them 
real jobs. (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1986, p.1) 
 
The New Deal in employment policy was an attempt to stem the tide of expectations 
from the community sector for increased state funding.  This expectation was fuelled 
by rising unemployment and an assumption embedded in the disarticulating social 
democratic citizenship regime that the unemployed had a right to social support.  
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Labour’s New Deal indicated the withdrawal of the state from the promotion of the 
overall level of employment and began a phase-out of the subsidised make-work 
schemes of the 1970s and 1980s: 
 
Labour market assistance will move towards an approach which 
more actively emphasises the importance of work-oriented skill 
acquisition.  While the state of the economy determines the overall 
level of employment. (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1985, 
p.5)  
 
The New Deal rearticulated the social democratic assumption that the unemployed 
had a right to social support while indicating their support for a market-led rather than 
state-driven unemployment policy/strategy.  The counter-hegemonic claims of 
feminist and Maori organisations were clearly part of the process of discursive dis-
articulation of Keynesian welfare state discourse.  While their goals expressed key 
Keynesian welfare state principles, they were re-articulated to Labour’s neoliberal 
agenda.  The calls of counter-hegemonic groups for the redirection of resources and 
responsibility from the state toward the community as part of a project to create a 
non-hierarchical and more directly democratic welfare state were translated into the 
government’s policy of devolution.  This policy discursively retained some 
radicalism, but, practically corresponded with the withdrawal of funding and/or 
continued funding under new workfare criteria oriented towards training for waged 
work in the formal labour market, and market driven regulation of employment.  The 
potential of Maori and feminist discourses to challenge the neoliberal project by 
offering an alternative policy prescription and by emphasising the social costs 
disproportionately borne by women and Maori, and particularly Maori women, was 
undercut by the government’s discourse strategy to connect a narrow set of feminist 
and Maori goals to its wider neoliberal restructuring project.   
 
The introduction of the retraining Access scheme coincided with the phase-out of 
direct intervention in job creation schemes.  The dismantling of the employment 
programmes administered by the workers’ cooperative movement removed their 
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means of policy advocacy.  The original goals and aspirations of the workers’ 
cooperative movement were administratively redirected towards the severely 
disadvantaged and the development of self-sustaining enterprise.   
 
A small number of work cooperatives were retained and two new programmes were 
initiated in the New Deal to provision and administer the severely disadvantaged, 
defined as physically or psychologically disabled, alienated from society, hostile to 
authority and therefore likely to benefit from group activity.  
 
Maori enthusiasm for work cooperatives was (re)articulated in the government’s New 
Deal as appropriate to the “severely disadvantaged” as a means to “develop their 
skills before becoming self supporting” (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1985, 
p.14). The development of self-sustaining enterprise was the second arm of the New 
Deal’s approach to the unemployed and was articulated with Maori aspirations for 
self-determination through the development of Maori economic bases.  For example, 
the Mana Enterprise Scheme was established in 1985.   
 
The scheme recognised that, in the past, employment schemes had 
not been as effective as they might have been in meeting Maori 
employment needs…. The new approach would place the 
responsibility for the use and allocation of funds in the hands of the 
Maori community. (New Zealand Audit Office, 1988, p.7)   
 
The new funding criteria stressed the role of groups as training providers in order to 
create a fit between the employment programmes and the priorities of the 
neoliberalising state.  The political implication of the New Deal was that advocacy 
groups should be self-supporting and the status of self-support provided the criteria of 
legitimacy.  The disestablishment of the workers’ cooperatives operating employment 
programmes, and retaining only those catering to the severely disadvantaged, formed 
part of the government’s strategy to reposition the unemployed as exceptional and 
deviant.  According to Castles (1985), unemployment in New Zealand has 
historically been embedded in a discourse of exceptionalism due to the long period of 
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full employment that coincided with the Keynesian era.  High levels of 
unemployment experienced in New Zealand during the 1980s and 1990s challenged 
the idea built into the social democratic citizenship regime that unemployment was an 
exceptional circumstance.  The presence of large numbers of unemployed during the 
1980s repositioned them as typical and their continued and expnding presence 
suggested a general critique of the restructured political economy.  The presence of 
large numbers of unemployed had to be domesticated and disarticulated from the 
crisis discourses of the 1970s fuelling counter-hegemonic projects.  This was 
achieved by disaggregating the unemployed into a series of disadvantaged groups 
requiring targeted social assistance designed to address their individual incapacities to 
compete in the market.  This disagreggation of the unemployed into a series of 
differentiated others in need of targeted assistance, discursively reinstated pre-crisis 
exceptionalism to social welfare benefiting. 
 
This discursive sleight-of-hand functioned to assert the atypical 
character/circumstances of the unemployed beneficiary and suppress the idea that 
citizens, generally, should receive state support.  Once unemployed beneficiaries 
were constituted as atypical categories of person, i.e. not like us, the electorate was 
primed for further welfare restructuring. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored how the workers’ cooperative movement made claims 
based on social rights and the right to participate and yet challenged the ways these 
rights had been framed within a productivist discourse of citizenship.  The workers’ 
cooperative movement sought to validate the needs of the unemployed in terms of the 
social citizenship discourse of belonging and participation and connect the fulfilment 
of the those needs to the development of a socially useful third sector.  The Fourth 
Labour Government, however, enclaved the needs of the unemployed within their 
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New Deal in Training and Employment Policy and reconstituted the problem of 
unemployment in terms of the lack of employability of the unemployed.  This chapter 
has demonstrated how Labour neutralised the radicalism of the workers’ cooperative 
movement by incorporating a selection of their discourses and (re)articulating them 
into a form compatible with its neoliberal project.  It translated the demands of the 
workers’ cooperative movement and associated social movement groups for the 
democratisation of work and welfare into a new concern for accountability and user 
involvement in the design of services.  The workers’ cooperative movement’s 
demand for democratisation was incorporated into the Government’s discourse about 
the rights of the social consumer to quality and choice.  The introduction of quasi-
markets in the provision of social services and the shift from job creation to 
individualised training was emphasised in the discourse as validating the rights of 
consumers (of training) to choice and value for money.  This new emphasis 
established the exercise of consumer sovereignty as the new form that democratic 
participation should take. 
 
The Fourth Labour Government’s discursive strategy to create an alliance between 
the people and their neoliberal regulatory agenda sought to neutralise their opposition 
by constructing an antagonism-free system of differences that incorporated as many 
counter-hegemonic discourses and goals as possible, including those connected to 
Maori self-determination, radical democratic and feminist counter-hegemonic 
projects.  
 
A transformist project consists of efforts to expand the systems of 
difference defining a dominant bloc.  If such a project is successful, 
it will result in a lessening of the antagonistic potential of the 
remaining excluded elements and a broadening of the hegemonic 
bloc. (Norval, 2000a, p.220) 
 
This chapter examined the Employment Promotion Conference as a site for the 
reconstruction of New Zealand’s citizenship regime.  Consultations with citizen-
based social movement groups over key aspects of policy change were used to 
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manage the direction of these discursive events in order to popularise the neoliberal 
programme.  The Employment Promotion Conference (1985) generated a number of 
unexpected articulations between neoliberal discourse and counter-hegemonic social 
movement discourses.   
 
This chapter explored how discursive struggles between counter-hegemonic social 
movements and the neoliberalising Fourth Labour Government shaped the 
construction of a neoliberal mode of political identification.  The neoliberal 
citizenship regime was built on a series of hegemonic articulatory practices which 
gradually domesticated a selection of Maori self-determination, liberal feminist and 
radical democratic discourses.  This strategy both expanded the neoliberal discourse 
and dissipated the antagonistic potential of the counter-hegemonic discourses of the 
workers’ cooperative movement whose agenda directly confronted the competitive 
ethos of neoliberal regulation with an alternative paradigm based on a democratic 
cooperative association of citizens.  Pertinent to this process was the political 
construction of categories of unemployed others and the articulation of a citizenship 
discourse which defined the in group in terms of an antagonism-free system of 
differences, consisting of social consumers, Maori entrepreneurs, professional mother 
workers and responsible self-steering communities.   
 
The analysis developed herein raises a number of issues for political analysis of 
neoliberal welfare restructuring, processes of political identification and social policy 
development.  Firstly, this discussion demonstrates how the claims of counter-
hegemonic groups were translated into the hegemonic project and how counter-
hegemonic projects were reshaped in the process.  
    
Zizek (1997) argued that an ideology becomes the ruling ideology by incorporating 
the motifs and aspirations of the oppressed and rearticulating them such that they 
become compatible with the existing relations of domination.  He states, “Etienne 
Balibar was fully justified in reversing Marx’s classic formula: the ruling ideas are 
precisely not directly the ideas of those who rule” (p.30).  Discursive struggle 
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between counter-hegemonic groups and the neoliberalising Fourth Labour 
Government in New Zealand resulted in the formation of a consensual logic based in 
the mutual appropriation of key terms and phrases which discursively neutralised the 
antagonisms between aspects of the neoliberal agenda and the positions and motives 
of counter-hegemonic groups.  The Labour Government translated counter-
hegemonic discourses and marginalised those discourses that could not be articulated 
to the neoliberal restructuring.  The Fourth Labour Government differentially 
incorporated the discourses of Maori entrepreneurialism, devolution and liberal 
feminism.  Their inclusionary strategy concealed the exclusion of the radical anti-
racist, anti-sexist and anti-capitalist social forces represented in the workers’ 
cooperative movement and their distinctive problematisation of unemployment and 
prescriptions for change.  
 
This chapter focused on the way gender and racial difference was constituted 
differently in two successive citizenship regimes and examined the political struggle 
accompanying the shift from one to another.  The Keynesian welfare state citizenship 
regime was premised on a gendered and racialised division of labour in which 
women, Maori and ethnic minorities were constituted as second-class citizens and 
deployed as a reserve army of labour.  The emergent neoliberal citizenship regime 
emphasised how aspects of the aspirations of social movements could be articulated 
to the neoliberal project and recognised gender and racial differences through the 
differentiated delivery of social services while at the same time excluding the 
structural dimensions of their disadvantage from consideration.   
 
This chapter analysed the Fourth Labour Government’s articulatory strategies in the 
restructuring of unemployment and examined the discursive struggle between the 
Fourth Labour Government and counter-hegemonic groups.  The following chapter 
focuses on the restructuring of taxation in the 1990s.   
 
The Fourth Labour Government’s (1984-1990) citizenship discourse was distinctive 
from what was to follow under National, particularly insofar as Labour retained 
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elements of the social democratic citizenship regime, including a continuing 
commitment to social inclusion evident in their use of the strategy of differential 
incorporation.  During the 1990s, the National-led governments purposively 
constructed a taxpayer citizenship regime by re-structuring and re-emphasising social 
antagonisms constituting the taxpayer and the beneficiary as a positive/negative 
pairing. 
 
Contestation and struggle between the Government and counter-hegemonic groups 
was much less relevant in the restructuring of taxation for two reasons.  Firstly, by the 
1990s the Fourth Labour Government had already subsumed a number of counter-
hegemonic discourses and articulated them to the neoliberal reforms and secondly, 
what was not already appropriated was delegitimated by the National-led 
Governments who defined citizens as taxpayers in opposition to counter hegemonic 
groups and minorities who they defined as making unreasonable demands on 
taxpayers for bottomless support.  For these reasons the following chapter focuses on 
the much more relevant struggle between the National-led Governments and the 
Labour party in opposition.    
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Transforming New Zealand’s political problematic and 
citizenship regime 1980-2000:  Shifting moral discourses and 
the taxpayer 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Discursive struggle in (and outside of) the political field focuses on contest around 
existing ideological signifiers.  The expansion of neoliberal discourse and the 
embedding of a neoliberal centring political problematic and citizenship regime in 
New Zealand strategically involved the dis-embedding of the social democratic 
traditions of social justice and fairness and their re-articulation within a neoliberal 
interpretive framework.  These re-articulated discourses were premised on the 
political identity of the taxpayer constructed as the model citizen and source of 
political legitimacy.  Corresponding changes in the social construction of the targets 
of social policy reinforced these rearticulated discourses and lent support to the 
ongoing neoliberal direction of policy reform. 
 
Central to the political conditions of a mode of regulation is the embedding of a 
citizenship regime and the fixing of a new centring political problematic.  A political 
problematic is a centring discourse that defines the scope of legitimate political action 
and orients policy development (see Chapter Two).  A citizenship regime regulates 
the conduct of citizens by establishing a mode of political identification that 
corresponds with the prevailing political problematic.  The embedding of a neoliberal 
political problematic and citizenship regime in the 1990s included the rearticulation 
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of taxation policy discourses and discourses of fairness, social justice and equality of 
opportunity.  The re-articulation of these key political values evident in shifts in the 
discourses of politicians lent moral authority to a neoliberal political problematic 
because they justified and normalised market distribution and inequality.  The 
following discussion analyses the link between a shifting politics of taxation policy 
and changes to how politicians represented citizens to themselves.  It examines shifts 
in the focus, emphases, logic and articulations of and between discourses of taxation, 
fairness and social justice, unemployment and equality of opportunity.  The argument 
is that while the Centre-Left and the Centre-Right offer distinctive dialects of 
citizenship, these dialects are underscored by a neoliberal political problematic that is 
tacitly accepted by both the Centre-Left and the Centre-Right.   
 
The chapter, therefore, examines how the dominant political parties operating in New 
Zealand’s political field rearticulated taxation and unemployment policy discourses, 
highlighting the rights of the taxpayer and obligations of the unemployed.  Jenson and 
Phillips (1996, p.115) argue that states engage in the politics of recognition by 
defining rights and obligations and granting access.  Politicians represent citizens to 
themselves by addressing citizens in specified ways and through policymaking that 
privileges certain identities and not others.  This chapter explores how in the 1990s 
the dominant political parties championed the identity and political rights of the New 
Zealand taxpayer and how the re-articulation of taxation and unemployment 
discourses re-specified the moral traditions of fairness, social justice and equality of 
opportunity in ways that reinforced a workfare approach to social policy and a 
neoliberal citizenship regime.   
 
The chapter is divided into three main sections that correspond with three distinct but 
overlapping phases of New Zealand’s process of neoliberalisation.  The first section 
follows the previous chapter in a discussion of the hegemonic articulatory strategies 
of the Fourth Labour Government 1984-1990 which sought to neoliberalise social 
democracy (Larner, 1997a).  This section, however, focuses on taxation policy and 
argues that, as with unemployment policy, the Labour government’s restructuring of 
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taxation policy discourses deployed social democratic values to justify neoliberal 
reforms.   
 
The second section examines the period of the National and National-New Zealand 
First coalition governments 1990-1999.  The National-led government’s restructuring 
of taxation and unemployment policy discourses deployed the political logic of 
equivalence, constituting the taxpayer in antagonistic relation to the unemployed 
beneficiary who was constructed as blocking the realisation of the neoliberal social 
order. 
  
The third section focuses on how discursive struggle over taxation and 
unemployment policy between the Centre-Left Labour Party and the Centre-Right 
National Party during the 1990s reflected and constituted a tacit neoliberal consensus 
over the goals and instruments of policy within Left and Right dialects.  Attention to 
the absences in their respective discourse strategies to distinguish themselves by 
claiming difference from each other reveals the nature of the neoliberal political 
problematic which currently centres the political field in New Zealand.  This tacit 
consensus about the direction of policy development includes, among other things, 
the redirection of public expenditure away from universal schemes of social 
protection towards selective forms of targeted social investment, tax reform away 
from progressive taxation towards flatter competitiveness-enhancing systems, flexible 
labour markets and workfare.  
 
This case study of the discourses of politicians focuses (although not exclusively) on 
the discourses of the Centre-Left Labour Party and the Centre-Right National Party in 
New Zealand which occupy this centre space and from whom the hegemonic political 
problematic is most clearly articulated.   The centre of the political field represents 
the most fiercely contested political space because it represents the position of 
moderation, pragmatism and majority opinion.  It represents a point of tension 
because while the centre divides the Left from the Right and this process involves 
their mutual constitution through defining their differences from each other, the 
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discourses of the centre also represent what Bobbio (1996) terms the inclusive 
middle.  By this he means the set of agreed upon assumptions made by both the Left 
and the Right.  This set of agreed upon assumptions is what is both Left and Right, 
and constitutes the centring political problematic which articulates the state within a 
wider social and economic mode of development.  Although Bobbio defines these 
two forms of centrist politics separately, this analysis of discursive struggle shows 
how the inclusive middle emerges as a result of struggle between the Centre-Left to 
define itself in difference from the Centre-Right and vice versa. 
 
The neoliberal political problematic represents the consensus between the Centre-Left 
and Centre-Right or the inclusive middle.  I argue that its emergence and 
consolidation occurred as the result of a process of discursive struggle between 
Labour and National over moral traditions.  Labour and National engaged in 
discourse strategies designed to differentiate their parties from each other.  The 
consensus between the Centre-Left and Centre-Right can be discerned by paying 
attention to the unspoken set of agreed-upon assumptions, which are the silences in 
the discourses of politicians whose motivation is to claim difference from their 
political opponents.  The third section analyses the key moral debates motivating 
struggle in the political field in the late 1990s in terms of what they reveal both about 
what distinguishes Left and Right and the nature of the unspoken consensus that is 
both Left and Right. 
 
 
The Keynesian welfare state and taxation 
 
This section examines the hegemonic discourse of the Keynesian welfare state 
citizenship regime which focused on progressive taxation and redistribution via the 
welfare state.   
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…throughout most of its seventy-five year modern history, the 
progressive personal income tax has been accepted by the general 
public in most jurisdictions as the one tax in the system which is 
truly fair. (Head & Kreaver, 1990, p.v) 
 
Taxation policy not only specifies a method of financing public services, but also, 
fundamentally, it is an instrument for the delivery of social conceptions of fairness 
and justice.  Social justice was a legitimate and privileged goal of government during 
the social democratic era and was realised through “social citizenship” (Marshall, 
1950).  Social citizenship was central to the moral economy underpinning the 
legitimacy of the Keynesian welfare state.  Material inequality was recognised as the 
fundamental source of social injustice.  This recognition was expressed in a social 
consensus for progressive taxation and welfare in order to generate a high social 
minimum and accompanying ceiling.  Progressive taxation based on the principle of 
the ability to pay or taxation capacity expressed the egalitarianism of the Keynesian 
welfare state.  Social citizenship guaranteed access to resources as a right of 
citizenship rather than according to contribution.  Sutch, a prominent New Zealand 
intellectual and civil servant, strongly advocated for the principles of social 
citizenship and inclusion.  In his book The responsible society in New Zealand 
(1971), he recognised that the market and the family do not and cannot provide all the 
means for the development of human potential.  This view positioned the state as the 
guarantor of a wide range of public services and legitimised government expenditure 
and involvement across a wide range of fields.  Thus, as Sutch (1971) stated: 
 
All New Zealanders should share, as of right, in the total production 
of the community because they are New Zealanders; that is they 
share not because of their poverty or even necessarily because of 
having paid taxes or made contributions.… The level of sharing 
should not be at a poverty level or modest-but-adequate level but at 
the level of the typical New Zealand living standard.… Social 
security, which includes the social services broadly conceived, 
should be regarded as one of the highest priorities of the country, a 
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priority to which economic activity should be directed, for the 
objectives are the realisation of the potentialities of human beings 
within the levels of knowledge and production.  For this reason the 
positive improvement of the person’s educational, social and 
physical environment and his growth as a person should be the major 
objective of social security in the wide sense. (pp.126-127)  
     
Castles (1985) argues that New Zealand’s post-war citizenship regime conceived the 
role of the state to provide security via the welfare state as a basic right of universal 
citizenship. This positive conception of the role of the welfare state was held by the 
majority of New Zealanders, irrespective of party affiliation.   
 
Even if the substance of such provision was precarious and subject to 
attrition under National governments, the existence of a favourable 
image of the welfare state, with New Zealand—rightly or wrongly—
conceived as a welfare exemplar, provided a pressure point for 
continuing political awareness of welfare issues.  The notion that the 
state has an important responsibility for the social welfare of its 
citizens was and is far more strongly developed in New Zealand than 
in the Australian popular consciousness. (Castles, 1985, p.53) 
 
Working families defined the productive core of the Keynesian welfare state.  The 
family taxpayer was the privileged identity in social and tax policy.  For instance, 
while the report of the Taxation Review Committee 1967 advocated the reduction of 
income taxes, the authors retained a commitment to progressive taxation and paid 
particular attention to the position of the “family taxpayer”.  As the Taxation Review 
Committee noted, “It is generally accepted that the impact of taxes on income should 
vary according to income levels and family responsibilities” (Taxation Review 
Committee, 1967, p.103).  The report, in its recommendations for a number of 
deductions and benefits for “family taxpayers” such as wife, child and dependent 
family member exemptions, recognised a society of male breadwinners and their 
dependents.   
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The need to support dependent populations was recognised as part of the legitimate 
distribution of the community’s income rather than as the subject of charity (Sutch, 
1971, p.23).  The dependency of certain categories of persons was recognised as a 
necessary feature of social and economic relations in a capitalist economy:  
 
Society recognises dependents and certain social organisations as 
needing the support of the state against market forces and utilitarian 
philosophy, and that this support is not regarded as charity, but as a 
distribution of the community’s income. (Sutch, 1971, p.23) 
 
Social services should be provided for all in such a way that those 
who use them should have no sense of inferiority or loss of self 
respect or dignity or being a ‘burden on the community’.  What is 
provided should be a normal social right for all without a person 
having to be a suppliant or prove eligibility by a means test.… Social 
security expenditure is not to be regarded as a burden, but at the very 
minimum, as an investment and a distribution of the total income of 
society. (Sutch, 1971, p.123)    
 
Social rights and progressive taxation were integral to the provision of social justice.  
The Keynesian welfare state discourse interpreted the market allocation of resources 
as inadequate insofar as it failed to distribute resources to all members of a more 
broadly conceived productive community, by decoupling the link between work and 
income.  “Generally speaking there is no essential functional link between work 
(contribution to output) and income (share of output)” (New Zealand Royal 
Commission, 1972, p.69).  The market allocation of resources was understood to be 
inadequate because it did not recognise all forms of contribution.  This view served as 
the fundamental impetus behind redistribution and progressive taxation. 
 
(Social Security) must work through a money-based economy to 
alleviate the imperfect distribution of the proceeds of the production 
from which every person’s living standards are derived … these 
238 
proceeds are distributed primarily by a market system. (New Zealand 
Royal Commission, 1972, p.53) 
 
While the report on taxation, produced by the Ross Committee in 1967 argued for the 
desirability of neutrality in the taxation system because the tax system should not 
interfere with the choices or courses of action pursued by members of society, the 
authors recognised that “complete neutrality in the system is neither attainable nor 
justifiable” (Taxation Review Committee, 1967, p.15).  Debates over taxation were 
not primarily about increases in the rate of growth; rather, the authors argued that the 
tax system must serve broad social objectives: 
 
In New Zealand, the social objectives most strongly sought are a 
more equitable distribution of income than occurs naturally, and the 
avoidance of excessively large concentrations of power in private 
hands.  They are, of course, attained in part by measures outside the 
tax system, but traditionally progressive rates of income tax and 
death duties have been the main instruments used to achieve the 
redistribution of wealth and income.  The tax system should 
therefore achieve a politically acceptable balance between the search 
for efficiency and the desire for equality. (Taxation Review 
Committee, 1967, p.13) 
 
The above passage argues for progressive taxation in order to, among other things, 
avoid concentrations of private wealth and power and achieve greater equity.  
Concern over the development of state monopolies was absent and instead it was 
private monopolies that were represented as an impediment to democracy.  The state 
was viewed as both reflecting and serving citizens.  In this discourse the state is the 
embodiment of the general interest that transcends the particular interests that inhere 
in a competitive market economy.  The authors criticised calls for tax cuts and 
reductions in state spending as not constructive, given continuing support for public 
sector activities:  
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Criticism of the high level of Government expenditure, while 
voluble, is seldom constructive and unfortunately, often not well 
informed. There is little serious effort to put forward reasoned 
arguments to demonstrate what particular functions of government 
should be abandoned, curtailed, or transferred to the private sector. 
(Taxation Review Committee, 1967, p.19) 
 
The dominant view of the time was that the state should represent and provide 
security for the citizen and that this necessitated an extensive role for the state in a 
broad range of areas and the tax base necessary to achieve this purpose.   
 
Discourses that challenge or refuse the terms of the hegemonic political problematic 
are excluded from the political field.  During the hegemony of the Keynesian welfare 
state, neoliberal discourse was excluded from the political field because it refused the 
terms of the hegemonic political problematic consisting of the pursuit of social 
security and social justice via the welfare state.  However, once New Zealand’s 
political field entered an out-of-regulation period, the social democratic political 
problematic became the subject of intense political debate and critique.  Many of its 
core principles fell into disrepute, particularly, labourism and redistribution.  In the 
context of this regulatory and normative crisis, neoliberals narrated the crisis in 
neoliberal terms and articulated a new centring political problematic based in 
monetarism and supply-side economics which currently dictates the ongoing 
neoliberal direction of public policy as a condition of sustained economic growth and 
competitiveness. 
 
 
Neoliberalising social democracy 1984-1990     
 
During the late 1970s a number of disruptive events and discourses of crisis 
interrupted the stability and hegemony of New Zealand’s political problematic and 
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citizenship regime.  These included the concurrence of inflation and unemployment 
that challenged the Keynesian orthodoxy that stagflation could not occur.  The failure 
of the Keynesian mode of regulation to sustain stable economic growth undermined 
the credibility and legitimacy of its citizenship regime.   
 
Politicians and state managers mobilised a discourse of fiscal crisis in which the 
burgeoning burden of public debt was attributed to political and bureaucratic 
irresponsibility and state overload (Boston, 1993, p.98).  Anti-statist discourses that 
attributed the crisis to the economic interventions of inefficient state managers were 
also mobilised against the Keynesian welfare state.  In the social field, social 
antagonisms began to perforate the “political quietitude” and interrupt the social 
consensus of the Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime.  The Springbok tour of 
1981 was the stage for a clash between the will to equality and the will to individual 
freedom because the tour brought into direct conflict protestors’ accounts of the 
racism of the tour and rugby fans’ claims to a right to enjoy their national sport.  
Maori land occupations, in particular Bastion Point, showed the strength of support 
within the Maori movement for the return to Maori of their lands and challenged the 
legitimacy of the state.  Feminists struggled for equal rights in the labour market and 
challenged the primacy of the male worker as the universal and primary source of 
identification, as did rising levels of unemployment (Neilson, 1996).    
 
These disruptive events and discourses brought into question the social democratic 
political problematic and citizenship regime and opened the space for new hegemonic 
projects seeking to give new direction and consistency to society.  The centring 
political problematic and citizenship regime of the social democratic era, its 
principles, values and assumptions became key points of debate.  New versions of 
what should constitute the legitimate goals and methods of government began to 
compete for hegemony.  
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 The Fourth Labour Government and taxation 
 
While taxation was the focus of a government Review Committee in 1967 and again 
in 1982, in the Report of the McCaw Task Force on Tax Reform, the problems 
addressed in these reports were recognised by a small circle of policymakers and did 
not enter public debate to any great extent (Kato, 2003, p.137).  By the 1980s, 
however, tax reform was rapidly politicised and a number of books and reports 
focusing on the fairness of the taxation system were published by the New Zealand 
Planning Council, trade unions, the New Zealand Business Roundtable and 
individuals outside of government (Caragata, 1998; Nelson, 1989; Jeffries, Snively 
and Thompson, 1981).  The debate culminated in the introduction of a goods and 
services tax (GST) in 198637 and a proposed but unsuccessful, flat tax which 
ultimately contributed to a ruptural moment on the issue of tax, fairness and social 
justice in which all that had been taken for granted became open to challenge.  
 
Prior to 1984, New Zealand had five nominal rates of tax in its personal income tax 
schedule with a top marginal tax rate of 66 percent.  By 1988, New Zealand had a two 
tier schedule with a top rate of just 33 percent (Stephens, 1990, pp.103-6).  These 
changes were seen as part of an integrated package that included the changes to 
income tax rates, GST and the Guaranteed Minimum Family Income for those in full-
time paid employment (Stephens, 1990, pp.108-9). 
 
These reports and the debate they inspired challenged the heavy reliance of New 
Zealand’s tax base on income tax (Stephens, 1993; New Zealand GST Coordinating 
Office, 1985) and raised perceptions of high levels of tax evasion.  Taken together, 
the above-mentioned reports provided a propitious discursive environment for the 
Fourth Labour Government’s public relations campaign to popularise its flattened tax 
                                                 
37 GST had been a feature of discourse about tax reform in New Zealand for some time and reflected a  
commitment to shifting tax from production to consumption. 
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schedule and GST.  One of the key discourses used to justify the shift to GST focused 
on the unfairness of the previous system to ordinary working people.   
 
It’s the wage and salary earners, particularly the middle and lower 
income groups, who pay the most tax!  They can’t avoid it.  Others 
employ tax specialists to help them take advantage of tax loopholes. 
(New Zealand GST Coordinating Office, 1985, p.10) 
 
This argument mobilised a social democratic emphasis on class inequality and 
redistribution to justify a neoliberal policy reform.  The Labour Government also 
claimed that an over-emphasis on income tax was discouraging productivity.  “People 
who want to work harder and work overtime or get promotion have been discouraged 
from doing this by higher taxes” (New Zealand GST Coordinating Office, 1985, 
p.10).  In this way the tax system was characterised as unduly restrictive of individual 
choice.  Opponents of the new tax stressed its regressiveness (Kato, 2003, p.140) but 
this was to be compensated for by a new Guaranteed Minimum Family Income which 
maintained the social citizenship right to a basic income while severing its link with a 
broader concept of redistribution. 
 
The Labour Government promoted GST as benefiting those on low incomes and 
stimulating productive investment and employment.  In the Labour Government’s 
Budget Statement (1984), the Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas stated: 
 
The major benefits of this reform will lie in the scope for delivering 
greater assistance to low-income families.  Reform of the income tax 
and of indirect tax will reinforce incentives for productive 
investment and expanded production and employment. (Douglas, 
1984, p.56)   
 
The Keynesian welfare state discourse with its emphasis on the need for different 
groups in society to act in concert in order to achieve economic development goals 
was displaced in the 1980s by a discourse of a polity comprising equivalent 
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individuals who are active, self sufficient and connected to the collective of New 
Zealand only as social consumers and taxpayers.  These neoliberal discourses of 
subjectivity denied the social collective and forcefully asserted an individualist 
rationality.  The following extract from the Treasury’s Government management 
privileges the enterprising self-interested individual, while reducing collectivity to 
being a myth of the welfare state:   
 
It is sometimes suggested that there is some wider society which is 
greater than the sum of the people in it and social benefits are felt by 
this society even though none of the people may comprehend the 
gain.… We would have some difficulty in deriving policy from an 
imaginary construct of that type. (New Zealand Treasury, 1987, 
p.448)  
 
The citizen is addressed in the political rhetoric of the 1980s and 1990s as both an 
individual consumer of social services and as a productive, contributing taxpayer.  
These different emphases correspond with these two distinct phases of the neoliberal 
restructuring.   During the 1980s, a discourse addressing the taxpayer as a social 
consumer was emphasised as part of the Fourth Labour Government’s corporatisation 
and privatisation programme (Larner, 1997b).  The taxpayer was constructed as a 
consumer of political product and his/her rights to “value for money” and “a return on 
his/her investment” were emphasised.  While the Fourth Labour Government 
decoupled the established link between social citizenship and progressive taxation in 
debates over tax reform during the 1980s, they continued to reinforce the link 
between social consumption and citizenship by constructing New Zealanders as the 
consumers of social services and made links between the corporatisation and 
privatisation of state services and the interests of a universalised social consumer. 
 
In the following discussion I show that while recognition of the taxpayer as a 
consumer remained, during the 1990s under the National government, the taxpayer 
was increasingly addressed as a producer rather than a consumer.  The productive 
taxpayer also expressed a new “modality of the social bond” (Donzelot cited in 
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Larner, 1997b, p.384).  In this discourse the taxpayer is socially connected as a 
producer of wealth and as a stakeholder in New Zealand constructed as a firm.  The 
taxpayer who works and contributes through taxpaying has a stake in New Zealand 
Incorporated.  The competitiveness of the New Zealand economy depends on this 
collection of individual efforts.  Pursuing one’s individual economic interests is 
accorded legitimacy in this discourse as a patriotic contribution to the nation’s 
competitiveness. The taxpayer was constructed as a self-seeking individual but also 
as a member of an imagined community of self-seeking individuals connected to each 
other via the goal of international competitiveness constituted as a type of economic 
nationalism.  For example, the National Party’s pre-election publication, entitled 
National Party policies for the 1990s: Creating a decent society (1990) deployed the 
image of New Zealand’s success in America’s Cup yacht racing under the heading 
“Enterprise: The path to prosperity” in order to construct the nation’s economic 
competitiveness as a national rallying project (New Zealand National Party, 1990a).   
 
 
Shifting the locus of wealth creation 
 
During the late 1980s, marked shifts in discourses about how wealth is generated 
underpinned changes in how the state addressed the citizenry.  The worker as labour 
was displaced as the locus of wealth creation by an idealised conception of the 
entrepreneur.  Standing argues that the increased recognition of the entrepreneur 
reflects the increased mobility of all aspects of production and distribution in a global 
economy which strengthens the role of the organisers of production over labour and 
the state (Standing, 2002, p.24).  The displacement of the worker by the entrepreneur 
can be described as a conversion from a productive culture to an entrepreneurial 
culture.   
 
Absent from the social democratic moral consensus was validation of the role of 
entrepreneurial capital.  The labourist and social democratic basis of New Zealand’s 
245 
Keynesian welfare state had recognised the contribution of workers to the generation 
of wealth, but, during the 1980s, Labour politicians raised the status of the 
entrepreneur in economic development and as a source of national distinctiveness.  
For example, Roger Douglas, the then Minister of Finance commented in the House 
during the presentation of the Government’s Financial Statement:   
 
Young people entering the workforce in the 1990s will find a climate 
of fair opportunity for all.  It will be an economy where the state 
imposes no constraints on the ability of individuals to achieve their 
potential.  They will succeed, not on the basis of state favours or 
entrenched privilege, but through equality of access to opportunity.  
Growth will be based on this country's human and natural resources, 
and the skills and entrepreneurial flair for which New Zealanders 
have made their name. (Douglas, 28 Jul 1988) 
 
While labour, the collective, was credited with guaranteeing wealth creation and 
accorded a prominent role in a corporatist framework of decision-making in the social 
democratic era, this began to change in the 1980s, and by the 1990s, the perception 
was that in a competitive world order the entrepreneur by following his self-interest 
generates wealth, and public benefit accrues as a kind of by-product.  This 
downgraded role for labour in discourses about wealth creation was also evident 
politically in a reduced role of labour unions in consultations over government policy 
post-1984 (Boston & Holland, 1987, p.12).   
 
 
The National and National/New Zealand First Coalition Governments and the 
privileging of the taxpayer  
 
During the 1990s, under National, the emphasis in taxation policy shifted to tax relief 
rather than reforms.  The subject of unfairness also shifted from low and middle 
income earners towards high income earners now constructed as paying too large a 
proportion of tax (Caragata, 1998).  Central to this shift in discourses about taxation 
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was changing perceptions of the legitimate functions of the state and the corollary, a 
changing perception about the fairness and growth potential of the market system.   
 
The failure of the Keynesian welfare state was interpreted by National as a function 
of the growth of the state sector at the expense of the private sector.  The state sector, 
it was argued, had “crowded out” the competitive private sector.  The then Minister 
of Finance, Ruth Richardson made this argument in her Economic Statement to 
Parliament: 
 
At the heart of these problems is the crushing burden of Government 
spending. The continuing increase in the size of the State has 
resulted in growing debt, punitive tax levels, and intolerable pressure 
on interest rates. These burdens have sapped the energy and initiative 
of New Zealand's wealth creators. We cannot prosper as a nation if 
we put spending ahead of earning. The Prime Minister has 
announced this Government's determination to attack the burden of 
Government spending and its commitment to translate into action the 
mandate it has obtained to redesign the welfare state. (Richardson, 
19 Dec 1990) 
 
This view of the state as crowding out private enterprise, combined with discourses 
about the inefficiency of state provision, lent credibility to ideas about punitive tax 
levels and economic discourses about the requirement to cut taxes in order to 
stimulate the enterprise economy.  A tax cuts agenda emerged in the 1990s and was 
articulated as a means to stimulate economic growth and in opposition to the welfare 
state.  National Minister, Marie Hasler, stated in support of the National 
Government’s planned tax cuts:    
 
The cuts to personal income tax to take effect from 1 July reflect the 
Government’s encouragement to personal effort and a recognition of 
the negative effect that taxes can have on economic growth. (Hasler, 
18 Mar 1998) 
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 During the 1990s, a conscious effort was made by government to promote the status 
of entrepreneurial business.  The Porter Report explicitly bemoaned the discourse 
which saw profits interpreted as being “made from other people”, i.e. labour, as the 
reason for the low status of business and a source of New Zealand’s declining 
competitive advantage (Crocombe et al., 1991, p.124).  In the following example, 
taken from the debate over the introduction of the Taxation (income rates) Bill 1997, 
Hasler (the then Minister of Culture and Heritage) constructed the role of 
entrepreneurs as essential to economic growth and employment.   
 
I believe that there will be tax cuts next year. To create wealth and to 
use capital innovatively and imaginatively, we cannot deprive the 
entrepreneurs of this country, the people who make the country 
work, of the very instruments necessary for that success. (Hasler, 4 
Mar 1997) 
 
Wyatt Creech, (former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Health) in 
opposition to the Fifth Labour Government’s budget statement which indicated 
some increases to the upper tax rates had this to say: 
 
Dr Cullen and Helen Clark have yet to learn that they cannot attack 
the people whose entrepreneurship, talent, risk taking, and skills 
cause economic development to occur…. Long term economic 
growth depends on giving flight to the collective initiative of us all, 
through the free enterprise system. (Creech, 15 Jun 2000) 
 
By the 1990s, and particularly after the Employment Contracts Act 1991, discourses 
about the role of labour in production underwent a radical shift away from the view 
that labour by working with nature and technology produces goods and services that 
generate profits which by virtue of property rights and the nature of the labour 
contract are appropriated by capital, towards the view that wealth is created by 
entrepreneurs who innovatively manage the various factors of production of which 
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labour is but one input.  As National Party MP, Patsy Wong, said [of Labour’s tax 
policy]   
 
They proposed increased taxes.  After they protect property rights, 
where people may earn rewards from their hard work and new ideas, 
they propose to punish them.  We believe that these individuals, who 
are collectively or single-handedly creating wealth should be 
rewarded. (Wong, 5 Oct 1999) 
 
The political and economic power of the controllers of production is strengthened in 
relation to workers and governments in a globalised economic system.  Increasing 
exposure to the global economy in the 1980s and 1990s required the policy 
framework to promote international competitiveness, and restructuring was 
increasingly constructed and justified in terms of this new constraint/opportunity.  
Connected to this view is the idea that the only way to stimulate economic growth 
and employment is through reductions in taxation.  As Bill Birch, the then Minister of 
Finance for the National Government stated: 
 
Reducing taxes will improve economic growth, create more jobs and 
make it more attractive for people to move from welfare to work.  
Reducing taxes leaves money for New Zealanders to invest or spend 
rather than leaving it to the politicians to spend for them. (Birch, 1 
Jun 1995)  
 
Similarly, National Party MP, John Luxton (previously Minister of Maori 
Affairs and Commerce) said of the Labour Government’s tax policy: 
 
This Government thought that it was helping to reduce 
unemployment when it put up taxes paid by employers, who provide 
jobs.  Well, what do employers do if they actually end up with some 
money in their pockets?  They repay their mortgages, they expand 
their businesses, and they provide jobs.  If we take money from them 
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to spend on benefits that will not result in jobs being provided; it will 
create welfare dependency. (Luxton, 20 Jun 2000)  
 
Within this neoliberal interpretive framework the argument maintained that it was 
better for employers/entrepreneurs to invest in enterprise than for the state to invest in 
welfare dependency.  The debate over tax cuts intensified during the 1990s.  During 
the course of this debate the socially progressive status of redistributive taxation was 
recast as not recognising the central role of entrepreneurial business in creating 
wealth and directly undermining growth and employment by redistributing it to 
parasitic and unproductive social groups.  This perspective stands in stark contrast to 
the social democratic era in which economic growth and employment was attributed 
to a more complex array of factors including a central role for public sector 
investment in both economic activity and social wellbeing (Castles, 1985), and where 
the payment of tax was interpreted as a contribution to the general interest and an 
expression of collective responsibility (Sutch, 1971).   
 
The previous section pointed to a number of displacements in the politics of taxation 
that indicate the construction of a new modality of the social bond.  These were, first, 
a privileging of the contributing, productive taxpayer connected to a discourse which 
re-specified the entrepreneur as the locus of wealth creation.  Second, this privileging 
of the productive taxpayer and the entrepreneur was articulated to the view that tax 
reductions on personal and corporate income were necessary, in the face of 
globalisation and ensuing pressures for economic competitiveness, to generate 
economic growth.  The following section shows how the National-led Government’s 
promoted the taxpayer as the source of political legitimacy and the model citizen in 
opposition to the targets of social policy constructed as deficient and morally 
bankrupt second-class citizens.  The analysis of debates between National and Labour 
over the Social Security Amendmant and the Tax Reduction and Social Policy Bills 
demonstrates the importance of the rearticulation of moral discourses of social 
justice, fairness and equality of opportunity in this process of reconstructing citizen 
subject positions.  
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 National’s decent society: Moralising the market 
 
The 1990s was marked by a shift in emphasis from the taxpayer as a social consumer 
to the taxpayer as a producer.  This shift corresponded with a shift from an economic 
to a moral rationality in restructuring discourses.  The National Party’s 1990 
campaign slogan “the decent society” indicated this shift from an economic to a 
moral justificatory framework and corresponded with a shift from economic policy to 
social policy as the main object of neoliberal restructuring. 
 
National’s election campaign connected “the decent society” with a working society.  
For example:  
 
National’s vision for New Zealand is clear.  We are going to build 
the Decent Society where people enjoy the opportunity of worth-
while work … the chance to enjoy the rewards of hard work and 
initiative. (New Zealand National Party, 1990a, p.3)    
 
As part of this process, the Code of Social and Family Responsibility (CSFR) (1998) 
built on Labour’s Children Young Persons and their Families Act (1989) in asserting 
familial responsibility over state responsibility for welfare (Labrum, 2004) and was 
the culmination of the National/New Zealand First Coalition government’s discourse 
strategy to add moral weight to the fiscal crisis arguments for restructuring the 
welfare state.  The CSFR attempted to further reinforce this dictum by redefining the 
expectations and obligations of citizenship.  It did so ostensibly by establishing a 
political frontier between taxpaying contributors and an underclass of unemployed 
welfare beneficiaries.  The construction of the unemployed beneficiary as a 
threatening other served to create an imagined community of taxpayers and define 
their unity in terms of their difference and antagonistic relation to unemployed 
beneficiaries.  The formation of a taxpayer citizen subject position in the 1990s 
occurred via the construction of a set of articulated discourses that established this 
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political frontier and connected moral righteousness with the project of an 
economically competitive nation.  The following section explores the construction of 
this political frontier in the political field through a discourse analysis of the shifting 
politics of taxation and the social construction of the targets of ‘welfare’ evident in 
the parliamentary debates.  In particular, debates over the amendments to the Social 
Security Act and the Tax Reduction and Social Policy Bill.   
 
 
Taxpayers and beneficiaries: A relation of reciprocity, the benefit principle and 
taxation 
 
The National-led government’s restructuring of taxation policy recast ‘fairness’ in 
taxation as requiring taxpayers to contribute in proportion to the benefit they derive 
from government and constructed a central social antagonism between taxpayers and 
unemployed beneficiaries.  This contrasted with the ‘ability to pay’ and ‘according to 
need’ principles that underpinned progressive taxation and social citizenship in the 
social democratic period (Taxation Review Committee, 1967, p.15).  In the National-
led government’s discourse, the unemployed beneficiary does not pay taxes and 
therefore his/her benefiting from taxes transgresses the ‘benefit principle’.  The 
invoking of the benefit principle established a clear demarcation between those who 
contribute and those who benefit.  “The community was perceived as divided 
between givers and takers” (McClure, 2004, p.152).  The argument follows that under 
the welfare state those contributing the most are benefiting the least.   
 
While New Zealand’s benefit system had been selectivist since its inception, insofar 
as applicants were required to meet minimal conditions to establish eligibility, its 
discourses and goals have always been universalist.  During the 1990s the targeting of 
social services was intensified under Welfare that works (1991).  The intensification 
of targeting in social policy emphasised the sense that those who pay for social 
security benefits do not benefit from them and vice versa.  The taxpayer is unfairly 
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burdened while the beneficiary collects a benefit without making an effort.  In 
National’s discourse, social benefits leave some worthy citizens with fewer after tax 
resources so that other less worthy citizens can benefit.  Policies of the welfare state 
are cast as unfair because they provide rights without establishing obligations and 
distribute benefits and burdens unfairly.  Comments by former leader of the National 
Party, Jim Bolger, and former National Party MP, Christine Fletcher, represent this 
view:      
 
There are unemployed people demonstrating in the streets, who want 
us to spend more money.  There are angry senior citizens passing 
angry resolutions in hall meetings, who want us to spend more 
money…. I understand the concerns of people who want 
Government to spend more but what they are really demanding is the 
right to spend someone else’s money. (Bolger, 1991, p.8) 
 
I do not think that one has the right to spend money that one has not 
earned. (Fletcher, 17 Mar 1994) 
 
These examples show how National’s discourse challenged the justice of 
redistributive taxation by constructing the contributors as not benefiting and the 
beneficiaries as not contributing.  The invocation of the benefit principle in debates 
over taxation policy had a number of effects on common sense understandings of tax 
paying which assume a negative construction of those on benefits and a positive 
construction of those in work.   
 
The National/New Zealand First Coalition government’s proposed Code of Social 
and Family Responsibility (1998) reinforced the antagonism between taxpayers and 
unemployed beneficiaries and clearly identified the centrality of this social 
antagonism to the need to reform the welfare system.  The National-led government 
constructed the welfare system as blocking New Zealand’s economic performance 
and constructed beneficiaries as a dependent underclass who lacked the capacity to 
foot it with the rest either through lack of skills and/or lack of moral character and 
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motivation.  In her opening statement to the House, Prime Minister Jenny Shipley 
represented the problem:  
 
The big outstanding challenge New Zealand faces is to reverse the 
trends that show too many New Zealanders not realising their full 
potential, not receiving income from paid work, and not coping with 
the demands of modern society…. The Government, on behalf of the 
taxpayer, cannot continue to increase funding of programmes that 
seek to solve problems when the answer lies elsewhere in the 
complex areas of personal and family relationships, responsibilities 
and self discipline. (Shipley, 17 Feb 1998)  
 
The National-led governments of the 1990s constructed the beneficiary as both a 
burden on the taxpayer and beholden to the taxpayer.  As the following excerpts from 
speeches by National MPs38 reveal, the spending of tax dollars was conceived as an 
investment requiring a palpable return for taxpayers such as reduced beneficiary 
numbers, increased employability and community work: 
 
If people are going to be given a payment by the taxpayer to keep 
them in an income bracket where their standard of living at least 
provides food on the table and shelter for their families, then the very 
least that they can be expected to do is return something back to the 
taxpayer. (Williamson, 16 Nov 2000) 
 
If they have money in the bank and they are not making a call on 
anybody, we have no involvement in that.  The State has no role to 
play in that.  But when people are making a claim on the community, 
then the State does have an interest.  We, on our side, believe that 
                                                 
38 These excerpts were taken from the debates over the Social Security Amendment Bill 2000.  This 
Bill removed some of the compulsory and punitive aspects of the previous administration’s treatment 
of beneficiaries.  It repealed the mandatory work-for-the-dole community wage scheme, repealed the 
work testing schedule and recognised community activity which had previously been viewed as 
hindering the beneficiaries availability for work.  Debates over the Social Security Amendment Bill 
1998 provided a new work-test framework and a sanctions regime for all work tested beneficiaries. 
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when people make those claims on other taxpayers, they do have 
some obligations that they have to meet. (Simcock, 12 Sept 2000)  
 
At present, we pay out $1.4 billion annually in unemployment 
benefits.  That is a significant portion of the New Zealand economy.  
What could we get in return?  There has been talk that we are 
coercing people into slave labour.  Not everybody in this world, and 
probably not everybody in this room, goes to work voluntarily.  
People go to work to fulfil commitments to themselves, their 
families, or whomever.  They do not necessarily do it voluntarily; 
they do it because they have an obligation. The underlying principle 
of this Bill is reciprocal obligation.  The State uses taxpayers’ money 
that it has collected to pay out money to people in the unfortunate 
position of not having paid employment, and in return those people 
contribute to some community activity. (McLauchlan, 13 Aug 1998) 
 
The principle of reciprocal obligation mobilised deep seated intuitions about fairness 
as a strategy to prepare the electorate for a workfare direction in social policy.  
During the Keynesian era, beneficiaries were constructed as contributing in various 
ways to the social and economic wellbeing of the community by caring for children, 
through voluntary community work or were employed in the public sector.  In the 
early 1980s when unemployment grew dramatically, their right and capacity to 
continue to contribute to the community was the justification for a complex array of 
employment programmes (see Chapter Five).  Production for social use was a central 
social movement discourse articulated to the demand of the unemployed to continue 
to contribute and participate.  In the 1990s this radical discourse was re-articulated to 
the coalition government’s community wage proposal in which the rights of the 
unemployed to continue to contribute was transformed from a demand made by the 
unemployed on the broader community to a demand made by taxpayers on the 
unemployed.  This discourse was deployed to popularise the community wage 
proposal by inciting social antagonism.  The radical discourse expressed by the 
workers’ cooperative movement in the 1980s for the development of a socially useful 
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third sector was re-articulated in the coalition government’s discourse with the 
assertion of taxpayers’ right to reciprocity from unemployed beneficiaries.  
Taxpayers’ were constructed as entitled to reciprocity from unemployed 
beneficiaries, constructed as parasitic on the contributions of ordinary taxpayers.  In 
this strategy, social solidarity between taxpayers was premised on the positive 
identity of the productive contributing taxpayer who was constructed in reference to 
the pure negativity of the non-contributing unemployed beneficiary.   
 
The neoliberal discourse of moral hazard iterated in the CSFR claimed that people 
must face the consequences of their actions to be socially responsible.  The welfare 
state was seen to protect people from the consequences of their own actions and in so 
doing generate socially irresponsible behaviour.  
 
A consequence of these disturbances [to church, family and other 
institutions] is that the welfare state itself through its mechanisms, 
produces young illiterates, juvenile delinquents, alcoholics, 
substance abusers, drug addicts and rejected people at an 
accelerating rate. (Shipley quoted in Larner, 1998b, p.7)  
 
The abjectification of beneficiaries, at its most virulent during the 1990s, and the 
National-led Governments’ articulation of tax policy, moral hazard, social 
responsibility and the benefit principle have had a lasting effect on the hegemonic 
common sense.  Ordinary taxpayers were incited to see themselves not as the 
beneficiaries of state services, but rather, as unwillingly funding a socially 
irresponsible and morally questionable underclass of unemployed beneficiaries.  
During the 1990s, politicians of the Left and Right established a clear division 
between those paying tax and those benefiting from taxpayer-funded welfare services.  
The idea that taxpayers and beneficiaries were often the same people broached the 
safe distance between the ordinary New Zealand taxpayer and an abjectified class of 
deviants.   
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While Labour Party discourse generally retained a commitment to the legitimate 
beneficiaries of state support, Labour MP Leanne Dalziel’s statement in debate over 
the annual Appropriation Bill39 below implicitly buys into this neoliberal ordering of 
social antagonism constructive of a mutually constituting difference between 
unemployed beneficiaries and ordinary contributing taxpayers.  
 
I say that superannuation is a right, something that people have 
earned over their lifetime of contribution to this nation… To say that 
people on superannuation are on benefits, as the ACT party does 
constantly, is to demean their contribution to this country. (Dalziel, 
30 Mar 1999)   
 
This construction of a deviant underclass of unemployed beneficiaries distinguishable 
from those who have earned their right to a benefit has been important ideologically 
in the construction of a neoliberal citizenship regime in which the good citizen is a 
self-sufficient productive taxpayer.  The discourse of self-sufficiency bestows on 
“taxpayers”, “ordinary New Zealanders” and more recently “mainstream New 
Zealanders”40 a sense of stewardship over their own destiny.  Right-wing parties 
consistently emphasised the transference of responsibility from the state to 
individuals who prefer to take responsibility for themselves in order to be 
independent from state interference.  During the 1996 election campaign, the National 
Party made a special point of attributing the growth and the strength of the economy 
to the “efforts of individual New Zealanders”; it “was not generated by the 
government” (quoted in Roper, 2000, p.17).  In National’s discourse, the 
government’s role is to set the conditions for competitive market regulation.  This 
market-oriented policy framework will provide the opportunities that enable 
individuals to be responsible for themselves:     
 
                                                 
39 An Appropriation Bill sets out the details of each annual and multi-year appropriation in accordance 
with the Public Finance Act. 
40 “Mainstream New Zealanders” was the political identity construction and target of the National 
Party’s 2005 election campaign (Watkin, 2005, p.14).  
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The National Government’s economic policies will provide an 
environment where New Zealand families are able to support 
themselves and take control of their own lives, freed from the 
dependence on State welfare. (New Zealand National Party, 1990b, 
p.2) 
 
In this discourse, the welfare state is not enabling but induces dependency.  The 
market on the other hand, empowers individuals to be self-responsible and thereby 
take control of their own lives.  
 
This section has demonstrated some key shifts in discourses of taxation and 
unemployment policy in the 1990s and the reordering of social antagonism around 
the mutually constitutive identities of the taxpayer and the beneficiary.  The following 
section connects debates on unemployment and taxation policy with the moral 
economy of neoliberalism and specifies how moral traditions of fairness, social 
justice and equality of opportunity were reconfigured in new relations in the 1990s.  
It maps the debate between the Centre-Left Labour party and Centre-Right National 
party over taxation and unemployment policy and foregrounds the discursive struggle 
between them to define their moral positions in opposition to each other.  The nature 
of the discursive struggle reveals an underpinning consensus constitutive of a 
neoliberal centring political problematic that is both Left and Right.  This section asks 
what the competing discursive strategies to articulate with fairness, social justice and 
equality of opportunity in the late 1990s can tell us about the restructured Left/Right 
dynamic in New Zealand’s political field.  The findings attest to the significance of 
paying attention to what the struggle between Left and Right reveals about what 
divides Left and Right, as well as what is both Left and Right, and demonstrates how 
the political problematic emerges through a process of contestation rather than 
consensus.    
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 Fairness and social justice: The sliding of signifiers, re-articulating moral 
discourses 
 
Political concepts such as social justice, fairness and equality of opportunity express 
goals and serve as standards for evaluating policy.  They are not original positions 
and do not have stable definitions, rather they are permanently renegotiated in time 
and place. Their meaning depends on connections being established between them 
and other discourses.  For example, in the social democratic era, justice was equated 
with social equality and inclusive citizenship.  These moral discourses provide a 
hegemonising discourse with linkages to normalised institutionalised traditions.  
Maclintock (1995, as cited in Smith, 1998, p.168) argues that the deployment of what 
she terms “archaic signifiers” (such as fairness or social justice) play a key role in the 
embedding of a hegemonic formation because they symbolise the new, while 
simultaneously creating connections with a return to an imaginary golden age.  The 
re-articulation of social justice and fairness in the 1990s connected the emerging 
taxpayer citizen subject position with established moral traditions and I argue that this 
process was central to the embedding of a neoliberal citizenship regime and centring 
political problematic.     
 
The late 1990s were marked by discursive struggle for moral authority between a 
neoliberalised social democratic Labour Party in opposition and a conservative 
neoliberal National government.  Labour and National articulated discourses of 
fairness and social justice with their position on taxation and unemployment.  The 
outcome of this struggle to define their respective positions in opposition to each 
other was the refinement of a tacit consensus or inclusive middle ground establishing 
a neoliberal political problematic and citizenship regime with Left and Right dialects.  
The National-led Governments and the Labour Opposition offered different dialects 
of social justice and fairness, each claiming difference from the other.  Through a 
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process of contest between these different dialects these archaic signifiers were 
rearticulated in new relations that altered their meaning.   
 
The process of embedding a neoliberal problematic and citizenship regime included 
establishing connections between discourses of fairness, social justice, equality of 
opportunity and neoliberal reform.  In the 1990s the Labour Party continued to 
articulate the neoliberal programmatic agenda with social democratic values of social 
equality and inclusive citizenship.  The following remarks by Labour MP Michael 
Cullen in the debate over the Tax Reduction and Social Policy Bill 1996 and Labour 
MP David Cunliffe over the Social Security Amendment Bill 2000 reflect this 
articulation: 
 
The moral line that we take is that the state is there to counteract the 
inevitable unfairness that results from the operation of the free 
economy. (Cullen, 26 April, 1996) 
 
There is, however, a grain of truth in what the previous speaker has 
just said---that is, that the case for incentives, rather than punitive 
measures, remains strong. We agree. That is why the Government is 
lifting benefit abatement levels, so that people can go back to work 
without having their wages taken from them. That is also why the 
Government has raised the minimum wage and brought in the 
Employment Relations Act. We see those things as a package. But 
people cannot have opportunity without security. People cannot have 
a leg up, without a base to step up from. That is why this 
Government is passionately committed to social assistance reform. 
(Cunliffe, 16 Nov 2000) 
 
The National Party, on the other hand, articulated conservative values with their 
neoliberal agenda and consistently emphasised an antagonistic relationship between 
the beneficiary and the taxpayer by constructing the beneficiary as a burden on the 
taxpayer and casting the payment of benefits as an investment that should generate 
returns to taxpayers:  
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 But I do think that people need to have some pressure put on them. It 
is the taxpayer who pays the money into the kitty for benefits; the 
Government does not make any money for that. Beneficiaries need 
to be told that if they are to continue to receive largesse from the 
taxpayer and the Government for more than a specific period of 
time---and I do not even mind a 6-month period, or whatever, first---
then from that point on, if they still have not been placed in work and 
training has not worked for them, they will be asked to do something 
for the community in return. For the life of me I cannot understand 
why anyone would oppose that; it would certainly make sure that 
people were really keen to return to the workforce…. the generally 
fair-minded community of this country expects that, if people are to 
get welfare from the State, then they should have to do something in 
return. (Williamson, 16 Nov 2000) 
 
Williamson in the debate over the Social Security Amendment Bill 2000 clearly 
articulates National’s position that taxpayer investment in benefits should generate 
returns to taxpayers such as shorter welfare roles, the upskilling of unemployed 
workers and/or community work 
 
During the social democratic era, the inequalities generated by capitalist social and 
economic structures were constituted in terms of social injustice.  Policies designed to 
promote equality of opportunity were designed to address the unfairness generated by 
the operation of the market.  Fairness constituted a fair share of the fruits of capitalist 
growth.  “A fair go” corresponded with citizens receiving the resources (housing, 
education, healthcare, employment) required to achieve not only a reasonable 
standard of living but a comparable one.  Social justice corresponded with the 
realisation of egalitarian principles and social citizenship and was institutionalised in 
the redistribution of the market allocation of rewards through progressive taxation 
and welfare.   
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During the 1990s neoliberal discourse dis-articulated social justice from this previous 
social democratic tradition and re-articulated it as the correlation between effort and 
reward in the market, in opposition to the welfare state.  Fairness and social justice 
were reconfigured in relation to the contributing taxpayer and sought through policies 
that treat taxpayers equitably rather than policies that promote equality between a 
citizenry broadly defined.  In this rearticulated discourse, fairness corresponds with 
the proper (market) correlation between effort and reward.  It is unfair when this 
relation is interceded by the welfare state:      
 
Our redesign of the welfare state is aimed at providing services we 
can afford, and services that meet the needs of New Zealanders…. 
Benefit rates have been adjusted to create a fairer margin between 
those on welfare and those in the workforce. (Richardson, 2 Jul 
1992) 
 
National’s neoliberal discourse strategically deployed a discursive sleight-of-hand 
representing all New Zealanders as comprising all productive taxpayers thereby 
excluding those outside of the workforce that are not paying tax.  In their discourse it 
is fair when social services are distributed equitably such that the benefits of policy 
can be spread to all taxpayers.  In the 1990s, both Labour and National 
parliamentarians consistently emphasised the requirement for policy to benefit “all 
New Zealanders”.  Underpinning this emphasis on all New Zealanders is the idea that 
progressive taxation corresponds with taxing some for the benefit of others.  In this 
discourse, policy should benefit ordinary taxpaying New Zealanders rather than be 
directed at special pleaders.  The following statements by National Party MPs 
emphasise this distinction: 
 
There is nothing here in this budget to make ordinary New 
Zealanders’ lives better.  Under this government unless one pleads a 
special case, one is ignored. (Creech, 15 Jun 2000) 
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Those special-interest groups that Labour members traditionally like 
to play to---young people, Maori and women----are benefiting from 
the growth in employment. (Smith, 7 Jun 1995)  
 
This discourse of special interest groups displaced the previous Keynesian welfare 
state discourse of universalism which articulated special needs with inclusive social 
citizenship and replaced it with a universal taxpayer identity in opposition to special 
needs.  This construction of citizens as taxpayers corresponded with an emphasis on 
the equity of policy.  The taxpayer represents the category across which equity can be 
applied such that all taxpayers get the same deal.  Labour and National 
parliamentarians consistently and repeatedly evaluate policy in terms of whether it 
“makes everyone’s lives better” or in terms of the promotion of “social justice for all 
New Zealanders” and distinguish these policies from a previous policy approach that 
granted special favours to particular social groups.  While National continues to 
portray Labour as the party of special interests, discourses of both political parties 
offer the view that taxation and social policy should deliver to all New Zealanders 
rather than special interests.  By the late 1990s Labour abandoned its coalition of 
minorities citizenship discourse and joined National in privileging the taxpayer in 
opposition to the beneficiary.   
  
One consequence of this is support on both the Left and the Right for the argument 
that when the benefits of policy cannot be spread to all New Zealand taxpayers they 
should be tightly targeted.  Targeting, became, therefore, an important component of 
fairness in both Labour and National’s discourse for two reasons.  Firstly, targeted 
social policy intervenes only in the worst cases of social and economic deprivation 
and for this reason achieves the most for the smallest investment of taxpayer funds.  
Labour MP Steve Maharey promoted targeting because it achieves “the prudent 
management of taxpayers’ money” (1 Aug 2000).  Secondly targeting, as opposed to 
universalism, does not undercut market incentives to self-help which would produce 
unfairness as some would receive rewards without making an effort.  Labour tended 
to emphasise the former rationale while National focused on the latter.  A targeted 
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benefit system with stricter entitlement criteria is able to identify those who abuse the 
system and ensures that everyone is treated according to the same principle; that 
reward should follow effort.  The following statement in support of increased 
targeting and tighter eligibility criteria by former National MP John Robertson 
follows this logic:   
 
The welfare service that I am promoting is about empowerment and 
case management.  From the taxpayer’s point of view, a system with 
an empowerment focus and case management makes sense.  Many 
people who draw a benefit do so for longer than is necessary simply 
because they are trapped in a poorly managed system.  There are 
some who remain on welfare because they choose such a lifestyle.  A 
case management approach would allow the progress of people who 
abuse the system to be monitored better.  It would also allow proper 
disciplines to be applied to those who abuse the system. (Robertson, 
14 Jun 1995) 
 
Targeting is cast as fair to taxpayers because it restricts those eligible for taxpayer-
funded benefits and is differentiated from the squeaky wheel syndrome of the past 
when taxpayers were overloaded by the demands of special pleaders for welfare.  
National MP David Carter represents this view: 
 
The budget was balanced in three critical aspects: first, continued 
rapid debt-repayment…. Second, increased social spending, which 
has been carefully targeted---it is not the squeaky wheel syndrome 
we used to see in the past; and third, tax cuts, … there will be tax 
cuts in 1997 so that all New Zealanders have a chance to share 
further in our economic recovery”. (6 Jun 1995) 
 
Debates over targeting reveal a reconfigured role for social policy in providing social 
justice to reflect the concerns of the taxpayer over the rising cost of welfare. 
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If we do not get social policy right, our society is in danger of 
collapsing slowly under the weight of the enormous cost of 
supporting those who are not contributing. (Fletcher, 17 Mar 1994) 
 
The moral framework underpinning citizenship changed from a focus on the 
impoverished and excluded to the taxpayer entitled to value for money and tangible 
returns on his/her investment.  Social justice was reconfigured from reflecting the 
rights of the poor to assistance from the better off to the assertion of the rights of the 
taxpayer not to be exploited by an undeserving poor seen as demanding continuing, 
unconditional support. 
 
In the social democratic era, conceptions of fairness and social justice were manifest 
in policies designed to promote equality of opportunity.  The Keynesian welfare state 
aimed to equalise citizens in terms of influence over the wage system and in terms of 
income through redistributive taxation, reflecting a commitment to an egalitarian 
society.  In this conception, the unequal power between employees and employers 
and the unequal distribution of income and wealth arising from the operation of the 
market was challenged as a social injustice.  These inequalities were unjust because 
the citizen’s right to equal participation in the national community should not be 
proportionate to his or her market value (Marshall, 1950).        
 
In the 1990s, equality of opportunity was presented as the key component of social 
justice, however, the application of equality of opportunity was scaled back to include 
the necessary prerequisites to becoming a contributing taxpayer, defined primarily in 
terms of access to health and education.  In both Centre-Left and Centre-Right 
inflections, equality of opportunity was grounded in a guarantee of a “safety net” of 
minimal material conditions, health care and education for all New Zealanders.  The 
actual distribution of resources or relative equality of outcomes was seen by the Right 
to depend on the use people made of this guaranteed minimum and by the Left to 
depend on opportunity structures that advantage some and disadvantage others.   
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For example, the Labour Opposition critiqued the tax cuts proposed by the minority 
National Government in the late 1990s41 on the basis that they maintained the 
structure of inequality: 
 
Does the Treasurer accept that 78 percent of taxpayers get less than 
$5 a week under that proposal; if so, why has the Government in two 
effected and one proposed tax round never altered the bottom 15 
percent rate, nor lifted the bottom $9,500 threshold, either of which 
would lead to more equitable results? (Cullen, 13 Jul 1999) 
 
Labour attempted to connect tax cuts with the withdrawal of social services, while 
the National minority government consistently maintained that it would increase 
investment in social services at the same time as deliver tax cuts to “hard working 
middle-income New Zealanders” and, in so doing, denied the trade-off between 
tax cuts and social service provision.  The following excerpt from a parliamentary 
debate illustrates this point:    
 
Grant Gillon (responding speaker): in view of Mrs Fletcher’s 
comments that: “I am sure if you were to offer a $10 tax cut a week 
or better access to education and policing, the majority would ask for 
access to services”, does the Prime Minister view demands for 
access to services as unacceptable? 
Rt Hon Wyatt Creech: No, of course not.  The Government’s 
commitment in this area has been clear.  We have always said that 
we will match our tax cuts with commitments to further social 
spending so that people can enjoy access to services.  It was never 
going to be done at the cost of reducing access to services. (2 Sep 
1999, Questions to Ministers, Title: Taxation)  
                                                 
41 The National Government’s Tax Reduction and Social Policy Programme 1996 proposed successive 
tax cuts on middle incomes and a tax credit (Guaranteed Minimum Family Income) designed to 
increase the gap between the incomes of low income working families and unemployed beneficiaries 
and thereby reinforce incentives to work.  “The Government has decided to reduce that [tax] burden to 
improve the reward that those families get from paid employment and to encourage effort, skill, 
education, and training.  With less tax, more people will want to work.  Those in work will get more 
for their effort” (Birch, 1996, 11-12). 
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 National’s denial of the trade-off between tax cuts and the provision of social 
services reflects their argument that lowering taxes will produce economic growth 
which will in turn maintain government revenue.  For example, Prime Minister 
Jenny Shipley stated: 
 
This Government believes that by bringing down taxes we will get 
significant economic growth, and we will reward hard-working middle 
income New Zealanders who have contributed so much to the growth of 
this country in recent years. (13 Jul, 1999) 
 
Increases to the upper tax rate effected by the Labour Government in 2000 were 
described by the National Opposition as a “talent tax” “applied to those New 
Zealanders who grow the economy” (Vernon, 5 Oct 2000), and is indicative of the 
view that upper income earners are the drivers of the economy. 
 
Debate between National and Labour in 2000 over the Social Security Amendment 
Bill focused on the role of work-testing and is indicative of both the moral divisions 
and the emergent underlying consensus between them over the role of social 
assistance:  
 
There is an old line: “The devil makes work for idle hands”. A 
Government that condones idleness, and in fact funds idleness, is out 
of step, I suggest, with the majority of New Zealanders.... We have 
in our community a hybrid ensemble of players. There are those who 
work hard and are committed to the cause of advancing the interests 
of this country. There are those … who, through misfortune or lack 
of skills, are not in employment but seek to be, and they need our 
support. And there are those who---to follow this theme of idleness--
-choose a life of idleness. They are, in effect, unemployment 
lifestylers. This Government by its position on this bill seeks to 
reinforce this last group by removing the community wage and 
replacing it with two separate benefits…. I was intrigued and 
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concerned to hear the Prime Minister in a television interview with 
Linda Clark the other day say that it was Government policy to 
redistribute the wealth of this society. That is truly disappointing, 
because the challenge, which this Government seems very reluctant 
to seize, is to grow the wealth pool for all New Zealanders---not be 
about the redistribution of wealth. (Worth, 16 Nov 2000) [emphasis 
mine] 
 
This statement of opposition from National MP Richard Worth, to the Labour 
Government’s Social Security Amendment Bill 2000, which repealed the previous 
government’s stringent and punitive three tier work test, reveals the nature of the 
citizenship regime pursued by the National Party which explicitly constructs a 
hierarchical catalogue of citizens.  A model taxpayer citizen is constituted in contrast 
to a second class “unskilled” welfare recipient “seeking employment” and in 
opposition to an abject underclass of non-citizens made up of “unemployment 
lifestylers”.  This citizenship regime is implicitly articulated to the view that there is a 
trade-off between growing the economy and redistribution.  The following statement 
from Labour MP Steve Maharey is distinctive from Worth’s insofar as it constructs a 
legitimate relation of support between taxpayers and the unemployed.  However, even 
here, the role of the unemployment benefit is to support the unemployed whilst they 
undertake steps to improve their capacity for work: 
 
This bill is the first step in a new system of social assistance aimed 
at building people's abilities and supporting them to get real jobs 
with real wages wherever possible.  The kind of punitive approach 
taken by the previous Government, which mirrored policy 
experiments all over the world during the 1990s, did not get people 
real jobs, did not reduce the number of people on a benefit, did not 
increase their capacity to take part in a knowledge-based society…. 
This bill will allow the Department of Work and Income and 
beneficiaries to work together in a cooperative way to help 
beneficiaries get sustainable work. It is about building people's 
capability and their capacity for work…. Also, from 1 July 
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beneficiaries will have an individual job-seeker agreement. These 
agreements will set out the specific actions that beneficiaries will 
undertake to improve their job prospects. They will include job-
seeker development activities such as programmes to enhance skill 
or motivation, work experience, work exploration, and employment-
related training. All these activities are designed to improve a 
beneficiary's capacity and prospects of paid work. (Maharey, 16 Nov 
2000) [emphasis mine] 
 
Agreement between National and Labour rests on the obligations of the unemployed 
to improve their employability and be work ready.  Both parties have pursued policies 
that are principally concerned with promoting work for those of working age.  The 
focus on the characteristics and behaviour of unemployed beneficiaries is an 
important component of the neoliberal consensus underpinning both parties’ 
citizenship discourses.  An emphasis on increasing the employability of the 
unemployed and addressing the skills and motivations of the long-term unemployed 
in particular, is oriented towards increasing the supply and quality of labour to the 
economy.  This is beneficial to a neoliberal growth strategy because increasing the 
size of the reserve army increases the potential for controlling the cost of entry level 
wages through competition; reduces the costs of welfare and thereby increases 
government revenue and provides labour market competitiveness which is partly a 
function of the cost of employing at the entry-level end of the labour market.     
 
 
Different dialects of the neoliberal political problematic 
 
Distinctions between the Centre-Left and Centre-Right in New Zealand’s political 
field in the late 1990s express themselves in conflicts over a number of moral 
positions but also reveal a set of issues that have become decontested through the 
1990s.  The focus of contestation between Labour and National shifted during the 
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1990s and a number of neoliberal discourses and policies became part of the 
unquestioned background assumptions of parties of the Centre-Left and Centre-Right.  
This inclusive middle ground, what is both Left and Right, is the space of 
decontestation and includes consensus over a broad neoliberal direction defined by 
the redirection of fiscal and social policy in the service of national competitiveness 
which achieved supreme status in the 1990s as the ultimate goal underpinning 
economic and social policy.  Because fiscal policy and the idea that capital must be 
taxed less otherwise it will disinvest has become part of the neoliberal consensus, 
both Labour and National politicians place limits on the extent of social protection 
possible in an era of globalization, and both to varying degrees have adopted a 
minimal safety net approach to social policy.  Labour securities and social equality, 
prime objectives of the social democratic era, were re-articulated in the 1980s and 
1990s as obstacles to national competitiveness.  The shift to increased targeting made 
by both Labour and National included a shift from income support attached to 
citizenship rights, with moderate conditions, to increasing “the intensity of benefit 
administration” (OECD cited in Department of Social Welfare, 1996, p.24) which 
translates to the application of more stringent criteria and conditions to receiving 
social support. 
 
The debates over targeting social assistance reveal the differences between Labour’s 
social democratic dialect and National’s conservative dialect of neoliberalism.  While 
National and Labour see targeting as a way to unburden the taxpayer, National 
adopted an approach to targeting that abjectified those receiving a benefit and cast 
them as the antithesis of the model taxpayer citizen.  Labour, on the other hand, 
adopted an approach to targeting that sought to implement selectivity in a positive 
and enabling direction.  This reflects a point of difference between them.  While 
Labour argued that the marginalised should have more rights to welfare that the non-
marginalised in order that they might become contributing taxpayers, National took a 
formal justice position that all taxpayers should have equal rights vis-a-vis the welfare 
state and constructed the welfare state as servicing a differentiated other whose social 
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irresponsibility entitles them to benefit while the socially responsible behaviour of 
taxpayers is taxed.  
 
This and other distinctions between Labour and National correspond with 
conceptions of the market and the fairness that inheres in it.  While the Centre-Right 
accords the market a moral value as a mechanism for making economic actors 
responsible for their individual allocation of effort and resources, the Centre-Left 
pragmatically accepts the market as the source of economic and technological 
progress. 
 
National’s neoliberal discourse of fairness was distinct from Labour’s to the extent 
that it required not only that effort be rewarded but also that non-effort should not 
only go un-rewarded but should be punished.  National Party MP Roger Maxwell 
(Minister of immigration, business development and employment) stated:   
 
We also know that a lot of people, probably a minority, are very 
comfortable on a benefit regime.  There are people in a sub-group of 
that group who do not want to work if someone else is prepared to 
pay them not to work.  I suspect that in this new environment and 
system those people will be targeted much more readily.  To put it 
bluntly, they will have the acid put on them.  I know that taxpayers 
the length and breadth of New Zealand accept that and support it. (18 
Aug 1998) 
 
For those who are a little reluctant or recalcitrant in terms of helping 
themselves, a penalty regime is available in this legislation.  I think 
that taxpayers deserve some accountability from people whom they 
are supporting. (Maxwell, 6 Aug 1998)  
 
The significance of punishing the non-effort of unemployed beneficiaries supported 
the Centre-Right’s discursive strategy which constructed a mutually defining 
antagonistic relation between taxpayers and unemployed beneficiaries.  The 
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distinction between those receiving social support and ordinary taxpaying New 
Zealanders was an essential component of the neoliberal citizenship regime and 
featured in both the Centre-Left and Centre-Right dialects of citizenship in the late 
1990s.  For example, Labour MP, Phil Goff stated: 
 
This tax package does not produce social justice; this tax package 
does not produce a world in which all New Zealand children can 
grow up to achieve their full potential; this tax package does not 
produce an education system that enables all the children of today to 
become the skilled workforce of the 21st century.  Where is the 
investment we need in education for all New Zealanders?  This tax 
package accepts that a very large percentage of our children who go 
to schools in low-income communities will not achieve their 
potential.  They will not become contributers to society, but will 
become the beneficiaries of tomorrow. (Goff, 29 Feb 1996) 
[emphasis mine] 
   
Goff’s statement articulates social justice with inclusiveness, arguing that National’s 
Tax Reduction and Social Policy Package contravenes social justice principles.  
However, his statement also reinforces the distinction between taxpaying contributers 
and beneficiaries.   
 
During the 1990s Labour re-articulated their social democratic commitment to 
equality of opportunity to a state active neoliberal social policy approach in order to 
remain relevant to the hegemonic currency of the neoliberal political problematic and 
distance themselves from outmoded socialist policies designed to achieve equality of 
outcome and which were widely blamed for economic decline.  The discursive 
convergence between Centre-Left and Centre-Right discourses of equality of 
opportunity represents a pragmatic concession by the Left to the idea that inequality 
in income distribution precipitates economic growth.  However, there are a number of 
significant differences between Centre-Left and Centre-Right discourses in debates 
over equality of opportunity.  In particular, unlike the Right, the Left has more 
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difficulty conceding to the idea that the market expresses the moral value of the 
correct correspondence between effort and reward.  
 
The Left-wing dialect of equality of opportunity assumes that the market distribution 
of resources generates unfairnesses and that the provision of equality of opportunity 
requires the state to redress disadvantage. “New Zealanders should have equality of 
opportunity to train and develop their potential in order to become fully contributing 
taxpayers, citizens and parents” (Tizard, 26 May 1999).  The Centre-Left recognises 
that common market rules cannot guarantee equality of opportunity.  However, their 
discourse of the structural determinants of inequality has been scaled back in order to 
remain relevant in a strategic context in which a neoliberal problematic centres the 
political field.  Claims for gender and racial equality that recognised the structural 
dimensions of disadvantage were legitimate discourses in the social democratic era.  
During the 1990s, Labour’s neoliberalised social democratic discourse increasingly 
restricted the legitimate targets of social policies promoting equality of opportunity to 
the welfare needs of children (c.f. Jenson, 2000).  
 
The emphasis on children as the targets of equality of opportunity policy is reflective 
of agreement at the centre on the illegitimacy of working age beneficiaries.  Working 
age parents caring for children, the sick and the disabled are now subject to more 
stringent work testing.  The remaining legitimate objects of state support are the 
young and the old.  The discourse of the right to employment, that was central to the 
social democratic citizenship regime, lost its political currency in the 1990s as the 
unemployed were increasingly portrayed as responsible for their own predicament, by 
Labour in terms of their capacities, and by National in terms of their moral 
bankruptcy.  Access to employment became a less important component of equality 
of opportunity discourse and policy, because following the neoliberal restructuring of 
the labour market in 1991, the unemployed were constructed by both Centre-Left and 
Centre-Right as those workers who had wilfully priced themselves out of the market: 
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For most people on the unemployment benefit it is not true, in a 
strictly literal sense, that they cannot find a job.  If their lives 
depended on it, most unemployed people would find jobs in short 
order. In most cases, people remain unemployed because they are 
searching for a type of work, or for a level of remuneration, that they 
have not yet found. (Richardson, 1995, p.210)  
 
 This conception of how the market operates underscored the view that the 
unemployed were those people who do not make an effort to be employable rather 
than people whose efforts go unrewarded.  While the Centre-Left constructed the 
unemployed as deficient in skills, the Centre-Right emphasised lack of motivation 
and a dependent lifestyle choice. Both the Centre-Left and the Centre-Right adopted a 
workfare approach and constructed social transfers as socially destructive insofar as 
they constitute disincentives to paid work.  In social policy terms this translated into a 
convergence between National’s and Labour’s social policy recommendations.  Both 
parties became wedded to a workfare policy paradigm in the 1990s.  ‘Self 
sufficiency’ in National’s discourse and ‘building people’s capacities’ in Labour’s 
discourse hinged on a person’s capacity to access the labour market.  In this way both 
Labour and National promoted versions of workfare.  Working age beneficiaries were 
not legitimate beneficiaries of social support in either party’s discourse and 
contribution for all New Zealanders was restricted to participation in the labour 
market. 
 
Both National’s and Labour’s social policy discourses were underpinned by a shared 
view of the value of engaging in paid work that can be distinguished from the 
discourse of the Keynesian welfare state policy paradigm which articulated 
contribution as encompassing both paid work and a range of activities outside of the 
formal labour market.  The following statements made by National MP Richard 
Worth and Labour MP Steve Maharey in the debate over Labours Social Security 
Amendment Bill 2000 demonstrate the consensus that is both Left and Right:   
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It should not be the policy of any Government to encourage 
freeloading.  The lifestyler choice of dependency on the State should 
not be an option.  The reality is there is a group in the community 
that will respond--and possibly respond only--to incentives and 
sanctions.  I suggest that those sanctions and incentives should not 
simply be taken away, as this bill proposes. (Worth, 16 Nov 2000) 
[emphasis mine] 
 
This bill will allow the Department of Work and Income and 
beneficiaries to work together in a cooperative way to help 
beneficiaries get sustainable work.  It is about building people’s 
capability and their capacity for work.  The emphasis here is on 
choice and cooperation, not compulsion.  The activities provided 
will be more responsive to the job seeker’s individual needs and 
what opportunities are locally available.  Beneficiaries will also be 
able to choose to include community activity and voluntary work in 
their job seeker agreements.  This will enable some beneficiaries not 
only to improve their employment skills, but at the same time 
contribute to their community. (Maharey, 16 Nov 2000) [emphasis 
mine]      
 
While these statements diverge in their treatment of beneficiaries and the 
technologies of governance they imply, they correspond in their assumption that self-
sufficiency through paid work as opposed to state support is the ideal.  Both parties 
link this value with an individual’s ability and willingness to access the labour 
market.  Both the Centre-Left and the Centre-Right speak the hegemonic language 
even if in their own ‘dialect’ (Jenson, 1993, p.201).  
   
The degree of permissible inequalities acceptable to the Centre-Left increased due to 
the hegemony of the neoliberal political problematic embraced by the Right and 
pragmatically accepted by the Left that ongoing neoliberal reform is a requirement 
for international, competitiveness-driven, economic growth and electoral viability.  
The corollary of this discourse is that acceptance of some level of socio-economic 
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inequality will precipitate economic gains.  The acceptance of increased inequality by 
the Left in the 1990s signals acquiesence to the argument that inequalities create 
incentives to greater productivity and foster an enterprising culture supportive of 
national competitiveness.   
 
 
Detaching social justice from its established chain of meaning 
 
Discourses of social justice specify the way tax and welfare policy should relate to 
inequalities of wealth, income and consumption.  An examination of parliamentary 
debates during the 1990s reveals shifts in the meaning of social justice.  Left and 
Right discourses were clearly differentiated on the issue of social justice; however, 
both parties constructed social membership as participation in the labour market, 
constituting citizens as contributing taxpayers.  This criteria of social membership 
was decontested and was an unquestioned background assumption made by both 
Labour and National in debates over social justice.   
 
Left-wing discourses argued social justice requires social disadvantage to be 
redressed such that every New Zealander has equality of opportunity to participate 
fully in the labour market.  Right-wing discourses, on the other hand, critique this 
Left-wing conception of social justice as a device for advancing the claims of special 
interests for a larger than deserved share of the community’s resources, as in this 
example from National MP Warren Cooper: 
 
New Zealand will be doomed unless we turn it away from 
‘welfarism’ to production…. Social justice means that people who 
because of human frailty, cannot work and cannot provide for 
themselves, get something from taxpayers…. What about the people 
living along the road---single income people who are working hard 
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and doing the right thing; virtuous people who are paying their 
tribute to society. (27 Feb 1990) 
 
Instead, Right-wing discourses construct social justice as equality of opportunity best 
provided for by the marketisation of social services.  They argue that competition-
driven efficiencies will result from market provision such that greater access to better 
quality services will result.  Centre-Right discourse strategies explicitly attempt to 
disarticulate social justice from the egalitarian Left by highlighting the deficiencies of 
the public health service, for example, and attributing these failures to the public 
nature of the health service (Roper, 1996).  The consolidating neoliberal citizenship 
regime articulates social justice and the extension and improvement of services with a 
market system of provision.  In this discourse, the market regulation of health and 
education services will provide for competition-driven efficiencies which will 
translate into social justice defined in terms of better equality of access to services.  
National MP Lockwood Smith makes this argument with regard to access to 
education:   
 
The Targeted Individual Entitlement scheme42 was innovative in 
education.  The Labour Alliance government stamped all over it and 
is saying to poor people in this country:  “We will tell you where you 
can send your children to school, because you’re not rich.  Only rich 
people can choose where their children can go to school”. (15 Mar 
2000) 
  
Parliamentarians on the Right consistently argue that social justice requires only 
tightly targeted assistance to those in high risk categories.  Social policy that expands 
beyond a tightly targeted minimum safety net approach transgresses the sanctity of 
the market.   For the Right, providing for economic growth will precipitate social 
justice. 
                                                 
42 The Targeted Individual Entitlement Scheme was a limited voucher scheme piloted in 1996 and 
given permanent funding in 1998 that provided a voucher for a small number of low-income children 
to attend private schools.   
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 The only way this country will deliver social justice is by having an 
economy that delivers growth, jobs, consistent government, lower 
debt, and targeted spending. (Bradford, 20 Jun 1996) 
 
National MP Maurice Williamson argued that only rich OECD countries can afford to 
provide social justice.  In this argument, the level of social justice is directly 
proportionate to the competitiveness of the national economy.   
 
The real problem in New Zealand is that that is what we as a country 
have to do until our earning capacity is back up there with the Smiths 
and Joneses—the Switzerlands, the Germanys, the Japans, and so on.  
Until we as a nation can get our spending under control so that we 
earn more than we spend … we will have exactly the same problem 
that the low-income family has. We have to try to strike a balance 
the whole time—just as the low income family does—between social 
justice and equity…. While New Zealand is down with the poor 
families—while it is down with Spain, Greece, Portugal, and 
Turkey—it will have to continue to walk that tightrope of trying to 
find a balance between social justice and equity and what this 
country’s actual earning capacity means that it can buy. (Williamson, 
6 Aug 1992)    
 
This quotation is an example of how Right-wing parliamentarians decouple social 
justice and equity, and consistently reinforce differences amongst New Zealanders.  
For example: 
 
A free society stands for justice; for the idea that private preferences 
should not result in harm to others.  But if it stands for more than 
justice, it will jeopardise the freedom of individuals to choose their 
needs as they see fit.  This is the core of the liberal creed in politics 
that draws a line between the needs which can be made a matter of 
public entitlement, and those which must be left to the private self to 
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satisfy.  I think that all members of this house have a responsibility 
to ensure that basic, human, material needs are set fairly to a 
standard that is reasonable.  But we cannot, and should never, 
attempt to try to meet all the wants and needs of all people in 
communities.  I think that this has been at the heart of the very 
disempowerment of our communities. (Fletcher, 17 March 1994) 
 
The extract above reveals how the Right opposes the egalitarianism of the Left by 
constructing equality as uniformity and the suppression of difference and presenting a 
trade-off between social justice and the freedom of individuals to set their own 
preferences.  This quotation also clearly draws out the cross-cutting logics of 
equivalence and difference in National’s citizenship discourse.  In this discourse, the 
taxpayer is evoked as the universal category but it is a strategic universalisation 
because it points to its own limits (Laclau, 1995, p.150), namely, the need to 
recognise privately different taxpayers.  These limits are recognised in Fletcher’s 
treatise in order to relegate the expression and recognition of differences to the 
private sphere of choice in the market. 
 
The consolidation of the taxpayer as the central source of political legitimacy has 
involved a number of displacements of meaning that shift conceptions of social 
justice.  Both Centre-Left and Centre-Right parties consistently reiterate that their 
policies provide “social justice for all New Zealanders” and in doing so seek to 
differentiate their social justice policies from policies that benefit minorities or 
“special pleaders”. 
 
Social justice has historically been articulated with Left wing projects and equated 
with state provision.  During the 1980s, social movement groups demanded social 
justice in opposition to neoliberal reform.  During the 1990s, however, Right-wing 
parties strategically attempted to articulate the achievement of socially just outcomes 
with the market.  This shift in ways of discoursing about social justice implicitly 
opposed Left-wing conceptions of social justice which sought to promote the 
advancement of social groups seen as structurally disadvantaged, particularly women 
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and Maori.  Policies designed to promote social justice must now cut across these 
categories and apply to all New Zealand taxpayers.  This shift was evident in debates 
in the house over the newly elected Labour government’s Closing the Gaps policy43.  
This debate centred on the illegitimacy of targeting resources to Maori and Pacific 
Islanders.  The following examples demonstrate the National Party’s refusal to 
differentiate between democratic and racist recognition of racial difference.   
 
I believe that the use of the word Maori by Labour party politicians, 
in particular, with regard to our nation’s social health, is becoming 
synonymous with depressed and illiterate underclasses that need 
constant funding in one form or another.… in reality thousands of 
people of Maori extraction are doing very, very well and are even 
eclipsing the best efforts of other New Zealanders…. ordinary Maori 
people who go about their daily work, having the same needs and 
commitments as everyone else and working just as hard…. Maori 
leaders should be standing up and saying that Maori is the most 
successfully integrated, indigenous culture in the Western world…. 
How can we go forward as a nation if our most interesting culture is 
not united and does not reflect the true status of the majority of its 
people.… There is no need for more money for Maori…. We should 
not be misled: resolving Treaty issues is one matter, and there is no 
doubt about that, but preferential social spending based on race is 
quite another. (Heatley, 23 Nov 2000)  
 
The National Party supports policies that effectively move in the 
direction of eliminating the gaps between Maori and Pacific Island 
people and others in the community.  But fairness dictates that all 
New Zealanders should be treated equally, regardless of their ethnic 
group.  Low-income Pakeha New Zealanders should benefit from 
those policies, too. (Creech, 15 Jun 2000)  
 
                                                 
43 A package of social service and employment initiatives targeted at Maori and Pacific communities 
introduced by the incoming Fifth Labour Government. 
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Taxpaying New Zealanders representing the majority and the mainstream are the new 
category evoked by demands for social justice, fairness and equality of opportunity. 
Claims for the redress of structural disadvantage once central to the development of 
social policy are now constituted as unjust and socially divisive.  The Keynesian 
welfare state, by protecting the atypical unemployed from poverty and exclusion is 
constructed as having failed to protect the interests of the unmarked typical New 
Zealand taxpayer.  The Labour Government which introduced the Closing the Gaps 
Programme in 1999 subsequently redirected the programme to “focus on all 
disadvantaged New Zealanders”. 
 
I reminded officials in my department…that the government’s goals 
are inclusive of all New Zealanders, and that departments needed to 
be clear that what had become known as the Closing the Gaps 
Programme was about ensuring that Government policies and 
programmes could be adapted to the needs of different communities. 
(Clark, 28 Nov 2000) 
 
The removal of discourses that recognise the structural disadvantages faced by 
women, Maori, youth and immigrant groups in employment have implications for the 
development of social policy insofar as systemic solutions to inequality have become 
politically unthinkable, associated with outmoded socialism and a coalition of special 
interests that dominated social policy at the expense of the “true majority” of New 
Zealand taxpayers.      
 
The embedding of a neoliberal centring problematic and citizenship regime is evident 
in the shift away from the articulation between fairness, social justice and egalitarian 
income redistribution, towards a tacit consensus between Centre-Left and Centre-
Right that self-sufficiency through paid work expressed through taxpaying is the 
measure of contribution and criteria of social membership.  Both National and Labour 
are committed to a workfare approach to employment assistance that restricts 
contribution to participation in the labour market and makes employability the goal of 
social assistance and the obligation of the unemployed.  What continues to 
281 
differentiate the Centre-Left and Centre-Right are the levels of permissible inequality 
seen by the Right as just and by the Left as tolerable and/or necessary for economic 
reasons.    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime institutionalised a persuasive 
definition of what it is to be a member of the community and recognised the equality 
of citizens through discourses of social citizenship.  During the 1990s, the discourse 
that there can be a moral right to welfare inherent in the requirements of social justice 
was the target of a highly effective neoliberal challenge.  This change occurred not as 
a result of institutional reform, but rather, as a result of discursive changes to 
understandings of citizenship especially in terms of the social construction of the 
targets of unemployment policy and an articulation of social contribution, 
responsibility and solidarity with the taxpayer citizen subject.  
 
Examining what happened to a number of moral discourses once they became 
strategies in the discursive struggle that shaped the battle for political and moral 
authority in the 1990s shows how, out of the bid for moral authority, the dynamics of 
Left and Right were reconfigured.  Analysis of debates between Centre-Left and 
Centre-Right in the late 1990s over moral discourse reveals the emergence of a tacit 
neoliberal consensus that now functions as the unquestioned background assumptions 
of policymaking that is both Left and Right. 
 
The analysis above mapped the evolution from a contested neoliberal centring 
political problematic towards its concrete specification through a process of 
contestation between the Centre-Left and the Centre-Right.  This movement from a 
neoliberal hegemonic formulaic centring discourse to a specified, expanded and 
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emptied neoliberal discourse emerged out of a process that included a respecification 
of the targets of social policy and contestation over moral discourses of fairness, 
social justice and equality of opportunity.  This research reveals the importance of the 
interface between moral debates and representational practices and meanings for 
mobilising people to identify with political constructions of citizenship. 
 
The analysis demonstrates that the restructuring of unemployment and taxation policy 
discourses reflects more than a shift from expansive to restrictive safety net 
interpretations of needs in social policy.  It also reflects a wholesale shift in the 
discursive framework underpinning ideas about the legitimate aims of the state, the 
meaning of citizenship, social responsibility and taxpaying.  Neoliberal discourse 
supports a shift away from the pursuit of social equality as a general principle of 
social policy development towards a workfare policy paradigm that retains only a 
minimum level of equality of opportunity. 
 
This case evidence demonstrates how a neoliberal citizenship regime consolidated 
points of social antagonism that divided the internal borders of the social into good 
taxpaying citizens in paid employment, a second class of skill-deficient unemployed 
in need of active assistance, and an underclass of parasitic, socially-irresponsible 
beneficiaries.  A political frontier was established between working taxpayers and 
unemployed beneficiaries by specifically contrasting taxpaying with receiving social 
support.  Taxpaying was linked with a new social solidarity that embraced the goal of 
international competitiveness and reduced social progress to economic progress.  At 
the level of the individual, taxpaying was constructed as contribution and 
membership excluding a range of non-market contributions once considered valuable 
to the economy/society mix.    
 
In the 1990s, the neoliberal regulatory project was able to achieve a moral authority 
through a re-articulation of discourses of fairness, social justice and equality of 
opportunity.  While debates between the Centre-Left and the Centre-Right establish 
clear Left and Right dialects, an outcome of the struggle to differentiate from each 
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other on issues of social justice, fairness and equality of opportunity was the 
emergence of a neoliberalised inclusive middle.  This neoliberalised inclusive middle 
constitutes a neoliberal centring political problematic and citizenship regime which 
constructs the market as delivering social justice and directs the development of 
social policy in the interests of working taxpayers.  
 
An analysis of speeches in the house that deploy equality of opportunity, social 
justice or fairness as justificatory or explanatory rationales reveals a shift from a 
moral consensus based on the goal of social equality towards a moral consensus 
based on a liberal conception of equality before the law articulated to a discourse of 
citizenship that constructed productive taxpayers as model citizens and effectively 
disenfranchised non-taxpaying beneficiaries.  This shifting moral consensus resulted 
from the reconfiguration of the legitimate relations between citizens.  These debates 
reveal both distinct Left and Right dialects of citizenship and an emergent tacit 
consensus underlying their justificatory frameworks. This convergence reflects the 
consolidation in the late 1990s of a neoliberal centring political problematic that 
rearticulated social justice, fairness and equality of opportunity with market 
regulation and a workfare social policy agenda. 
 
Citizenship regimes institutionalise patterns of social subjectivity and are 
consolidated through the repetition of political discourses that recognise people as 
particular types of persons.  These discourses of personhood structure social 
expectations and political mobilisation.  The neoliberal ordering of social antagonism 
based on the privileged identity of the taxpayer and his/her antithesis, the 
unemployed beneficiary, was central to embedding the neoliberal citizenship regime 
because it provided the consolidating neoliberal mode of development with a 
supportive moral discourse, established a popular consensus about legitimate and 
illegitimate practices and the proper relations between citizen categories (Jenson, 
2004, p.156).   
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This chapter has examined the emergence and consolidation of a neoliberal political 
problematic as the outcome of discursive struggle between Centre-Left and Centre-
Right to establish difference from each other.  This analysis of parliamentary debates 
focused on discursive acts of social categorisation and has specified how the 
privileging of taxpayers in the discourses of politicians has altered the meaning of the 
moral discourses of fairness, social justice and equality of opportunity.  This 
hegemonising articulatory process occurred in the 1990s, as part of a broadening of a 
neoliberal mode of regulation that during the 1980s was promoted and justified 
mainly in terms of efficiency (Larner, 1997a) into a wider social authority such that 
its corresponding mode of signification became the “system of narration” for a wide 
range societal demands (c.f. Smith, 1998, p.174).   
 
During the late 1990s and subsequently, the political identity of the taxpayer has been 
routinely hailed in the discourses of parliamentarians and the media.  The discussion 
above brings us part way towards unearthing the discursive emergence of the 
taxpayer by examining the ideological struggle that produced him/her and cast 
him/her at the centre of things.  The political origins of the privileged taxpayer have 
been effaced, evident at the 2005 election in which the taxpayer was the unquestioned 
object of political engineering and rhetoric.  In analysing the conditions of the 
emergence of the taxpayer we are reminded that this privileged political identity is 
predicated on both transformations in moral discourses of fairness, equality of 
opportunity and social justice, and the abjectification of a welfare dependent 
underclass.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis has applied a post-Marxist theoretical framework to the examination of 
the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s citizenship regime.  The case evidence 
demonstrates how in the 1980s and 1990s citizenship discourses were reconfigured in 
new relations constitutive of a neoliberal citizenship regime and centring political 
problematic.  The thesis contributes to understanding the specific effects of 
articulatory discourse strategies and discursive struggle in directing these changes.  
Rather than describing the neoliberal project or explaining its forms, this thesis has 
explored its strategic dimensions.  In other words, this thesis provides a guide as to 
how the hegemonic viewpoint—both as citizenship discourses and as a centring 
political problematic—has been practically transformed through discursive strategies.  
In this particular way this thesis should be viewed, ultimately, as following the 
tradition of the study of statecraft as presented by Machiavelli’s The Prince (1961), 
Gramsci’s The Modern Prince (1957), and Foucault, especially his lecture entitled 
‘Governmentality’ (1979).  This approach has made it possible to understand how the 
neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s political problematic and citizenship regime 
proceeded. 
 
 
Overview of the findings 
 
New Zealand politics in the period 1980-2000 was characterised by ongoing struggle 
over the meanings and practices of citizenship.  In exploring the hegemonic discourse 
strategies of neoliberalising governments during the 1980s and 1990s, this thesis has 
traced the process of reconfiguring citizen subject positions, initially as social 
consumers linked in an antagonism-free coalition of minorities, and subsequently as 
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universal taxpayers connected to a competitive advantage seeking economic 
nationalism.  These changes in discourses of citizenship were explored via analysis of 
shifts in unemployment and taxation policy discourses.   
 
The neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s citizenship regime and political problematic 
was realised in three relatively distinct but overlapping phases.  The first phase was 
driven by the Fourth Labour Government 1984-1990, and principally involved the 
articulation of social democratic values and neoliberal reforms.  In New Zealand, in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the institutions of the Keynesian welfare state were 
unable to meet the demands of increasingly vocal social movement groups resulting 
in an accumulation of unfulfilled democratic demands from the unemployed, Maori, 
women, workers’ cooperatives and radical democrats.  As argued in Chapter Five, 
during the early 1980s, the workers’ cooperative movement articulated the distinctive 
and excluded goals of feminists, Maori, radical democrats and Christian 
communalists around the practice of the worker cooperative.  That all of these 
distinctive demands went unrecognised and largely unfulfilled by the Keynesian 
welfare state established an increasing relation of equivalence between them.  This 
unity was based on the exclusion of their demands within the context of a citizenship 
regime which not only privileged the identity of the Pakeha male waged worker, but 
sought to integrate other identities by subsuming them within a patriarchal, white, 
workerist universalising citizenship discourse.   
 
The Fourth Labour Government, elected in 1984 at the height of this period of social 
dislocation, sought to construct a citizenship discourse that selected elements of these 
counter-hegemonic social movement discourses and projects (while jettisoning 
others) and articulated them in a transformative way to their neoliberal programme.  
Labour disarticulated the Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime’s universal 
citizen, the Pakeha male waged worker, and offered a new citizenship discourse that 
sought to express recognition of difference through a new social consumer identity 
that articulated the need to recognise social diversity with social forms of 
consumption.  Labour’s citizenship discourse was politically vulnerable not only 
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because it papered over clear social antagonisms but, more importantly, because 
National was able to construct an image of Labour as a party of special interest 
minorities and construct itself in difference from Labour as the party representing the 
new universal subject, the New Zealand taxpayer.   
 
The second phase of New Zealand’s process of neoliberalisation (1990-1998) was led 
by the National and the National/New Zealand First Coalition Governments and 
established points of social antagonism constitutive of a taxpayer mode of political 
identification (see Chapter Six).  The analysis offered by this thesis demonstrates that 
the privileging of a taxpayer citizen subject position in the National-led 
Governments’ citizenship discourse renegotiated the heterogeneity of the population 
asserted by counter-hegemonic groups as distinct expressions of an underlying 
homogeneity and unity.  
 
During the 1990s, the National and National/New Zealand First Governments 
established the particular demands of the New Zealand taxpayer as representative of 
all of the demands of community.  This taxpayer identity re-shaped a number of other 
identities in a chain of legitimate identities constitutive of a neoliberal citizenship 
regime.  These identities included productive workers (particularly those in the 
competitive sector), parents, businesspeople and entrepreneurs.  The signifier ‘New 
Zealand taxpayer’ established the links between these legitimate citizen categories by 
both representing their articulation in a chain of equivalence and representing this 
chain of linked identities in opposition to illegitimate categories, principally 
gendered, raced and classed unemployed beneficiaries of welfare.   
 
A focus on discourses of the other, establishing the internal borders of citizenship 
over this period of change, found that whereas a raced and sexed subject was 
sublimated in the Pakeha worker universal citizen of the Keynesian citizenship 
regime, the neoliberal citizenship regime allows space for ethnic and gendered 
subjectivities so long as their expression remains sequestered within the unsubsidised 
private sphere of enterprise (see Chapters Five and Six).  This privatisation of gender 
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and ethnic difference conceals the structural determinants of disadvantage that 
compound the disadvantages that minorities face in the labour market and outside it.  
The displacement of structural considerations in the development of social policy, 
particularly active assistance policy, serves in the ideological construction of the 
market as the neutral arbiter of fairness and social justice.   
 
In the 1990s, the National-led Governments’ articulatory discourse strategies 
operated to forge a correspondence between moral discourses and the competition 
imperatives and regulatory principles of the neoliberal mode of regulation (see 
Chapter Six).  These articulations between market regulation, competition and moral 
discourses of fairness, social justice and equality of opportunity formalised and 
reinforced neoliberal claims and pointed to neoliberal reforms.   
 
By the late 1990s, Labour had learned that “winning majorities is not the same as 
adding up minorities” (Hobsbawm, 1996, p.44) and began to parrot National in 
privileging the taxpayer as the source of political legitimacy.  During this third phase 
of the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s citizenship regime, political contestation 
between parties of the Centre-Right and Centre-Left occurred on a neoliberalised 
terrain.  Both the Labour Opposition and the minority National Government adopted 
a citizenship discourse that privileged a taxpayer citizen subject, and the focus of 
discursive struggle between them shifted from the economic framework underpinning 
New Zealand’s growth strategy to the moral discourses of fairness, social justice and 
equality of opportunity (see Chapter Six).  This shift in the focus of contestation 
between them reflected the decontestation of a neoliberal policy paradigm.  The tacit 
acceptance of a neoliberal policy direction by the Centre-Left and Centre-Right was 
revealed in an analysis of discursive struggle between Labour and National to define 
themselves in opposition to each other.  The thesis showed how, via processes of 
articulation, neoliberal discourse expanded and was transformed from a political 
position in contest with other political positions to a new centring political 
problematic.  This problematic currently structures all the positions in New Zealand’s 
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political field and functions as the hegemonic space of representation for citizen 
demands.       
 
Out of a process of ideological struggle between political parties and between 
governments and social movement groups, neoliberal discourses and policy priorities 
evolved into the decontested background assumptions that underpin the ongoing 
neoliberal direction of policy development and constitute the centring political 
discourse.  The subsequent neoliberal policy paradigm included a number of 
articulated discourses: the idea that unemployment is a function of the economy 
rather than politics; that a flattening of tax rates will both facilitate economic growth 
and be fairer to taxpayers; and the recasting of welfare and labour securities, central 
to the Keynesian welfare state citizenship regime, as obstacles to economic growth 
and competitiveness and creative of dependency and social disintegration.  In 
addition, such discourses involved the social construction of taxpayers as the new 
universal citizens, which led to taxpaying subsuming a number of other discourses 
that it had not previously signified.  Taxpaying was constructed as representing 
contribution, belonging, family and social responsibility, as well as identifying a 
rights-bearing citizen with rights to accountability, value for money, and a return on 
their investment.  Taxpayers here were articulated as representing the community of 
New Zealanders in opposition to unemployed beneficiaries, the latter collectively 
represented as the anti-community (see Chapters Four and Five). 
 
 
Success and failure of articulatory discourse strategies 
 
The Fourth Labour Government’s citizenship discourse sought to suppress 
antagonisms and constitute the social as a coalition of positive differences.  This 
discourse constructed a relative universalisation around the discourse of the social 
consumer but ultimately failed to hegemonise the social.  Labour’s failure raises 
questions about the political efficacy of citizenship discourses that both seek to 
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express difference and commit to inclusiveness.  In contrast, National’s citizenship 
discourse ordered the social around two antagonistic poles.  National’s discursive 
strategy succeeded in privileging a taxpayer identity which assumed a hegemonic role 
in representing a chain of equivalence and included good citizens in antagonistic 
relation to an abject underclass of excluded unemployed beneficiaries (see Chapters 
Five and Six). 
 
This example may reflect an underlying difficulty for a post-neoliberal radical 
democratic politics which must grapple with how to construct citizen subject 
positions in ways that support multiple identities and the right to self-determination 
and yet articulate differences within a universalist discourse of social citizenship and 
democracy.  According to Laclau (1995), the process of winning hegemony involves 
universalisation.  One identity has to stand in for the universal, to contingently 
assume the representative function of the community as a whole.  This thesis has 
shown how citizenship discourses involve the universalisation of a particular identity 
and for this reason have a homogenising tendency.  This tendency needs to be 
problematised.  As Smith argues:  
 
Genuine ‘multiculturalism’ must mean not only the addition of 
minority democratic values, but also the opening up of the values 
held by the majority to the minorities’ democratic critique, and the 
construction of a new set of shared community values through 
negotiation. (1998, p.33)      
 
Labour attempted to construct the appearance of democratic consultation and change 
driven by recognition and negotiation but in practice engaged a strategy of 
recognising only those causes it could articulate with its neoliberal restructuring 
agenda. 
 
Labour’s appellation of the social consumer served an inclusionary function by 
linking the projects of Maori self-determination, liberal feminist calls for equal pay 
and anti-discrimination legislation, and radical democrats’ aspirations for the 
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devolution of decision-making.  However, Labour’s discourse recognised diversity in 
order to depoliticise it.  By recognising only those parts of these counter-hegemonic 
discourses that could be incorporated into their neoliberal programme, Labour 
foreclosed on a number of other alternative discourses such as the workers’ 
cooperative movement’s agenda to modify economic relations by restructuring work 
in the direction of a socially useful, cooperative, non-hierarchical third sector.  
Because the workers’ cooperative movement more fundamentally challenged 
Labour’s programme, it was marginalised. 
 
Labour’s coalition of minorities was shaped by the identity of the social consumer 
which privileged a consumer identity articulated with the need to recognise social 
diversity.  This discourse emphasised social consumption and, in this respect, was 
continuous with the previous social democratic imaginary which had emphasised the 
demand side, but was discontinuous with it insofar as it marginalised the worker 
identity which had been central to the previously hegemonic citizenship regime.  
Labour lacked a perspective on the supply side and thus failed to govern for the 
subjective requirements needed to bolster its neoliberal mode of economic regulation, 
for example, the need to construct an enterprise culture based on the promotion of 
greater self responsibility.  While Labour articulated the centrality of the entrepreneur 
to the economy and significantly displaced the traditional Labour party preoccupation 
in social policy with distributional equality, it endeavoured to maintain a commitment 
to social democratic values even as it simultaneously addressed the need for a new 
mode of regulation through neoliberal reform.   
 
Labour’s social consumer discourse was transitional because it dealt with the crisis of 
the previous regime by both radicalising it and maintaining continuity with it.  While 
Labour’s social consumer discourse succeeded in disarticulating the growing alliance 
between counter-hegemonic groups, it was ultimately unable to connect New 
Zealanders beyond political differences, raising the question as to why National’s 
taxpayer identity was better able to fulfil this representational role.   
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National’s hegemonising strategy sought to represent itself as exhausting the field of 
possible options by constructing the pursuit of international competitiveness as 
imperative and as equivalent with neoliberal reform.  National offered an account of 
the drivers of economic growth and reinscribed production within its taxpayer 
discourse.  National’s discourse was therefore able to offer a more comprehensive 
representation of experience in its incorporation of both consumption and production 
relations.  The National-led Government’s taxpayer discourse rearticulated existing 
subject positions.  Employed workers (particularly private sector workers), business 
people and entrepreneurs were represented as model citizens contributing to the 
public interest, as socially responsible and as connected to each other via a nationalist 
discourse of economic competitiveness and a social ethic of individual responsibility.   
 
National’s taxpayer discourse incorporated the social consumer in its discourse of the 
rights of the taxpayer to value for money and choice, but displaced the social 
consumer constructed in terms of a social citizenship claim to social services, and 
rearticulated the claim to social services as a mark of inferiority, thereby negating full 
citizenship.  The National-led Governments of the 1990s constructed both 
unemployed beneficiaries, and, post-2000, an urban Maori underclass, as residing 
within an amoral universe, rather than as groups representing alternative discourses 
and projects.  They did so by rearticulating the myths of social justice and equality of 
opportunity in neoliberal terms, aligning these values and goals with the taxpaying 
community.   
 
 
Restructuring the Left and Right dynamic 
 
Another significant dimension of the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s citizenship 
regime and political problematic highlighted in this thesis was the shift in New 
Zealand’s relative form of the Left/Right dynamic.  Bobbio’s (1996) insights into the 
trans-historical and historically and nationally contingent dynamics of Left and Right 
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informed this analysis of the dynamics of ideological change in New Zealand’s 
political field in the 1980s and 1990s.  Although the political field in New Zealand 
remains structured by the poles of Left and Right, the relative form of the Left /Right 
dynamic characteristic of the previously hegemonic social democratic mode of 
regulation has been transformed.  This thesis sought to shed light on how the 
neoliberal policy paradigm was transformed from an experiment with mixed reviews 
to the unquestioned centre of political space.  It revealed how the decontestation of 
the on-going neoliberal direction of policy proceeded through a process of 
contestation between National and Labour to define themselves in difference from 
each other in moral terms.  This struggle to define themselves in difference from each 
other, resulted in the construction of a moral opposition between equal treatment 
before the law and different treatment according to needs, in the citizenship 
discourses of National and Labour respectively.  These discourses represent Centre-
Right and Centre-Left dialects of the neoliberal political problematic and underpin a 
number of key differences between Labour’s and National’s approach to 
unemployment and taxation policy.  The restructuring of the Left-Right dynamic reset 
the boundaries of contestability of policy discourse and draws attention to the need to 
analyse the different dialects of neoliberalism.  
 
This analysis of New Zealand’s process of neoliberalisation occurring through three 
relatively distinct phases shows how, through processes of articulation and discursive 
struggle, a hegemonising discourse evolves from a political discourse in competition 
with other discourses to become a taken-for-granted worldview informing the 
assumptions that shape institutional practice, policy development, the relative form of 
the Left/Right dynamic and ultimately popular ‘common sense’.   
   
The consolidation of a taxpayer mode of political identification in the 1990s resulted 
from its capacity to coherently represent a broad range of subjective experiences.  
The identity of the taxpayer was able to link a set of identities and articulated a 
broader set of social relations to it than Labour’s social consumer discourse.  In the 
late-1990s, both National and Labour revived the universalism of the previous era and 
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a tacit consensus emerged based on the ongoing neoliberal direction of policy reform 
and the corresponding constitution of the taxpayer as the source of political 
legitimacy. 
 
 
Counter-hegemonic strategy 
 
The neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s citizenship regime and political problematic 
has fundamentally reconfigured the political opportunity structures for counter-
hegemonic groups.  The discourse strategies of counter-hegemonic groups are shaped 
to a large degree by both the centring political problematic which sets the parameters 
of acceptable political discourse and action and the citizenship regime which provides 
a discourse of citizen subjectivity in antagonistic relation to included and excluded 
others.  Counter-hegemonic social movement groups who assert their right to 
participate in ways other than as taxpayers are marginalised.  The Keynesian welfare 
state citizenship regime legitimated social group identities and granted citizens a 
corporate presence with rights to participation and influence (c.f. Jenson, 1999; 
Brodie, 1996; 2002).  The taxpayer discourse privileges individual taxpayers and 
forecloses on these previously legitimate channels of democratic participation and 
citizen claims-making.  In this neoliberalised discursive environment, politically 
organised social groups are constructed as selfishly and illegitimately seeking to 
privilege their special interests over the interests of ordinary taxpayers.  
 
The neoliberalised political problematic and citizenship regime set new limits on 
citizens’ claims-making.  However, the thesis shows how the discourses of 
governments of the 1980s and 1990s were shaped by struggles with counter-
hegemonic social forces and the party in opposition.   For instance, Chapter Five 
showed that the myth of the democratic association of workers deployed by the 
workers’ cooperative movement was successful in articulating the demands of 
different social movement groups around the practice of work cooperatives.  
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However, the movement was unable to transform this myth into a hegemonic 
discourse capable of structuring the post-Keynesian welfare state mode of regulation.  
The set of social movement groups explored in this thesis developed out of 
opposition to some of the negative implications of the Keynesian welfare state mode 
of regulation.  Counter-hegemonic groups opened up the “universe of political 
discourse” (Jenson, 1991, p.53) to a greater multiplicity of themes, previously 
excluded during the hegemony of the Keynesian welfare state mode of regulation.  
However, the discourse strategies of the counter-hegemonic groups explored here 
both critiqued their exclusion from recognition within the Keynesian citizenship 
regime and articulated their discourses with the Keynesian welfare state citizenship 
regime.  In this respect, they articulated their discourses within the terms of a 
faltering discourse, which goes some way towards explaining their marginalisation.  
Only those counter-hegemonic projects that were able to articulate their goals to the 
neoliberal agenda succeeded in achieving a limited set of goals.  The discursive 
struggle between the Labour Government and the workers’ cooperative movement 
resulted in the incorporation of a selection of counter-hegemonic demands into their 
neoliberal restructuring programme involving significant gains for the Maori self-
determination movement, equal pay and anti-discrimination legislation and the 
devolution of decision-making in school administration and local government.  Other 
demands, such as those for cooperative, socially useful democratic forms of 
enterprise were rendered invisible. 
 
The consolidation of a neoliberal citizenship regime in the 1990s has restructured the 
environment in which counter-hegemonic groups must operate.  In the 1990s the 
government emphasised how a marketised environment could meet the demands of 
liberal feminists and articulated neoliberalism with Maori self-determination and 
devolution.  The articulation of these projects to the neoliberal project has reset their 
course, foreclosing on a number of discourses and projects that were relevant in the 
1980s.  Counter-hegemonic groups operating in a neoliberalised environment must 
therefore seek to rearticulate their discourses and goals in ways that engage with and 
yet rearticulate the neoliberal political problematic and citizenship regime.   
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 Significance of the research 
 
This thesis has applied discourse analysis to examine a concrete historical shift in 
ideology.  It has documented shifts in the form of policy and citizenship discourse 
that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, for the most part after the neoliberal 
restructuring of the New Zealand economy was in place.  I have argued that these 
shifts in policy and citizenship discourses were responses to the need to articulate 
accumulation, representation and legitimation, which had become increasingly 
mismatched as a result of the Fourth Labour Government’s attempt to pursue social 
democracy via neoliberal reform (Larner, 1997a). 
 
 
Reflecting on method 
 
The analysis offered by this thesis rests on a post-Marxist conceptual framework that 
is not widely used in the political science discipline.  Analysis of policy change in the 
political science discipline tends to focus on the principal actors and political 
institutions.  This thesis demonstrates the limits of a focus on the agents-of-change.  
The discourse analysis offered here emphasises the significance of ideological 
discourse strategies in struggle as a driver of policy development.  This application of 
the expanded post-Marxist conception of discourse and discursive struggle has 
highlighted a number of features of New Zealand’s neoliberal restructuring that have 
not been explored until now, particularly, how the process of winning hegemony 
involves the expansion of the hegemonic discourse through struggle and articulation 
within the political field.  In the process of articulatory expansion, counter-hegemonic 
projects and moral frames were reconfigured.  A perspective on New Zealand’s 
neoliberal restructuring is offered here that foregrounds the role of political identity 
297 
formation and contributes to novel understanding of the strategic, ideological context 
of policymaking.  
 
According to Tickell and Peck (2003), neoliberalisation describes a concerted 
political programme to promote and defend the spaces of market and market-like rule 
(p.167).  This definition underscores the need to explain the political dimensions of 
processes of neoliberalisation.  The shift from a social democratic to a neoliberal 
hegemony in New Zealand was rapid and abrupt creating representation and 
legitimation deficits for neoliberalising governments.  While structural factors are of 
crucial importance for understanding the impetus to redesign New Zealand’s wage 
earners’ welfare state, ideological discursive shifts also require explanation (bearing 
in mind the inextricability of structure and ideology).  A Post-Marxist theoretical 
framework makes possible an analysis of the dislocatory events and the discursive 
conditions under which new myths and social imaginaries can emerge.  It sheds light 
on the how discursive articulation proceeds via the logics of equivalence and 
difference and highlights the role of social antagonism in constituting political 
identity, thus, offering a way of examining how a new pattern of social regulation and 
citizen representation was consolidated in New Zealand during the 1990s.     
 
This approach proved useful because it provided a way of understanding ideological 
transformation as proceeding from (1) strategies that articulate different discourses in 
transformative ways, and (2) the ordering of social antagonism as constitutive of 
political identity.  Post-Marxist discourse theory was applied here to analyse 
discontinuity in policy and citizenship discourses and has definitively shown how 
articulatory discourse strategies connected the neoliberal policy paradigm with 
discourses of citizen subjectivity.  This analysis has revealed the significance of the 
discursive ordering of social antagonisms to processes of representation and political 
identity formation and has drawn attention to how these processes have contributed to 
hegemonising the ongoing direction of neoliberal reform in the New Zealand context. 
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This account of how the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s citizenship regime 
proceeded indicates broader and cross-nationally generalisable features of ideological 
discursive struggle directing processes of neoliberalisation.  They include the 
expansion of neoliberal discourse through processes of articulation, the political 
exploitation of social antagonism in the restructuring of citizen subjectivity, and the 
way the decontestation of the ongoing neoliberal direction of regulatory policy 
proceeded out of discursive struggle between contesting strategies over moral 
positions.  It seems plausible that these political ideological processes might find 
other empirical referents in other countries which have experienced neoliberal 
reforms.    
 
The thesis has shown how neoliberal discourses articulated with other discourses, 
particularly social democracy and discourses promoting its radicalisation, and 
demonstrated how these articulations consolidated the hegemony of neoliberal 
discourse through its expansion from a discourse about economic regulation to a 
legitimising moral framework, thus, enabling it to function as a space of 
representation for all societal demands.  The findings indicate future research 
directions, in particular the distinctive features and outcomes of hegemonising 
articulatory discourse strategies, the role of the political ordering of social antagonism 
and struggle over moral values in other national experiences of neoliberalisation.   
 
By reflecting on the discursive limits and the political ideological dimensions of New 
Zealand’s process of neoliberalisation, this thesis endeavours to intervene in the 
neoliberal direction of New Zealand’s policy development.  The significance of 
cross-national studies into the political ideological dimensions of neoliberalisation 
also relates to the need to map the strategic terrain for counter-hegemony.  
Recognition of how neoliberalisation proceeded ideologically allows consideration of 
strategic opportunities for alternative projects more consistent with social citizenship 
and democratisation. 
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Articulating the relationship between the state and the citizen 
 
This account of the articulations and displacements of meaning that established the 
taxpayer as the universal privileged identity in political discourse has demonstrated 
how hegemonising projects seek to dominate discourse by offering a chain of related 
subject positions such as parent, worker, entrepreneur etc. overdetermined by, in this 
case, a taxpayer identity.  This selection of articulated subject positions represents 
people’s experience.  As a mode of political identification it gives the ‘universe of 
political discourse’ an appealing intelligibility and predictability that generates 
feelings of security, belonging and purpose in those who identify with it and thereby 
provides interpretive and emotional inducements for people to actively identify with 
it. 
 
The discourse of the taxpayer empowers those who identify with it because it offers 
them a set of democratic demands that logically follow from this identification.  The 
identity of the taxpayer shapes the demands of the other subject positions.  For 
instance, parents’ demands for better education become taxpayers’ demands for 
choice and quality in a competitive education market.  Demands made in the name of 
democracy become demands for accountability to the taxpayer.  Demands for fairness 
become demands for tax cuts.  The taxpayer became the space of representation 
through which an increasing number of societal demands were expressed.  
Furthermore, the taxpayer mode of political identification structured social 
antagonism, providing fictive others who represented the antithesis of this taxpaying 
community.  In this way, the taxpayer identity provides those who identify with it a 
sense of moral superiority and projects their fears and frustrations onto the 
domesticatable problem of the welfare-dependent unemployed.  This process of 
othering displaces the unpalatable recognition of the costs to our existence of a 
neoliberalised environment. 
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Limitations of this research and paths to future research 
 
The politics of New Zealand’s neoliberal transformation were explored in this thesis 
primarily through an analysis of the discourses of politicians, particularly the debates 
between the dominant Centre-Left and Centre-Right parties.  Parliamentary debates, 
in particular, have a complex distribution with an audience of mostly political 
supporters, allies and opponents, mass media and an international audience.  While 
the polyvalence of the discourses of parliamentarians was useful to an analysis that 
focused on ideological discourses as strategies, because the statements of politicians 
in the House are quintessentially strategic, parliamentary debates can be incoherent 
and politicians’ statements can lack ideological integrity.  A focus on the discourses 
of the two dominant parties reduced this drawback as the minor parties exhibit the 
most ideological inconsistencies.  While this served as a rationale for ignoring the 
discourses of minor parties in this study, a more comprehensive study could examine 
the role of minor party discourse strategies in structuring the political field.  Such an 
expanded study could specify the effects of minor party discourse on the development 
of the dominant parties’ discourses.  An investigation into the minor parties which 
position themselves at the centre could contribute to a fuller understanding of 
discourse strategies that seek to profit politically from stitching together multiple and 
contradictory ideologies.  An analysis of the discourse strategies of those parties 
positioned on the poles of Left and Right, on the other hand, could provide insights 
into their role in defining the historically relative limits of political contestation.  
These proposed investigations could further our understanding of the nature and 
strategic opportunities of New Zealand’s relative form of the Left/Right dynamic 
especially within a proportional representation electoral system based in inter-party 
coalitions and alliances between major and minor parties. 
 
Analysis of the citizenship discourses of Labour and National politicians during the 
late 1990s when the neoliberal legislative reforms were in place, revealed the moral 
and emotional dimensions of ideological discourse.  Future research should therefore 
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focus not just on the interpretive aspects of discursive strategies but take account of 
the emotional needs that are met by a particular mode of identification.  Future 
research might also inquire more directly into the transformation of popular 
consciousness by investigating the multiple and perhaps unforeseen ways neoliberal 
subject positions have been actively taken up.  
 
The empirical focus on the discourses of politicians runs the risk of affirming the idea 
that citizenship regimes and the modes of identification they establish become 
embedded through their mobilisation in the rhetoric of politicians.   While this is not 
the case, politicians play a strategic role in integrating the plurality of included 
identities with their parties’ political programme.  For this reason the discourses of 
politicians are highly pertinent to a study of changing citizenship regimes.  While this 
study of citizenship discourses has privileged the ideological discourse strategies of 
politicians, Chapter Five was an attempt to recognise the multiple and contested 
nature of citizenship discourse by drawing attention to the struggles between the 
Fourth Labour Government and social movement groups.   The significant role of 
counter-hegemonic discourse in the restructuring of unemployment in the 1980s 
contrasts with the restructuring of taxation in the 1990s in which counter hegemonic 
discourse barely featured at all.  The dwindling role of counter-hegemonic discourse 
in the 1990s can be explained by the distinctive roll-out phase in the cycle of 
hegemonic consolidation that the 1990s represents and yet future research could 
usefully investigate further how and in what circumstances counter-hegemonic 
discourse can assert itself and become politically relevant.  In this regard, in Chapter 
Five, a number of articulatory strategies were flagged but were not fully explored.  In 
particular, a more comprehensive study would analyse a larger set of counter-
hegemonic discourses and could therefore offer a deeper analysis of the articulations 
between the Government’s neoliberalising project and both liberal feminist agendas 
and radical democratic supporters of devolution.  A more comprehensive study could 
also offer a more nuanced understanding of how and why counter-hegemonic 
discourse does or does not become politically relevant.  Further a more 
comprehensive study could explore the implications of changing discourses of 
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citizenship for counter-hegemonic strategy.  Research of this nature could investigate 
the extent to which counter-hegemonic organisations have been forced to adopt the 
discourse of taxpaying consumers in their lobbying of government and analyse the 
consequences of this engagement for counter-hegemonic projects.  Such research 
could usefully assist counter-hegemonic groups in negotiating hegemonic discourse 
in ways that transform the terms of hegemonic discourse and counter the tendency for 
counter-hegemonic discourse to be re-articulated in ways that serve the neoliberal 
hegemony.  
 
Additionally, we could expect that similar discursive practices would find empirical 
referents in other policy contexts.  Therefore, future research could usefully pursue 
the application of the post-Marxist theoretical approach to other policy fields such as 
the social construction of the targets of immigration, education, health, etc. both in 
New Zealand and cross-nationally.  
   
This research has critiqued the currently hegemonic conception of citizenship that is 
grounded in the rights of taxpayers, which articulates freedom with consumer choice 
and a capitalist ethic of enterprise and competition as the basis of our collective 
identity.  New discourses of the citizen must be mobilised that rearticulate democracy 
with cooperative forms of work and social organisation and counter racist, sexist and 
narrowly or ultra nationalist discourses.  These new citizenship discourses need to 
build alliances between socially diverse groups and challenge the institutionalisation 
of forms of exclusion, be they imposed by the state or the market. 
 
This analysis of the way social antagonisms are constituted in citizenship discourse 
draws attention to the limits of the taxpayer citizen identity.  The construction of a 
feminised, racialised, unemployed other as the internal limit of the ordinary New 
Zealand taxpayer citizen points to what needs to be repressed if the neoliberal mode 
of regulation is to be consolidated.  The disavowal of the work ethic, the refusal to 
compete in the labour market and the desire for leisure time is what subverts the 
universal taxpayer identity and must be projected onto the other.  This polarisation of 
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the social is not only illegitimate but points to the costs of becoming socially 
respectable taxpayers in a neoliberalised environment.  The moral dictum to work 
harder and longer fetishises work, constructing an artificial division between work in 
and for the market and socially useful work outside it, which is responsible for 
decimating family and community life leading to social disintegration.  A counter-
hegemonic rearticulation of citizenship must disrupt this link between paid work and 
citizenship and assert the need to foster a socially useful third sector that recognises 
the value of unpaid work to the enrichment of family and community life. 
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Postscript 
The centre cannot hold: New developments since 2000 
 
During the 1990s, New Zealand’s long-standing wage earner welfare state was 
transformed in line with a neoliberal mode of regulation.  Post-2000 there has been 
both continuity and change.  The present Labour Government has put in place a wider 
range of incentives to paid work such as childcare and tax credits whilst maintaining 
the majority of the social policy reforms put in place by the National-led 
Governments of the 1990s.  Labour has continued to regulate the unemployed in the 
interests of competitiveness by maintaining an active assistance approach and 
continues to draw in Domestic Purposes Beneficiaries, and sickness beneficiaries in 
order to expand the size of those actively seeking work.  It has also attempted to draw 
in non-beneficiary groups, particularly stay-at-home mothers, by offering increased 
childcare subsidies in the Working for families package of policies being rolled out 
between 2005 and 2007 (New Zealand Government, 2005).   
 
The current Labour government has maintained continuity with the 1990s in 
privileging a universalised taxpayer identity but has de-emphasised business and 
entrepreneurial taxpayers in favour of the family taxpayer.  Labour’s Working for 
families package of policies privileges the responsible taxpaying parent who cares 
emotionally and materially for his/her children, who supports their education and 
keeps them healthy and safe while ignoring non-taxpaying beneficiaries.  A key 
subtext to this discourse is the continuation of a social antagonism between members 
of a taxpaying majority who accept their responsibility in this regard and the abject 
underclass of unemployed beneficiaries constructed as absconding from their 
responsibilities towards their children.  This citizenship discourse represents 
continuity, in its emphasis on taxpaying parents in opposition to unemployed 
beneficiaries, especially those on the Domestic Purposes Benefit.  On the other hand, 
this discourse represents change, in terms of the privileging of the family taxpayer 
that seeks to build a community of taxpaying parents based on responsibilities toward 
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children and articulates with a broader policy direction emphasising sustainability and 
economic stability.  Labour’s emphasis on children allows them to both continue to 
commit to a social democratic articulation of equality of opportunity and social 
justice that asserts the need to treat people according to their needs while at the same 
time pursuing a workfare approach that abandons the social democratic commitment 
to distributional equality and the democratisation of work.  In Labour’s social 
democratic dialect of neoliberalism, work is to be organised according to market 
principles, and equality of opportunity and social justice are to be pursued via the 
treatment of children, particularly in the areas of health and education. 
 
Labour has departed from the approach of the National-led governments of the 1990s 
insofar as it has de-emphasised the personal characteristics of the unemployed, but it 
continues to construct taxpayers in opposition to beneficiaries.  The Working for 
families package also contributes to reducing the costs of employing the peripheral 
workforce.  This approach has contributed to maintaining the downward pressure on 
wages by subsidising employment at the lower end of the labour market.  The reserve 
is therefore larger, more actively connected to the labour market and subsidised.  
Labour’s push to reintegrate stay-at-home mothers also aims to generate further 
demand at the lower end of the labour market as working parents require childcare 
and home help services.  Thus mothers’ return to the labour market generates service 
sector employment.  This strategy aims ultimately to reintegrate beneficiaries into the 
paid workforce. 
 
National in Opposition continues to represent taxpayers in opposition to special 
pleaders. National’s targeting of unemployed beneficiaries as representing the 
internal border of citizenship has shifted, in a time of low unemployment, to a greater 
emphasis on unemployed Maori beneficiaries.   In what has become known as the 
Orewa Speech of 27 January 2004, then National leader Don Brash critiqued the 
“treaty grievance industry” and portrayed Maori claims against the state as a 
perpetual dispute that requires resolution once and for all (Brash, 2004).  This 
discourse assumes that the assertion of a separate Maori identity will become 
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unnecessary once a finite number of disputes are resolved.  National’s racist 
nationalist discourse also constructs an urban Maori underclass as the bearer of social 
disintegration.  Examples of Maori beneficiaries perpetuating child abuse and benefit 
fraud are politically exploited to confirm this perception which recasts the antagonism 
between Pakeha and Maori values as a division between the Pakeha moral 
community and the Maori anti-community.  National’s ordering of social antagonism 
continues to generate an opposition between responsible taxpaying citizens and the 
welfare state, constructed as designed to address the differentiated needs of raced, 
sexed, classed, non-taxpaying and increasingly amoral citizens.  
 
The 2005 general election was notable in its targeting of taxpayers constituted as 
burdened by the need to finance the welfare state.  Tax cuts dominated the election 
contest with both major parties deploying pocket book strategies designed to appeal 
to taxpayers.  National’s and Labour’s internet sites offered prospective voters a 
calculator for calculating the effects on their personal incomes of each Party’s 
proposed policies.  In this way, both Centre-Right and Centre-Left parties reinforced 
a discourse of citizenship that privileged the individual taxpayer. 
 
The 2005 election contest articulated National with individual, self-responsibility and 
Labour with continued defence of the welfare state against further neoliberalisation.  
The centrality of tax cuts for the contest between Labour and National represents 
further neoliberalisation because support for tax cuts in opposition to the welfare state 
articulates the idea that once the welfare state is completely dismantled, individuals 
will become self responsible architects of their own destiny.  The surge in support for 
National during this campaign indicates that the centre continues to move in a 
neoliberal direction.  
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